

THE SOCIO-POLITICAL THOUGHT OF SHĀH WALĪ ALLĀH

MUHAMMAD al-GHAZALI

AhleSunnah Library (nmusba.wordpress.com)

The Socio-Political Thought of Shāh Walī Allāh

MUHAMMAD AL-GHAZALI

Contents

Foreword v

Preface ix

Editor's Note xiii

Part ONE

The Contribution of Shāh Walī Allāh to Islamic Thought 1

1 Introduction 3

2 Religio-Philosophical Thought 13
- The Ontology of Shāh Walī Allāh 13
- *'Ālam al-Arwāḥ* (Spiritual Sphere) 18
- *'Ālam al-Mithāl* (Supra-material World) 18
- *'Arsh* 19
- *Al-Insān al-Akbar* 19
- *Ḥaẓīrat al-Quds* and *al-Mala' al-A'lā* 19
- Man and His *Raison d'etre* 20
- Basic Morals of Man 21
- Concept of Prophethood 22
- Prophets and the Reform of Human Society 25
- Sources of Shāh Walī Allāh's Thought 28

3 Social Thought 33
- Influence of Earlier Muslim Thinkers on Shāh Walī Allāh 36
- The Influence of Fārābī 37
- The Influence of Māwardī 41
- The Influence of Ghazālī 42
- The Four Stages of Social Development 43

4 The Theory of *Irtifāqāt* 51
The First Stage of *Irtifāq* 51
Second Stage of *Irtifāq* and the Five Basic Sciences 53
The Primary Stage of Political Organization 67
Aides and Lieutenants of rulers 68
Sources of Corruption in the City-State 71
The Fourth Stage of Social Development *Irtifāq* 72
Shāh Walī Allāh's Conception of Islamic State and its Relation to His Fourth *Irtifāq* 77
The Universal Model of Society and State 80
Shāh Walī Allāh and Ibn Ṭufayl 81

5 Politics and Statecraft 83
Shāh Walī Allāh's Concept of Islamic State 83
Qualifications of the *Khalīfah* 87
Modes of Appointment of the *Khalīfah* 89
Responsibilities of the *Khalīfah* 92
Khilāfah 'Āmmah and *Khilāfah Khāṣṣah* 93
Relations between the *Khalīfah* and the Citizenry 96
Functions of the State 97
1. Penal Injunctions *Maẓālim* 99
2. Crimes against Society and their Specified Punishments *Ḥudūd* 100
3. Judicature 101
4. *Jihād* 102

Part TWO

The Major Writings of Shāh Walī Allāh: An Introduction 109

1 A Survey of Shāh Walī Allāh's Works 111

2 *Al-Budūr al-Bāzighah* 117

3 *Izālat al-Khafā' 'an Khilāfat al-Khulafā'* 123

4 Political Epistles of Shāh Walī Allāh 127

5 *Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah* 131

Part THREE

Selection from *Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah* 143

1 Section I: The Method of Deducing *Irtifāqāt* 145

2 Section II: The First Stage of *Irtifāq* 149

3 Section III: The Science of the Manners of Living 151

4 Section IV: The Management of Household 154

5 Section V: The Science of Human Transactions 158

6 Section VI: The Administration of the City-State 161

7 Section VII: The Conduct of Rulers 165

8 Section VIII: The Policy with Regard to Aides and Lieutenants 168

9 Section IX: The Fourth Stage of *Irtifāq* 172

10 Section X: Universal Consensus on the Principles of *Irtifāqāt* 175

11 Section XI: The Conventions Prevailing Among People 178

12 Section XII: The Need for Guides of Paths and Founders of Religious Communities 181

13 Section XIII: The Essence of Prophethood and its Attributes 185

14 Section XIV: The Origin and Essence of Religion is One, but the Prescribed Laws Vary 193

15 Section XV: Causes of the Revelation of a *Sharī'ah* Peculiar to a particular Era and Community 199

16 Section XVI: Causes for Impeachment concerning the Methods of Guidance 207

17	Section XVII: The Subtle Meanings of an Injunction	211
18	Section XVIII: The Establishment of *Irtifāqāt* and the Reformation of Customs	217
19	Section XIX: The Need to a Religion which Abrogates all other Religions	225
20	Section XX: The Conditions of *Jāhiliyyah* reformed by the Prophet	231
	Sections on Politics	240
21	Section XXI: *Khilāfah*	243
22	Section XXII: Judiciary	249
23	Section XXIII: *Jihād*	260
	Notes and Reference	283
	Bibliography	323
	Index	329

Foreword

It gives me great pleasure to contribute this foreword for Professor Muhammad al-Ghazali's work, "Socio-Political Thought of Shāh Walī Allāh".

Shāh Walī Allāh was a prolific writer whose contributions range over the entire spectrum of the classical Islamic disciplines: Qur'ānic Studies, *Ḥadīth* methodology, applied and theoretical jurisprudence, and Islamic mysticism. In the Indo-Pakistani sub-continent he is seen as an intellectual inspiration behind almost all contemporary interpretations of Muslim thought. Modernists, Ahl-i Sunnat wa al-Jamā'at, Ahl-i Ḥadīth, Deōbandīs, the Jamā'at-i Islāmī and others view him as an intellectual precursor to their own interpretations of Islam.

Professor al-Ghazali's specific focus in this work is on the socio-political aspects of Shāh Walī Allāh's thought. He reviews all of the major discussions of social and political ideas in Shāh Walī Allah's extensive writings. In particular, al-Ghazali considers material drawn from three of the author's major works most concerned with questions of practical and theoretical politics and sociology. These three works are *Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah* ("The Conclusive Argument from God"), *al-Budūr al-Bāzighah* ("Full Moons Rising on the Horizon"), and *Izālat al-Khafā' 'an Khilāfat al-Khulafā'* ("Ending the Mystery about the Caliphate").

In addition to presenting a synopsis of the author's socio-political terminology and concepts, Professor al-Ghazali contextualizes this dimension of Shāh Walī Allāh's thought within the preceding Islamic intellectual tradition. One of the services rendered by this work is the tracing of Shāh Walī Allāh's social and political thought in the intellectual lineage of Islamic philosophy and theology, for example, the heritage of al-Fārābī, al-Rāzī, al-Māwardī, Ibn Taymiyyah, Aḥmad Sirhindī, and others. Professor al-Ghazali's work is the first to trace in some detail these major intellectual currents influencing Shāh Walī Allāh. The highly structured, or as Professor Halepota characterized it, "systematic", nature of Shāh Walī Allāh's thought led him to lay out a comprehensive schema integrating

the various domains of human activity. This schema was structured within the overarching cosmology of classical Islamic religious thought, and had as its guiding principle, concern with the ultimate purpose and religious meaning of all spheres of human activity. Shāh Walī Allāh therefore strove to find the organising ethos, conscience, and principle of movement and development that pulsed through all aspects of individual and collective experience, drawing humanity toward its greatest felicity and highest divinely ordained purpose. He combined the sources of reason, tradition, and intuition in his search for a comprehensive vision which could integrate the increasingly fragmented approaches to religious and political authority tearing apart the Islamic polity.

Shāh Walī Allāh understood himself as living in an age of crisis in which the integrity of the various Islamic sciences was threatened by the tendency to abandon broader vision and principles in favour of narrow disciplinary specializations and polemical rejection of other perspectives. One of Shāh Walī Allāh's goals was the achievement of an ideally moral, altruistic, and perfectly civilized society. Therefore Professor al-Ghazali is particularly concerned with exploring the possibilities of Shāh Walī Allāh's thought as an early macro-sociological theory. Accordingly, he gives considerable attention to the author's doctrine of the *irtifāqāt*, or the progressive stages in the development of human social configurations and their concomitant political orders.

Shāh Walī Allāh was influenced by Islamic Sufism and philsophical ethics in envisioning a similar process of progressive development of the inherent potential of the human individual. This model of inner development incorporated increasing refinements of consciousness conceived of as stages of drawing closer to God *(iqtirābāt)*. The usefulness and relevance of Professor al-Ghazali's scholarly contribution lies not only in its constituting an important resource for locating Shāh Walī Allāh's socio-political thought within the Islamic intellectual heritage but also in its suggestiveness regarding Muslim responses to contemporary social, political, and theological issues.

For those Musims who are today striving for the recovery of elements of tradition which can inform contemporary struggles for authenticity in the ethical, political, and intellectual domains, Professor al-Ghazali's characterization of Shāh Walī Allāh's contribution in *Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah* as a new approach to Muslim theology *('ilm al-kalām)* suggests a productive direction. This renewal of Islamic theology *('ilm al-kalām)* would find its home neither in dry scholastic reasoning nor in the flat assertion of literalist legalism. Encompassing and reaching beyond exclusively social and

political concerns, the quest for a broader existential vision within which the authentic tradition can be articulated and applied is one of the major principles elaborated in the writings of Shāh Walī Allāh.

The characterization of Islam as an "orthopraxic tradition" suggests a concern with observance of the law to the neglect of the understanding of that law's deeper spiritual and existential significance for both human worldly and spiritual benefit. Professor al-Ghazali correctly points out that Shāh Walī Allāh's thought is a Muslim theology in the broadest sense of *'ilm al-kalām*. This theological perspective views the practical and material situation and the *sharī'ah* rulings within a framework of ultimate religious meaning. Since Shāh Walī Allāh "looks at the totality of existential phenomena as a manifestation of Divine unity", his system is ultimately grounded in the principle of *tawḥīd*, even when it considers features that might seem to be exclusively social or political. His *Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah* is a work in the *asrār al-dīn* (inner meanings of religion) tradition in Islamic thought that had been developed by scholars such as Imām al-Ghazālī and 'Izz al-Dīn ibn 'Abd al-Salām al-Sulamī. Such integrative works in Islamic thought aimed at developing a framework for theology that orients human activities within the context of the divine unity.

This study of Shāh Walī Allāh's thought is therefore an important corrective to the perception that Islamic theology remained frozen in a scholastic mode, unable to address either empirical facts or broader human existential concerns. The focus of this volume on social and political aspects of Shāh Walī Allāh's thought reflects the project of contemporary Muslim scholars and intellectuals of recovering and implementing aspects of the Islamic heritage which can speak to the practical needs of today's political and social contexts.

It is instructive to note that as a Muslim thinker who bridged the classical and the modern periods of Islamic history, Shāh Walī Allāh did not have a rigid interpretation of concepts such as the Caliphate *(khilafāh)*. His methodology for understanding such concepts was both historical and religious. In treating the Caliphate as the highest stage of political development, the fourth *irtifāq*, Shāh Walī Allāh allowed that the super-national or transregional Islamic polity could legitimately assume a variety of forms. For example, this exposition of the Caliphate *(khilāfah)* stressed the "moral reformation of a socio-political organization rather than focussing on the specifically Islamic character of the society." This greatly enlarges the scope for the conceiving of social and political institutions within a contemporary and Islamic framework.

The religious character of Shāh Walī Allāh's thought is recognized by Dr. al-Ghazali as incorporating a dimension which is unrealized in the modern secular concepts of nationalism and sociology, disciplines which at the same time share some of his practical concerns. It remains for contemporary Muslim thinkers to decide whether an act of historical recovery of the essential religious principles as undertaken by Shāh Walī Allāh remains viable, and whether it may serve as a corrective to certain rather literal and inflexible notions of Islamic political and legal orders which are today represented as being the Islamic option for Muslim societies.

Professor al-Ghazali's substantial work includes extensive and well-rendered translations of critical portions of the *Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah*. By providing the scholarly and lay reader with a significant portion of Shāh Walī Allāh's thought on political and social topics, Professor al-Ghazali has made possible a broader awareness and informed consideration of this aspect of Muslim intellectual history.

Department of Theology
Loyola University
Chicago, IL, USA

Marcia Hermansen

Preface

In the recent history of Islam Shāh Walī Allāh stands as a bridge between the classical and contemporary streams of scholarship. Indeed, he has been acknowledged as a precursor of the galaxy of luminaries that emerged in Muslim India during the last two centuries. The spiritual and intellectual successors of Shāh Walī Allāh left a perennial impact on the Muslim ethos of the Sub-continent by their unremitting efforts for the revival of the true perception of Islam and the application of its teachings to the dynamic and diverse conditions of society.

Muslim scholars, especially those from the Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent, have displayed a keen and sustained interest in understanding the versatile genius and vivifying message of Shāh Walī Allāh. This is evident from the spate of studies over the last fifty years or so dealing with his life, his academic contribution and pioneering role in the Islamic renaissance in the Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent. Nevertheless, little notice seems to have been taken of the socio-political aspect of his thought. One possible reason to account for this could perhaps be the absence of any independent work of Shāh Walī Allāh dealing exclusively with human society, state and politics as such.

Doubtlessly there have been contributions mainly in the form of short monographs or articles on various aspects of Shāh Walī Allāh's socio-political thought which is represented by his peculiar theorization of anthropo-cultural and socio-economic evolution of society (*irtifāqāt*). However, there has not yet appeared any full-fledged and comprehensive exposition of his thought on the subject in the context of the over-all framework of his cosmology which is integral to this theme of Shāh Walī Allāh.

Shāh Walī Allāh's approach to the phenomena of society and politics combines the essential elements of the plurality of trends discernible in the past among different Muslim scholars and thinkers in dealing with socio-political ideas. Further, he developed a total cosmological framework, indeed a complete *weltanchaaung*, and sought to identify man's

career in life with reference to the entirety of its diverse experience. He looks at the totality of existential phenomena as a manifestation of Divine unity permeating the wholeness of the complex, albeit orderly cosmic scheme. Identification of this all-pervading unity in divergent spheres of knowledge and experience is thus a central theme of Shāh Walī Allāh's philosophy. All his works and writings appear to be fully related to this basic framework of thought. It is within this framework of total and comprehensive approach to the reality that he explains the career of man, his nature, function and role in this temporary life as a necessary prelude to his ultimate destiny, realizable in the absolute scales of the Hereafter.

In this regard, Shāh Walī Allāh occupies a unique position for no other scholar or thinker was able to develop an approach to the enterprise of human life which is as comprehensive as that of Shāh Walī Allāh. It is an approach whereby the unity regulating the diversity of individual and social undertakings of man could be rationally explained within a well-integrated ethical framework. In this endeavour, he evolved his own premises that would serve as the basis of further argument. However, he derived the parameters of his thought from *revelation,* i.e., the Qur'ān and its authentic and authoritative explanation, the *sunnah.* His originality lies in that the basic premises founded on the word of God have been supplemented by supportive or illustrative evidence provided by empirical observation and 'practical wisdom' (*ḥikmat-i 'amalī*) further reinforced by logical reasoning.

This epoch-making contribution of Shāh Walī Allāh to socio-political thought is enshrined mainly in *Ḥujjat Allāh-Bālighah,* his *magnum opus.* However, some of his other works are also directly relevant to the study of this subject. These works are: *Izālat al-Khafā' 'an-Khilāfat al-Khulafā'* and *al-Budūr al-Bāzighah.*

The present study does not lay claim to having brought to light something altogether new or to have disclosed anything hitherto entirely unknown. However, it is hoped that it will make some contribution to a better understanding of this dimension of Shāh Walī Allāh's thought by putting together the relevant material in a manner that would bring out its significance and help an appreciation of its meaningful implications.

The study is divided into three parts. Part one, after briefly referring to important areas of Shāh Walī Allāh's contribution to Islamic thought, proceeds to define his religio-philosophical framework and concludes with a brief notice of the sources of his thought. An appreciation of this framework is essential to the understanding of his socio-political ideas. This is

followed by a discussion of his substantive social thought. While attempting to do so, we have not been oblivious to some aspects of the influence of earlier Muslim thinkers on him. Thereafter, the features of his peculiar universal paradigm of society, which emerges through a natural and progressive evolution of social culture according to him, have been explained. This is followed by a discussion of *khilāfah* as conceived by Shāh Walī Allāh with particular reference to its period of perfection realised in the early Islamic history. Here, the culmination of the universal paradigm of a cultured human society as identified by him in the *khilāfah* has also been brought into sharp relief.

Part three begins with an identification of some celebrated works of Shāh Walī Allāh and proceeds to present a slightly more detailed introduction to the three main works mentioned above which, apart from other things, embody his socio-political thought. This part also contains an annotated English version of selected portions of the *Ḥujjah* that embody the socio-political doctrines propounded by Shāh Walī Allāh.

The writer would like to acknowledge his gratitude for the help and encouragement provided to him by Dr Zafar Ishaq Ansari, Chairman, International Institute of Islamic Thought and Director General of the Islamic Research Institute, who spared no means to assist him in completing the work, providing all resources at his disposal for that purpose. He is especially indebted to Dr Mahmood Ahmad Ghazi, his elder brother, teacher and a senior member of the faculty of International Islamic University, for his help and guidance extended from the initial steps to the final stage of the work. Gratitude is also due to the writer's wife, Mrs. Saimah Ghazali, for her help in proof-reading the typescript and in the preparation of bibliography.

The author is also grateful to his friend, Mr Khalid Bin Majeed, for his earnest attention and expert advice on the technical aspects of this work in addition to conceiving an impressive title cover for this book. His thanks are due to Mr Amjad Mahmood for typing the first draft and to Mr Alam Zeb for preparing the final typed copy. Last, but not the least, is the debt which the writer owes to Dr S.M. Zaman, former Director General, Islamic Research Institute for his considerate personal attention and help in this work.

May God reward them all for their sincere help and co-operation.

Islamabad
July 2000

Muhammad al-Ghazali

Editor's Note

Shāh Walī Allāh, whose socio-political thought forms the subject of the present study, is one of the most erudite, profound and brilliant scholars and thinkers produced by Muslim South Asia. In fact it would be no exaggeration to say that he ranks among the most towering personalities of Islam, comparable in some respects to intellectual giants like Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī. Like al-Ghazālī, Shāh Walī Allāh attempted to study Islam in its totality and like him he tried to go below the surface and plumb the deeper meaning and purpose of the injunctions of Islam. His *magnum opus, Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah*, is among the most profound works of Islamic scholarship. This work constitutes a serious and sustained attempt to answer a basic question: do Islamic injunctions solely represent God's intent to impress His power and authority upon His creatures and to force upon them the realisation that He can command as He pleases? Or, should one rather regard them as a conglomerate of values, directives, and commands of Divine provenance alongwith a set of beneficent considerations and objectives that ought to guide man's pursuit of good life? Shāh Walī Allāh strongly subscribes to the second view and sets out to show how these permeate the entire gamut of Islamic injunctions. While this view is most evident in *Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah,* of which it forms the centrepiece, it is also evident in quite a few of Shāh Walī Allāh's other writings.

It is heartening that not only the scholars of South Asia are waking up to recognise the extraordinary profundity of Shāh Walī Allāh's thought, but scholars of the Arab countries too are showing keen interest in it. It is significant that several editions of *Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah* have already been published from Egypt. Further, Arab scholars are paying increasing attention to quite a few aspects of Walī Allāh's thought and have begun to perceive their abiding value and relevance for Muslims, especially in their striving to establish an Islamic society and polity in our time. Likewise, perceptible interest has been shown by several Western scholars who have laboriously studied Shāh Walī Allāh. The most mentionable among

them, of course, is the veteran Dutch scholar, J.M.S. Baljon, who has devoted a full-scale book to an analytical study of Shāh Walī Allāh. There are, however, also other Western scholars who have contributed to a better understanding of his thought.

Dr Muhammad al-Ghazali, Professor at the Islamic Research Institute, has devoted many years to a careful, painstaking and perceptive study of Shāh Walī Allāh. The present work is the outcome of that effort and is focused on Shāh Walī Allāh's socio-political thought. It is pleasing to note, however, that, as one would expect from a scholar of Professor al-Ghazali's maturity, Walī Allāh's socio-political thought has not been studied in isolation. Instead, it has been viewed in the context of his thought as a whole and in conjunction with his overall intellectual approach and outlook. Also, the author has made a serious attempt to relate it to the various strands in the rich and variegated intellectual tradition of Islam.

What has greatly added to the value of this book is that the author lets Shāh Walī Allāh speak for himself. This has been achieved by the translation of those portions of Walī Allah's writings which pertain to socio-political matters. Professor al-Ghazali was much assisted in this task by his extraordinary grip over Arabic language and literature and his deep acquaintance with various branches of Islamic learning. All this, combined with a good command of English, has made the translation faithful, lucid and readable.

We feel particularly happy to publish this book for it deals with socio-political matters which have been among the priority concerns of the Muslim intellectuals of the present time. Now, as we know, Shāh Walī Allāh lived over two centuries ago and hence was familiar with the socio-political ideas and structures that are substantially different from our own. Shāh Walī Allāh, however, drew upon the teachings of the Qur'ān and *Sunnah*, the perennial source of guidance for Muslims. We hope sure that the readers will be struck by the relevance of a great many of Shāh Walī Allāh's ideas and observations. To be sure, the Islamic intellectual tradition is a rich resource of insights and wisdom articulated by a host of outstanding scholars and seers over the last fourteen centuries; insights and wisdom to which they were led in the course of their effort to understand the meaning of God's Message and the way of His Last Messenger (peace be on him). Hence, it would not be surprising if a great many men and women of our time, who are baffled by the bewildering circumstances confronting them, will find a great deal in this tradition that will help them find a new, constructive orientation in their lives. It goes without saying that the way to benefit from the treasures of Islamic tradition is not to carbon-copy the

ideas of these great thinkers and blindly apply them. This tradition will yield the riches of its meaning only to persons with keen minds and genuine curiosities. It is only such persons who will discover valuable gems of wisdom in the writings of Muslim thinkers and savants that would either elude the grasp of the mediocre and the undiscerning, or would appear to them as utterly irrelevant to the problems of our age.

We hope that we will be able to present, in a series of publications, the thought of several significant Muslim thinkers, especially their ideas relative to issues of abiding concern to mankind.

We are grateful to the author for carefully revising his work, originally a doctoral dissertation, and making it available to us for publication. Professor Marcia Hermansen has placed us under considerable obligation by writing a 'Foreword' to the work that is both concise and illuminating. That Hermansen's 'Foreword' should be as brilliant as it is does not come as a surprise. For there are very few scholars who have studied Shāh Walī Allāh with as much care and understanding as she has. Her English translation of the first half of *Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah,* a tough and challenging task for any scholar, is a living monument of her penetrating grasp of Shāh Walī Allāh's thought which deserves much applause.

My friend and colleague, Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee, helped me in solving a number of technical problems pertaining to the composing of the work. To Mr Khalid Bin Majeed we are grateful for giving us an attractive cover design and assisting us in improving the format of the book. Mr Alam Zeb, our computer operator, has, as on so many other occasions in the past, cheerfully put up with my annoying habit of endlessly revising the text in the course of its editing and has worked very hard indeed to compose it. Sincere thanks are offered to all of them.

Islamabad
July 2000

Zafar Ishaq Ansari

Part ONE

The Contribution of Shāh Walī Allāh to Islamic Thought

1

Introduction

Quṭb al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn 'Abd al-Raḥīm, popularly known as Shāh Walī Allāh (1114-1176/1703-1762), lived at a critical juncture of Muslim history.[1] India, where Shāh Walī Allāh was born and where he lived and died, had enjoyed the peaceful and prosperous rule of the Mughals for more than 200 years. By the time of Shāh Walī Allāh, however, the state had begun to disintegrate into a number of mutually hostile principalities which tended to claim independence of the central authority of Delhi one after the other.[2] Among the newly emerging quasi independent states, many were not even under Muslim control. Power and glory in the Sub-continent of India were being gradually lost to the rising influence of the militant Maratha, Sikh and Hindu communities.[3] At that time Muslims in other parts of the world too were far from being ascendant. The authority of the Ottoman Caliphs as a super-power already showed signs of weakness. Although Muslims had achieved a historic victory against the Byzantium by conquering Constantinople in 1453, yet the dreadful fall of the Muslim empire in Spain in 1492 was not too remote an event in their memory. It was at this moment of utter despair and despondency for Muslims that Shāh Walī Allāh was born, *dextro tempore*. It is perhaps at such hours that the Providence chooses to favour humanity and reformers emerge.[4]

The generations of Muslims who succeeded Shāh Walī Allāh owe a considerable debt to him in many ways. The intellectual and cultural history of the Muslims of the Sub-continent, and to some extent, of those in other parts of the world in the post-Walī Allāh era, can hardly be discussed without reference to the impact of his reformist ideas. Many educational, intellectual and spiritual currents of thought which arose in India in the

late 18th century and which subsequently made any notable contribution in any branch of Islamic scholarship proudly trace their origins to the school of Shāh Walī Allāh. The most outstanding centres of traditional Muslim education that flourished in the Sub-continent during the 19th century —Deoband, Farangī Maḥal, Nadwat al-'Ulamā', Aligarh, and others — have all claimed the intellectual and spiritual influence of Shāh Walī Allāh. These centres not only provided the nuclei for purely educational programmes which produced specialists in the religious disciplines and other branches of knowledge, but also responded to the needs of spiritual training and moral reform of the society at large. Besides, the contribution of Muslim scholars in various basic Islamic sciences, such as *Tafsīr, Ḥadīth, Fiqh, Uṣūl al-Fiqh, Kalām*, and other auxiliary disciplines such as philosophy, logic, Arabic language, syntax, morphology, and rhetoric, was made almost exclusively by those scholars whose academic genealogy is traceable, directly or indirectly, to Shāh Walī Allāh.

Shāh Walī Allāh's contribution has many facets and dimensions. It is not confined to purely academic and theoretical matters. Its wide and profound impact is discernible, *inter alia*, in the *jihād* movement which swept the entire Sub-continent under the inspiring leadership of Sayyid Aḥmad Shahīd (d.1246/1831) in a heroic struggle against the anti-Islamic forces in India. This struggle sought to bring about a total change in the body-religious as well as body-politic of the Indian Muslim society. It included in its ranks many celebrities among whom Shāh Ismā'īl Shahīd (d. 1246/1831) is particularly mentionable. He was not only a descendant of Shāh Walī Allāh, but also an exponent of his philosophy and a prominent scholar of Islam in his own right.[6]

The tremendous influence of Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1356/1938) not only on the Muslim thought of the Sub-continent but also on the contemporary Islamic thought in general is too well known to require any elucidation. He was no exception is receiving the guiding influence of Shāh Walī Allāh's thought. According to a recent writer, Shāh Walī Allāh was the precursor of Iqbal: "Anyone delving deep into Iqbal's *Reconstruction,*[7] will find the spirit of Shāh Walī Allāh prevading this work from beginning to end".[8]

Thus it would be evident, as the present study would attempt to show in the following pages, that the impact of Shāh Walī Allāh's thought has been both intense and extensive. In a catastrophic period of Indian Muslim history, he grew to see the Muslim community suffer from a number of maladies. As pointed out earlier, the political power of the Muslims had already begun to crumble due to the weaknesses and follies of the Muslims and the malice and hostility of their cunning foes. Neither was any ray of

hope visible to the Muslims nor did they have any reason for optimism. Thanks to his wisdom and sagacity, Shāh Walī Allāh was able to diagnose, at an early period of his life, the malaise of his society. In his view, it consisted in: (i) lack of strong faith, (ii) disunity in the Muslim ranks, and (iii) acute moral degeneration.[9]

Shāh Walī Allāh's role, however, did not remain confined to this diagnosis but he also suggested a cure and vigorously tried to have it put into effect. He tried to redress lack of faith by presenting a rational interpretation of Islam. In his expositions of religious doctrines, we find that rational arguments proceed side by side with traditional dialectics. Reason, tradition, and intuition appear in full harmony when Shāh Walī Allāh articulates his religious point of view.[10]

As to the malady of disunity, Shāh Walī Allāh addressed the problem by attempting to bring about a reconciliation between the diverse schools of law and theology. His genius was specially gifted with an exceptional ability to conceive a *via media* between divergent points of view. With this synthesizing approach, he was able to render insignificant many controversies which had hitherto kept the adherents of divergent viewpoints poles apart.[11] One remarkable example of this blending of ideas and fusing them together, so as to make them appear essentially one and the same, is his reconciliatory approach to the so-called metaphysical doctrines of *waḥdat al-wujūd* and *waḥdat al-shuhūd*. The former had been typically represented by the Spanish saint-philosopher Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn 'Arabī (d. 638/1240) and his followers whereas the latter represents a critical response to it by Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindī (d. 1034/1624).[12]

The third malaise of the Muslim society, viz. its moral degeneration was treated by Shāh Walī Allāh through *taṣawwuf* which, for him, meant a direct approach to the heart. Shāh Walī Allāh, who derived his wisdom from the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah,* knew very well that without purification of the heart, it was not possible to overcome the moral degeneration which permeated the individual and collective life of the Muslim community. He was initiated in the realm of spirituality by his illustrious father Shāh 'Abd al-Raḥīm (d. 1131/1719). He richly contributed to his father's spiritual legacy and advanced that cause further.[13]

In the wake of this grave crisis which engulfed the entire Muslim society of India and infected all its strata in varying degrees, Shāh Walī Allāh undertook the onerous task of reforming the minds and morals of his brethren in faith. He adopted both short-term and long-term measures for rebuilding the culture, polity and ideological orientation of the Muslims. The thrust of his reform movement ranged from matters of belief to social

structure, from politics and statecraft to economy, from legal and juristic concepts to philosophical and metaphysical ideas. He addressed himself to the needs of this world but at the same time did not forget to respond to the requirements of ultimate success in the Hereafter.[14]

Shāh Walī Allāh conceived man to be a microcosm and viewed the cosmic scheme to be merely an enlargement of man's needs, hopes, aspirations and ideals, on the universal scale. To him, man is the central agent in the Divine scheme of life. He has been granted the necessary faculties —instinctive, aesthetic, rational and intuitional — to actualise the objective of a just, peaceful, humane and theo-centric civilisation here. This would lead to the ultimate realisation of true and lasting bliss in the Hereafter.[15]

The most remarkable feature in the thought of Shāh Walī Allāh is the treatment of problems on firm grounds of inductive reasoning in which process he establishes that the evidence of revelation is in full conformity with the axioms of reason and observation. In this connection his spiritual imagination complements his rational thinking.[16] But the focal point in this synthesis of religio-rational dialectic is the Qur'ān which remains throughout the ultimate source of his thought.

The introduction of a new methodology in the understanding and application of the revelational guidance embodied in the Qur'ān is another remarkable contribution of Shāh Walī Allāh. The principles of Qur'ānic exegesis, which he has set forth in his masterly work, *al-Fawz al-Kabīr*, introduced a new dimension in the science of *tafsīr*.[17] He emphasises a direct approach to the Qur'ān which was facilitated by him for posterity by his rendering of the Divine text into easy Persian prose. By performing this service Shāh Walī Allāh ushered in a new era of understanding the Qur'ān. The comprehension of its meanings from then onward became easily accessible to the common man.[18]

Prior to Shāh Walī Allāh, the question of the permissibility to translate the Qur'ān had largely remained an unresolved issue. The notion that the Qur'ān may not be translated had rendered Qur'ānic scholarship, to a great extent, an exclusive domain of the specialists. Shāh Walī Allāh took a bold initiative and translated the Qur'ān into Persian, the *lingua franca* of the Muslim literati in the Subcontinent. This had a wholesome impact on the religious life of Muslims. It became increasingly possible for ordinary people to understand the teachings of the Qur'ān. They were helped in this by the works of a growing number of scholars who concentrated their efforts on explicating the message of the Qur'ān. This was a healthy development, especially in the non-Arabic speaking lands.

Although jurists had always regarded the Qur'ān as the primary source of legal doctrines, yet the jurists of the later period generally tended to confine the verses containing injunctions of legal import to five hundred or a little more. They did not consider it necessary for a *mujtahid* to master the rest of the verses. Even men like Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505 /1111) did not consider that necessary.[19] Thus the field was left open, to a considerable extent, to preachers and story-tellers who let loose their imagination to explain the meaning of the Qur'ān. Further, the classical exegetes tended to narrow down the scope of Qur'ānic verses by assigning rather strictly a certain context to each verse of the Qur'ān. Shāh Walī Allāh rejects this tendency and considers it tantamount to unduly constricting the Qur'ān which, by the nature of things, has a wide and universal application.[20]

Shāh Walī Allāh's pervasive approach to the Qur'ān, once again, emphasises its application to the entirety of human thought and experience. There is a great debt which the students of the Qur'ān after Shāh Walī Allāh's time owe to him. This consists in his classification of the main themes of the Divine Book. After a penetrating and comprehensive survey of the contents of the Qur'ān, he classifies them under five subjects: (i) *aḥkām* (injunctions); (ii) *mukhāṣamah* (dialectics); (iii) *tadhkīr bi ālā' Allāh* (reminding man of the Divine favours); (iv) *tadhkīr bi ayyām Allāh* (reminding man of God's interventions in history); and (v) *tadhkīr bi al-mawt wa mā ba'd al-mawt* (reminding man about death and the life thereafter). Thanks to this classification, many misunderstandings of the students of the Qur'ān disappeared and a number of problems as regards the sequence of the verses, their inter-relationship and thematic coherence, were solved. For no statement occurring in the Qur'ān falls outside the scope of these five categories. This insight, indeed, constitutes a great achievement of Shāh Walī Allāh in the field of *tafsīr*. The second heading in the classification of Shāh Walī Allāh namely: 'dialectics', is worthy of particular notice. Many *'ulamā'* had been neglecting this important theme of the Qur'ān and thus were unable to appreciate the discourse of the Revelation addressed to all mankind who must belong to either of the following categories: (i) the faithful, (ii) the people of the Book, (iii) the polytheists or atheists, and (iv) the hypocrites.[21]

Another source of confusion for many students of the Qur'ānic exegesis prior to Walī Allāh was the vagueness of the notion of *mutashābih*.[22] This put more or less an embargo on human mind to exert itself on many verses of the Qur'ān and attempt to grasp their true meaning and signification. For there remained an apprehension among the scholars that their

understanding of the Book was likely to be erroneous as it could be in conflict with the *mutashābih*, which itself was not clearly defined. Shāh Walī Allāh emphasized the essential comprehensibility of all the verses of the Qur'ān, including those assigned by the exegetes to the category of *mutashābih*.[23]

In short, the contribution he made to a better understanding of the message of the Qur'ān and its application to the lives of common Muslims and the pursuit of its knowledge by students other than those specialized in the Qur'ān was indeed great and singular. As a result of his efforts in this behalf, an increasing number of ordinary Muslims began to approach the Qur'ān with confidence and enthusiasm. They thenceforth treated it as a universal message addressed to all mankind and not merely as a code of law containing commandments and prohibitions for the use of a few specialists of law. 'Ubayd Allāh Sindhī, one of the most prominent exponents of Shāh Walī Allāh's philosophy, expressed the view that after being imbued with the philosophy of Shāh Walī Allāh, one can understand the overall message of the Qur'ān directly from its text and can be satisfied with it without being compelled to seek any external aid.[24]

Shāh Walī Allāh's approach to the Science of *Ḥadīth* is characterized by his view that the *Sunnah* is essentially a commentary on the Qur'ān itself, rather than something independent of it. An intensive and profound analysis of the Prophet's traditions led him to see an organic relationship between the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*.[25] Further, he brought out the rational and beneficent considerations underlying the directives of the Prophet (peace be upon him).[26] He also took note of the severe criticism made against *Ahl al-Sunnah* by the rationalists, partly under the impact of Hellenistic philosophy in the classical period of Islamic thought. He advocated the traditional point of view of the former and supported it with strong rational arguments.[27]

Shāh Walī Allāh adopted a method of interpreting the traditions of the Prophet in which he has shown an evolutionary process in the lives of all Prophets from Ibrāhīm upto Muḥammad (peace be upon them), in that they received Divine guidance gradually and commensurate with the onward progress of human civilization. He looked upon the teachings of all Prophets as a continuous commentary on the ever-unfolding process of revealed guidance.[28] Moreover, unlike many other jurists, Shāh Walī Allāh did not assign to *ijmā'* (consensus)[29] a categorical position as an independant source of law. He rather has a restricted conception of *ijmā'*. He recognizes the binding character of the consensus based on the rulings of the early caliphs, especially Abū Bakr, 'Umar and 'Uthmān, the three

immediate successors of the Prophet (peace be upon him), on any interpretation of the Qur'ān or the *Sunnah*. He grants this special status to these Companions on grounds of their close association with the Prophet and their temporal proximity to him. Any other consensus which took place at any later period is, in his opinion, not of the same consequence in as much as it does not bind Muslims of any other era or area to any particular view.[30] Thus, Shāh Walī Allāh gave *ijmā'* a somewhat diminished position. According to him, *ijmā'* is an explanatory source and an authentic interpretation of the Qur'ān by those whose understanding is less fallible than of others for the reasons we have stated earlier.[31] The fourth source of law, according to the generally held view of jurists, is *qiyās* (analogy). Again, this is not recognized by Shāh Walī Allāh as an independent source because it is integral to our process of understanding the Qur'ān and its interpretations that are either embodied in the *Sunnah* or can be derived from the collective understanding of the Companions in the Best Era (*khayr al-qurūn*).[32]

In the field of law and jurisprudence, Shāh Walī Allāh's remarkable genius is reflected in his ability to reconcile the differing views found among Muslims and explaining them with reference to the basic principles that may be deduced from the Qur'ān and are also plausible on rational grounds. He mentions this as a great Divine favour to him.[33] Shāh Walī Allāh did not undertake this synthetic exercise in the domain of law alone, but it is a distinctive mark of his works on theology and mysticism as well. This is evident, for instance, from his synthesized version of the doctrines of *waḥdat al-wujūd* (unity of existence) and *waḥdat al-shuhūd* (unity of manifestation).[34]

Shāh Walī Allāh's contribution to the development of a new *'Ilm al-Kalām* is perhaps the most original component of his entire intellectual legacy. It left a deep impression on the subsequent Muslim scholastics and established an altogether new tradition in this field.[35]

In order to assess this contribution it is important to compare it with the state of *kalām* before Walī Allāh's time. In this connection we must cast a glance at its genesis and development in the early Islamic period. The evolution of classical *Kalām* from the end of the second century *hijrah* onwards took place mainly in response to the intellectual challenges posed by the Hellenic metaphysics. The expansion of the Muslim State beyond the Arabian Peninsula, and the resultant interaction between Muslim intellegentia and the Persian and Byzantine civilisations and Greek thought gave rise to a number of intellectual debates. One of the main consequences of these debates was that a number of new questions began to be posed. These questions betrayed an attitude of skepticism towards some of the very basic

postulates of Islamic worldview. Muslim scholars accepted this challenge and responded to it vigorously. They delved deep in the Hellenic intellectual legacy, and not only articulated the position of Islam in response to the new questions, but also undertook a critical examination of the Greek logic and other important tools of their dialectics. In this process the scholars of Islam sought to establish the superiority of the Islamic *weltanchaaung* on the one hand, and to expose the fallacies underlying certain assumptions of Greek philosophy, on the other.[36]

These Muslim scholars, known as *mutakallimūn*, resorted to articulating their position in the intellectual terms which they shared with the main exponents of Greek philosophy. As these discussions went on, a distinct corpus of knowledge emerged and the bulk of literature thus produced by Muslim scholars came to be known as *'Ilm al-Kalām*. In this process there appeared on the intellectual scene a galaxy of scholars who contributed to the development of *'Ilm al-kalām* and in the course of time diversified those discussions. Notable among them were such luminaries as al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085.) al-Ghazālī, al-Ash'arī (d. 324/936 A.H.), al-Māturīdī, (d. 333/944), al-Shahrastānī, (d. 548/1153), and many others. The last prominent representative of these intellectual giants was Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209).[37]

The later *mutakallimūn* developed their themes in scholastic discussions more or less on the same pattern as were set forth by these pioneers. However, with the passage of time, *Kalām* became a rigid and sterile discipline with little contemporaneous relevance. It became fashionable for Muslim scholars to be immersed in highly formalised discussions of a theoretical nature in utter disregard of their diminishing value for their own ethos.[38]

This was the state of *Kalām* when Shāh Walī Allāh made his debut in the Islamic academia. He at once realised the futility of the prevalent formulations of *Kalām* and felt the pressing need of introducing a new approach in this discipline. One comes across his remarks about this dire need in his preface to *Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah* in these prophetic terms: "[T]he *muṣṭafīḍ* [Muḥammadan] *sharī'ah* has now reached the threshold of an era in which it is destined to appear in the perfect garment of demonstrative proof".[39]

For this new discipline of *Kalām* which he named *'ilm asrār al-dīn* ('Science of the Subtle Meanings of Religion'), he formulated his own framework which he derived from the principles enunciated in the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*.[40] Shāh Walī Allāh established these principles on the basis

of solid empirical evidence. Thus he provided fresh and sustainable rational foundations for this discipline along with the speculative reasoning of the classical *mutakallimūn*. The main subject of his *Kalām* is an enquiry into the weal and wisdom underlying the injunctions of Islam. The most remarkable and original trait of his discourse is that he relates the entire body of injunctions to the fundamental objective of the universal mission of the Prophets and Messengers of God, namely, preparing man to countenance the Ultimate Reality. This predominant objective in the Divinely ordained Prophetic dispensation is to be realised through the purification of the soul and reformation of morals which provide the sole guarantee for human salvation and eternal bliss.[41]

Shāh Walī Allāh perceives human life essentially as a unity. The emphasis that life here and the Life Hereafter are not different or mutually exclusive, but merely different stages in one interminable journey, pervades all his discourses on *Kalām*. While discussing the religious issues, he does not address human intellect alone but also appeals to man's heart. As a result, we find his *Kalām* to be an amalgam of *sharī'ah* and *ṭarīqah*, philosophy and metaphysics, reason and tradition, intuition and imagination. His achievement in this domain lies in that he has endeavoured to make *imān bi al-ghayb* (belief in the unseen) appear to perceptive minds as a kind of *imān bi al-shuhūd* (belief in the seen).[42]

To sum up the discussion, it can be said that Shāh Walī Allāh injected a new life in this discipline. This fact would become clearer if his writings on the subject are compared with those of his predecessors. As we have noted before, *Kalām* in the classical period mostly consisted of lengthy discussions dealing with questions posed by Greek philosophy. These were often fragmented discussions, aimed at answering the philosophers' questions and doubts so as to defend the theological point of view of Islam. The corpus of *Kalām* thus evolved often lacked coherence and consistency required of a well-organised and full-fledged discipline. The questions dealt with by the *mutakallimūn*, in a great many cases, had no logical or sequential relationship with each other. The point of culmination in these discussions was a severe criticism and strong rebuttal of the premises of Greek thought by men like Ghazālī and Rāzī.[43] However, despite the valuable contribution of these important thinkers, the discipline itself did not undergo any significant change in its general characteristics. In contrast to this incoherent and fragmented approach, Shāh Walī Allāh laid the foundations of a solid, fully integrated and logically consistent discipline. He undertook the paramount task of re-stating the fundamental postulates of Islamic belief system within the framework of the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*. Furthermore,

he provided external evidence drawn from pure reason, empirical observation and intuitional imagination to reinforce the propositions derived from Revelation and tradition.

According to the famous Islamic scholar and historian of India, Shiblī Nu'mānī (d. 1914), the scholastic profundity of Shāh Walī Allāh, which is reflected, *inter alia*, in his contribution to *kalām* overshadows men like Ghazālī and Rāzī. While the expositions of earlier *mutakallimūn* exclusively focussed on questions of belief (*'aqīdah*), Shāh Walī Allāh went beyond this narrow scope of theology. The new discourse that he introduced, in the main, sought to substantiate the inimitability (*i'jāz*) of the *sharī'ah*. He endeavoured to establish an organic link between *'aqīdah*, (belief) and *sharī'ah*(revealed code of law). Moreover, he tried to bring home the inimitability of the latter in as much as it responds to the diversity of the varying conditions of human life. Avoiding as far as possible, a discussion of the archaic issues of early theology such as the eternity of the Qur'ān and free will, pre-determination, and the indivisibility of Divine Essence and Attributes, he developed an altogether original approach to *Kalām*. This approach consisted chiefly in presenting the rationale of the injunctions of Islam on the premise of their compatibility with human nature. By developing this comprehensive approach to *Kalām*, Shāh Walī Allāh arrived at a holistic explanation of Islam. His contribution lies in that he put in bold relief not only the rationality of belief, but also established a necessary nexus between the ordinances of the *sharī'ah* and the innate urges of human nature.

2

Religio-Philosophical Thought

One of the striking features of the writings of Shāh Walī Allāh is his stress on the necessary relation between the creation and the Creator which consistently pervades all his thinking. Whether the subject of his discussion is highly spiritual or purely mundane, the consciousness of the Ultimate Reality is always uppermost in his mind. This characterizes all his discussions including those pertaining to such questions as the evolution of man as a moral being or man's role as an active member of the society. This also characterizes his analysis of human instincts and behaviour, or his survey of the development of human society even when it is in the nature of an empirical enquiry.[45]

Shāh Walī Allāh essentially looks at the entire contingent phenomena as a manifestation of God's creational power. In his opinion, without reference to the Absolute there could be no conception whatsoever of the creation. This distinctive characteristic of Shāh Walī Allāh's thought is perhaps attributable to the influence of the monistic philosophy of Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn 'Arabī. A probe into the sources of his thought which would be attempted at a later stage of this study would further elaborate this hypothesis.[46]

The Ontology of Shāh Walī Allāh

In his discussions on the genesis of man and the creation of the universe, Shāh Walī Allāh develops three main terms namely *ibdā'* (creation *ex-nihilo*), *khalq* (creation), and *tadbīr* (governance). *Ibdā'* is creation out of

sheer nothingness. *Khalq* is to create something out of an existing substance. *Tadbīr* is to manage and employ a set of created things so as to derive the required benefits which are conducive to universal weal. With reference to these concepts, which signify different stages of the Divine creative process, Shāh Walī Allāh discusses the creational phenomena.[47]

Another key concept which constitutes an important element in his philosophy of existence is the doctrine of 'universal soul' (*al-nafs al-kulliyyah*). Explaining this doctrine, Shāh Walī Allāh says that a deep and profound thought on the diversity of universal phenomena leads human intelligence to the notion that God has created a universal soul *ex-nihilo*. From this 'universal soul' or 'universal genus' emanate all existents. But the relationship between the Creator *ex-nihilo* and the 'universal soul' cannot be explained in terms of this material world. There is some kind of unity between the Creator and the 'universal soul'. But this unity is neither real, nor comprehensible to the finite human intelligence. The highest degree of perception attainable by human intellect is this 'universal soul' where it is able to combine all diversity of existence on one point. At this point the voyage of human intellect ends. This unique relationship between the Creator and the 'universal soul', which is called *ibdā'* by Shāh Walī Allāh, is far beyond the grasp of the human mind.[48]

The problem of existence has always occupied an important place in the metaphysical and mystic thought of Islam. Shāh Walī Allāh's position on this issue is middle of the road between the well-known doctrine of *waḥdat al-wujūd* (Unity of Existence) of Ibn 'Arabi and *waḥdat al-shuhūd*[49] (unity of manifestation), which was put forward by Aḥmad Sirhindī in the course of his criticism of the doctrine of Ibn 'Arabī. As mentioned by us in the preceding chapter, Shāh Walī Allāh's stand on this question is that there is no significant disagreement between the ideas of these two great philosophers, one from Spain and the other from India. He looks at the apparent difference in their respective positions as simply a problem of semantics. Both, according to him, ultimately arrive at the same conclusion.[50]

Explaining his stand on the problem of Existence, Shāh Walī Allāh says that when we look at the things in existence, we find both common and distinctive features in them. There are certain characteristics that are common to all things. For example, all human beings share the characteristic of humanness although in several other respects they are distinct from one another. At the same time, being a man or a horse distinguishes one from the other. But all the existents do have a common feature of existence.

Both the 'contingent' *(mumkin)* and 'essential' (*wājib*) have the characteristic of existence. 'Existence', however, does not merely mean 'to be'. It rather signifies the 'Reality' on the basis of which we regard something as existent. This 'Reality' itself exists without any external cause, giving it its existence. Since this 'Reality' is the cause of all existence, therefore, it must, of necessity, exist by itself. Hence its existence is all-pervading. For if this 'Reality' were not there, every other thing would have been non-existent. Now all other things that exist (other than this Essential Reality) are merely accidental. For without the Essential Existence they would disappear into sheer nothingness. This is the nature of all the things of this world. They merely have an accidental existence, the only exception being the 'Real Existence'. Thus it is clear that existence is a common feature of all existents. If there is no existence then all things shall vanish.[51]

This led some mystics to think that God consists in the existents, or that He has manifested Himself in these existents. This school of mystics has been called *wujūdiyyah* or *'ayniyyah*. But there are other Sufis who think that the existence of all things that exist is contingent upon this Real Existence. This school of Sufis is called *warā'iyyah*. They are so named because they hold that the Essence of God is beyond this cosmic phenomena.[52] There are some statements attributed to Ibn 'Arabī which suggest that his position on this issue is closer to the school of *'ayniyyah* or *wujūdiyyah*. Such statements have been taken by Shāh Walī Allāh in a metaphorical rather than their literal sense. It may be pointed out that on other occasions Ibn 'Arabī clearly draws a line of distinction between the 'Essential Existent' *(wājib al-wujūd)* and the contingent existent *(mumkin al-wujūd)* and discusses at length the five stages *(tanazzulāt)* of determination. These stages, according to Ibn 'Arabī, are *aḥādiyyah*, *lāhūt*, *jabarūt*, *'ālam al-mithāl* and *nāsūt*, all of which emanate from the 'Essential Existent' (i.e. God). Like many other Muslim thinkers before and after him, Shāh Walī Allāh offers an explanation of the ideas of Ibn 'Arabī which conform to the views held by the major theological schools of Islam.[53] Shāh Walī Allāh interprets all such statements of Ibn 'Arabī, statements in which he identifies a unity between the creational phenomena and the 'Essential Existent', to mean unity of the latter with the 'universal soul'. This is so because the stages of existence beyond the 'universal soul' fall, in his opinion, outside the cognitive domain of human intellect.[54]

According to Shāh Walī Allāh, the 'universal soul' constitutes the stage where a confluence takes place between substances and accidents, and there remains no disparity between them. He criticizes Greek philosophers for their lack of vision and for their failure to recognize this necessary level

of existence which transcends all duality between substance and accident. A significant implication of this idea is the negation of any real incongruity between matter and spirit. This hypothetical dichotomy between matter and spirit has permeated human thought since the Greek times and has resulted in a number of misconceptions about the nature of man's constitution.[55]

Moreover, along with this concept of 'universal soul', Shāh Walī Allāh also recognizes a physical dimension of this soul, which he terms as *al-shakhṣ al-akbar (universum permagnum)*. The entire physical world with its length and breadth, according to him, constitutes this *universum permagnum*. All corporeal bodies stand in the same relation to it as waves belong to the ocean. The *universum permagnum* has tremendous power of imagination. This power of imagination is represented by what is called *'ālam al-mithāl*, world of pre-figuration. It also has its own will power which resides in its *qalb* (mind). This mind is the centre or the throne *('arsh)* of the 'universal soul'. The throne is like a mirror in which reflections of the Creator of *universum permagnum* (i.e. God) are constantly cast. Through these reflections the *universum permagnum* attains cognition of its Lord and naturally forms an image of Him. This image is known as *al-tajallī al-a'ẓam* (*repercussus permagnum*, or 'supreme theophany', or radiance).[56] Shāh Walī Allāh asserts that the highest level of human conception of God, whether attained under the guidance of the Prophets or acquired, if at all, by following the course set by the philosophers, cannot go beyond a conception of this *repercussus permagnum*. This is the centre wherefrom all human intentions, movements, and activities emanate.[57]

The metaphysical thought of Shāh Walī Allāh should not be viewed in terms of any given system of philosophy which might have existed before his time. He has formulated his own perspectives on metaphysics, something which parallels his creative and original approach in other branches of thought. Some of his views on metaphysics appear to be similar to those of the Greek philosophers. A study of Shāh Walī Allāh's thought shows that several of his ideas have been influenced by the Aristotlean school. At the same time, points of similarity are also noticeable between him and Ibn 'Arabī and Aḥmad Sirhindī. Notwithstanding these and other similarities, he has developed his own original framework of metaphysical thought.[58]

Shāh Walī Allāh does not attempt, like many Greek philosophers and some Muslim thinkers influenced by them, to establish, on grounds of pure reason, the existence of God.[59] On the other hand, he takes the Qur'ānic approach to the problem and regards the idea of God as one that is naturally rooted in human conscience. This latent God-consciousness, according to him, is activated in the human mind and soul by the Prophets. It is they

who, on the basis of revealed guidance from God, spell out the right attitude of man to his Creator, and then, in accordance with the requirements of space and time, the Prophets lay down the details of a definite course of action as per the Divine mandate. Thus he considers Revelation and Prophetic teaching to be the only reliable sources of the human conception of God.[60]

Shāh Walī Allāh also criticizes the speculative approach of the Greek philosophers to a conception of Deity as the first cause productive of a series of causes and effects. In *al-Budūr al-Bāzighah*, a basic source of his metaphysical doctrines, he says:

> One should not think that the ultimate being is actually necessary as the termination of a chain of emanations of contingent being, so that if an emanation were to emanate from the Ultimate Being and another emanation were to emanate from that emanation, then the first emanation would become an intermediate link between the last emanation and the Ultimate Being; and the last emanation would stand in need of the first emanation only, even if the latter stands in need of the Ultimate Being. No, it is not like that.[61]

The above passage shows a clear rejection of the typical philosophical concept of God in the Greek tradition as a mere speculative theorem or a mathematical idea out of which no message can be communicated to man.

In the rich and varied material on metaphysical thought spread over dozens of treatises and books authored by Shāh Walī Allāh, we come across a number of original doctrines and ideas. Taken together, they provide the framework of his philosophy as a whole. He approaches the same problem in a variety of ways. Sometimes he resorts to the employment of more than one alternate term for explaining one and the same idea. At times he expresses himself in wholly mystical terms. Perhaps he consciously addresses different schools of Muslim intellegentia on different occasions, and intentionally employs a variety of terms depending on the requirement of the context.

There are, however, certain basic concepts to which reference in his writings is very frequent. It is important to have some idea about these concepts in order to grasp his theoretical framework. This would help appreciate Shāh Walī Allāh's point of view in its proper perspective. As the following terms would suggest, the Sufi orientation of Shāh Walī Allāh seems to have significantly influenced the development of this perspective.

'Ālam al-Arwāḥ (Spiritual Sphere)

We have already seen that the term used for cosmos in the philosophy of Shāh Walī Allāh is *al-shakhṣ al-akbar (universum permagnum).* If we accept a world which has the same relationship with the *universum permagnum* as our intellectual images have with our mind, this world is called *'ālam al-arwāḥ* (spiritual sphere) by Shāh Walī Allāh. As intellectual images in our minds are free from matter, similarly the spiritual world is also free from matter.[62]

'Ālam al-Mithāl (Supra-material World)

In the same way, if we recognize a sphere of existence which has the same relation to *universum permagnum* as our mental images that are created by our imagination, fancy and cognition, have to our brain, when these pictures contain form and magnitude but no matter, this is called *'alām al-mithāl* (supra-material world).[63] All things and events that occur in the material world have a prior existence in the *'ālam al-mithāl.* Moreover, any act, whether good or bad, when committed in the material world, is reflected in *'ālam al-mithāl* and preserved there in some form.[64]

According to Shāh Ismā'īl Shahīd, a descendant of Shāh Walī Allāh, and a prominent exponent of his philosophy, a considerable number of Qur'ānic verses and traditions from the Prophet (peace be upon him), cannot be adequately explained without recognizing *'ālam al-mithāl.* He, therefore, considered it necessary for all those engaged in an indepth study of the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah* to recognise that all things existing or occurring in the material world have a prior existence before their actual occurrence. When these things will disappear from this tangible world, they will still retain some kind of existence with God (that is, in the supra-material world).[65]

Shāh Walī Allāh substantiates his ideas about *'ālam al-mithāl* with the help of a number of traditions from the Prophet (peace be upon him).[66] These traditions, which Shāh Walī Allāh frequently cites in the chapter on *'ālam al-mithāl* in *Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah,* signify that a lot of abstract things of this material world assume certain forms in *'ālam al-mithāl.*[67]

This signification of the traditions which entails a recognition of *'ālam al-mithāl* also conforms to the principle of interpretation of traditions recognised by the *muḥaddithūn* namely that as long as the literal meaning of a tradition is not inconsistent with reason, it need not be taken in a

figurative sense. According to Shāh Walī Allāh, the same view is also held, among others, by Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505).[68]

'Arsh

While discussing the concept of *al-shakhṣ al-akbar (universum permagnum)*, we have already seen that it has its own will power of which the repository is its mind (*qalb*). This mind is the 'throne' of the 'universal soul'. The range of the 'throne' extends to all creatures including animals, jinns, human beings, angels and other forms of life. This is the focus of the *al-tajallī al-a'ẓam (repercussus permagnum)* and is fully exposed to it. It is also the nucleus for the entire creational world from where all events originate, and to which all things of this world finally return. From this focal centre constant waves of light are showered upon our planet and Divine bounties are ceaselessly supplied in great abundance.[69]

Al-Insān al-Akbar

In that centre of light and radiance there is an entity which may be regarded as an embodiment of the entire humanity. This entity is called *al-insān al-akbar* (cosmic man) in the mystic terminology. It is also known as *imām* (head) of the humankind. The mind and heart of this cosmic man receives radiances of various degrees from *al-tajallī al-a'ẓam (repurcusses permagnum)*. All mankind are attached to the 'cosmic man' with such a strong tie that they cannot exist without it. This tie is established through a kind of spiritual force in the same way as atoms of earth are attracted to each other magnetically. It is this force which maintains a nexus between the inner components of the 'cosmic man' i.e. individual human beings or microcosms. There are many centres for the different forces operating in the 'cosmic man'. Human faculties of senses, reasoning and imagination are only specimens of the spiritual force granted to the 'cosmic man'.[70]

Ḥaẓīrat al-Quds and *al-Mala' al-A'lā*

There is, in *'ālam al-mithāl'*, a certain enclosure to which all spirits of great and virtuous men are attracted, like iron to magnet. This enclosure is known as *ḥāzīrat al-quds* (holy enclosure). This is the *rendezvous* for the spirits of great human beings after being emancipated from their corporeal bodies. This constellation of spirits is called the 'supreme spirit' *(al-rūḥ al-a'ẓam)*. There is found in this 'holy enclosure' the biggest assembly of

prominent angels who, along with the spirits of the most pious members of mankind, constitute *al-mala' al-a'lā* (the higher assembly). The highest level of spiritual progress attainable to man is some kind of association with *al-mala' al-a'lā* and *ḥazīrat al-quds*.[71]

Man and His *Raison d'etre*

In the cosmic scheme envisaged in Shāh Walī Allāh's thought, man occupies a central position. It is through the agency of man, the Divine vicegerent on earth, that the universal moral and spiritual ideal is realised in history. The value of this realisation lies in its voluntary acceptance and actualisation as a tangible reality. Apart from man, the rest of the observable natural phenomena so far discovered, seems to have been created for no end other than serving the purposes of the moral and spiritual ideal for which man has been commissioned.

Conscious acknowledgement by man of his Lord and conformity to the code of approvals and disapprovals (*dīn*) prescribed by Him is inherent in his nature. The primary testimony which points to the verity of the 'religious truth' revealed by God to man through the Prophets is provided by his own natural disposition anchored by sound intellect and immaculate imagination. Man is called upon to seek cognizance of the fundamental truths, by accepting the express Divine commands conveyed by the Prophetic revelation. He should strive for further understanding necessary for his objectives by heeding to the dictates of sound reason and by responding to the implicit Divine message in nature within and without.

The ultimate end for which man has been entrusted with the enterprise of Religion will be actualized in the Life Hereafter. But in order to qualify for Paradise, man is expected to create a paradise here. To this end, he is required to disseminate justice and constantly try to eliminate injustice and wilful acts of evil from the earth.[72]

Like some other Muslim and many Hellenic philosophers, Shāh Walī Allāh expounds his idea of man in contra-distinction to the fellow members of his genus i.e. animals whose higher kind constitutes man according to many of them. But the originality of Shāh Walī Allāh's conception of man lies in that he essentially regards man as a 'moral being' unlike merely the 'social animal' of Aristotle. What basically distinguishes man from beasts, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, is *al-ra'y al-kullī*, i.e. universality of purpose, which motivates many altruistic actions on the part of man and determines his priorities in life. The beasts, on the other hand, merely pursue

what Shāh Walī Allāh calls *al-ra'y al-juz'ī* that is, individual purposes pertaining to the immediacies of biological existence. Man is urged by nature to voluntarily abide by a moral law to achieve certain objectives beyond his immediate selfish needs of food, shelter, and sex.[73]

The other quality by which Shāh Walī Allāh distinguishes man from fellow-animals is *ẓarāfah*, i.e. aesthetic sense. This sense is employed by man to seek added joy out of material life. For example, man feels the desire for beautiful spouse, delicious food, elegant dress and a lofty house. The Divine scheme in this manner fashioned man as a suitable agent for effecting an equilibrium between the requirements of the Hereafter and the demands of this temporary abode by investing him with these two distinct qualities.[74]

This equilibrium, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, can be maintained properly by balancing the dual capacity of human personality consisting of *malakiyyah* (i.e. the angelic disposition) and *bahīmiyyah* (i.e. the animalistic disposition). Also, Shāh Walī Allāh identifies two main categories of human beings according to the nature of the inner relationship in man between his angelic and animalistic dispositions. In some individuals there is a complementarity between both the dispositions. They are designated by Shāh Walī Allāh as *aṣḥab iṣṭilāḥ* (harmonious individuals). There are others in whom there remains a constant struggle between the two. They are called by him *aṣḥāb tajādhub* (individuals with an inner competition). While in the former category the animalistic disposition is subdued through progressive spiritual efforts, in the latter, it is strong enough to put up resistance to the dictates of the angelic disposition. The Prophets and Messengers belong, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, to the first category. He makes further classification of human beings on the basis of the relative intensity and depth of these two dispositions.[75]

Basic Morals of Man

As noted before, the basic trait distinguishing man from animals, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, is his moral urge. Morality, therefore, constitutes an integral ingredient of human personality. Essential morals, according to him, are the following:

Ikhbāt: total submission before the Lord. This implies modesty and humility before Him and His creatures. This is the pivot around which the entire moral personality of man revolves;

Ṭahārah: cleanliness and purity of body, dress and environment as a necessary reflection of the inner purity of the soul;

Samāḥah: generosity and benevolence. This moral quality, among other things, implies possession of worldly treasures without compromising the other essentials of morals;
Justice and equity: this is the cardinal virtue which, according to the Qur'ān,[76] is the most essential norm and a basic principle of human association.[77]

After a profound analysis of human personality with its biological and spiritual components, its intellectual and psychological dimensions and an explanation of his environment which brings into focus the nature of relations between man and the creational phenomena, Shāh Walī Allāh concludes that *taklīf* (encumbering man with responsibility) and holding him accountable for all his deeds is an essential demand of his own nature. To this end, man has been endowed with the requisite faculties of reasoning and contemplation, and all necessary inner as well as outer opportunities have been afforded to him.[78]

The entire corpus of injunctions prescribed in the *Sharī'ah* is based on this basic conception of man. Obviously, it is ultimately man who, as an individual, is responsible in the sight of God for the realization of the moral and spiritual ideals. However, this realization is contingent upon a healthy socio-political organization, which emerges as a necessary corollary of the application of these injunctions in the lives of individuals. Our concern in this study is to highlight the features of this socio-political organization of which the chief agent is man. In the philosophy of Shāh Walī Allāh there appears to be little emphasis on anything comparable to merely abstract or impersonal entities referred to in the contemporary Western socio-political thought as 'institutions'. On the contrary, we find that Shāh Walī Allāh's emphasis remains throughout on the healthy, balanced, purposeful and theocentric cultural growth of individuals, which *ipso facto* leads to the development of society and state, displaying these characteristics on the collective plane.

Concept of Prophethood

According to the theological doctrines generally propounded in the Aryan metaphysics, there is more or less a consensus on the existence of the 'Essential Being'. But their conception of the 'Essential Being' is so abstract and mathematical, as we have seen before, that they almost rule out the possibility of any meeting point between the cognition of the 'Essential Being' and human perception.

This is a radical departure from the teachings of the Prophets which necessitates, for obvious reasons, the possibility of some kind of human cognition of the Absolute. For the very office of prophethood implies the communication of an express, explicit and definite articulation of the 'Divine Will' from the 'Essential' to the 'contingent', through the intermediacy of the Prophets. It is on the basis of this communication, i.e. *waḥy*, that the Prophets are able to express 'Divine approval' for those who consciously conform to the 'Divine Will' in thought and life. Nay, the Prophets go even further and promise the actual sight of the *repercussus permagnum* in the Hereafter to those who will have attained in their worldly life enough spiritual purity through the constant effort of both body and soul. Shāh Walī Allāh's metaphysics explains this question by elaborating the concept of *al-tajallī al-a'ẓam (repurcussus permagnum).*

This concept had been a familiar theme in the mystic literature of Islam before Shāh Walī Allāh.[79] But Shāh Walī Allāh developed it further and made it comprehensible by employing a peculiar terminology of his own and by relating it to the basic framework of his ontology. He elucidated the issue by saying that the phenomenon which is exposed to Divine radiance is so infused and enlivened with Divine complexion that in a sense it may be called identical with the 'Essential Being'. In our intellectual quest and spiritual voyage we reach a point where we attain a kind of relationship with the *repurcussus permagnum* by establishing our link with the phenomenon exposed to it. In such an event we can rightly say that we have reached God. Thus the radiance of the 'Essential' becomes an object of cognition for our inner senses and intellect. When that happens we may also say that we have seen God or heard His speech.[80]

Thus Shāh Walī Allāh explains the possibility of Divine communication of meta-rational, supra-sensuous knowledge, i.e. *waḥy*, to man in terms of which he is able to understand and apply the Divine commands. But the pattern of this communication unfolds itself in a process of selection by God, from amongst mankind, of an extraordinary individual who receives Divine dispensation on behalf of his community. By the dictates of the Divine Providence, this individual is enabled to attain such a high level of spiritual purity as to acquire the capacity to reach the fountainhead of Divine Knowledge in *ḥaẓīrat al-quds* (holy enclosure). With regard to this individual (i.e. the Prophet), there is already, in the estimation of people, an idea that he is on the right path and an object of Divine blessings. Thus they are prepared to respond to his call, whereby he invites humanity to the path of the Lord and to establish, in collaboration with them, the patterns of life approved by Him.[81]

We have seen in the foregoing that Shāh Walī Allāh introduces a classification of human beings on the basis of the relative intensity and depth of angelic disposition, or lack of it in different individuals. He makes a further categorisation of human beings according to the religious perception, spiritual vision, and wisdom with which they are endowed. He identifies eight categories of individuals below the rank of a Prophet, namely:

- *mufham*: the one who is granted understanding;
- *kāmil*: the perfect man;
- *ḥakīm*: the wise man;
- *khalīfah*: the vicegerent;
- *mu'āyyad bi rūḥ al-quds*: one who is supported by the holy spirit;
- *hādī muzakkī*: one who guides and purifies;
- *imām*: the leader; and
- *mundhir*: i.e. the warner.

Thereafter he defines *nabī* (i.e. Prophet) and rounds off the above list with the mention of a Prophet who delivers people from darkness to light and conducts them to the path of guidance, and whose community is the best of communities raised for all mankind.[82]

Thus it appears that Shāh Walī Allāh's acute religious perception and keen spiritual insight led him to identify the Prophet Muḥammad (peace be upon him) at the pinnacle of a graded human pyramid, as it were, of moral and spiritual excellence. Further, he conceived the life of a Prophet to combine in its fold all the dimensions and depths of the faculties with which man has been endowed. His mind and heart are exposed to Divine luminosity to the utmost limit. The entirety of his soul is focussed, with full concentration, on progressive acquisition of Divine proximity. This proximity, which is achievable by his soul, is unparalleled in the rest of mankind. Thus each Prophet is given a singular opportunity for spiritual ascension as a pre-condition for the showering of Divine blessings and the descension of Revelation on him.

Shāh Walī Allāh, does not subscribe to the generally-held view that a Prophet is necessarily appointed at the age of forty. Nor does he think it necessary for each Prophet to possess miracles. What is important, in his view, is that the Prophets be given clear signs to convince people of the

truthfulness and genuineness of their mission. These may be rational arguments, supernatural portents, or a Book with miraculous qualities. Or else, the moral example of a Prophet might be so excellent and extraordinary as to surpass the entire people, providing a testimony to the truth of his mission.

Shāh Walī Allāh also believes that the Prophets possess, from the outset, qualities of perfection. These are natural endowments as well as qualities acquired through personal effort. For example, the Prophet Muḥammad (peace be upon him) possessed wisdom and innocence and was conscious of some of the realities of the life Hereafter even before he was proclaimed a Prophet. His wisdom protected him from the contaminations of the material life. His innocence made his soul an object of Divine enlightenment which was conducive to the instinctive negation of evil and a natural affirmation of good as well as purging his conduct of every evil and embellishing it with every kind of goodness. This inner purity attained by the Prophet (peace be upon him) much before receiving Divine revelation manifested itself in the excellent and unique moral and spiritual virtues of which his life was an embodiment.[83]

In *al-Khayr al-Kathīr* Shāh Walī Allāh deals at length with the excellent virtues of moral and spiritual perfection in the life of the Prophet (peace be upon him). He contends that there was a constant progress in his spiritual and moral ascension, and the evolution and growth of religious dispensation granted to him from God was commensurate with this progress.[84]

Prophets and the Reform of Human Society

Reform of the society, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, constitutes the basic objective of a Prophet's mission. The writings in which he has dealt with this important theme of his philosophy are scattered in his various works. His philosophy has a comprehensive bent and takes a total view of human life and society. In many of his treatises dealing with different branches of thought he frequently returns to this theme. He does not conceive any reformation of the social organization of human beings without assigning a central role to the religious dispensation of the Prophet and his rightly-guided successors.

A survey of his numerous writings on the subject shows that by reform he means essentially a 'revival' of the qualities that are latent in human beings. Some of these qualities are an integral part of human nature. Other qualities are either remnants of their own past, patterns of living rooted

in the collective experience of their progenitors, or have their origins in the teachings of the earlier Prophets. Their influence on human lives diminishes with the passage of time due to a variety of factors. Therefore, when a Prophet introduces a pattern of life, it is neither alien to the collective memory of his people nor in any way incompatible with their natural temperament. Moreover, Shāh Walī Allāh considers reform of people from within much more vital and substantial than their reform from without. The scope for the latter aspect of social change is, therefore, limited in his opinion. He also considers fertility of land, abundance of water and sunshine, favourable weather and environment necessary pre-conditions for sowing the seed of Prophetic reform in the soil of human society.[85]

Further, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, the raising of the Prophets entails the presence of certain conditions here below which provide a definite context warranting their advent with a specific mission. God's will requires that people understand the Divinely ordained *sharī'ah*—which streamlines the reform of their thought and behaviour—and that this *sharī'ah* should be universally known and acknowledged so that circumstances are created wherein mankind are driven voluntarily toward Good and repel Evil in all forms. This cannot take place unless a Prophet, aided by the "sacred realm", is raised among human beings.[86]

We have noted above in this chapter that Shāh Walī Allāh considers *taklīf* —investing man with responsibility and holding him accountable for his deeds—to be an integral part of human nature. This peculiar conception of *taklīf* has perhaps largely influenced Shāh Walī Allāh's ideas about the reform of the society with an accentuated emphasis on its inner dimensions.[87]

The fundamental problem, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, lies in striking a balance between the angelic (*malakiyyah*) and the animalistic (*bahīmiyyah*) dispositions. This is attainable by pursuing the angelic deeds which are not in conflict with the animalistic disposition, and following, at the same time, the animalistic practices which are compatible with the angelic disposition. The peculiar formation of man as a species demands this balanced state.[88] This state has its own degrees of excellence, conditions and contingencies that are the means to attain it. There are many things that hinder this attainment whereas there are other things which can redress this hindrance. When God calculated the measured courses *(taqdīrāt)*[89] of all species in eternity, and determined the urges of the human species, He determined, in His infinite wisdom, the conditions, contingencies and degrees of excellence of this state of balance (*fiṭrah*). God also prescribed the means

of attaining it and identified the factors which hinder its attainment. This identification precisely constitutes the universal *sharī'ah*.[90]

The universal *sharī'ah* is a body of injunctions that are mainly categorized into *wājib* (obligatory), *mustaḥabb* (recommended) and *ḥarām* (prohibited). Man cannot be instructed in these injunctions except through a similarity and concord between them and his instinctive intuitions. The universal *sharī'ah* is one and immutable, and does not admit any change or alternation. But its injunctions have been restricted by God to definite occasions and circumstances like a physician who prescribes, from among the numerous possible treatments, one definite treatment in view of the age, condition and environment of the patient who is in need of treatment.[91]

It will have become evident from the foregoing that the Prophetic reform, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, consists mainly in the revival of latent potentialities of the members of the society. Moreover, on different occasions Shāh Walī Allāh explains at length the factors which led to the laying down of legal injunctions. In this connection he surveys the conditions and circumstances in which various communities of Islam prior to the time of the Prophet Muḥammad (peace be upon him) received different sets of Divine commandments and injunctions. He draws attention to the social, cultural and psychological conditions of those societies to show that they provided the underlying considerations for these injunctions. Each community was charged only with those obligations which already had a basis in their consciousness as something worthwhile and valuable. The injunctions and commandments which constitute the preferred pattern of living have been invariably compatible with the legacy of the religio-cultural thought and practices possessed by a community.[92]

The conclusion drawn from this discussion by Shāh Walī Allāh is that no Prophetic dispensation introduces any reform in a society which brings in its wake an idea or precept which is completely foreign to that society or is totally inconsistent with its religious consciousness. On the contrary, the Divine practice in reforming a society had been to appeal to the religious imagination of people with reference to the ideas preserved in their collective genius. These ideas served as the common premises for intellectual interaction between a Prophet and his community.[93]

Thus it seems that in Shāh Walī Allāh's view of reform, direct Divine intervention is minimal. Of course, in a certain sense, God's intervention is always there. This is so because He alone is the Creator of all actions and is the sole Maker of all causes and effects, and of time and space. In this sense, nothing is beyond the domain of His constant control and governance. On the other hand, in the limited sphere of human endeavour

wherein God Himself has granted man a choice between alternate courses of action, He does not interfere to suspend the cause-effect relationship operating in this created world of accidents.

Shāh Walī Allāh's discussion of this theme, which has been summed up in this chapter, clarifies the misconception of those who tend to consider every reformation in the name of religion to be free from God's law of causality. They some how are led to believe that man,who is actually the main agent of reform, may sit idle after pronouncing certain articles of faith, and wait for the hand of providence to confer upon him the favour of ascendancy in the world and supremacy over all false creeds and cults. Such a belief is in clear conflict with the statements of God concerning His *modus operandi* in history. Shāh Walī Allāh is to be credited with removing the misconceptions on the subject and for clearly defining the principles which govern the change brought about under the guidance of the Prophet.

So far we have made an attempt to highlight the general framework of the overall religio-philosophical thought of Shāh Walī Allāh. It is within the matrix of this world-view that he conceptualizes the archetypal model of society and spells out the terms of the Islamic scheme for its reformation. Thereafter he goes on to develop his concept of *khilāfah* which symbolizes the political organization of the society with a given set of religious and moral traits.

The socio-political doctrines expounded by Shāh Walī Allāh constitute an integral part of his theoretical framework outlined above. An understanding of this framework should, therefore, precede any endeavour to define these doctrines.

Sources of Shāh Walī Allāh's Thought

Before we proceed to the main theme of our study, it seems useful to throw some light on the sources of Shāh Walī Allāh's thought. This would help appreciate his socio-political ideas in their proper perspective. Almost all the scholars who have carefully studied the life of Shāh Walī Allāh and his thought agree that his illustrious father, Shāh 'Abd al-Raḥīm, had a profound and abiding influence on his intellectual and spiritual development.[94] Shāh 'Abd al-Raḥīm was a noted Sufi thinker and jurist of his time. Apart from his other attainments, he was well-versed in the esoteric and monistic tradition of Shaykh Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn 'Arabī. He was in fact a disciple and student of his elder brother, Shaykh Abū al-Riḍā (d. 1111/1699), a prominent exponent of the philosophy of Ibn 'Arabī. Both Shāh 'Abd al-Raḥīm and his brother had been influenced by Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindī through

spiritual association with the latter's disciples. Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindī was a prominent critic of Ibn 'Arabī in India. Despite that, Shāh Walī Allāh's father and uncle were inclined towards Ibn 'Arabī's school of *waḥdat al-wujūd*, and later it fell to the lot of their outstanding son and nephew to evolve a new mystic-philosophical tradition by bringing about a reconciliation of the doctrine of *waḥdat al-wujūd* with the express injunctions of Islam.[95]

The intellectual and academic mission of his father and uncle lay in their efforts to "build a boulevard of thought which Muslim philosophers, mystics, theologians and jurists could tread together".[96] To this end they sought to combine the differing traditions of reason, tradition and spiritual intuition. The impact of this synthetic approach is clearly discernible in the comprehensive and well-integrated thought of Shāh Walī Allāh whereby he further advanced the mission of his father and uncle. He made a successful attempt of doing away with the incongruity between the various schools of Islamic thought that sought guidance exclusively either from reason or tradition or spiritual intuition. Shāh Walī Allāh, on the contrary, judiciously emphasised all the three equally important sources of human knowledge and wisdom.

Among the prominent teachers and mentors of Shāh 'Abd al-Raḥīm, Mīr Zāhid Hirawī (d. 1101/1690), is also worthy of mention. He was an eminent mystic and logician. His thought was also oriented in the approaches of tradition and reason at the same time. Further, his ideas were developed, under the overpowering influence of his intellectual progenitor Jalāl al-Dīn Dawwānī (d. 928/1522), whose celebrated work, *Akhlāq-i Jalālī*, is an epoch-making contribution to the philosophy of ethics.[97]

Among the distinctive features of Shāh 'Abd al-Raḥīm's thought was his strong emphasis on what he called *ḥikmat-i 'amalī* (practical wisdom). On the other hand, we find the majority of *mutakallimūn* prior to him engrossed in purely theoretical discussions, using mostly the terms borrowed from the speculative philosophy of Aristotle. One can note the influence of Shāh Walī Allāh's father on him in his concern with the practical issues of life.[98]

Another important factor which contributed to the flowering of Shāh Walī Allāh's genius, quite early in his life, was a thorough study of the Qur'ān. He mentions in his short autobiographical note entitled *al-Juz' al-Laṭīf fī Tarjamat al-'Abd al-Ḍa'īf* that he had committed the Qur'ān to memory by the age of seven. In the same work, while mentioning important landmarks of his academic life, he says:

> Out of the numerous favours of God upon me, one very great favour is that in addition to an exhaustive study of several exegeses and deep contemplation over them, I have had the good fortune of attending my worthy father's discourses on the Qur'ān. Thus I was able to read the text of the Qur'ān with him several times. It was precisely this experience which proved conducive to a great opening for me.[99]

This explains the profound impact of the early memorization, study and absorption of the Qur'ān, on the mind and soul of Shāh Walī Allāh. His father seems to have whetted up in the young Walī Allāh the appetite for a direct nexus with the Qur'ān in addition to creating in him an insatiable thirst for acquiring the knowledge and guidance enshrined in it. This experience invested Shāh Walī Allāh's scholarship with an aptitude for understanding and interpreting the Qur'ānic verses, something which endured throughout his life and its influence on his thought is clearly discernible in all his ideas.[100]

Among other disciplines which Shāh Walī Allāh studied as a regular student at the Rahimiyyah College, an institution established by his father and named after him, were Persian language and literature including works on ethical philosophy, Arabic language, grammar, syntax, etymology, and rhetoric, *Ḥadīth*, *Tafsīr*, *Fiqh*, *Uṣul al-Fiqh*, logic and philosophy. It is also worth noting that he studied, as part of the curricula, selected major works of *Taṣawwuf*, which played a significant role in the direction of his thought. He also studied medicine, astronomy, and mathematics. This vast range of learning contributed to the broadening of his intellectual horizons and the enrichment of his mind, traits which are fully reflected in his numerous works.[101]

In 1143/1733, Shāh Walī Allāh travelled to Ḥijāz, where he performed *Ḥajj* and stayed for two years. During this sojourn he found a valuable opportunity to benefit from scholars who came to Ḥijāz from various countries and representing different academic traditions in the world of Islam. Among the prominent scholars who influenced him most, was Shaykh Abū Ṭāhir al-Kurdī al-Madanī (d. 1145/1733). His impact on the subsequent spiritual and academic development of Shāh Walī Allāh's personality was indeed tremendous. Shaykh Abū Ṭāhir was a disciple of his own father, Shaykh Ibrāhīm al-Kurdī (d. 1101/1690). It is interesting that both Shaykh Ibrāhīm al-Kurdī and Shāh Walī Allāh's father traced their academic genealogy to Jalāl al-Dīn Dawwāni. Again, both of them were under the influence of Ibn 'Arabī, an influence which they received through their respective spiritual guides. Therefore, this interaction of Shāh Walī Allāh

with Shaykh Abū Ṭāhir al-Kurdī further reinforced his orientation in the academic and spiritual traditions of Jalāl al-Dīn Dawwānī and Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn 'Arabī.[102]

Although Shāh Walī Allāh was brought up in the Ḥanafī tradition of jurisprudence which was followed by the majority of his own countrymen, he nevertheless benefited from the legal heritage of other schools as well. His approach in dealing with the variant opinions of the four schools was to identify the common ground of their apparently differing lines of argument. He regarded *al-Muwaṭṭa'* of Imām Mālik as the main source of all the major Sunnī schools of law. His two commentaries on this early source of *Ḥādīth* namely *al-Musawwā* (Arabic) and *Muṣaffā* (Persian) clearly indicate the importance which Shāh Walī Allāh attached to this work.[103] He considered *Muwaṭṭa'* to be the most authentic source of the legal opinions of 'Umar, the second Caliph, whom he regarded as an absolute *mujtahid* in the true sense of the term. The founders of the other four legal schools were, in the opinion of Shāh Walī Allāh, mere followers of 'Umar's school of *fiqh* and exercised *ijtihād* within the framework of his legal opinions.[104] Thus, we find that among the books which left the deepest impact on the mind of Shāh Walī Allāh after the Qur'ān, was the *Muwaṭṭa'* of Imām Mālik ibn Anas which, according to him, was the most valuable source of traditions as well as authentic legal opinions of the early Islamic era.[105]

Among the other noteworthy sources of his thought, Shaykh al-Islām Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728/1328) deserves particular mention. We have already referred to the influence of Shaykh Abū Ṭāhir al-Kurdī's ideas on Shāh Walī Allāh. The former and his father, Shaykh Ibrāhīm al-Kurdī, were great admirers of Ibn Taymiyyah and his school. It was perhaps through this association with the two Kurdīs that Shāh Walī Allāh established an intellectual liaison with this great thinker of Islam and immensely benefited not only from his works, but also from those of his illustrious pupil, Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 751/1350). On more than one occasion we find Shāh Walī Allāh paying rich tributes to the scholarship of Ibn Taymiyyah and his typical revolutionary orthodoxy.[106]

Empirical observation is yet another important feature of his thought. In many of his writings, particularly *Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah,* we find him often having recourse to empirical arguments to establish a contention. He marshals evidence from the simple fact that an act of virtue, a moral value or a cultural norm is universally acknowledged as such by all human communities, irrespective of their differences in creed, culture, race or geographic location.[107] This empirical dimension of his thought afforded him a perception of reality that was at once more comprehensive and profound

than that of a great many of his predecessors. We would sum up this survey of the sources of Shāh Walī Allāh's thought by pointing to the three important elements which constitute, according to Maulānā 'Ubayd Allāh Sindhī, the main components of his thought:

- First of all, he logically arranged in his mind all information acquired from the classical sources, initially through learning as a student, and later through instruction and independent pursuit of studies.

- By the activation of intuitional faculties (which he achieved through association with many saints and spiritual guides), he acquired a consciousness of the grand Divine scheme at work in this cosmos. His intellect further anchored this intuitional consciousness and reinforced it.

- With this perception, comprising reason and intuition, he focused his mind on contemplating over the teachings of the Qur'ān. Therein he was able to discover the eternal principles governing the forces of history, principles that bring about a meaningful change in the individual and collective life of mankind. He fully absorbed those principles and, in their light, strove to identify the straight path in thought and behaviour conducive to eternal bliss. In his understanding of the message of the Qur'ān, however, he received full guidance from the traditions of the Prophet.[108]

3

Social Thought

Shāh Walī Allāh's conception of the society is an integral part of his basic philosophy of life. It would perhaps be no exaggeration to say that his social thought constitutes one of the most original and significant aspects of his philosophy. It seems that with his peculiar orientation of thought, of which the main features have been outlined in the preceding two chapters, one is bound to conceive the emergence of the human social organization as he spelled it out. From the vantage-point of Shāh Walī Allāh's thought, the entire phenomenon of life seems to be nothing but an all-round spectacle of the grand Divine scheme, whether in the realm of the natural order or in the sphere of social organization. Although his understanding and exposition of the social development of man appears to be somewhat in the nature of an empirical survey, yet the final conclusions drawn by him come as a confirmation of the fundamental postulates of Religion.

Some modern exponents of Shāh Walī Allāh's social doctrines tend to suggest lack of originality in many of his ideas. They point out that similar ideas had previously been held by some of the Muslim thinkers such as Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037) and Ibn Khaldūn (d.808/1406), who were the possible sources for some of Shāh Walī Allāh's ideas. But a total view of Shāh Walī Allāh's framework of thought does not confirm such a contention.[109]

Shāh Walī Allāh's survey of the social phenomena seems to have been intended essentially for substantiating the standpoint of Religion by empirical argument. He looks at the creational phenomena, with man installed in its centre as the chief executor of the Divine scheme, as a supplement to the Revelational guidance from God embodied in the scriptures and handed

down to the Prophets. His basic premise, therefore, is that knowledge attainable to man through the intellect or the senses is bound to be in total conformity with the Divine Revelation. This is because whatever we come to know about the laws of nature, including the laws of human behaviour, by means of inductive enquiry, is nothing but a part of the Supreme Divine Law, of which the Revealed Law is the portion enunciated by the Prophets. This guided Shāh Walī Allāh's thought to the inescapable conclusion that man's relation to his follow-beings is just another aspect of his spirituality.[110]

Shāh Walī Allāh takes a total view of life, identifying an essential unity pervading all the diverse pursuits in human life. His philosophy represents a vigorours attempt to bring out a strong objective link between social, ethical, economic and political spheres in the temporal life of mankind.[111]

Given Shāh Walī Allāh's theocentric view of the human individual, the primary unit of social organisation, it was natural that a transcendental moral law should provide the mainstay for this organisation. This law ought to be comprehensive and immutable and should serve as the final touchstone for determining right and wrong, good and evil, virtue and vice.[112]

The most outstanding and distinctive characteristic of human society, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, is *'adālah* (justice), which is both an individual and a collective quality. We have already noted that Shāh Walī Allāh recognises justice as an essential moral trait of human beings. This individual moral consciousness needs to be augmented on the collective plane where its maintenance and preservation is even more necessary than at the individual level since moral degeneration spells disaster and may even prove fatal if it extends to the society as a whole. Moreover, Shāh Walī Allāh's conception of *'adālah* encompasses the entire spectrum of diverse human pursuits. When *'adālah* is expressed in dress, manners and mores, it is *adab* i.e. etiquette. When it is maintained in matters relating to income and expenditure, it is 'economy'. Its observance in the affairs of the state is called 'politics'.[113]

Shāh Walī Allāh regards economic justice as the basic requirement for the realization of the objective of *'adālah* in every human group. Economic justice is, therefore, necessary for the healthy and balanced development of human society. Every social group needs an economic system, guaranteeing material necessities of life to all members. Without these necessities, human beings cannot remain contented, and without contentment, they will not find sufficient leisure for the pursuit of higher purposes of life, and it is very likely that they turn neglectful of the eternal bliss of the Hereafter.[114]

Like many other philosophers and propounders of the theories of sociology from Plato (d. 347 B.C.) down to Auguste Comte (d. 1857), Shāh Walī Allāh's ultimate concern was the achievement of an ideally moral, altruistic, and perfectly civilized society. According to Shāh Walī Allāh, however, it is not possible to achieve this objective without attaining a high level of God-consciousness and spiritual purification.[115] However, as we know, the attitude of founders of modern sociology is at variance from such ideas. August Comte, for instance, thought that "perfect society would come about by the proper application of a new moral science, the study of society". He aspired for building a "scientifically designed commonwealth, wherein social control would be entrusted to the "Religion of Humanity"—with sociologists as its priests".[116] Comte insisted that a strictly rational, rather than religious course should be followed to alleviate the ills of the post-industrial European society. An application of this 'rational strategy', according to him, would be possible by incorporating the methodology of physical and natural sciences in the service of social relationships.

Another notable social philosopher after Comte, Herbert Spencer (d. 1903), also advanced his theories more or less along the same lines as Comte. He was of the opinion that: "there can be no complete acceptance of sociology as a science, as long as the belief in a social order, not conforming to natural law survives".[117]

It is evident that in the scheme of Western sociology no significant role has been assigned to religion. Modern sociology, like all other social sciences, developed in the West approximately during the last two centuries, gradually divested all knowledge of the spiritual dimension of the reality. The inevitable consequence of this secularization in all behavioral sciences, in addition to other curbs and bars on man's comprehensiveness of perception, is that has been reduced to a *promethean anthropos* rather than a holistic moral and spiritual being whose ultimate fulfilment is to be actualised in the Hereafter. Moreover, today's sociology is mostly concerned with "low level empirical generalisations rather than constructing grand theories and fail[s] to come to grips with the great problems of the modern society at large".[118]

Notwithstanding this overall constricted outlook prevailing in the predominant perspectives of contemporary sociology, we also find that some sociologists take a broad view, examining such themes as total societies, world wide trends, historical phenomena, or the relationship between personality types and cultural differences. Thus Max Weber(d. 1920)[119] related the rise of capitalism to the Protestant reformation;

David Riesman(1909-) associated different character types with social trends;[120] and Robin Williams analysed the American society.[121]

In contemporary sociological parlance, studies of such large-scale macroscopic phenomena as cited above are called macro-sociology.[122] In a sense we may call Shāh Walī Allāh, among other things, a great macro-sociologist in his own way. For he made a lasting contribution to the development of human thought as an outstanding social philosopher, in that he was a grand theorist concerned with historical trends and human destiny, one who worked out a social philosophy that explains a broad range of phenomena and constructs a model of a good society. The writers on modern sociology are generally disinclined to acknowledge anyone other than Auguste Comte and Karl Marx (d. 1883) as 'social philosophers' while applying the criteria set forth above.[123] It would seem that Shāh Walī Allāh's original and innovative ideas in the field of sociology aptly fulfil this criteria of contemporary sociology.

Influence of Earlier Muslim Thinkers on Shāh Walī Allāh

Shāh Walī Allāh is one of those few thinkers who are known for their consistent and systematic approach who tend to treat the questions in hand in a pervasive manner, a quality which he shares with some of his illustrious predecessors such as Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (d. 339/950), al-Rāzī, Ibn Taymiyyah, and Aḥmad Sirhindī. To begin with, he marshals arguments from the Qur'ān and the traditions of the Prophet (peace be upon him). These arguments are then supplemented by corroborative evidence from history, philosophy, logic, *kalām*, Sufism and many other disciplines in vogue at the time.[124]

Shāh Walī Allāh's socio-political thought is based primarily on a perceptive study of his own environment, particularly Muslim India. He was a keen observer of all important developments of social and political significance that took place around him.[125] His political letters display his deep and critical insight in the prevailing socio-political situation in Muslim India.[126] He looks at the problems of the human society from the Qur'ānic perspective and it is from that same perspective that he interprets everything. The question of the rise and fall of societies discussed by him in the *Ḥujjah*, and the ideas set forth by him for understanding various developments in history, have their bases in the Qur'ān. When necessary, he also substantiates these ideas by referring to the relevant traditions of the Prophet (peace be upon him).[127]

As we have pointed out elsewhere,[128] the socio-political thought of Shāh Walī Allāh emanates from his theoretical framework. Society to him represents a certain stage of human development. But a meaningful social and cultural development can only take place under Divine guidance. To him, Divine guidance is internal as well as external to human nature and the two are complementary to each other.[129]

While developing his social philosophy, Shāh Walī Allāh further advances the line of thought developed by his predecessors in this field on the one hand assimilates and systematises various ideas that have a bearing on the socio-political development of the society on the other. In this respect, it seems that his endeavour was to combine different academic traditions into one coherent system of thought. It is not strictly within the scope of the present study to make a detailed comparison between the socio-political doctrines of Shāh Walī Allāh and the ideas of the earlier thinkers in this field. However, an attempt will be made below to identify the main areas in which Shāh Walī Allāh shows traces of the influence of the earlier thinkers and to highlight those aspects in which he further advanced their ideas. It seems that Shāh Walī Allāh's socio-political thought was influenced by several Muslim philosophers and thinkers of the past such as al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Miskwayh (d. 421/1030), Dawwānī and Aḥmad Sirhindī. In the present context, we would confine ourselves to three scholars who represent the major trends in Muslim scholarship. One of these was Fārābī, who has influenced Muslim thinkers in the field of pure philosophical thought, and had a penchant for abstract rational approach. Another thinker was Māwardī, who is perhaps the best representative of juridical approach to socio-political problems. Still another thinker was Ghazālī who represented a combination of scholasticism, philosophy and jurisprudence blended with Sufism. It is significant that out of these three, Ghazālī is the only one to whom Shāh Walī Allāh has not only paid rich tributes, but whose influence he has generously acknowledged in his introduction to the *Ḥujjah*.[130]

The Influence of Fārābī

Let us first consider Fārābī. As the founder of an independent school of philosophical thought, he has left a deep and profound impact on philosophical thought, both in the East and in the West. His ideas and style set the standard of philosophical writing for many centuries to come.[131] Eminent thinkers and celebrated philosophers like Ibn Sīnā ungrudgingly record their indebtedness to Fārābī.[132] Muslim philosophy, in general, has

always recognised the exalted position of Fārābī in the history of human thought. This is evident from the appellation of *al-Mu'allim al-Thānī* or the Second Teacher conferred on him, the first teacher being Aristotle.[133] Indeed the impact of the 'second teacher' on Muslim philosophico-ethical thought is no less profound than that of the first.

Shāh Walī Allāh was no exception to the general indebtedness of Muslim thinkers to Fārābī. Although he has not specifically made any reference to the political ideas of Fārābī in any of his writings, there are some traces of the latter's thought on his style and approach. The effort to reconcile the rational with the traditional, so conspicuous in Fārābī, is also evident, and in fact seems to have reached its culmination, in Shāh Walī Allāh. The idea of integrating the institution of prophethood with cultural developments in human society was first initiated by Fārābī. This idea found its mature expression in Shāh Walī Allāh's *Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah*. The categorisation of the state and society on moral bases which we note in Fārābī in the fourth century of the *Hijrah* finds its echo in Shāh Walī Allāh's writings in the twelfth century.[134]

There is also a significant degree of similarity between the two in respect of style. "Fārābī is characteristically concise and precise. He selects his words and expressions as deliberatively as he profoundly conceives his ideas. His aphorisms are pregnant with profound significance".[135] The same can safely be said about Shāh Walī Allāh. His books, *Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah, al-Budūr al-Bāzighah, al-Khayr al-Kathīr* and *al-Tafhīmāt al-Ilāhiyyah* are particularly remarkable for their precision and succinctness.

Both Fārābī and Shāh Walī Allāh emerged at very significant transitional periods in the intellectual history of Islam. In the age of Fārābī, Muslims were on the threshold of an epoch which was to be characterised with attempts to synthesize various philosophical points of view and to reconcile hellenized rationalism with the teachings of Islam. For this purpose, Fārābī undertook a survey of the available fund of philosophical knowledge and tried to develop a framework of doctrines compatible with his own academic ethos. In this connection, he attempted to evolve a systematic and coherent philosophy which could accommodate both traditional and rational points of view. Thus he paved the way for more advanced efforts to harmonize differing or conflicting ideas into a systematic and synthesized statement of Muslim philosophical thought.

An integrated approach in philosophy, which is conducive ultimately to a unity of knowledge, is also an important facet of philosophical thought on which the views of Shāh Walī Allāh appear to be in considerable agreement with those of Fārābī. It was, perhaps, under the influence of the cardinal

Islamic doctrine of *tawḥīd* that Fārābī was able to develop the idea that philosophy was essentially a single unit. His *Iḥṣā' al-'Ulūm*[136] is not simply an attempt to classify the various prevalent sciences and disciplines, but its real value rather lies in that it sets forth a definitive concept of the unity of knowledge. Shāh Walī Allāh's systematic re-statement of an Islamic *weltanschauung* in the *Ḥujjah*, which comprises discussions on almost all important areas of social and cultural significance, is a remarkable example of philosophical thought premised on the unity of knowledge.

It was primarily the idea of the unity of knowledge which provided an intellectual framework in which Fārābī and other Muslim scholars made an attempt to synthesize *ḥikmah* or rational philosophy with the *sharī'ah* or the revealed law of Islam. In this respect, Fārābī is considered to be the first Muslim thinker who tried to develop a philosophical system based on such a synthesization. During his own life-time, this attempt might not have attracted much attention, let alone much participation from or approval of the traditional scholars. However, with the passage of time it became increasingly evident that Muslim thought, owing to the compulsions of history as well as the sheer force of logic, was bound sooner or later to follow the lines set by Fārābī. About four centuries later, the greatest Muslim scholar of his time, Ibn Taymiyyah declared that there was no conflict or inconsistency between *ṣarīḥ al-ma'qūl*, a rationally established fact, and *ṣaḥīḥ al-manqūl*, an authentic religious doctrine. This statement of Ibn Taymiyyah was, in fact, a tribute to the sound seminal thinking of Fārābī as early as in the fourth century A.H.

Shāh Walī Allāh's *Ḥujjah* and *Budūr* represent the culmination of the process of harmonizing the rationally established facts and the authentic religious principles of Islam. In fact the entire effort by the author of the *Ḥujjah* was to marshal rational arguments in support of the teachings of the Prophet (peace be upon him).

But the most important area in which Shāh Walī Allāh seems to have been conspicuously influenced by the line of Fārābī's thinking is the institution of prophethood and revelation which furnishes the basis for all religious teachings. Right from the days of Fārābī upto our own time when we have had such an important and brilliant thinker as Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938),[137] Muslim philosophical thinking has been centrally concerned with interpreting the doctrines of prophethood and revelation in rational and philosophical terms. The aim of this exercise was to articulate these concepts in such a manner as to make them comprehensible in rational terms.

The concept of prophethood, as presented by Fārābī, can rightly be considered a pioneering attempt toward explaining this strictly religious and transcendental experience in philosophical terms. How far Fārābī was successful in this attempt can be assessed partly by the fact that men like Ibn Sīnā and Shāh Walī Allāh could not go beyond the ideational parameters set by Fārābī, who explained prophethood, within the broad framework of perspectives borrowed from the insights of psychology, metaphysics, ethics, sociology and politics. The combination of all these fields suggests that while explaining prophethood Fārābī had the extraordinarily great and all-embracing personality of the Prophet of Islam in mind.

Shāh Walī Allāh also developed his ideas on *nubuwwah* (prophethood) on the axioms of metaphysics, psychology, ethics and politics. Shāh Walī Allāh integrates his discussion on *nubuwwah* with his theory of *irtifāqāt*. He conceives Prophet as the embodiment of the highest degree of spiritual development. This development starts from the level of *khalīfah* or the ruler who presides over the third and the fourth *irtifāq*. Thereafter he mentions *hādī* or the spiritual guide, *imām* or the leader, and *mundhir* or the warner. These levels refer to various degrees in the hierarchy of spiritual leadership short of the final degree of Prophet. Shāh Walī Allāh's discussion on the nature of prophethood and the categories of revelation mentioned by him in *Budūr* present an interesting example of his approach of integrating the perspectives of different fields in dealing with this subject.

Another important area in which there is a close affinity of views between Fārābī and Shāh Walī Allāh is the concept of bliss or *sa'ādah* which has been a question of great interest and a subject of lengthy discussions by the Muslim philosophers. It is on the basis of *sa'ādah* that Muslim thinkers from the days of Fārābī to Shāh Walī Allāh evolved their socio-ethical theories, which eventually developed into their ideas on politics and statecraft. *Sa'ādah*, according to Fārābī, is a stage of ethical accomplishment and moral perfection of the human soul. It is here that this perfection and accomplishment becomes a Prophet's second nature, and he remains no more in need of any external factor to sustain it. This moral perfection permeates all the spiritual aspects of his life.[138]

Like Fārābī, Shāh Walī Allāh also defines *sa'ādah* in terms of moral perfection. The latter, however, goes a step further and interprets *sa'ādah* in the context of spiritual accomplishment. Shāh Walī Allāh relates the attainment of ultimate happiness with *'ibādāt* or acts of worship, and with *riyāḍāt* or acts of spiritual purification.[139] He contends that the real and lasting happiness can only be achieved through acts of worship whose ultimate objective is the spiritual progress of the soul, its close communion

with the 'Higher Assembly', and the subservience of man's animal urges to his spiritual ideals.[140]

Thus, both Fārābī and Shāh Walī Allāh, see *sa'ādāh* as the *summum bonum* both in this world, and in the Hereafter. In this context, they develop their argument on the basis of their study of human nature. Following the Qur'ānic statements which consider change as one of the signs of God,[141] both of them recognise change and variety as necessary elements in human nature. This nature varies from person to person and from society to society. Human qualities and characteristics are as susceptible to variation as any other thing in this world. Despite this change there is an element of permanence in human life which provides the basis for an understanding of human nature and life. Both Fārābī and Shāh Walī Allāh have elaborately discussed these aspects of human behaviour in their masterpieces on socio-political thought, namely *Arā' Ahl al-Madīnah al-Fāḍilah* of Fārābī and the *Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah* of Shāh Walī Allāh. There are striking similarities between the two.

Shāh Walī Allāh's socio-political thought is, in the main, constructed on his theory of *irtifāqāt*, i.e. the stages of social development. In this area he has developed an original and coherent social philosophy with reference to the nature of human society, its needs and requirements. One finds traces of certain rudiments of this theory in the writings of Fārābī who refers to the nature of human needs and the amenities of life.[142] For him, it is incumbent on men to gather and organise themselves in large groups in order to achieve the highest degrees of cultural progress.[143] While Shāh Walī Allāh introduces different categories of society in accordance with the degrees of cultural development of the social organism, Fārābī categorises them into perfect and imperfect, rightly guided and misguided, virtuous and sinful. In effect, both interpret the diversity of human social phenomena by subsuming them into the unity of a systematic social philosophy based on the broad principles of Islamic ethics.

The Influence of Māwardī

As we have pointed out earlier in this chapter, in the exposition of his political ideas, Shāh Walī Allāh's approach appears to bear similarity to that of the fifth century jurist and political thinker, Māwardī. He raises almost the same issues which Māwardī had discussed and marshalled almost the same arguments that we find in Māwardī's *al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah*.[144] We do not know, however, whether Shāh Walī Allāh was influenced directly by Māwardī or not, but we can safely assume that he did receive an indirect

influence of his Abbasid precursor, through the writings of the Shāfi'ī and Ḥanbalī jurists of a later period with whom he had become familiar during his stay in Arabia. The impact of Ibn Taymiyyah on Shāh Walī Allāh is also well-known.[145] It was, perhaps, through the writings of Ibn Taymiyyah and others like him that the influence of Māwardī extended to Shāh Walī Allāh.

Apart from this indirect impact, it appears that a similarity in social conditions and intellectual and political climate, despite the obvious time and space gap between Māwardī and Shāh Walī Allāh, also contributed to a correspondence of views between them. The two lived at a time when their respective contemporaneous Muslim empires were on a rapid decline. Their heyday was over and their only concern was to arrest this decline. Unlike Shāh Walī Allāh, Māwardī occupied judicial offices in the Abbasid empire in addition to his engagement in teaching and research.

There is an unmistakable similarity in the ideas, modes of argument and methodology adopted by these two great thinkers. The concept of *imāmah* and *khilāfah* and their bases and functions discussed by Shāh Walī Allāh are almost identical with what we find in the writings of Māwardī. Both consider the establishment of state obligatory for the Muslim *ummah*. The basis of this obligation, according to both, is reason as well as revelation. Likewise, the functions of government, as enumerated by Māwardī, have also been enunciated by Shāh Walī Allāh, and along more or less the same arguments.

Shāh Walī Allāh's treatment of the institutions of *qaḍā'* and *jihād* is also essentially a reproduction (of course, with some addition and improvement), of what Māwardī had already written seven centuries earlier in his *al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah*.

The Influence of Ghazālī

Last, but not the least, is the influence which Shāh Walī Allāh received from Ghazālī. This indebtedness to Ghazālī is not something peculiar to Shāh Walī Allāh for Ghazālī occupies an exceptionally important place in the history of Islamic thought. His impact on the subsequent thinking of Muslims in several fields such as jurisprudence, Sufism, ethics, logic, philosophy, socio-political thought and theology has been tremendous. We can hardly find any Muslim scholar after Ghazālī who is not directly or indirectly influenced by him.

As we have already pointed out, there are striking similarities between Ghazālī and Shāh Walī Allāh. Both of them are considered important links

between two distinct epochs of scholarship. Each of them left a lasting imprint of his ideas on the thinking patterns of the subsequent generations. The thought of each of the two represents a unique combination of religious, rational and intuitional systems of knowledge. Each tried to present and interpret the teachings of Islam in the light of the hitherto developed rationalist tradition of scholarship in his respective milieu.

Like Shāh Walī Allāh, Ghazālī extensively wrote on society, state and politics. His *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn*, in many respects, is a forerunner of Shāh Walī Allāh's *Ḥujjah*.[146] Both of them have dealt with the teachings of Islam in their entirety and attempted to explain them in terms of a consistent, rational, and logically tenable philosophy of life. Like the *Ḥujjah*, the *Iḥyā'* also discusses politics in the framework of its author's social thought. In this respect, both Ghazālī and Shāh Walī Allāh make a sort of anthropological study of human society and trace the onward development of human social behaviour. Both of them have discussed the need, and surveyed the emergence, of various arts and skills universally found in human societies.

The Four Stages of Social Development

Shāh Walī Allāh explains the evolution of social life by identifying four stages for the development of a cultured society. He gives them the name of *irtifāqāt*.[147] First, he underlines, as a great many medieval and modern social philosophers do, the distinctive traits of human beings whereby they become different and distinguished from 'fellow animals'. These traits, as briefly mentioned earlier, are:

a. *Al-ra'y al-kullī*, i.e. universality of purpose. According to Shāh Walī Allāh, all members of the genus of animals share the instinctive drive to pursue their immediate physical needs of eating, drinking, sex, and seeking shelter from the vicissitudes of weather. Satisfaction of these immediate needs have been instinctively taught to every member of the animal genus according to the requirements of each species. For instance, God has taught a bee to instinctively partake of varied fruits, to make a dwelling where the members of its species may join each other, to submit to the drone, and then to produce honey. In the same way, the natural law ordained by God has provided for each species a *sharī'ah*[148] (i.e. a course of conduct) which is transfused in the heart of each individual member of the species. Likewise, God has inspired man to instinctively pursue his beneficial ends (*irtifāqāt*) with regard to these necessities.[149]

Over and above these immediate and instinctive drives, which Shāh Walī Allāh terms as *al-ra'y al-juz'ī* (individuality of purpose), man is further driven by a degree of *al-ra'y al-kullī* (universality of purpose). This drive inspires him to pursue a purely rational goal which may not be rooted in his instinctive disposition. For instance, he may seek to create a good social system, to perfect his morals, to achieve cultural accomplishments, or to strive for salvation in the Hereafter.[150]

Thus it is clear that the fundamental point of distinction between man and beast, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, is the moral aspect of the former's nature. It is man who, despite the fullest satisfaction of his biological needs, remains dissatisfied and feels an additional urge to strive in a variety of ways for the ascendancy of moral ideals on the individual as well as collective planes of human life. He devotes a good deal of his opportunities and resources for attaining accomplishments in the fields of culture and civilization. Moreover, a very large measure of the material means available to man are often dedicated to no purpose other than attaining Divine salvation in the Hereafter.[151]

It is to be noted here that unlike many other Muslim social philosophers before him Shāh Walī Allāh doe not emphasise the faculty of intellect or *virtus rationalis,* as the essential difference between man and the rest of the animal world. This is notwithstanding his discussion of some external physical and inner mental features of the archetypal man, such as uprightness, power of speech, a relatively hairless body and the perceptive faculty of the mind (*idrāk*).[152]

The most prominent propounder of sociology before Shāh Walī Allāh is perhaps 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Khaldūn. He also regards *quwwah nāṭiqah* (*virtus rationalis*), *fikr* (*cogitativa*) or *rawiyyah* (deliberation) to be the essential differentia of man.[153] This seems to be almost a common notion of a very large number of early thinkers in and outside the tradition of Islam. Shāh Walī Allāh's approach to the issue, in our opinion, represents an improvement in this respect. His main emphasis is placed on the identification of the underlying motives rather than merely the potencies with which man or animal has been endowed. As to the rational faculties, to him they are instruments conferred upon man by the Divine Power. But it is ultimately a conscious pursuit of the higher ends which distinguishes man from the beast. The value of pursuing the ends that are beyond the frontiers of biological existence lies in the fact that this pursuit transcends all his immediate selfish interests that are essentially of a beastly nature. This transcendence requires suppression of the

animalistic disposition (*bahīmiyyah*) and elevation of the angelic disposition (*malakiyyah*). The distinction granted to man over all animals is, therefore, due to his conscious struggle for the achievement of certain objectives that are morally commendable and conducive to universal good.

This original concept of *al-ra'y al-kullī* expounded by Shāh Walī Allāh settled the issue arising out of the seemingly overlapping instinctive pursuits of man and beast, which led the human mind to different confusions concerning the correlation between various species of the animal world. This confusion might also have been responsible for leading many thinkers to exaggerate ostensible aspects of similarity between men and beasts, so much so that fantastic theories about the origin of species gained currency, claiming a common ancestry of both man and animal.[154]

b. The second distinctive trait of man, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, is that his satisfaction of the instinctive needs is supplemented by an aesthetic urge which Shāh Walī Allāh calls *ẓarāfah*. While a beast is exclusively concerned with warding off heat and cold, allaying hunger, quenching thirst and relieving sexual tension, man aspires for added pleasure and joy out of these things. He yearns for a beautiful mate, delicious food, elegant dress, and a lofty house.[155]

Though man's pursuit of these instinctive desires namely food, sex and housing is rooted in his animalistic disposition, he employs his intelligence to satisfy them in an accomplished and refined manner. Therefore, a great deal of human energy, time, and potential is spent for achieving progressive refinement, and capricious modes of fulfilment, in enjoying the pleasures of food, sex and housing.

c. The third distinctive trait of mankind is that there are found among them some individuals who possess intelligence and understanding at a higher level than others. These gifted individuals apply their minds to discover the beneficial stages of social development (*irtifāqāt*). Other individuals in the human species might feel an urge to discover something beneficial like them, but they are not intellectually advanced enough to be able to do so. Such people naturally turn for help to those gifted with exceptional inteiligence, learn what they have discovered for common good, and adopt their methods whole-heartedly because these methods conform to their own general perception.[156]

Thus a foundation for co-operative effort toward achieving common good is established. This mutual co-operation is the primary condition for the growth of a social set-up. Shāh Walī Allāh seems deeply conscious of the varying degrees of intellectual capacity among different individuals of the human species when he assigns the role of discovering methods of human social development, to a gifted group of men on behalf of the rest. He explains this by various illustrations. He imagines a man living at the most primitive level of existence. He feels hunger and thirst, but finds nothing to eat or drink. He faces acute hardship until he somehow finds food and drink. Thereafter he strives to develop a regular method to satisfy these vital needs in a regular manner, but fails to do so. Perchance he comes across a wise man who, on facing the same situation, already discovered certain remedies by making use of his intelligence. Thus he learns from this wise man that there are seeds of food and also discovers methods of growing, watering, reaping, threshing and refining — which he finds out to be the various stages of growing food stuff. He further learns the methods of preserving the produce for future needs. Similarly, that wise man explains to him methods of digging well for irrigating the lands that lie at some distance from springs and streams, and of making earthen waterpots, skin bags and other big containers to carry and preserve water. This layman thus discovers methods of satisfying his needs in an organised and intelligent manner and is able to attain a degree of *irtifāq*. He then attempts to crack seeds as they are with his teeth and tries to swallow raw fruits, only to find out that he cannot digest them. He tries to overcome this difficulty but finds no means to do so. Then he comes across another wise man who has already discovered methods of cooking, frying, grinding and baking. He learns from him yet another means of satisfying his needs in an organised and intelligent manner.[157]

Shāh Walī Allāh gives the above illustration to offer an analogy whereby one can form an idea as to how the imaginary primitive man gradually attains the primary level of *irtifāq*. These attainments, according to him, come about by the presence of two elements. One is the natural intuitional guidance provided by nature to man by virtue of his very creation as human species. The knowledge, accumulated by the human mind from the source of this intuitional guidance, is further supplemented by the knowledge acquired from experience. These two elements constitute the knowledge whereby man discovers various methods of satisfying his material needs in an organised and regular manner. In the course of time these practices become so common and familiar that they form part of the collective habitude of a human group living together.[158]

The characteristics of man, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, are too numerous to be counted. But when we analyse them, they can be reduced to three:

1. the urge for social welfare and common good of humanity which he terms as *al-ra'y al-kullī*;
2. the urge for cultural accomplishment which he calls *ẓarāfah*;[159]
3. the capacity to attain knowledge. Man aspires for perfection through the attainment of knowledge. But all men are neither equally capable of attaining knowledge, nor every knowledgeable person has the aptitude for the same kind of knowledge as others. Rather, God has endowed different individuals with varying capacities for attaining different kinds of knowledge.[160]

Further, it should be noted that according to Shāh Walī Allāh, as the animal species can be classified into higher, middle and lower orders on account of their relative harmony, vigour and purity, so also human individuals can be classified on grounds of possessing these qualities in higher or lesser degrees.[161]

The most perfect individual is he whose vigour, harmony and purity are most perfect. The effects of these qualities are manifested in three faculties: (i) *qalb*: conation and will, (ii) *ṭabī'ah*: physico-biological constitution, and (iii) *al-nafs al-nāṭiqah*: rational soul.[162]

It is obvious that the three traits of human species namely the urge for social welfare or universality of purpose, the urge for cultural accomplishment, and the capacity for knowledge are not found in all human individuals to the same extent. This disparity in aptitude and competence between members of the same species is attributable to a number of causes and factors. However, we would not go into the details of these factors in this study. Its significance for our purpose lies in the fact that, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, *irtifāq* exists at two levels owing to the varying intellectual and cultural levels of different social groups of mankind.

The first or primary level of social development (*irtifāq*) is an essential characteristic of small social groups like those of nomadic people and the dwellers of remote and far-flung areas such as mountain peaks. These lands are geographically distant from the main centres of civilisation and culture. Shāh Walī Allāh calls them *al-aqālīm al-ṣāliḥah* (the virtuous realms).[163]

The second stage of social development (*irtifāq*) is attained by the people who live in urban areas and civilised cities, in the 'virtuous realms'. These 'realms' have been called 'virtuous' by Shāh Walī Allāh because the

social environment of these 'realms' is a constant incentive for the breeding of men of excellent morals and wisdom. This is so because in such realms human social organisation expands tremendously, giving rise to increasing needs and requirements of life. The natural result of this expansion is that the experience of their inhabitants is diversified, and a large number of social practices are developed. In the course of time, these practices become permanent social customs and form part of the collective social behaviour of the individuals.[164]

The point of culmination in the second stage of social development is reflected in the practices that are in vogue among kings and rulers, who acquire and possess higher standards in the amenities of life. An additional advantage enjoyed by them is that they are visited by men of wisdom drawn from different communities of the world. They acquire 'virtuous practices' *(sunan ṣāliḥah)* from these men of wisdom. When the rulers and kings learn, adopt and follow these virtuous practices these are also reflected in the living patterns of their subjects. These societies may then be called 'virtuous realms'. This, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, constitutes the highest level of the second stage of social development (*irtifāq*).[165]

The achievement of the second stage of social development (*irtifāq*) to its point of culmination leads as a natural consequence to the third stage, the stage in which a human society needs the agency of government. It so happens that when various transactions take place between the members of a society, elements of greed, jealousy, procrastination, and denial of each other's rights give rise to many differences and disputes. The form in which this generally appears is that some individuals, who are ruled by low passions, tend to commit murder and loot. Apart from this, there is another reason which warrants the establishment of government. There are some *irtifāqāt* of which the benefits are shared by all members of the society. However, these *irtifāqāt* cannot be easily achieved by every member of the society individually. Or, perhaps, every member may not be prepared or interested to work for their achievement.

It is for these and for such other reasons that the members of the society are compelled to instal a ruler (or a government) in order to resolve their disputes, administer their affairs on the basis of equity and justice, and deter those who commit contravention of social rules and cultural norms, and repel all those who might show criminal tendencies. All these objectives require collection of necessary taxes from the more affluent members of the society. This precisely is the *raison d'etre* of the establishment of government in the opinion of Shāh Walī Allāh.[166]

Again this third stage of social development (*irtifāq*) leads to yet another stage, the fourth stage. This comes about when a ruler tends to become independent in his own domain, comes to possess considerable riches through taxes and maintains a substantial army. All this generates niggardliness, greed and hatred which, in turn, prompt different rulers to engage in mutual quarrel, even fighting. In this state of affairs, people feel compelled to establish the office of a superior authority—*khalīfah*—or to join the jurisdiction of *al-khilāfah al-kubrā* (supreme authority). The definition of *khilāfah* offered by Shāh Walī Allāh is that it is the rule of someone who acquires such prestige and popular respect that it becomes almost impossible for anyone to deprive him of his position.[167]

Each individual *khalīfah* essentially reflects the social psychology of those over whom his authority is established. All communities whose tempermanents are stronger and sharper stand in greater need of rulers and *khulafā'* (singular, *khalīfah*) than those who are less greedy and grudging.[168]

It will be clear from the foregoing that contextual evolution and cultural relativity are the prominent marks of the social philosophy of Shāh Walī Allāh. He conceives and constructs the evolution of society like one organic whole.[169] In his view, society is a dynamic organism which naturally evolves. This evolution is relative to a variety of factors and circumstances that accompany it. The Islamic form of society is no exception to this rule. Shāh Walī Allāh does not regard society "as an aggregate of units, held together by an external force, or artificial means of social contract, but as a veritable living organism. It obeys the laws of its own evolution. It has an end and a purpose. It works on lines almost analogous to those of the individual, who is subjected to states of health and ailment, progress and regression, life and death".[170]

4

The Theory of *Irtifāqāt*

After this general introduction to *irtifāqāt* — the four stages of social development expounded by Shāh Walī Allāh — we shall proceed to discuss separately the distinctive features of each *irtifāq* (stage of social development). As we have already pointed out, Shāh Walī Allāh conceives human society to have moved ahead through these four stages. He begins his survey of human social phenomenon by pointing to the emergence of a primitive type of society and traces its evolution and development to the highest level of culture and civilisation attainable by any social organisation. At the pinnacle of the social evolution of man he envisages something in the nature of a cosmopolitan socio-political organisation, or a commonwealth of different countries, bound together by the spirit of a universal Islamic fraternity. The golden examples of the early Islamic history as well as the hopes and aspirations for a future socio-political resurgence of Muslims seem to have contributed immensely to shaping the ideas of Shāh Walī Allāh on these questions.

The First Stage of *Irtifāq*

Language

Man's first step toward socio-cultural development is language which is not only the vehicle of communication, but also a great instrument of intellection. Shāh Walī Allāh defines language as "an instrument whereby man expresses something born in his mind".[171] Tracing the genesis and evolution of this phenomenon, he says that various acts, forms, postures

and physical objects are associated with certain sounds either by proximity, causality or some other factor. These sounds are spoken as they are. Then etymological alternations are made in them through the derivation of different forms and tenses according to variation in connotation. Things that have some association with vision, or which create any mental image, are represented by sounds similar to them. This is the primary form of language. Thereafter this phenomenon of language undergoes a process of expansion and diversification beyond the limited scope of proximity, similarity or relation between external sounds and their introspective meanings.

The significance of language as "the real incomparably important, and absolute distinction between humans and other living organisms" has been recognized by contemporary sociologists as well.[172] However, the experiments conducted in recent years for teaching chimpanzees to communicate by gestures, or to recognise words with the help of plastic tokens representing words, have been of little avail. These experiments have only further established the enormous gap between human and non-human communication.[173] Thus the modern science of sociology, which is now equipped with the supplementary aid of data provided by anthropology, psychology and even zoology, would seem to endorse the contention of Shāh Walī Allāh regarding the significance of language as the distinctive trait and important vehicle of human culture.

Among other attainments which Shāh Walī Allāh enumerates as marks of man's progress in the first stage of *irtifāq* are cultivation of land, plantation of trees, digging of wells, adoption of different methods of cooking food, and enriching nutrition, making of pottery and water containers, animal husbandry and utilization of animal's backs, meats, skins, hair, furs, milks and their offspring, building houses to seek shelter from heat and cold; making dresses to protect and cover human body, identification of an undisputed spouse for sexual satisfaction, procreation of progeny and mutual assistance in raising children and other familial needs, discovering and making instruments for cultivation, plantation and drilling, barter and other co-operative activities for serving the common interest of the members of society.[174]

An important feature of this stage of social development, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, is that a man of sound judgement and an exceptional ability to set things in order comes forward, subdues the people around him, and becomes their leader in one way or the other.[175]

A society with the characteristics outlined above also naturally demands that there should develop among its members certain established

conventions for settling disputes, preventing injustice and oppression and repelling aggressors.[176]

Besides, it is also an essential trait of every social set-up that there remain amongst its members some individuals of relatively higher intellectual calibre. These individuals possess the ability to discover methods of social development *(irtifāqāt)* which they employ to this end, and which the rest of the people in the community follow. They also enjoy the fruits of the former's intellectual labour to improve their conditions of living.[177]

It is also natural that in every society some individuals love beauty, comfort, and means of luxury in one way or the other, while others feel greater pride in possessing moral and intellectual qualities like bravery, generosity, eloquence and a sharp mind. There are still others who crave for spreading their fame and exalting their prestige in the world.[178]

The above exposition of Shāh Walī Allāh's understanding of the socio-cultural development of man from its initial stages amply shows that his approach is universal and comprehensive. In his survey of the socio-cultural phenomena of human life, he takes notice of different kinds of society, without limiting the scope of his survey to any particular period or to any specific region, clan or creed. In the current text books of sociology, human society is usually understood to be divided into five kinds with reference to their main sources of sustenance, namely (i) hunting (ii) horticulture, (iii) pastoral pursuits (iv) agriculture and (v) industry.[179] In Shāh Walī Allāh's social philosophy we find a notice of all these kinds of society.

Second Stage of *Irtifāq* and the Five Basic Sciences

We have already noted that according to Shāh Walī Allāh, it is a part of human nature that man should have a constant urge to seek and pursue improvement in the patterns of living which is dictated by the inherent aesthetic urge of man. We have also noted earlier the diverse needs of socio-cultural significance and their various categories which are attained by man in the first stage of social development, according to Shāh Walī Allāh.

When man seeks the satisfaction of these basic needs in a refined and sophisticated manner so as to improve and develop their means further, this gives birth to five sciences. When these sciences emerge in a society and guide man's pursuit of his basic needs, he achieves a higher degree of social progress which constitutes the second stage of *irtifāq*.

These five sciences are:

1. *al-ḥikmah al-ma'āshiyyah* or the wisdom living;

2. *al-ḥikmah al-iktisābiyyah* or 'earning wisdom';
3. *al-ḥikmah al-manziliyyah* or 'household wisdom';
4. *al-ḥimkah al-ta'āmuliyyah* or 'business wisdom'; and
5. *al-ḥikmah al-ta'āwuniyyah* or 'co-operative wisdom'.[180]

1. The Wisdom of Living

This science deals with that department of human knowledge which guides man towards desirable manners and etiquettes of living. When society reaches the highest level of the second stage of social development (*irtifāq*) in the satisfaction of its needs pertaining to the manners and mores of living, the sum-total of practices that evolve in this process are further streamlined by experience. The experience which is collectively gained by the society recommends certain beneficial practices in this behalf, and disapproves some attitudes as detrimental to the common weal. The former are, therefore, further reinforced, while the latter are eschewed. In the same manner, these practices are also subjected to the scrutiny of the principles of excellent morals that are inculcated in the people who have perfect temperaments. Whichever of these practices is found in accord with the requirements of excellent morals is adopted and the rest is abandoned. These practices also undergo a process of further refinement by another standard. All such activities are adopted which fulfil the requirements of sociability and amicable co-existence among the members of the society. The final standard of judgement in retaining or eschewing these practices is, of course, their compatibility with the aim of the 'universality of purpose' *(al-ra'y al-kullī)*.[181]

Thus before any habit or collective behaviour acquires the status of a custom or convention of the society, it undergoes a long and thorough process of scrutiny both from pragmatic considerations and ethical standpoints. Not only that, the customs and practices in vogue in a society become permanent parts of a society's culture only if they fully conform to the ultimate human aim of the 'universality of purpose', which is the chief distinction between man and animal in Shāh Walī Allāh's philosophy. It is according to this distinction that every quality which makes man distinct from the beasts is either a sign of moral virtue or of cultural accomplishment.[182]

The main issues dealt with in this science are: manners of eating, drinking, walking, sitting, sleeping, various methods of personal hygiene, conjugal life, dressing, maintenance of household, cleanliness, beauty care,

manners of conversation, medication, practice of incantation for the cure of diseases, feasts on happy occasions like birth, marriage and also other festivals, and celebrating the returning home of a traveller, mourning on grievous events, visiting the sick and burying the dead.[183]

The customs and conventions mentioned by Shāh Walī Allāh above are mostly parts of the universal human culture which,according to him, is rooted in 'healthy human temperaments'. It is clear that there has been no cultured social group of human beings in the past, nor is there any today, in which a good number of such practices is not found.[184]

Elaborating the 'universally followed customs' of human culture, Shāh Walī Allāh points to a number of positive and negative elements of behavioural patterns that are according to him, a matter of social consensus "among the inhabitants of the civilised societies, who have healthy temperaments, and whose examples are worthy of notice".[185] For instance, it is accepted by all such people that dirty food should not be eaten. Such people also prefer to serve food in utensils on proper dining tables, recommend the cleaning of face and hands before taking meals, and avoid improper postures and expression of greedy feelings. Such people also abstain from drinking stinking water, or drinking it directly without using any pots, or gulping it down. There is also a social consensus on maintaining personal hygiene and keeping the environment, particularly the areas of human habitation and their surroundings, clean. They also agree that a married woman should attend to the requirements of beauty care with dyestuff, jewellery and other means. They also agree that dressing is grace and nakedness is a disgrace, and that the exposure of the private parts is an abomination. Further, there is social consensus among various human societies on the desirability of adopting proper modes of speech. This involves choice of pleasant words and expressions that are both easy to pronounce for the speaker's tongue and, at the same time, are not disgusting for the ears of the listeners.[186]

This survey of the universally acknowledged and adopted patterns of social and cultural behaviour leads Shāh Walī Allāh to the conclusion that "in every department of life, there are some universally accepted ideas among peoples of different societies, however, remote they might be from each other in time or space".[187] He, however, grants that there exist variations in different societies as to the detailed rules concerning manners and etiquettes. Further, there also occur some differences which are attributable to the varying approaches that are adopted in addressing the different problems of human society. A physician, for instance, shall evolve

certain behavioural patterns in accord with the priorities of the medical science, and an astrologer, according to the assumed properties of stars. But a theologian derives his ideas from the principles of *iḥsān*, i.e., considerations of spiritual proximity to the 'holy quarters'.

Despite this apparent similarity in the cultural phenomena at the macro level described above, Shāh Walī Allāh does not disregard the existence of variations and diversities of cultural patterns at the micro level. Each human society, according to him, possesses a set of visible fashions and folkways whereby its members are distinguished from the rest of mankind.[188]

2. Science of Family and Management of Household

Another important component of human culture at the second stage of social development is the science of the family and household management. Shāh Walī Allāh defines it in the following words: "the wisdom of discovering ways and means for preserving relations between the members of one house at the second level of *irtifāq*".[189] Acquisition of this wisdom enables man to cultivate the qualities of excellence which are to be supplemented by empirical knowledge in order to pursue general welfare in his dealing with other members of his household and with friends of the family.[190]

Shāh Walī Allāh identifies four issues that form the subject-matter of this science. These are marriage, procreation, ownership, and companionship. In a manner peculiar to him, he deals with these issues by tracing the roots of the institution of family. According to him, man's instinctive need for sexual intercourse necessitates contact and fellowship between man and woman. The affectionate predilection of the parents toward their children, a predilection which is common to both the parents, demands mutual cooperation in bringing up the children. While a female by dint of her natural endowments is abler than a male to nurse children, she is weaker in intelligence and generally tends to evade hardships. At the same time, she is more perfect in modesty and attachment to her home, more skilful in looking after secondary matters, and has a greater capacity for sacrifice. A male, on the other hand, is intellectually stronger, abler to protect himself from disgrace, and has more courage than his female partner to undertake challenging tasks. Also, he has a higher capacity to wander about, to impose himself, to debate with others, and to zealously pursue his aims. These natural tendencies of the two sexes lead male and female to the necessary conclusion that the life of each is incomplete without the other.[191]

Shāh Walī Allāh finds a natural justification for the bond of matrimony in the psychological attitude of men toward women. He says that with regard to women men are highly jealous and are prone to strong rivalry. This can be overcome only by a proper and formal attachment of each male to his spouse in full knowledge of the society. Shāh Walī Allāh puts forth a rational argument to support the idea of prohibited categories of kinship (*maḥārim*) on the grounds that they are essential, not only for the sake of the free choice of husband by a woman, but also in order to ensure that a woman's chastity would be considered beyond all doubt by those who might solicit her matrimonial companionship. He further says that the sound instinct with which man has been endowed by nature disposes him not to desire the bond of marriage with someone from whom he is begotten or who is begotten from him, or who has grown with him like the two branches of the same tree.[192]

Although Shāh Walī Allāh's description of marriage in the context of human social evolution is not substantially different from the standard definitions given by the Muslim jurists, that is, "establishing a permanent bond between male and female, other than the relations in the prohibited degrees, in the presence of people, with offering a dower, and a prior proposal, having regard to proper match, involvement of guardians and a feast to publicise the event".[193] Shāh Walī Allāh, however, describes this phenomenon in a form which seems to be almost universally applicable. Indeed, barring a few negligible exceptions, the institution of marriage in almost all known cultures fulfils certain minimum requirements recognised in every society. Ever since the inception of human society, marriage has been the established procedure for founding a family and is usually symbolised by a ceremony. Its most prominent characteristic function in the sexual sphere is to sanction parenthood and to legitimize children. It typically involves the expectation of common residence, economic co-operation, and reproduction.[194]

Shāh Walī Allāh discusses the institution of marriage from different angles. His discussion contains elements of significance from the perspectives of various disciplines such as biology, psychology, anthropology and sociology. However, an elaboration of these elements would fall outside the main scope of our discussion. We would, therefore, confine our treatment here to the basic features of a healthy and balanced family life as identified by Shāh Walī Allāh. For the realisation of this goal which, according to him, is cherished by every normal human being, he assigns a positive role of responsibility to each of the three angles of the triangle which constitutes the main structure of a conjugal family, namely, husband, wife and

children.[195] In this context, Shāh Walī Allāh details the qualities of excellence that are normally expected from each of the three main participants in the familial enterprise. These qualities, according to him, represent the criteria for an ideal family.

"A good husband is expected not to be needy, nor lean and slender, nor irascible in temper, nor unsteady, nor incapable of going to women, nor afflicted with elephantiasis, leprosy or insanity, nor to be a parasite on others".[196] Moreover, he should live amiably with his wife and protect the sanctity of private life from indecency and disgrace.[197]

For a woman entering wedlock with a man possessing the above qualities, "it is recommended that she be pretty, virgin, fertile, chaste,affectionate toward children, loving toward her husband, trustworthy about his property, experienced in home management, and neither irascible in temper nor prone to fainting".[198]

As to the third angle of the triangle, that is children, Shāh Walī Allāh regards it as inherent in their nature that they are obedient to their parents. This is so because parents foster their children under their guidance, authority, affection, kindness and care, and become the masters of the children while they are still in their tender and impressionable age.[199] Thus the kind and loving attitude of children to their parents in the later stage of life, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, stems from the children's indebtedness to their parents. He goes further and says that this acknowledgement of kindness and love for him who has been kind to someone is even present in the nature of animals.[200] Therefore, it is a requirement of the 'moral rectitude' inherent in man's nature, that children be kind to their parents, and try to repay the good done to them earlier by their parents. Hence kindness to parents is an essential social norm and an absolute moral value in the estimation of Shāh Walī Allāh.[201]

For strengthening the bond of matrimony, Shāh Walī Allāh considers it necessary that there be lasting love between husband and wife and that each of them regard the gain or loss of the other as his/her own.[202] He contemplates a relation of equal partnership between the spouses. According to him, this partnership cannot be productive of the required results except by providing a firm foundation of *ulfah* (mutual affection and congeniality). But this affection and congeniality is contingent upon certain attitudes to which each partner should commit himself. These attitudes, apart from the purely legal obligations, include consolation of each other, forgiving each other's omissions, avoiding the behaviour which is conducive to resentment or ill will, humouring and amusing each other, and keeping a cheerful and jovial countenance toward each other, etc.[203]

After highlighting the significance of family as a primary and basic social unit, Shāh Walī Allāh proceeds to underline the importance of the cardinal principle of social cohesion between human beings, namely mutual co-operation. This is an inevitable need of every member of the society in order to cope with countless problems of life, and also to receive a return for performing one's obligations to others at various levels. For no human being can single-handedly solve the complex and diverse problems of life; in fact, everyone constantly depends on the co-operation of fellow beings. According to Shāh Walī Allāh, there are some rules of conduct for benefiting from, and providing this co-operation to, others. These rules are binding for everybody and are sanctioned by the entire society. Thus any violation of them incurs censure from other members of the society.[204] Shāh Walī Allāh recognises two main levels of co-operation and holds them to be subject to two considerations. First, they are subject to the nature of needs that prompt man to seek co-operation of his fellow-beings. Second, they are subject to the nature of the mutual relationship between those who extend co-operation or benefit from it.

The first level involves the need which can only be satisfied when someone regards the loss and gain of the other as his own, and exhausts all energies in supporting him by obligatory expenditure (e.g. maintenance of parents, spouse, children and other near kin as prescribed by the *sharī'ah*) and by other efforts. The same attitude of co-operation is, in turn, expected from the other side. This establishes the principle that the "enjoyment of a benefit incurs an obligation".[205] The most proper application of this level of multilateral co-operation is to relatives since their mutual love and consideration provides a natural incentive for it.

The other level of co-operation involves a relatively lower degree of mutual support and assistance. It includes all forms of help and aid extended to the disabled and the depressed members of the society, which is a universally accepted practice among mankind.[206]

Concluding his discussion of the subjects dealt with under the "science of family and the management of household", Shāh Walī Allāh lists the following items:

- reasons for marriage;
- factors compelling the abandonment of marriage;
- traditions of matrimony;
- qualities of spouses;

- modes of reconciliation between spouses should they violate their matrimonial obligations;
- procedures for divorce and mourning over the deceased spouse;
- nursing and upbringing of children;
- kindness to parents;
- treatment to slaves and servants;
- observance of obligations toward kith and kin;
- extending help and assistance to the poor and aid to those in adversity;
- respect for the chief of one's tribe or clan and the latter's obligations to look after his community;
- distribution of inheritance, and
- protection of lineage.

Every human society, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, upholds the main principles of the above norms and customs and strives for their establishment despite their difference in creed or geographic location.[207]

As the above survey would show, Shāh Walī Allāh focussed on different dimensions of the institution of family. His treatment of the subject, as usual, is comprehensive and multi-dimensional. He approaches the issues involved in this basic science—the science of family and household—from the biological, psychological, sociological, anthropological, micro-economic and ethical points of view. There is hardly any Muslim thinker after Shāh Walī Allāh who, to our knowledge, has enriched sociological thought to the extent that he did. In fact, most of the literature produced in the post-Walī Allāh period on the subject, specially in the subcontinent largely draws on the doctrinal framework of his sociology. It would perhaps be no exaggeration to say that Islamic Sociology has been virtually stagnant since Shāh Walī Allāh.

3. The Three Sciences of Human Transactions

Under this heading, Shāh Walī Allāh discusses three items, namely, the origin of exchange, the emergence of vocations and the ways and means of

establishing various forms of co-operation for the common good of society. He considers these "sciences of human transactions" among the basic components of the second stage of social development (*irtifāq*). These three sciences, taken together, have been defined as: "the wisdom to discover ways and means of establishing exchanges, mutual co-operation and modes of earning pertaining to the second stage of *irtifāq*". He deals with these three sciences of economic import under the heading of *fann al-mu'āmalāt* in *Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah*. In his other work, *al-Budūr al-Bāzighah*, however, he discusses each of these three sciences separately.[208]

We have seen above that the institution of family has been identified in the sociology of Shāh Walī Allāh as a multi-dimensional phenomenon. It is conceived as an important instrument for satisfying some needs of an economic character on the primary level. When the individual is unable to meet certain needs, this leads to the emergence of the family. When it is not possible for the family to fulfil all its economic requirements by itself, there arises the need to have barter or to have recourse to commodity economy because human needs are ever-increasing. Further, man's aesthetic urge constantly inspires him to attain higher standards of excellence so as to "provide comfort to the eye and pleasure to the soul".[209]

While still at the primary levels of livelihood by horticultural and pastoral means, man is able to develop some commodities which satisfy his needs and those of his family, without much external aid. As his needs increase, he is compelled to occupy himself with making other commodities, or providing some services, in order to barter them for his needs.[210]

Further diversification in needs opens avenues of specialisation and division of labour, so that efforts of all individual members of the society, taken together, fulfil the needs of the entire society. This is a higher level of exchange than barter, which necessitates an unwritten agreement among the members of the society. Under this agreement, each member undertakes to provide a certain need, to specialise in it, and to work for providing all instruments necessary for it. This agreement is a natural compulsion of the society because a lot of people are interested in certain commodities and not interested in others. For enabling everyone to acquire what he needs, the society adopts a *modus operandi*. "It agrees to employ some durable metallic objects as instruments of exchange between people, and it becomes an established usage among them. Since the best of metallic objects to be used for this purpose were gold and silver owing to their small size, identical forms, tremendous benefits for human body, and their common use for beautification, they were adopted as real money and other things were treated as money by agreement".[211]

When division of labour takes place in response to the divergent needs of the society, there emerge a number of vocations that are adopted by different individuals depending on their variant aptitudes, competence and peculiar circumstances. These vocations also afford people regular opportunities to seek their livelihood. According to Shāh Walī Allāh, the basic professions that are necessary to satisfy the essential human needs are confined to the following categories:

- that which pertains to waging war against infidels, to expressing an opinion on a point of law, and so forth;
- that which relates to providing food;
- that which relates to the supply of dress;
- that which relates to the procurement of drink;
- that which relates to provision of housing;
- that which relates to import or export of goods to meet the needs of the people; and
- that which relates to hunting, fishing, or gathering of other valuable things from land and sea, from mountains and plains.[212]

Choice of vocations by different individuals is mainly determined, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, by two factors: (i) the aptitude and ability of the individual concerned, as pointed out above; and (ii) the availability of suitable means and opportunities for a vocation and the society's need for it.[213]

There are some individuals in every society who are not morally strong enough to adopt good vocations. They become so degenerate morally as to have recourse to those means of earning which bring harm to the society in different ways such as theft, gambling, and beggary.[214] When, pursuant to the conditions enumerated above, various vocations are designated for different members of the society, the second stage of social development (*irtifāq*) expands to its full, opening avenues for trade and commerce. Different forms and modes of business like buying and selling, renting and loaning are widely practiced.[215] At this stage the society moves forward towards increasing opportunities of business transaction and mutual co-operation. This mutual co-operation cannot be regularised without recourse to some contracts, stipulations, and a general agreement in the society on

certain established conventions. Thus there emerge such practices as crop-sharing (*muzāra'ah*), profit-and-loss sharing (*muḍārabah*), hire *(ijārah)*, partnership (*mushārakah*), and agency (*wakālah*).[216]

When people engage in such activities, they naturally experience, in the course of time, breach of obligations, evasion of responsibilities, and various manners of procrastination in their mutual dealings. They resort to calling people to witness, to the writing of deeds, and preparing other necessary documents, mortgages, sureties, bills of exchange, and similar other procedures. Thus, diverse modes and procedures of economic transactions emerge, and gradually form part of the society's permanent customs and conventions.[217]

Moreover, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, integrity and cohesion cannot be maintained in a society without creating mutual love and congeniality among its members. This requires, among other things, that at times people are provided with their needs without any return. This consideration gives rise to the customs of gift and lending. The same consideration also demands that the less affluent members of the society are helped by the more affluent. This gives rise to the practice of almsgiving *(ṣadaqah)*.[218]

This attitude of mutual help and assistance is all the more necessitated by the fact that all individuals in a society are neither equally competent, nor sufficiently rich to be able at all times to meet all their needs. Besides, some individuals are disposed to undertake trivial jobs which others disdain; some are strained for want of basic necessities of life, while others enjoy luxuriant living. The living of all members of the society, therefore, cannot be maintained without mutual help and assistance.[219]

When the main components of social and cultural progress, which Shāh Walī Allāh discusses with reference to the five basic sciences, are actualised, human society fully attains the second stage of social development (*irtifāq*). The sequence in which he mentions these sciences is indicative of their order of precedence and importance in his mind. However, in his two main works, *Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah* and *al-Budūr al-Bāzighah*, in which he has discussed these ideas at length, and which mainly embody his socio-political doctrines, we find a difference in their order and arrangement. One possible explanation for this variation might be that the former work not only seems to belong to a relatively earlier period, but also appears, as a result of comparative analysis, to be an outline for his later and more gigantic enterprise, *Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah.* This concision and rudimentary form and relative lack of sequence which characterises *al-Budūr al-Bāzighah* lends further support to our view. Hence, it can be safely assumed that the order maintained and the emphases placed by Shāh Walī Allāh in the

treatment of this subject in *Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah,* represents not only his later views, but also the more carefully considered ones. Besides, there seems to be greater logical coherence in the order maintained in the *Ḥujjah,* as we shall presently see.

At the very outset, Shāh Walī Allāh discusses the "science of the manners of living", as the foremost pre-requisite of social evolution. Now this aspect of human culture provides the mainstay for every society. Without reference to the mores and manners of living prevalent in a society we cannot assess its moral fibre and cultural worth. The more a society's manners and mores are in conformity with the universal norms of decency and rules of ethics and morality, the higher it rises in terms of the standards of culture and civilisation. Therefore, the "science of the manners of living" has been rightly considered by Shāh Walī Allāh as the foremost criterion of the ethical and cultural level of a social organisation.

The second in Shāh Walī Allāh's order of discussion is the "science of family and management of household". Now, almost all sociologists worth any note agree on the pivotal importance of family as the basic unit of a social organisation. In many ways, society is nothing but an enlargement of family. If the latter is established on sound and healthy foundations, and its moral fibre in strong, it will eventually be conducive to the consolidation of the social organisation. But if moral values loosen their grip on the family, there remains no way for strengthening their hold on the society as a whole. Similarly, if there is fairness and justice in the mutual relations of members of the families, positive effects would be visible in the relations between the various groups of society.

The third in Shāh Walī Allāh's order of importance is the group of sciences pertaining to economic transactions. Naturally, the prospective actors who will come forward to play various roles in market places and business centres, would be drawn from the general body social consisting of families. If human beings will have attained sufficient moral accomplishment and cultural refinement in the first and second phases of social evolution as mentioned earlier, it would, *ipso facto,* yield its fruits and moral values would dominate economic life and business enterprise. This will also heighten the spirit of co-operative activity which is so vital for the welfare of a society.

Thus there appears to be a well-thought-out and logical order in the various components of human culture identified by Shāh Walī Allāh as necessary steps in the social evolution of man.

We have noted earlier that the social evolution which starts in the life of man with the acquisition of language, the primary instrument of culture

and communication with fellow-beings progresses further as human needs multiply and assume diverse forms. The expansion of social structure goes side by side with the development of refined manners and mores, fads and fashions, and the diversification in the modes of business transaction and economic co-operation which enriches culture and civilization. Further, as we have already noted, Shāh Walī Allāh traces various phases through which human culture passes and considers this graded progress to be quite natural. He cites many paradigms which, in modern parlance, would relate to cultural anthropology, paradigms that are universally applicable. Shāh Walī Allāh demonstrates that each phase in the socio-cultural development paves the way for the attainment of the subsequent higher stage. These stages, which he calls *irtifāqāt*, finally lead the society to the primary political stage of *madīnah*, which Shāh Walī Allāh considers the third *irtifāq*. This third stage is a natural outcome of all the achievements made in the preceding two stages. Moreover, the third stage, as its very nature requires, is the pinnacle of the whole pyramid of social organisation.[220]

As in the preceding stages of social development, wherein the society required a number of basic sciences to fulfil various needs of domestic, cultural and economic life, the third stage also requires the science of 'civics' for the realization of various objectives related to it. Shāh Walī Allāh defines this science, as "the wisdom of discovering methods of preserving the relations which exist between the members of a city-state".[221]

Elucidating his concept of city-state, Shāh Walī Allāh points out that it is "a socio-economically homogenous group of people, who conduct regular transactions among them".[222] He regards the city-state as "an organic whole while each group of people and each family are the constituent parts of it".[223]

Society's acquisition of the five basic sciences and their interaction is further reinforced by moral excellence and mutual co-operation. All this leads to the emergence of a socio-political organisation, i.e. *madīnah*, which is Shāh Walī Allāh's standard term for city-state. *Madīnah* is not merely a city; if the citizens of a group of cities and towns have this interaction and co-operation among them, this group will also be termed as *madīnah*. Moreover, "a *madīnah* is not confined to its boundaries, its bazars and its edifices. It is, in fact, a special kind of relationship among various groups".[224]

According to Shāh Walī Allāh, a society attains the stage of political organisation when a "bond is created between various groups of people such as farmers, merchants , and craftsmen, etc., when men carry on various transactions with one another, and different men specialise in different

occupations, and seek help from each other, and as a result various forms of exchange of goods and co-operation come into being. It is these groups which, by dint of that unifying link, form the body of a city-state".[225] Unity is, therefore, a necessary precondition for a city-state, which cannot yield its full benefits without preserving and developing unity.[226]

According to Shāh Walī Allāh, when unity is established between the constituent groups of a society and is further reinforced by their mutual co-operation, this collective body resembles a single individual, having a kind of spiritual entity. This 'corporate' individual goes through phases of health and illness arising from outward and inward causes. To cure this corporate individual from its illnesses and to preserve its health, there should be a competent physician. This physician is the *imām* and those who adhere to him. According to Mahmood Ahmad Ghazi, a contemporary scholar of Shāh Walī Allāh, "...by *imām* Shāh Walī Allāh does not mean any particular individual; *imām* seems to be the equivalent of government or ruling group in his terminology".[227] Shāh Walī Allāh seems to recognize, on pragmatic grounds, the need and value of the institution of government. He regards this institution as a means for preserving the ethical and cultural accomplishments of the society on the one hand, and for safeguarding the individual and collective economic interests of its members on the other. According to him, a large body of men comprising the society do not always voluntarily abide by just and fair conventions, nor can they deter one another from wrongs except through achieving the distinction of an office; hence the need for establishing a government.[228]

Further, the developments brought about by man in the process of his social, cultural and economic evolution, on both micro and macro levels, require a political order for their preservation. Obviously, in order to discipline their individual and collective behaviour towards positive and useful orientation, human beings are in need of certain factors from without, along with some others from within. Moreover, there are certain other vital interests of the individual and the society which in Shāh Walī Allāh's opinion, provide the *raison d'etre* of a political order. For example, there is need for (i) a proper and equitable distribution of economic resources; (ii) a fair and profitable deployment of human labour and specialized skills in various fields of economic and cultural enterprise; (iii) deterring people from letting loose their criminal tendencies and thereby depriving others of the opportunity for social development; (iv) defending the society and its treasures from external aggression; (v) mobilizing the society to defend itself in the event of such an aggression; (vi) engaging in other positive activities conducive to public welfare such as construction of wells, market

places, bridges and irrigation systems, food supply and providing means of communication, and maintenance of public health; and (vii) introducing devices for spiritual guidance and moral reform. All these and many other objectives of public weal and welfare warrant the establishment of an agency comprising able men from among the members of the society so that it may undertake the above tasks on behalf of the society. This gives rise to establishing the agency of government on its primary level, i.e. the city-state.[229]

The Primary Stage of Political Organization

Shah Walī Allah conceives the third stage of social development to be the first stage of political organisation. At this stage, the natural evolution of human society leads to the identification of an individual who would head, on behalf of the society, the agency to carry out a number of responsibilities. For this purpose, this institution is invested by the society with some authority. Referring to this individual, on different occasions, Shāh Walī Allāh employs two terms, almost interchangeably, namely, *imām* (leader) or *malik* (king).[230] In the context of this preliminary stage of political organisation, he does not use the word 'government' or any other term equivalent to it. But the characteristic features of the third stage of social evolution, as he has portrayed them, make up the conditions of the primary form of government. Moreover, he discusses a society's need at this stage for a ruler who is assisted by a number of aides to carry out certain duties. These duties are universally acknowledged to constitute the functions of the government from time immemorial.[231]

It appears that Shāh Walī Allāh does not attach much importance to the concept of government as an abstract institution, at least in its preliminary stage. But as he develops his political philosophy and proceeds to spell out his conception of *khilāfah*,[232] he conceives it in a somewhat abstract form, as we shall see later.[233]

We also find that Shāh Walī Allāh explains the natural ingredients of a government with reference to the qualifications which he deems necessary in a ruler. Therefore, when he uses such terms as *imām* or *malik*, these can be considered, in a sense, equivalents of 'government' in the absence of any other appellation conveying that meaning.

These necessary qualities of rulers have been set forth by Shāh Walī Allāh as a universal paradigm of government in that they offer a solution to the problems faced by every society in the realization of its vital interests.

Some of these qualities are in the nature of personal traits such as bravery, intelligence, balanced temperament and mental alertness, etc. There are other qualities as well which pertain to a conscious moral and political conduct that the rulers are required to adhere to. Without these qualities, Shāh Walī Allāh considers the ruler to be a burden on the city-state.[234]

The minimum essential qualities of a ruler, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, are the following:

- Sanity, adulthood and maleness;
- bravery: if a ruler is not brave, he would show weakness in confronting aggressors, and his own subjects would look down upon him;
- forbearance and gentleness, so that the subjects do not collapse under his powerful authority;
- wisdom: so that he is able to formulate proper public policies;
- extraordinary understanding and judgement; the ability to listen, observe and articulate; an acute ability to sense the state of public psychology;
- noble birth: he should be widely acknowledged as such; and
- reputation among people for dedication to the welfare of society with a practical record testifying to this reputation.[235]

According to Shāh Walī Allāh, the above qualities are recognised among people of all regions and religions because the objectives for which a ruler is installed cannot be achieved by him without possessing these qualities. When a society disregards any of them, that leads to unpleasant consequences and resentment among the populace.[236]

Aides and Lieutenants of rulers

No ruler, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, can carry out his duties toward public policy without being assisted by a number of honest and competent aides and lieutenants who are his well-wishers, both openly and secretly. The aides ought to be answerable to the ruler, but the latter should not be under any obligation to them on account of kinship or otherwise.[237]

Shāh Walī Allāh recognizes three main categories of aides and lieutenants, and considers them as essential for a city-state as different parts

and limbs of a human body. These categories in fact represent different departments into which the functions of a government are usually distributed. These have been identified by Shāh Walī Allāh with reference to the individuals who look after them and whom he considers the chief and foremost lieutenants of a ruler. They are:

- Those who protect the city-state from the treachery of enemies. Shāh Walī Allāh likens them to the two hands in the human body that carry arms.
- Those who formulate various policies and run the general affairs of the city-state. Shāh Walī Allāh considers them to be as important for the city-state as the natural potential in the human biological system.
- Those who advise the ruler. They are to the ruler like intellect and sensory apparatus are to an individual.[238]

As to the number of aides and lieutenants needed by a ruler, in the opinion of Shāh Walī Allāh, that may vary according to the difference in the requirements of the city-state. There may be more than one aide in-charge of one department, or one aide for a number of departments as expediency requires.[239]

On different occasions Shāh Walī Allāh employs different terms to denote different aides/heads of departments necessary to assist the ruler in the governance of the city-state. Similarly, the number of aides to whom he assigns various departments, varies in his different writings. While in *Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālligha*h he mentions five chief aides, in his earlier work, *al-Budūr al-Bāzighah*, this number is seven with the addition of two more functionaires. The first is called *Shaykh al-Islām*, an authoritative representative of Islamic Law, who issues authentic edicts on matters involving doctrinal questions, in order to enthrone religion in human life and to arrange for religious preaching. He has also been called "teacher of good morals" on another occasion. The second is called *ḥakīm*, a versatile intellectual, with knowledge of medicine, astrology, history, arithmetic and art of composition. Shāh Walī Allāh considers a ruler's need for expertise in these fields to be self-evident.[240]

A possible explanation for this variation could be that Shāh Walī Allāh might have been visualising an Islamic framework when he emphasised the need for a ruler to be assisted by a *Shaykh al-Islām,* while in the *Ḥujjah* his terms of reference are defined by a universal paradigm of city-state. As we have noted before, in the *Ḥujjah* Shāh Walī Allāh traces the natural evolution of society from its most primitive stage upto the level of its eventual

Islamic form of political dispensation. He, therefore, conceives the emergence of five departments looked after by the ruler's aides in this process of socio-political evolution as a minimum requirement of every city-state, irrespective of whether it adheres to Islam or not.

The five 'chief aides' identified by Shāh Walī Allāh as the main functionaries in-charge of the basic departments in a city-state are the following:

1. **Judge:** He should be free, male, adult, sane, competent, and possessing knowledge of the established norms and conventions of human transactions. He should be firm, but at the same time mild and patient. He should not pronounce any judgement without considering all the evident and hidden circumstances, and all relevant antecedents and evidences whether written or otherwise pertaining to the case concerned. Further, he should give full opportunity to both the plaintiff and the defendant to explain their positions. Thus he would be able to ascertain exactly what is pleaded by each litigant.[241]

2. **Commander of the Soldiers** *(Amīr Al-Ghuzāt):* It is essential for him to know all about war machinery, formation and organisation of brave soldiers and gallant fighters. He should also be fully aware of the capacity of the troops under his command. Besides, he ought to understand the methods of equipping the army, and the techniques of deploying spies and informers to gather all necessary information about the enemy's tactics. Moreover, before engaging in any war, he should consider exactly what is his aim in that war.[242]

3. **Administrator** *(Sā'is al-Madīnah)*: He is the over-all in-charge of the internal affairs of a city-state. He should be an experienced man with full understanding of the means of welfare and the causes of decay. He should be firm and patient. But the exercise of patience should not lead to suppressing his reaction over the things that he abhors. He should appoint, for every group of people, someone in-charge of their affairs (viz. *naqīb*),[243] who is fully aware of their conditions.[244]

4. **Tax-collector** *('Āmil)*: He should know the ways and means of collecting taxes and distributing them among those who are entitled to them. The term employed by Shāh Walī Allāh for this office in *Ḥujjah* is *'āmil*, while in *al-Budūr* we find the term *wazīr*. But the functions assigned to them in both the works are more or less identical.[245]

5. **Secretary** *(Wakīl):* He is responsible for the living of the ruler because the latter cannot personally attend to many things due to his pre-occupation with important affairs of the city-state.[246]

Sources of Corruption in the City-State

Discussing the different factors that hinder the progress of culture and civilisation in the city-state, Shāh Walī Allāh identifies a number of causes of decadence that are of common occurrence. The most prominent of these are the following:

- Disunity in matters of religion which is not often without elements of false pride and vanity. For if these elements creep into man's relations with God, he will be afflicted with evil consequences in the Hereafter. If there appear syndromes of fraud and corruption in the economic life of people, their temporal well-being will be adversely affected. Besides, division and discord among people often lead to disputes and litigations that are the root-cause of decadence in a city-state. The remedy for this social malaise lies in urging the apostates and all deviators from the straight path to repent; but if they persist, there is no other option left save putting such corrupt elements to death.[247]

- Concealed forms of corruption like magic, poisoning, and mischief by scoundrels among traders who purchase goods and sell them without employing any money. Their sole purpose is to defraud people and deprive them of their rights. Another instance of this concealed form of corruption is the profession practiced by unscrupulous lawyers who teach people tricks of litigation and various methods of subterfuge. These forms also include clandestine activities of spies, who spy on behalf of the enemies of the city-state. All such individuals deserve to be imprisoned or put to death.[248]

- Violation of the sanctity of properties belonging to people such as usurpation, theft, or robbery. Those guilty of such crimes should be punished in an appropriate manner.

- Crimes of homicide which might have been committed either deliberately or by mistake, or crimes in which injuries are caused to the human body.

- Slander and defaming the honour of people and violating the sanctity of their genealogies e.g. false accusation of un-chastity, or recourse to vilification or use of vile language against people.

- Instigating people to commit adultery which, in addition to other consequences, incites violence and fights among people, corrupts human race and degrades the institution of marriage, the preservation of which is so vital for every society. Another form of such evil is sodomy which destroys the healthy nature of man, corrupts the human race and puts marriage into disrepute. Included in the sources of corruption are such evil practices as gambling and usury which lead to the squandering of money and generate unlimited disputes among people, and drinking wine which, apart from causing damage to faith, gives rise to numerous fights and quarrels;

- Corruption also ensues from attempts to distort the characteristics of each of the two genders, masculine and feminine. Through such attempts, the masculine traits of males and the feminine traits of females are deformed in dress and demeanour.[249]

The Fourth Stage of Social Development (*Irtifāq*)

Human aspiration for progressive accomplishments in culture and civilization through attaining higher degrees of social cohesion prompt people to go further beyond the stage of city-state. Besides, the emergence of a plurality of city-states creates certain conditions in their mutual relations, prompting them to establish a common basis for co-existence. This gives rise to a kind of confederacy or commonwealth of various city-states. Under this confederacy, they enter into a formal relationship in pursuit of common goals of peace, security, justice and public weal. For these ends, the city-states have to voluntarily forego certain rights that are to be exercised by the confederacy on their behalf. This constitutes the highest stage of social development which, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, is a natural outcome of the developments hitherto achieved by the human society. He calls this stage the fourth *irtifāq*.[250]

Shāh Walī Allāh had, perhaps, two main models of such a confederacy in mind when he formulated the above concept. These were the Mughal empire, based in Delhi, and the Ottoman empire, centred in Constantinople. They were the two greatest Muslim empires of his time. Each of them comprised semi-independent states and autonomous entities which had many

characteristics similar to those identified by Shāh Walī Allāh in his city-state. The presence of these examples in practice might have influenced his thinking, even if in a minor way, about confederacy.

In modern political parlance we can say that the confederacy envisaged by Shāh Walī Allāh mainly exercises its authority in the spheres of foreign relations and defence. In financial matters, the city-states or the units of the confederacy are invested with a large measure of autonomy, except that they are obliged to surrender a portion of their respective revenues to the confederacy. This is further supplemented by their participation in the armed forces of the confederacy for the defence of its territorial and ideological frontiers. But the forces provided by the units are to act under the supreme command of the confederacy.

Shāh Walī Allāh's writings on this subject show that he does not conceive the state as a centralized repository of authority similar to some of the modern unitary systems of government with concentration of power. For example, his distribution of the functions between various departments at the level of city-state with many checks and balances rules out any form of unitary government, autocracy or even oligarchy.[251] Further, the institution of *naqīb*s, as explained by him, clearly suggests exercise of autonomous political authority by providing sufficient financial resources at the grass-roots level of the city-state.[252]

Shāh Walī Allāh does not entertain any totalitarian notions about the state. This is indicated, *inter alia*, by his strong emphasis on minimising the burden of taxes on farmers, traders and craftsmen on the one hand, and by his insistence on keeping a reduced size of the administrative machinery of the state whose living is dependent on the public exchequer, on the other. Indeed, he considers the burdening of small earning groups with heavy taxes, while keeping a large number of individuals dependent on the exchequer, to be one of the main sources of decay in his times.[253]

As we have noted in the case of city-states, Shāh Walī Allāh does not designate his idea of confederacy by any particular term which he would consistently use in every subsequent reference to it. On some occasions, he calls it *al-khilāfah al-'uẓmā* ('supreme vicegerency'). On other occasions, he discusses it with reference to the *khalīfah*, the agent responsible for administering it as its head. This head has also been called *ṭabīb al-aṭibbā'* ('the supreme physician') on another occasion, while in the same context, the ruler of a city-state has been termed as *al-ṭabīb* ('the physician'). At other places Shāh Walī Allāh uses such titles as *khalīfat al-khulafā'* (the supreme vicegerent) and *imām al-a'immah* (the supreme leader), or *malik*

al-mulūk (the king of kings). While on some occasions the ruler of city-state has been called *khalīfah*, *imām* or *malik*, on another occasion Shāh Walī Allāh uses the term *al-khalīfah al-a'ẓam* (the supreme vicegerent). This is where he talks about the highest level of political authority.[254]

By alternating these variant terms on different occasions, Shāh Walī Allāh seems to consciously emphasize various roles that he assigns to the office of *khalīfah* or *khalīfat al-khulafā'*. *Khalīfah* is a standard Islamic term of which the most remarkable signification is that authority is a sacred trust, and therefore, its incumbent is obliged to exercise it accordingly. Similarly, the term *imām* points to the fact that a ruler is also a community leader, which involves a high level of moral integrity, social obligation and even spiritual responsibility. Also the term *ṭabīb* or *ṭabīb al-aṭibbā'*, whether used in the context of city-state, or any higher political organisation, necessarily implies an attitude of extreme diligence, sincerity and altruism on the part of the ruler toward the ruled. Further, it signifies an educative and corrective role of the rulers, who should constantly apprise themselves of the conditions of their society, to diagnose its maladies and devise their remedies. It is because of the realisation of such moral objectives that Shāh Walī Allāh stipulates the participation of the "teachers of good morals" in the actual conduct of the business of the state, side by side with the rulers.[255]

Thus, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, when human society continues its development and cultural progress to reach the level of city-state, and a number of city-states emerge in different areas, there arises the need for a science relating to city-state. By acquiring this science, people from various city-states learn how to fulfill the requirements of this higher stage of socio-political development, which constitutes the fourth *irtifāq*. Shāh Walī Allāh defines this science as "the wisdom of dealing with the political and administrative patterns of governors and rulers of city-states, and the ways and means of preserving the relationship between the people of various countries;.[256]

Discussing the factors leading to the fourth *irtifāq*, Shāh Walī Allāh says that selfishness, greed and jealousy are bound to appear among people when a ruler consolidates his authority in his city-state, collects revenues and mobilises armies of gallant men. This results in disruption of the established conventions of civilised behaviour in mutual relations. If this situation is not properly controlled, different people, mobilised under their respective rulers would fight each other, causing colossal loss of life and property. This would ruin the peace and tranquillity of human life, and all achievements in the sphere of socio-cultural development, i.e. *irtifāqāt*,

would be undermined. Moreover, the organised groups of people who acquire power, motivated by 'individual purposes' *(al-ra'y al-juz'ī)*, often resort to the use of force against the weak so as to exploit them. This vitiates all norms of justice and equity. It is, therefore, imperative to instal a *khalīfah* to look after the common interests of peace, security, justice and public welfare which are shared by all the city-states. For the realisation of this objective it is necessary that the *khalīfah*, in addition to possessing perfect moral qualities and political acumen, should also have such tremendous power and prestige that it would be well nigh impossible for anyone to challenge or usurp his authority. When a *khalīfah* is installed in office and establishes virtuous patterns of conduct in his realm, subjugates all those who might pose a threat to his authority, and secures the active cooperation of the rulers of different city-states, life is filled with prosperity and contentment.[257]

The above observations of Shāh Walī Allāh concerning the unbridled pursuit of selfish and parochial political and economic interests by organised and powerful political groups and their recourse to various forms of oppressive and exploitative policies toward the smaller and weaker communities can be fully substantiated by historical evidence. The experience of humanity with nationalism during the last hundred and fifty years or so bears ample testimony to the soundness of Shāh Walī Allāh's diagnosis. Although he lived at a time when humanity had not fully tasted the bitter fruits of the cult of nationalism, which brought in its wake the worst forms of economic imbalance between the rich and the poor communities, Shāh Walī Allāh's acute grasp of the collective psychology of nations and his penetrating analysis of the political behaviour of mighty states, evidences the profundity of his political genius. This originality of thought is almost without any known parallel not only in the Muslim academic tradition, but perhaps also in world scholarship in the recent history of mankind.

Shāh Walī Allāh's views also bring into sharp focus the incompatibility between the *weltanschauung* of Islam and the contemporary political philosophy of nationalism. For the latter appears to be nothing but an enlargement of man's egocentric and promethean pursuit of individual interest *(al-ra'y al-juz'ī)* to the detriment of the universal purpose *(al-ra'y al-kullī)* which constitutes the borderline between human civilization and the world of beasts ruled by the law of the jungle, according to the philosophy of Shāh Walī Allāh.[258]

It has already been noted that the most prominent cause for setting up a confederacy, or entering the fourth stage of *irtifāq*, to use Shāh Walī Allāh's characteristic terminology, is that no human society is devoid of

some wicked elements whose brutish nature ceaselessly harbours designs of plundering the properties of peaceful people. These elements thus pose a threat to their life and honour, necessitating the establishment of justice on firm foundations. This *raison d'etre* of confederacy is also the fundamental function of the *khalīfah*. But no system of justice can be kept intact without maintaining physical force which could be used against those individuals or organized groups who might attempt to totally destroy this system. For this purpose the *khalīfah* requires an army and a war machinery. At the same time, the *khalīfah* needs to understand the factors calling for war or peace and such means of containment as imposition of land-tax, or tribute. He should not engage in war for its own sake. Rather, he ought to carefully consider his motives at the time of going to war. The motives justifying war, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, are repulsion of injustice and extermination of extremely wicked elements who are well-nigh past reform. As to the less wicked elements, they may be suppressed by measures short of war such as by curbing the activities of some wrong-doers, by executing or imprisoning their ring leaders, or confiscating their lands and properties. In this connection Shāh Walī Allāh strongly emphasises that in the furtherance of a cause, the *khalīfah* should not take any strong action unless it is necessary and is warranted by overwhelmingly valid reasons.[259]

Like other points of similarity noted earlier, in considering the phenomenon of state to be a social necessity, Shāh Walī Allāh has been preceded by Abū Naṣr al-Farābī.[260] This most outstanding political philosopher of the classical Islamic period, tremendously influenced almost all subsequent Muslim political thinkers of any significance in a variety of ways as we have already noted in the preceding chapter. Among others, one of the most celebrated exponents of Muslim political thought in the post-Fārābī period, al-Māwardī, developed under Fārābī's influence the doctrine that establishing political authority was a social necessity and that the maintenance of social order demanded the office of kingship and obedience to a ruler.[261]

According to Shāh Walī Allāh, one of the devices through which the *khalīfah* might enhance his prestige and make his office formidable, is to win over the hearts of his subjects. To this end, it is necessary for the *khalīfah* to know the level of usefulness of every functionary in his government. He should neither charge anyone nor depend on anybody beyond his capacity. Further, he should acknowledge the standing of leading and shrewd individuals. While pursuing formidable tasks such as war, a *khalīfah* should have recourse to means that will inspire people variously with fear and expectation.[262]

No *khalīfah* is able to fully discharge his avowed responsibilities without exercising unquestioned authority. It is necessary, therefore, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, that the *khalīfah* should pay his utmost attention to dispersing the alliances of rulers (of city-states). This would blunt the edge of their possible animosity, and would inspire awe in their hearts and prompt them to submit to his authority for they would then have no other option.[263]

Moreover, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, the *khalīfah* is the overseer and protector of a system combining in its fold heterogenous elements. It is therefore necessary for him to remain alert, to disperse his spies in every nook and corner, and above all, to utilise his own penetrating acumen. Whenever he senses any rebellious move from any individual, he should hasten to take preventive measures against his possible advances. He should not rest until he has destroyed the power base of his adversary and has rendered him incapable of posing any threat to his confederacy.[264]

At the same time, Shāh Walī Allāh emphasises that the *khalīfah* should make constant efforts to achieve general acceptability among his subjects so that their popular consensus in his favour becomes an established fact. However, he does not consider that merely the verbal acceptance of his authority would be sufficient. Rather, he deems it necessary that there should be some evident signs of this acceptance. For instance, prayers should be offered for his success and a public acknowledgement of his authority should be expressed in large gatherings. Further, the public should adopt those symbols for their expression of allegiance which are prescribed by the *khalīfah*. In this connection, Shāh Walī Allāh cites an example from the practice which had been in vogue in his own time viz. engraving on the coins the name of the *khalīfah*.[265]

Shāh Walī Allāh's Conception of Islamic State and its Relation to His Fourth *Irtifāq*

We have so far attempted to survey the ideas of Shāh Walī Allāh concerning the evolution of human society and its gradual cultural development. This development goes through various phases before reaching the political stage when the city-state (third *irtifāq*) emerges. This development continues further to culminate in the attainment of the level of confederacy (fourth *irtifāq*). These ideas of Shāh Walī Allāh seem to be some kind of an empirical survey of macro-sociological nature in which he does not introduce Islamic norms, except that he alludes to them on two occasions. The first is a reference to the 'teacher of good morals' as a requirement of the city-state. Such a teacher has been termed by Shāh Walī Allāh as

Shaykh al-Islām.[266] But the emphasis here seems to be laid more on the moral reformation of a socio-political organisation than on the specifically Islamic character of the society. As we have noted from the outset, morality is regarded by Shāh Walī Allāh as the most distinctive characteristic of man. At no point does he play down the paramount importance of the moral foundations of the individual and collective conduct of human beings.[267]

Another reference to Islamic norms in Shāh Walī Allāh's description of *irtifāqāt* is found in the discussion in which he contends that the attainments of the fourth *irtifāq* are inevitably necessary for the human society in order to preserve its security and maintain a system of justice. The only other course available is contingent upon the rise of some overpowering spiritual personality who is aided by Divine guidance. Such a personality, when joined and supported by the most valiant and obedient warriors, is able to curb and control all wicked elements and to establish a peaceful and just order. It is an exceptionally gifted personality who can truly guide his people to realise the objectives that are usually pursued by the application of the principles identified in the fourth *irtifāq*. The actual presence of such a guide, however, is not a permanent feature of human society and is subject to many conditions that may not always exist. Therefore, the society has no option but to strictly adhere to the principles of the fourth *irtifāq*, which constitute the universally valid norms. Any departure or deviation from these principles would be detrimental to the socio-economic and cultural accomplishments of the society.[268]

It is also important to take note of some references to the Qur'ān that are found in *Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah* in the context of the fourth *irtifāq*. They occur in connection with the elaboration of the vital needs that justify the establishment of a confederacy. Shāh Walī Allāh refers to the Qur'ānic verse (2:246) which points to the prayer of the Children of Israel to God to grant them the dispensation of a full-fledged king under whose leadership they might fight in the way of God. According to Shāh Walī Allāh, this prayer was meant for the establishment of an authority envisaged in his fourth *irtifāq*.[269]

There are two other references to the verses (17:40) and (2:193) which are also in the nature of illustrative explanations, the purpose being to emphasize that recourse to the establishment of higher political authority and to curbing through its power the forces of evil and mischief was like a natural law described in the above verses. According to Shāh Walī Allāh, it is to confront and subdue evil dispositions such as those mentioned in the above verses 17:40; 2:193 that the establishment of a confederacy becomes a natural compulsion for the human society.[270]

It is clear from the above that references to the Qur'ān in the present context come as a supplement to Shāh Walī Allāh's elaboration of the universal laws of socio-political evolution of human society, and these references are not mentioned as a mandatory source in the traditional sense.

In this connection it would be useful to quote some remarks made by Shāh Walī Allāh himself which support our view:

> We have dealt with the concept of *irtifāqāt*, and their relevant sciences, at great length. In this context, it is necessary to take two important points into consideration.
>
> First, we often cite a particular illustration to explain *irtifāq*āt. But we do not, thereby, intend the cited case *per se*. Rather, we mean to say that it can be something similar or approximate to that illustration. Our purpose is to show that the general principles which we outlined above apply to the social phenomena. Obviously, these phenomena cannot be totally identical in each country or community. For every people have their own particular customs and peculiar heritage. What is important for us is that they conform, in essence, to the general principles, even though they might appear somewhat different in their particular forms and manifestations.[271]

These remarks of Shāh Walī Allāh explain his point of view concerning his references to the Islamic conceptual framework while explaining the universal laws of social evolution. Thus the co-existence of a variety of trends in his thought is easily explained.

The underlying idea which seems to be prominent in the mind of Shāh Walī Allāh is that he regards the Islamic dispensation as a natural course for a society's evolution. Therefore, without making any conspicuous departure from the universal model of state and society, he proceeds to discuss the Islamic paradigm of socio-political organisation.

Shāh Walī Allāh's conception of the Islamic state presupposes a certain level of that society's accomplishments in culture and civilisation wherein the Islamic state is established. He conceives, at this high level, a supranational and extra-territorial entity which "belongs to the fourth and the last *irtifāq*, because it is a perfect and mature concept of both state and society".[272]

The Universal Model of Society and State

A striking feature in Shāh Walī Allāh's social philosophy is his construction of a more or less empirical theory of a universal model of socio-political organisation. He marshals numerous examples based on an observation of the social phenomena to substantiate his basic contention that all cultured societies that have emerged in the world since the genesis of man have adhered to the basic principles of *irtifāq*.[273] These principles, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, have been common among all human societies, for they stem from the urges rooted in human nature and these are ultimately directed to actualize humanity's common objectives. It is these objectives which constitute the immutable basis of all culture and civilisation. Notwithstanding any variations that might appear from time to time between various kinds of society in forms, fads, fashions and customs, mankind has always unanimously upheld these basic principles.[274]

Shāh Walī Allāh derives this conclusion from his penetrating analysis of human nature. Through this analysis, he was able to identify the basic urges of *ẓarāfah* (aesthetic urge) and *al-ra'y al-kullī* (universality of purpose) inherent in man's nature which distinguish him from the rest of the animals. The two urges are supplemented by man's *virtus rationalis*. These urges, combined with man's rational and intuitional faculties, generate in his life moral consciousness and provide the mainstay for his social and cultural strivings and attainments. All enterprises undertaken by man are a response to these urges inherent in his natural disposition. In this way, they give rise to such accomplishments of human society as culture, civilisation, moral discipline, economic order and political organisation, in varying intensive and extensive degrees.[275]

Any appreciation of Shāh Walī Allāh's views on society and statecraft should be made by relating it to his overall perspectives on man and his nature. Each step in the development of his social and political philosophy is fully integrated with his basic views on man and his relationship with his environment. The point of culmination in his socio-political thought is the Islamic version of state. But he does not approach it through the process of classical arguments derived from the traditional sources — the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*. Rather, he constructs a full-fledged theory of society on empirical and rational foundations, and finally arrives at a meeting point between inductive reasoning, empirical observation, and religious prescriptions. Thus, the Islamic state in Shāh Walī Allāh's view, emerges as a natural outcome of a free and healthy pursuit by man of his socio-cultural aims as dictated by his natural disposition, provided it is unhampered by moral perversion, or any other deviation from the natural course.[276]

Shāh Walī Allāh and Ibn Ṭufayl

In this respect, the approach of Shāh Walī Allāh seems comparable to that of the Spanish-Muslim philosopher, Ibn Ṭufayl (d. 581/1185) in his famous philosophical fiction *Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān*. Ibn Ṭufayl had imagined the natural evolution of an individual human being, who, in total isolation from society, pursues an imaginative, intuitional and rational quest to discover God. Shāh Walī Allāh, on the other hand, conceives the evolution of human society from its primary stage to finally reach the stage of the God-conscious Islamic state.[277]

This similarity between Shāh Walī Allāh and Ibn Ṭufayl is further accentuated by a brief remark made by Shāh Walī Allāh in *Ḥujjah*[278] and another remark which is slightly more elaborate in *al-Budūr al-Bāzighah*. In the latter work, Shāh Walī Allāh emphasizes that the *irtifāqāt* were a natural attainment made by man through his intuition. This was just like the instinctive knowledge imparted by nature to birds and animals so that they may obtain their means of sustenance. We also come across in this regard to the following significant remark of Shāh Walī Allāh:

> ... I have heard from some of those who are not gifted with sound imaginative perception that this system [(of *irtifāqāt*)] is acquired from the ancestors. Had there not been any legacy from the ancestors, people would have been ignorant of this system. If by this statement they mean that the second *irtifāq* was based on the first *irtifāq*, then this statement is correct and stands to reason. Otherwise, it is an obvious untruth. An evident sign of this untruth is that if we presume a man growing all alone in wilderness, and he never sees another human being, he still must acquire a degree of the morals that we have made mention of.[279]

While the conclusions drawn by Ibn Ṭufayl appear to be based on elements of fantasy and imagination, in the case of Shāh Walī Allāh these ideas are founded on the observation of the functioning of the human society.

Likewise, Shāh Walī Allāh's concept of *iqtirābāt* is fully integrated with his basic ideas about man and his nature. The psychological, moral and religious personality of man is deeply rooted in his nature. As we have noted previously during our exposition of Shāh Walī Allāh's theological ideas,[280] he regards religion as a response to the natural urge of man. Indeed, he points to man's concern for salvation in the Hereafter as stemming from *al-ra'y al-kullī*, the universality of purpose.[281] *Iqtirāb* is the equivalent of *irtifāq* in the domain of religion.[282] Any endeavour on the part of

man to seek spiritual fulfilment by attaining Divine proximity is termed *iqtirāb* by Shāh Walī Allāh.[283]

Shāh Walī Allāh's comprehensive understanding of man posits the concept of a balanced and multi-faceted being who is at once a biological animal, a moral agent, a spiritual being, and a rational creature. He then traces the evolution of this comprehensive personality as an active member of the social organism. In this process of evolution, he identifies various apparently differing pursuits, as integrated phenomena catering for various urges that have been deposited in this comprehensive personality by nature.

Shāh Walī Allāh's unique contribution lies in that he moves from an analysis of the micro level of cultured and civilised society to spelling out the features of a universal paradigm of society and state. He is able to ultimately bring home the point that a healthy evolution of culture, both in the sphere of the individual's life as well as in that of the collectivity, is of necessity, conducive to the attainment of *iqtirābāt*. This attainment, when it assumes the collective form at an organised level and is reinforced by the apparatus of an army and a judiciary, *ipso facto* leads to the emergence of *khilāfah*, i.e. the Islamic state.[284]

According to Shāh Walī Allāh, the emergence of this Islamic state on the universal plane represents the point of culmination in the cultural evolution of human society. With its emergence, Divine mercy and favour to humanity are consummated to the degree of perfection. For, at this stage, humanity is able to achieve the highest levels of peace and tranquillity by means of organised solidarity between various social groups under a just and beneficial order. The establishment of this order ensures felicity in this world and brings the promise of eternal bliss in the Hereafter.[285]

5

Politics and Statecraft

Shāh Walī Allāh's Concept of Islamic State

Khilāfah has been the standard term used in almost all the political discussions of Muslim scholars from the earliest times to denote the institution charged with social, political, economic and ideological responsibilities on behalf of the *ummah*.[286] The word *khilāfah*, meaning vicegerency, is derived from the root *kh-l-f*, which carries a general sense of succession. The term obviously has been borrowed from the Qur'ān, where it has occurred no less than twenty two times in various forms and in different contexts. Among the contemporary writers, W.M. Watt denies the Qur'ānic source of this term, and suggests instead that it had been derived from "its use in secular affairs at the time".[287] But a careful examination of the relevant Qur'ānic verses would easily rule out Wattt's assumption and lend sufficient support to our contention. Almost all prominent Muslim political thinkers have employed the term *khilāfah* in nearly the same sense from the very early period of Islam to this day.

Another term related to the theme is *imāmah*. Both *khilāfah* and *imāmah* have generally been used as interchangeable terms. In the juridical literature, however, the latter term is often used in preference to the former.[288] In the juridical context wherever the terms *imām* or *imāmah* occur, they almost invariably stand for the same meaning as 'ruler' and 'government' respectively in the modern political terminology.

The term *imām* seems to emphasize the paramount importance of religion as the guiding ideology of government since *imām* is also the religious title used in Islam for the leader of the congregational prayers. As the entire

life is regarded as *'ibādah* (servitude of God), therefore, the leader of the Muslim community in the temporal sphere was granted the same title as assigned to their leader in the ritual activity of *ṣalāt*. That was why, when the Prophet (peace be upon him) designated Abū Bakr as *imām* in the prayers during his last days, the Muslims generally took this to imply the Prophet's preference for him as his successor in the mundane affairs as well.[289]

As we have noted before, Shāh Walī Allāh also uses the term *khilāfah* in the context of the universal model of state. When he finally proceeds to discuss the Islamic concept of state, he still uses the same term. By his consistent employment of this typically Islamic term in both the contexts, he seems to suggest that the state in its Islamic form is the state *par excellence*.

In the course of time, the terms *khilāfah* and *imāmah* came to be used for 'state' and 'government' respectively in the political literature of Islam. *Amīr* and *imārah* are also two other familiar terms that are in use since the early decades of the first century of *Hijrah* as almost synonymous with *imām* and *imāmah*. All these four terms have been frequently used in a number of traditions from the Prophet (peace be upon him), which have a political import and therefore, they seem to have their roots in those traditions.[290]

We have seen in the foregoing discussion of Shāh Walī Allāh's theory of *irtifāqāt* that he regards the emergence of the Islamic state as a natural outcome of the socio-cultural and politico-economic development of human society at a time when it attains a level of convergence between *irtifāqāt* and *iqtirābāt*. Thus the establishment of Islamic state (*khilāfah*) is seen by Shāh Walī Allāh both as a compulsion of reason and as a pragmatic requirement of human society. In the classical discussions on Muslim political theory we come across two different approaches to this question. On the one hand, there have been some political thinkers, including Shī'ī theorists, who regarded the Islamic state as a compulsion of reason. In contrast to this position, the Ash'arī view which was represented by such major figures as Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī, al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013) and al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209) contented that the inevitability of state had its roots in the obligations prescribed by the *sharī'ah*. There was yet another school of some Mu'tazilah represented by Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025), Abū Bakr al-Aṣamm (d. 346/975) and others, who rejected the obligatory character of the state. These men were of the opinion that if the affairs of the community were based on fairness and justice, there remained hardly any need for the state.[291] In keeping with his reconciling and synthesizing trend of thought, Shāh Walī Allāh combined both the elements of reason *('aql)* and tradition *(naql)* in spelling out the *raison d'etre* of the state (*khilāfah*).

Adding a rational dimension to the traditional approach, Shāh Walī Allāh considers the establishment of *khilāfah* a *farḍ 'alā al-kifāyah* (collective religious obligation of the Muslim community). If a group of individuals performs the duty of establishing and running the institution of *khilāfah* on behalf of the whole community, the latter would be absolved of its obligation. But if no one comes forward to undertake this task, the entire community will be guilty of collective sin on account of this negligence.

In this respect, the line of Shāh Walī Allāh's argument is as follows: whereas God has prescribed the duties of (i) *jihād* (peaceful as well as military struggle to promote faith and protect the faithful), (ii) dissemination of justice through all available means including an elaborate mechanism of judicature, (iii) revival of religious sciences *(iḥyā' 'ulūm al-dīn)*, (iv) establishment of the pillars of Islam in the individual and social life of the community, and (v) defence of the Islamic realms against the aggressive forces of unbelief as a collective obligation. Now since all these tasks cannot be accomplished without installing an *imām* and since whatever is a necessary condition for the discharge of a collective obligation is also a collective obligation, therefore, the establishment of *khilāfah* is a collective obligation.[292]

Shāh Walī Allāh derives further support for his argument from the fact that the Companions of the Prophet (peace be upon him) addressed themselves immediately after the Prophet's demise to the election and appointment of *khalīfah* even before his burial. This shows that the Companions were fully cognizant of their obligation, under the *Sharī'ah*, of installing *khalīfah*. This is because, according to their understanding, any delay in the matter was prohibited. Had this not been the case, argues Shāh Walī Allāh, the Companions would never have given precedence to the appointment of *khalīfah* over the burial of the Prophet (peace be upon him).[293] In support of his contention, Shāh Walī Allāh relies on the following statement of the Prophet (peace be upon him) which provides a textual basis *(naṣṣ)* for the obligatory character of the institution of *khilāfah*: "Whoever dies while there is no oath of allegiance *(bay'ah)* in his neck, he indeed dies the death of *jāhiliyyah*".[294]

Furthermore, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, the establishment of *khilāfah* was historically necessitated to provide continuity in some of the basic functions performed by the Prophet (peace be upon him) during his lifetime. These functions included waging *jihād*, appointment of governors and tax collectors, despatch of military expeditions, adjudication of disputes, appointment of judges, enforcement of the ordained punishments, and enjoining good and forbidding evil *(amr bi al-ma'rūf wa al-nahy 'an*

al-munkar). A rigorous discharge of these functions, in accordance with the precedents set by the Prophet (peace be upon him), called for the establishment of *khilāfah*, with the *khalīfah* as its head. Such a head alone could be the true successor of the Prophet (peace be upon him) and a living symbol and upholder of his mission in an all-embracing sense.

Shāh Walī Allāh also classifies the *khilāfah* into temporal *khilāfah (al-khilāfah al-ẓāhirah)* and spiritual *khīlāfah (al-khilāfah al-bāṭinah)*. While the former concerns the establishment of *jihād* and judicature, the enforcement of *ḥudūd*[295] (ordained punishments), the collection and distribution of taxes, etc., the latter pertains to the teaching of the Book (i.e. Qur'ān) and wisdom, the purification of the faithful through preaching and spiritual training, which were the main functions of the Prophet (peace be upon him) as had been spelled out in the verse 62:2 of the Qur'ān.[296]

Shāh Walī Allāh also recognises partial succession (*khilāfah*) of the Prophet (peace be upon him) in the domain of knowledge and wisdom. According to him, among the Prophet's Companions, 'Abd Allāh ibn Mas'ūd was the Prophet's successor in the field of Qur'ānic sciences and law, Mu'ādh ibn Jabal in the sphere of judiciary, and Zayd ibn Thābit in the field of the law of inheritance. In contrast to this partial succession, there were some other Companions who fulfilled the criteria of 'absolute succession' (*al-khilāfah al-muṭlaqah*). They were the ones who were also competent to shoulder the responsibilities of state and government in addition to the ones mentioned just above.[297]

As a result of keen understanding of the early model of the *khilāfah*, Shāh Walī Allāh formulates the following definition of it:

> It is the general authority to undertake the establishment of Religion through the revival of religious sciences, the establishment of the pillars of Islam, the organisation of *jihād* and its related functions of maintenance of armies, financing the soldiers, and allocation of their rightful portions from the spoils of war, administration of justice, enforcement of *ḥudūd*, elimination of injustice, and enjoining good and forbidding evil, to be exercised on behalf of the Prophet (peace be upon him).[298]

It is evident that this definition is so comprehensive that it encompasses all areas of activity in which the Islamic state or *khilāfah* is required, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, to engage. In the following pages, the functions of the Islamic state, as set forth by Shāh Walī Allāh, would be discussed in some detail. It seems appropriate for the present to briefly take note of the

salient features of the state that immediately come to mind from the above definition:

- The first condition or the basic constituent of *khilāfah* is its effectual character. This implies that the state should be physically strong so as to undertake the tasks assigned to it, and to execute them. Obviously the nature of these tasks demands that the Islamic state should enjoy fullest geo-political, economic, and military independence and sovereignty.

- The second feature of the state is its ideological character. The entire concern of the state, as conceived by Shāh Walī Allāh, seems to be focused on the establishment of the supremacy of Religion. All other functions of the state are subservient to this fundamental ideological objective.

- The educative role of the state is stipulated by the mention of the revival of religious sciences. Since the society of which the state is a manifestation, espouses a certain world-view and a definite set of values, it is one of the foremost responsibilities of the state to protect and promote that world-view, and to inculcate those values in its members through the dissemination of religious sciences.

- There is also a strong emphasis on *jihād* which, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, constitutes one of the most important duties of the Islamic state, as we shall see later.

- The administration of justice has been regarded as the main reason not only for the existence of the Islamic state, but of every good state and government as we have noted before.

- There is great stress on the role of the state as an agency for the moral upliftment and ideological guidance of people by having recourse to *amr bi al-ma'rūf* and *al-nahy 'an al-munkar* (enjoining good and forbidding evil).

Qualifications of the *Khalīfah*

Discussing the qualifications of the *khalīfah*, Shāh Walī Allāh points out that some of these qualifications have been universally recognised as criteria for rulers and kings by every community, irrespective of its creed or space-time location. While discussing Shāh Walī Allāh's ideas on *irtifāqāt*

we have noted the universal qualifications necessary for the rulers. They are: sanity, adulthood, malehood, bravery, wisdom and the abilities to hear, observe and articulate. Further, they include a general acceptance by the people of their ruler's distinction for these qualities, and an acknowledgement by them of his sincere pursuit of the public weal in running the affairs of the state, and in his general political conduct.[299]

In addition to these universally recognized conditions, Islam lays down, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, a few other qualifications necessary for the *khalīfah*. They are: (i) total loyalty to Islam, (ii) keen insight and understanding in the matters of the *sharī'ah*, and (iii) a high level of integrity and upright conduct (*'adālah*).[300]

Explaining the last condition i.e. *'adālah*, Shāh Walī Allāh says that the incumbent of *khilāfah* should be a person who abstains from major sins,[301] and at the same time, does not persist in the commission of minor ones. Moreover, he ought to be generous and magnanimous.[302]

As regards knowledge of the *sharī'ah*, we find that Shāh Walī Allāh considers it necessary for the *khalīfah* to be a *mujtahid*, that is, he should be knowledgeable and competent enough to form an independent opinion while interpreting the provisions of Islamic law. This seems necessary since the office of the *khilāfah*, as defined by Shāh Walī Allāh, involves certain responsibilities which cannot be adequately discharged by a non-*mujtahid*. They include the following:

- judicial functions at the highest level;
- revival of the religious sciences; and
- enjoining good and forbidding evil.

It is, therefore, necessary for the *khalīfah* to possess thorough knowledge of a large body of Islamic injunctions (*aḥkām*) along with their detailed proofs (*al-adillah al-tafṣīliyyah*) derived from the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*, consensus (*ijmā'*) and analogical reasoning (*qiyās*). This means that he should understand each injunction pertaining to his functions as *khalīfah* in relation to its effective cause (*'illah*). However, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, the *khalīfah* need not be an independent (*mustaqill*) *mujtahid* like Abū Ḥanīfah or al-Shāfi'ī. It would rather suffice for him to be a *mujtahid muntasib*, that is, a *mujtahid* affiliated with any one of the four major schools of law. This would require, instead, an acute understanding of the investigations made on legal injunctions alongwith their supporting arguments by the first elders of the Muslim community (*salaf*).[303]

Following the opinion of the majority of the classical Muslim political thinkers, Shāh Walī Allāh also holds that the *khalīfah* should be a Qurayshite in paternal ancestry. In this connection, he relies on the well-known tradition attributed to the Prophet: "The leaders are from amongst the Quraysh".[304] Moreover, according to him, the first *khalīfah* Abū Bakr, had recourse to this tradition in his debate with the Anṣār, the Madīnite followers of the Prophet, on the occasion of the election of *khalīfah* following the Prophet's demise. In this connection, Shāh Walī Allāh also cites a statement attributed to 'Umar, the second *khalīfah*: "This matter (i.e. *khilāfah*) shall remain among the Quraysh as long as there survive two persons among them who are qualified for it".[305]

Modes of Appointment of the *Khalīfah*

In Shāh Walī Allāh's opinion, a *khalīfah* who fulfils the above qualifications can be lawfully installed in office in either of the four ways mentioned below. These modes of election are mainly based on the precedents that were set in the appointment of the first four caliphs. These precedents furnish the normative framework for the ideas of Shāh Walī Allāh, as far as the questions of election and legitimacy are concerned, as we shall see later. These modes of election are as follows:

- Oath of allegiance *(bay'ah)* by those who are competent to "loosen and bind" *(ahl al-ḥall wa al-'aqd)*.[306] They include, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, scholars, judges, leaders or chiefs (*umarā'*) and other prominent personalities among the people. He does not deem it necessary that all individuals fulfilling the criteria for *ahl al-ḥall wa al-'aqd*, drawn from the entire realm of Islam, should participate in the election of a *khalīfah*, for this is impossible. Rather it would be sufficient that those among them who are easily available should perform this function. However, if an oath of allegiance is made only by one or two persons in favour of some individual, it will not be of any consequence. In this respect, Shāh Walī Allāh cites a statement of 'Umar, prohibiting oath of allegiance for anybody without "a general acceptability of the Muslims" in his favour. This was the mode of election adopted in the appointment of Abū Bakr.[307]

- Testamentary designation of a person who fulfils the requisite conditions by a just *('ādil) khalīfah* out of sincere concern for the future well-being of Muslims. He may announce this succession publicly and make a will to the Muslims, calling upon them to accept him as his successor and

to follow him. Thus this particular individual becomes distinguished by his designation among all those who fulfil the requisite conditions for the office of *khalīfah*. This mode of appointment was adopted in the appointment of 'Umar as *khalīfah*.[308]

- Testamentary designation confining this office among a particular group of persons who fulfil the necessary conditions so that one of them is elected by mutual consultation. After the demise of the earlier *khalīfah*, the successor is to be elected from amongst those designated by the predecessor by a process of consultation ending in a consensus. According to Shāh Walī Allāh, when a testamentary designation is made in favour of a particular individual or a group of individuals, it becomes unlawful to elect any other person to the office of *khalīfah*. It was through this procedure that 'Uthmān was elected to the office of *khalīfah* when 'Umar, in his last days, nominated a group of six prominent Companions of the Prophet, out of whom one was to be elected as 'Umar's successor. Following the demise of 'Umar, 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn 'Awf, who was one of the six, conducted extensive consultations to ascertain the public views about these men. In the light of these consultations, 'Abd al-Raḥmān finally decided in favour of 'Uthmān. A similar process of mutual consultation was subsequently followed, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, in the election of 'Alī.[309]

- Acquisition of authority by a person who establishes himself as a *khalīfah*, the investiture being regarded as *fait accompli*. It takes place when the office of *khalīfah* becomes vacant by the death of the *khalīfah* and an individual comes forward and takes over the office, without any oath of allegiance by *ahl al-ḥall wa al-'aqd*, or a testamentary designation in his favour by the earlier *khalīfah*. This incumbent of the *khilāfah* secures the support of the people by recourse to appeasement, force, or oppression. Such an individual becomes a *khalīfah de facto*. All the commands issued by him which conform to the *sharī'ah* will be deemed as valid. According to Shāh Walī Allāh those commands of such a *de facto khalīfah* that are not contrary to the *sharī'ah* and are consistent with public weal ought to be complied with by all Muslims. Such a compliance is deemed an obligation.

Further, this latter mode is of two kinds:

1. The individual who acquires the office fulfils the requisite conditions prescribed for *khalīfah* and is able to avert the resistance of opponents without resorting to unlawful practices and achieves this purpose

through peaceful means. This kind of acquisition is valid in times of necessity. According to Shāh Walī Allāh, this mode was adopted in Mu'āwiyah's accession to the office of *khalīfah* after 'Alī's demise, following his agreement with al-Ḥasan ibn 'Alī (d.50/670).

2. The individual who occupies the office of *khalīfah* does not fulfil the requisite conditions and defeats his opposition by resorting to violence or other prohibited means. This form of acquisition is invalid according to Shāh Walī Allāh. Indeed he considers the person acquiring office in this manner to be a sinner. However, he recognises the necessity of validating his lawful orders. If *zakāt* is paid to the collectors deputed by him it would absolve the payers of their religious obligation. Similarly, the decrees issued by the judges appointed by him should be enforced. It would also be lawful to join *jihād* under such a *khalīfah*. For, in Shāh Walī Allāh's opinion, the validation of the lawful actions of such *khalīfah*, and an acceptance of his *de facto* authority, is dictated by necessity. In this connection he subscribes to the generally held view of the Muslim jurists that such a *khalīfah* need not be removed from office at all costs[310] because this, according to him, would involve heavy loss of the lives of Muslims and might lead to a state of anarchy. Moreover, it is not certain that the hardships and troubles incurred in the process of his forcible removal would lead to good results. On the contrary, it is very likely that someone worse than the previous incumbent might take advantage of the conditions of anarchy, and become dominant. Shāh Walī Allāh is, therefore, of the opinion that Muslims should not open the avenues of anarchy in the hope of promoting public interest when that is seriously doubtful. In this behalf, he cites a number of traditions from the Prophet supporting his view.[311]

Shāh Walī Allāh confines the modes of appointment of *khalīfah* to the four methods outlined above. According to him, even if there is found at any time an individual or a group of individuals who fulfil the requisite qualifications of *khalīfah*, none of these qualified individuals, even if he is considered the best suited for the office, shall be recognised as *khalīfah* if he does not follow any of these four procedures.[312]

Further, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, the cardinal principle underlying all the modes of appointment outlined above, is to ascertain popular consent for the *khalīfah*, for which either of the four procedures is to be adopted.[313] Since the first form of acquisition, mentioned under the fourth mode is so comprehensive as to include all possible methods of accession

to office that do not involve any resort to prohibited means, Shāh Walī Allāh rightly considers his listing of the four valid procedures to be exhaustive.

Responsibilities of the *Khalīfah*

The *khalīfah*, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, is charged with heavy responsibilities for the protection of the vital interests of the Islamic community. His main responsibilities are:

- Safeguarding and protecting the Religion, as established by the authentic traditions from the Prophet and upheld by the consensus of the pious elders of the past. This includes denunciation of infidels by executing apostates and atheists and punishing the heretics.

- Establishing an elaborate system for the observance of the pillars of Islam e.g. Friday congregation, daily congregational prayers, collection and distribution of *zakāt*, and the organisation of Pilgrimage and fasting. The *khalīfah* should organise these activities personally in his own city and should deploy *imāms* of mosques and collectors of *ṣadaqāt*[314] at other places. He should also appoint *Amīr al-Ḥajj*, leader of the Muslims performing the Pilgrimage.[315]

- Reviving the religious sciences and appointing teachers, and instructors at various places for this purpose. This would involve a vigorous intellectual and instructional activity to ensure the growth and transmission of authentic Islamic knowledge and academic heritage.

- Providing for emoluments of judges, jurisconsults, teachers, preachers and *imāms* without extravagance or miserliness.[316] This constitutes an important duty of the *khalīfah* because the latter relies on these functionaries for the performance of these vital functions.

According to Shāh Walī Allāh, it is also a part of the duties of a *khalīfah* to appoint his lieutenants from amongst the truthful, honest and sincere people to run the business of the state. Besides, he should keep himself fully abreast of the affairs of his people, the conditions of the regular armies, the activities of the chiefs of cities and battalions of voluntary warriors, and the functions of judges, etc. This is required to ensure that no injustice or embezzlement of funds is committed. Moreover, the *khalīfah* should, on no account, leave the affairs of the Muslims to the care of the infidels.[317]

Khilāfah 'Āmmah and *Khilāfah Khāṣṣah*

Shāh Walī Allāh introduces a unique classification of *khilāfah* into *'āmmah* (ordinary) and *khāṣṣah* (extraordinary). Whatever has so far been explained concerning the qualifications, the modes of election or functions and duties of the *khalīfah*, pertain to what Shāh Walī Allāh terms as *khīlāfah 'āmmah*. This latter type of *khilāfah* can be established at any point of time in history whenever the necessary conditions, as outlined above, exist. In addition to this, Shāh Walī Allāh recognises a distinct form of *khilāfah* which he regards, as it were, an extension of the Prophetic mission, and which historically emerged immediately after his demise in 10/632. He identifies certain extraordinary qualities (in addition to those enumerated above) and characteristics that were hall-marks of the personalities of the four immediate successors of the Prophet (peace be upon him). These successors are commonly referred to, by the Muslim scholars, as *rāshidūn* (the rightly guided). But Shāh Walī Allāh avoids the use of this term in the present context. In preference to this common appellation, Shāh Walī Allāh employs his own innovative term of *khīlāfah khāṣṣah*, which represents an original idea hitherto unknown in the Muslim political thought. Relying on a number of Qur'ānic verses and traditions from the Prophet (peace be upon him), he contends that promise for the emergence of this peculiar and extra-ordinary type of *khilāfah* was implied in these verses and traditions. Among these verses, the following verse most conspicuously carries the signification pointed out by Shāh Walī Allāh:

> God has promised to those among you who believe and do the righteous deeds that He will, of surety, grant them in the land inheritance of Power, as He granted to those before them; that He will establish in authority their Religion that He has chosen for them; and that He will change their state, after the fear in which they lived, to one of security and peace; they will worship Me alone, and not associate anything with Me. If any do reject Faith after this, they are rebellious and wicked.[318]

The above verse, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, clearly contains the Divine promise of ascendancy in the land through the agency of *khilāfah* to "those among you who believe" (i.e. the first addressees of the Qur'ān) who did good deeds. He discusses in depth the different aspects of the signification of this verse, establishing that it alludes to none except the immediate successors of the Prophet (peace be upon him), who were his Companions and the first addressees of the Revelation.[319]

Shāh Walī Allāh extensively surveys some other relevant verses of the Qur'ān and several traditions from the Prophet (peace be upon him), which have any bearing on the *khilāfah khāṣṣah*, and identifies its peculiar characteristics in contrast to those of *khilāfah 'āmmah*.[320]

Shāh Walī Allāh identifies the following peculiar traits of a *khalīfah*, belonging to the category of *khilāfah khāṣṣah*:

- That he should be from among the *Muhājirūn* (Migrants).[321]
- That he should be from among those who were promised entry to the paradise by the Prophet (peace be upon him).
- That he should be one of those whom the Prophet (peace be upon him), considered as belonging to the highest ranks of the faithful mentioned in the Qur'ān namely *ṣiddiqīn* (the truthful), *shuhadā'* (the martyrs or witnesses to the truth of Islam in their actual conduct) and the *ṣāliḥīn* (the pious).[322]
- That the Prophet (peace be upon him) should have accorded to him the treatment of a *khalīfah* or that of his designated successor. This means that such circumstantial indications should have been discernible in the Prophet's dealing with him as would suggest to the Companions that he had a tacit approval of the Prophet (peace be upon him) to become *khalīfah*.
- That he should have been charged by the Prophet (peace be upon him), in his lifetime to perform the duties which relate to the Prophet's mission as the Messenger of God.
- That a Divine promise made to the Prophet (peace be upon him) had been actualised, and he (i.e. the *khalīfah* belonging to this special category) became instrumental in it.
- That his opinions were regarded by the community as authentic evidence *(ḥujjah)* in matters of the *sharī'ah*; and
- that he had been reckoned the best of the community by the standards of reason *('aql)* as well as textual evidence *(naql)*.[323]

Shāh Walī Allāh raises a question by way of a hypothetical objection to his contention (i.e. so called: *duf' dakhl muqaddar*) that the basis for establishing the *khilāfah* of the early successors of the Prophet (peace be upon him) was available in a *naṣṣ* (an express injunction of the Qur'ān

or the Prophet's tradition). The question is as follows: "... if it were so, why was the need felt to instal the successors in office by following the procedures of oath of allegiance by *ahl al-ḥall wa al-'aqd*, or by seeking sanction from testamentary designation (*istikhlāf*) in their favour"? Shāh Walī Allāh answers this hypothetical question through the following illustration: "Prayers have been prescribed in the eternal word of God, and by the express injunctions of the Prophet (peace be upon him). But their performance actually becomes obligatory only when the appointed hour comes". Moreover, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, holding consultation before the appointment of Abū Bakr, or the latter's nomination of 'Umar through testamentary designation, does not necessarily point to the absence of any textual basis (*naṣṣ*) to that effect. For, obviously, these elders of Islam must have based their opinions in that behalf on some text (*naṣṣ*) or tacit suggestion by the Prophet (peace be upon him). Shāh Walī Allāh further elaborates this point by another illustration. He says: "... if one were to say that Abū Ḥanīfah prescribed something or al-Shāfi'ī prescribed a certain act or 'Umar permitted something, then all these statements would actually mean that it was the Prophet (peace be upon him) who, in fact, prescribed them. These men only formed opinions on the basis of some proof derived from the law-giver, and not of their own will".[324]

In short, a *khalīfah*, belonging to the category of *khilāfah khāṣṣah*, is distinguished by his auxiliary role in the realization of the supreme objectives that have been regarded as a part of the Prophet's mission, according to the Qur'ān and the Prophet's traditions. The achievement of these objectives is indeed attributed to the Prophet, but the *khulafā'* do become instrumental in it in some way.[325] Further, such *khulafā'* command an extraordinarily high degree of confidence and faith of the Muslim community in their leadership. This faith stems from the explicit and implicit approval pronounced by the Qur'ān and the Prophet's traditions in favour of their installation. On the other hand, a *khalīfah* who belongs to the category of *khilāfah 'āmmah*, does not enjoy this lofty level of faith from the community. Members of the community do support his appointment on account of high level of knowledge and integrity, but they do so merely on the basis of their opinion in that behalf and not pursuant to any revelational indication or Prophetic approval to that effect.

Moreover, in the *khilāfah khāṣṣah* there is a convergence of *khilāfah ẓāhirah* (temporal vicegerency) and *khilāfah bāṭinah* (spiritual vicegerency), according to Shāh Walī Allāh. Thus this extraordinary *khalīfah* becomes not only the head of the Muslim community in a mundane sense, but

is also acknowledged as its unquestioned head in spiritual and religious matters.[326]

Relations between the *Khalīfah* and the Citizenry

The Prophet's traditions regarding his statements and acts that have any significant relevance to politics and statecraft mostly furnish the contents of the ideas of Shāh Walī Allāh on what may be called, in contemporary parlance, the constitutional law of Islam. We, therefore, find that in respect of the exemplary relations that ought to exist between the *khalīfah* and the members of the community or the citizens of the state, Shāh Walī Allāh also draws heavily on the relevant traditions from the Prophet (peace be upon him).

We have noted earlier the duties of the *khalīfah* towards the citizens living in his realm as spelled out by Shāh Walī Allāh. He also dwells upon the duties of the citizens towards the *khalīfah* and relies on a number of traditions to define the parameters of their obligation to comply with the commands of the *khalīfah* in an Islamic political framework. The cardinal principle in this connection, which is a striking feature of Islamic political theory, and which has been recognised by all Muslim political thinkers since the early era, is that the citizens are under an obligation to obey the *khalīfah*, whose commands in turn ought to be in conformity with the injunctions of Islam. Muslims are obligated to obey whatever command is issued by the *khalīfah* in the interest of Islam and the Muslim community. This obligation to compliance is not contingent upon the just or unjust character of the *khalīfah*, according to Shāh Walī Allāh. He further holds that, in matters that call for *ijtihād*, it is the duty of the citizens to enforce the opinions based on the *ijtihād* of the *khalīfah* even if some of the citizens themselves are qualified to make *ijtihād* by dint of their erudition and integrity.[327]

Moreover, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, it is not permitted by the *sharī'ah* to rebel against any government which has already received the support of the Muslims, even if its head does not fully qualify for the office. It is only when a ruler commits 'evident infidelity' *(kufr bawwāḥ)*, and openly rejects, condemns or puts into disrepute, any of the 'essential postulates' *(ḍarūriyyāt)* of the true Religion, then it becomes not only permitted, but even obligatory to struggle for his deposition. This struggle would then be considered the highest form of *jihād*.[328] In this respect, Shāh Walī Allāh relies on a tradition, according to which, the Prophet (peace be upon him) was asked by a Companion: "Shall we not then overthrow them"? (i.e. the

unjust rulers). In response to this question, the Prophet (peace be upon him) categorically said: "No, as long as they establish Prayers".[329] These words of the Prophet (peace be upon him) have been interpreted by Shāh Walī Allāh to signify a ruler's general adherence to the cause of the true Religion and his upholding of its principles, symbolically represented by the establishment of Prayers, notwithstanding trivial shortcomings or minor lapses here and there. Shāh Walī Allāh expresses this opinion by employing the well-known terminology of Muslim scholars, namely, "rejecting any of the essential postulates *(ḍarūriyyāt)* of the true Religion".[330] Further, it is lawful, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, to refuse to obey those commands of the *khalīfah* which are violative of the *sharī'ah*, provided that this violation is established by a clear proof*(burhān)*. In such a case anyone who collaborates with the *khalīfah* in vexing or tormenting those who might challenge the *khalīfah* on the said ground will be a sinner and liable to God's chastisement.[331]

Shāh Walī Allāh is of the view that if a person enjoins the *khalīfah* to do good and forbids him to commit evil, that will be the highest form of *jihād,* provided it is not accompanied by recourse to violence. He further holds that those who perform this important duty ought to be lenient rather than harsh in their expostulations with the *khalīfah*, and should address their protestations preferably in private rather than in public.[332]

In short, the relations between the *khalīfah* and the citizens, the obligations of the latter to the former, and the former's answerability to the latter, are determined by a number of principles laid down in the *sharī'ah*. It is these principles that provide the framework for the mutual relationship between the ruler and the ruled. According to Shāh Walī Allāh, it was necessary to lay down these principles of governance so as to check those rulers who had any oppressive tendencies, or who might be inclined to pursue their whims and desires in their political conduct, thus putting the public policy in jeopardy. With these principles succinctly spelled out, the limits of authority in Islam are clearly defined, and it is possible to hold to account the rulers who might violate them.[333]

Functions of the State

Shāh Walī Allāh discusses the functions of the Islamic state on different occasions, from various angles. While in *Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah* his approach, like that of al-Māwardi and al-Bāqillāni and many others, is mainly juridical,[334] in *al-Budūr al-Bāzighah* he confines his treatment to a discussion of the conceptual foundations of the state. In this work he shows that

the state emerged in the course of a natural development of human social organisation. In *Izālat al-Khafā' 'an Khilāfat al-Khulafā'* as its title also suggests, he mainly adopts a historical approach, tracing the genesis and development of the institution of *khilāfah* in its period of perfection. This perfection, according to Shāh Walī Allāh and other Muslim political thinkers, except some Shī'ah thinkers, was attained by this institution at the time of its inception, immediately after the Prophet's demise. Hence, this period of perfection in *khilāfah*, which Shāh Walī Allāh designates by the term *al-khilāfah al-khāṣṣah*, provides an important source of normative precedents for state and government and their functions, alongside the two main sources of Revelation and Prophetic tradition.

Shāh Walī Allāh divides the functions of the Islamic state into two main categories. The first pertains to the general political role of any state, whether Islamic or otherwise, whereby it is able to protect its frontiers against external aggression, deter oppressors from various forms of injustice and oppression, and provide a judicial framework for settling disputes and dispensing justice among its citizens. We have already discussed this universal feature of a state's functions in some detail with reference to the theory of *irtifāqāt* as propounded by Shāh Walī Allāh.[335]

The second major function of the Islamic state is the pursuit of a religious mission. It is the paramountcy of this religious mission, which characterises the Islamic state as an essentially ideological entity, in contradistinction to the universal paradigm of state identified by him in the context of his discussion on *irtifāqāt*.

Explaining this distinctive ideological feature of the Islamic state, Shāh Walī Allāh points out that the "supremacy of the Religion of Islam over all other religions was inconceivable without contemplating among the Muslims a *khalīfah*, who can put those who might transgress the ideological frontiers, and commit acts which have been prohibited by their Religion or omit their obligations under it, into open disrepute". Further, he should be able to subdue the followers of all other religions and receive *jizyah*[336] from them, while they submit to the supremacy of the *sharī'ah*.[337] For, in his view, without establishing the supremacy of Islam over other religions and creeds, no preference of the Muslim community over non-Muslims could be visibly demonstrated.[338]

These functions of the Islamic state, which were identified by Shāh Walī Allāh as pertaining to its role as an ideological entity, have been defined, according to him, by the Prophet (peace be upon him) under four main categories. These are penal injunctions *(maẓālim)*, injunctions pertaining to the punishments provided for specified crimes against God

(*ḥudūd*), injunctions relating to judicature (*qaḍā'*), and rules and regulations governing the peaceful and military struggle to protect, defend and promote the true Faith (*jihād*).[339]

In respect of all these areas in which the Islamic state mainly functions, some basic principles of policy that are binding on every *khalīfah* have been laid down. But their particular modalities have been left to the discretion of the leaders of the Muslim community who have been counselled to act in the best interests of the community without violating the general framework of these principles.[340] Before concluding this chapter, it seems appropriate to have a glimpse of these four categories of the ideological functions of the Islamic state as identified by Shāh Walī Allāh.

1. Penal Injunctions (*Maẓālim*)

One of the chief objectives that have been pursued by all the Prophets, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, is to prevent oppression in society which is the biggest source of human misery. Oppression mainly consists of three kinds of crime: (i) crimes against human life; (ii) crimes against human body; and (iii) crimes against private property. For each kind of these crimes, the *sharī'ah* provides strong and deterrent measures whereby people with criminal tendencies may be forcefully deterred from committing those criminal acts again. According to the priorities established by the *sharī'ah*, the most heinous of all crimes is the one committed against human life. This, according to the Qur'ān, amounts to the genocide of all mankind.[341] Therefore, the *sharī'ah* takes an extremely serious view of the crime of murder and provides for *qiṣāṣ*, i.e., retaliation by the heirs of the victim. They may take life for life in retaliation, or agree to blood-money (as specified in the *sharī'ah*), or compound the murder with the guilty, or exercise the right to pardon, if they so desire.[342]

Next in Islam's order of priorities, as explained by Shāh Walī Allāh, are the crimes committed against human body. For these crimes too the *sharī'ah* provides the punishment of retaliation by way of *qiṣāṣ* i.e. inflicting similar physical injury on the criminal as was sustained by his victim. The victim, as in the case of murder, may accept compensation specified by the *sharī'ah*, or compound the crime, or simply pardon the offender.

The third kind of crimes to which the *sharī'ah* addresses itself after giving precedence to the crimes against human life and limbs, are the crimes against property. These crimes have been categoriesed by Shāh Walī Allāh into: (a) *ghaṣb* (usurpation); (b) *itlāf*, damage; (c) theft; and (d) dacoity. The latter two crimes fall in the category of *ḥudūd*.[343]

2. Crimes against Society and their Specified Punishments (*Ḥudūd*)

This category of crimes includes those offences against the society which combine numerous elements of moral turpitude. These crimes, on the one hand, cause the spread of mischief in the land and destroy the general peace and tranquillity in the life of the community on the other. Further, they cause damage to victims which cannot be removed without the intervention of the state. Moreover, for curbing these crimes so as to minimise their occurrence, it is not sufficient to warn the offenders against the chastisement to which they will be subjected on the Day of Judgement. Hence, the public policy sanctioned by the *sharī'ah* demands that those guilty of such grave crimes as adultery should be exposed to strongest censure and be awarded the severest deterrent punishment. By prescribing these severe punishments, the *sharī'ah* seeks to eliminate the root cause of a number of evils which generally cause immeasurable mischief. Besides, if adultery is not checked by strong deterrents, it gives rise to countless genealogical, psychological, social and moral problems. Furthermore, unlawful sex-indulgence has a corrupting influence on human temperament and gives rise to incessant fights and disputes among people.[344]

Other crimes included in this category are theft, highway robbery, drinking and false accusation of un-chastity *(qadhf)*. If theft is not dealt with strongly through deterrent measures, it would diminish the opportunities of earning livelihood by fair and legitimate means, and would pose a constant threat to the sanctity of private property. Preservation of this sanctity is among the primary functions of the state. Similarly, the victims of highway robbery *(ḥirābah)* are exposed to open plunder and serious threat to life and property. Individuals cannot, repulse this danger by themselves. If the state does not provide adequate punishment for such fierce crimes, citizens can enjoy no peace or security. So is the case of drinking. If this goes unchecked, it opens avenues of enormous corruption and damage to human sanity and intelligence, which is the instrument of improving this life as well as the Life in the Hereafter. Further, the state should also take a serious notice of the crime of *qadhf* (false accusation of unchastity). Those who are made its victims experience great anguish and suffering. They can find no means to avert it, save murder. Thus *qadhf* often proves to be a cause of murders. If the victim resorts to beating, he is beaten in turn. Therefore, to deal with such situations, human reason demands something which has also been prescribed by the *sharī'ah*, namely, strong preventive

measures, and exemplary punishment by the state in order to protect the honour, and property of its citizens.[345]

Since the nature of the crimes categorised under *ḥudūd* is such that they produce extremely adverse effects on the peace and tranquility of human society, it was necessary for the state to treat them sternly, without showing the least leniency in awarding the specified punishments. For these are, in the eyes of the *sharī'ah*, unpardonable crimes against society. Hence the strict enforcement of *ḥudūd* has been stressed and is regarded as one of the main functions of the Islamic state.[346]

3. Judicature

Adjudication of disputes is reckoned by Shāh Walī Allāh as one of the main functions of the state for it seeks to eliminate the causes of injustice and exploitation as far as possible. According to him, mutual disputation is a common phenomenon in human society. It opens avenues of animosity, mutual hatred and family feuds. Above all, it gives rise to greed, which by its very nature tends to contemptuously deny the rights of others and defies all reason. Therefore, one of the primary responsibilities of the state is to depute judges throughout its realm to undertake settlement of disputes and compel the disputants to comply with their judgements. Since the function of the judiciary is a delicate exercise which is liable to be influenced by bias and prejudice, it has been the utmost concern of the *sharī'ah* to lay down certain rules for the judges in the discharge of their judicial functions.

Shāh Walī Allāh derives these basic principles from the relevant traditions which he frequently cites to substantiate his views on the subject in *Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah*. The foremost principle in this behalf is that the expression of the wish to be appointed to a judicial office constitutes a disqualification because self-candidature may at times stem from a selfish desire for wealth, prestige or satisfaction of a personal grudge or vendetta against some adversary. Since the *sharī'ah* lays great emphasis on a high level of integrity and competence for a judge, only those who are pre-eminent on account of being free from the elements of bias and wrongdoing and possess adequate knowledge and understanding of the Divine Law, particularly in the field of judicature, are qualified to hold the judicial office.[347]

Emphasizing the psychological aspect of this question, Shāh Walī Allāh says that a judge is required to be of sound and resolute mind, should have a fine intellectual and balanced temperament, and should not be prone to fury and anger in his judgements. For, shortness of temper blurs a man's vision and clairvoyance distorts his objective and impartial perception of

the reality, and hampers a cool and detached deliberation over intricacies of jurisprudence and law. It also prevents a clear and comprehensive grasp of facts and circumstances involved in the case brought up for judgement. Moreover, no judgement should be pronounced in any dispute without full opportunity of defence being afforded to the defendant, as has been clearly laid down in the Prophet's command which Shāh Walī Allāh quotes.[348]

Further, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, the judicial process is followed in two stages. The first stage involves questions of fact and its verification. The second stage is to determine a just, fair and right judgement which is warranted by the facts of the case. A judge ought to take both these aspects into full consideration. The first aspect is governed by the rules pertaining to evidence and oath. It is through these instruments that the circumstances of a case can be ascertained. The fundamental criterion laid down for ascertaining facts is *ḥujjah* (clear and conclusive proof) which should be established by evidence, whether circumstantial or otherwise. Since the evidence administered by witnesses occupies an important place in the dispensation of justice, the *sharī'ah* lays down strict conditions for witnesses. The main conditions are adherence to the teachings of Islam, sanity, adulthood, sound understanding of the case in question, integrity, upright conduct, and an unimpeachable moral character.[349]

4. *Jihād*

It is with reference to Shāh Walī Allāh's theory of *jihād* that the international role of the Islamic state can be appreciated in the right perspective. Therefore, an attempt would be made in the following pages to acquaint ourselves with Shāh Walī Allāh's concept of *jihād* and its significance as one of the basic functions of the Islamic state.

As noted earlier, Shāh Walī Allāh considers *jihād* to be one of the *raisons d'etre* of the Islamic state. He even goes further and contends that no religion is complete if it does not stipulate and prescribe *jihād*.[350] According to Shāh Walī Allāh, since the religious dispensation granted by God to man through the intermediation of the Prophets was a great Divine favour, God did not choose, out of His boundless mercy towards man, to leave it wholly to his will to enter the fold of God's religion. He rather sought to provide the conditions through prescribing *jihād* wherein man might feel motivated *perforce* to acknowledge his Lord and follow the way of life which had His approval. Since there are people who, overcome by selfish and lowly passions, do not heed the call of the true Religion, and thus deprive themselves of the eternal bliss, therefore, compassion for such

people demands that they be not left alone; that, on the contrary, they be afforded ample opportunity to hear, see, listen and choose the right path. It is similar to a physician's concern to make his patient take medicine, even if the latter does not like the taste of it.[351] This inducement to enter God's Religion and enjoy its blessings can be provided only by overpowering active opposition to the Faith by those strong elements who choose to collaborate with others against the natural growth and rise of the true Religion. Thus, on the one hand, they stand in the way of other people's acceptance of Islam, and obstruct the entry of their own progeny to its fold, on the other. If active opposition of the leaders of the forces which stand for unbelief breaks down, their weak followers and descendants will easily find their way to Islam.

In this connection, Shāh Walī Allāh cites a tradition from the Prophet (peace be upon him), which significantly points to this underlying concept of *jihād*. The Prophet (peace be upon him) is reported to have said: "God marvels those who enter Paradise in chains".[352]

This tradition supports the contention of Shāh Walī Allāh that mercy to mankind requires that they be afforded the fullest opportunity to follow the straight path. At the same time, the oppressive elements which not only do not accept the Truth themselves but also prevent others from doing so, ought to be rendered helpless in their obstinate opposition to the call of Islam which guarantees general peace and tranquillity as well as the social, political and economic well-being of all mankind. According to Shāh Walī Allāh, the corrupt states controlled by perverted elements, which pose a constant threat to Islam and hinder the Muslim community from conveying the universal message of God to humanity, are like a cancer in the human body which cannot be restored to normalcy without cutting off the sick part. If a little use of force is of necessity conducive to tremendous good, it is obligatory to resort to a little force for the sake of greater good.[353]

Shāh Walī Allāh likens those who perform the duty of *jihād* to Angels, in so far as the former also dedicate themselves to the execution of the Divine mission, as decreed by God. The only difference, according to him, between the two in this respect is that the Angels undertake their mission without pursuing any given and definite principles. They only carry out the Divine command in total obedience to God's decrees. As for the Muslim community, when it is engaged in *jihād*, it struggles for the same end, but pursuant to a principle given by God. That is why this struggle, on the part of the Muslim community, is reckoned as the best and most desirable of all human acts. Hence the act of killing in the cause of God is not attributed

to the human agents. It is rather attributed to the One Who issued the command to do so (i.e. to God). This, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, is the purport of the Qur'ānic verse: "... it is not you who killed them it was God who killed them".[354]

Jihād, therefore, becomes the chief instrument of the Islamic state for actualizing the Divine scheme on earth, and all efforts for its realization bring about overwhelming mercy. Any attempt to frustrate this scheme incurs an all-pervading curse, as unequivocally declared in numerous verses and the traditions which are profusely cited by Shāh Walī Allāh.[355] Any omission on the part of the state in the discharge of this fundamental duty would, therefore, mean negligence of a vital objective of the public policy.[356]

According to Shāh Walī Allāh, *jihād* is a strenuous struggle that involves great hardships, heavy expenditure, sacrifice of life and property, forsaking one's home and comfort. Those who undertake this noble mission are regarded as the most loyal and sincere servants of God. For they virtually demonstrate their unqualified preference of the Hereafter to this temporal life, and place their total reliance on God. Such a spirit of wholehearted submission to the Divine will cannot be attained without there being some resemblance with angelic traits. Only those who are farthest from animality and in whose hearts and souls the true Religion and its ideals are deeply seated can carry this spirit to its perfection.[357]

In a number of traditions cited by Shāh Walī Allāh, it has been emphasized that *jihād* should be undertaken purely for the sake of God and should be solely motivated by the aim of 'exalting the Word of God', *(i'lā' kalimat Allāh)*. This struggle should aim at nothing except Divine approval and ought to be free from such motives as the display of bravery, or pride, or vengeance, or worldly fame or material gain.[358]

Furthermore, *jihād* is an extraordinary act of piety which merits Divine pleasure and commendation. *Jihād*, however, obviously requires a number of tools, instruments, and means such as expense of money, preparation of arms and armoury and other logistics and auxiliaries. Therefore, by a necessary corollary, Divine commendation also extends to the means required for waging *jihād*.[359]

According to Shāh Walī Allāh, the great emphasis laid upon *jihād* in the Qur'ānic verses and the Prophet's traditions is explained by the fact that through it the religious dispensation of Islam, symbolised by the state, is fully actualised, the superiority of the true Religion is manifestly established in space and time, and the Islamic way of life eventually emerges as an obligatory course for humanity.[360] That is why we find numerous

verses and traditions placing great stress on *jihād*. They also contain good tidings for those who sincerely participate in *jihād*, whether directly or indirectly by providing the necessary means for it, even though they may not be engaged in the actual conduct of war.[361]

Referring to the significant contribution made by *jihād* during the early period of Islamic history to the expansion of Islam, Shāh Walī Allāh points out that the benefits of *jihād* multiply, a fact that is illustrated by the annals of history. For the *jihād* undertaken by the early followers of Islam from amongst the *Muhājirūn* and the *Anṣār* brought the tribe of Quraysh and the people who were under their influence into the fold of Islam. Subsequently, it was at the hands of these Muslims of Quraysh that Islam's conquest of Mesopotamia and the Byzantine Empire took place. Thereafter, God enabled the people of Iraq and Syria to conquer the Persian and Roman realms, whose inhabitants were in turn instrumental in introducing Islam among Indians, Turks and Sudanese. By offering this historical illustration, Shāh Walī Allāh emphasizes the point that *jihād* is a multiplying act of virtue.[362]

Further, explaining the importance of *jihād* as a function of fundamental significance carried out by the Islamic state, Shāh Walī Allāh argues that one of the chief aims of the Prophet's mission was the establishment of the supremacy of Islam over all other creeds and cults. This aim could neither have been achieved in the absence of *jihād* nor sustained without performing it, and without maintaining a constant preparedness for it. Therefore, if the Muslim community neglects *jihād* and is lulled into slumber due to its immersion in worldly comforts, it would soon become dominated by other religions, and would be degraded to a state of subjugation and humiliation. This would frustrate the very purpose of its religious mission.[363]

Discussing the juridical aspect of *jihād*, Shāh Walī Allāh expresses the opinion that this is a collective obligation of the Muslim community (*farḍ 'alā al-kifāyah*) like the establishment of the state itself. But the duty to take all necessary measures for enabling the individuals to discharge this obligation devolves upon the state. Any voluntary initiative by individuals or groups to engage in *jihād*, and to provide the means for it, does not absolve the state of its duties toward *jihād*. This, however, would absolve the general body of the Muslims of their obligation because a group from amongst them, be they regular warriors or voluntary fighters, were already performing that duty. According to Shāh Walī Allāh, the engagement of the entire community in *jihād* would be detrimental to *irtifāq*āt (i.e. the vital socio-economic and cultural interests of the community). It is necessary, therefore, that a group from amongst them should perform this duty.[364]

Moreover, since *jihād* is an obligation of the state, and whatever is a necessary means for performing an obligation is also an obligation, therefore defence of the frontiers, raising of armies, deployment of warriors in the battle fields, deputation of commanders, and providing all necessary tools of war machinery are also an important obligation and a basic function of the state.[365]

Shāh Walī Allāh also derives some important principles from the Prophet's traditions which concern the conduct of war in *jihād*. It is within the framework of these commissions and omissions that the commanders deputed by the state for various military tasks relating to war are authorized to carry out their duties.[366]

It is the foremost duty of a commander to fear God in all his endeavours and to be a well-wisher of the Muslims at all times. These two considerations provide the touchstone for evaluating all actions and moves that are made by the commanders in the execution of their military plans.[367]

Similarly, there are other traditions, some of which have been cited by Shāh Walī Allāh, which expressly prohibit certain acts in war. These include mutilation, the killing of women, elderly people and children, the breaking of pledges, the destruction of crops and vegetation, putting things to arson, and the killing of animals.[368]

It is necessary before waging an offensive to invite the enemy to either of the three options: (1) to embrace Islam and to accept its necessary implications of *jihād* and *hijrah*.[369] In this case they would be entitled, like other Muslims, to the same rights including a share in spoils of war; (2) to accept Islam, but without agreeing to join *jihād* along with the Muslims; and (3) to accept to pay *jizyah* and surrender. In this last case, they will be treated as protected citizens *(dhimmīs)* of the state. They shall be free from any obligation to participate in war, but will be required to submit to the supremacy of Islam.[370]

As to the treatment of prisoners of war, it has also been regulated by a number of Qur'ānic verses and traditions in the light of which Shāh Walī Allāh deals with that question. In this behalf, the state is authorised to follow either of the four courses: (i) to kill them; (ii) to ransom them; (iii) to set them free gratuitously; and (iv) to enslave them. Whichever of these four options best serves the interests of the Muslim community may be adopted. Moreover, the state may also grant safe conduct to enemy persons, both individually and collectively.[371] The state may also enter into peace treaty with non-Muslims and eschew the option of war altogether, should the common weal of the Muslim community so demand. This may

be in consideration for money or without it, as the *imām* may deem fit in his best judgement.[372]

There are also elaborate rules based on a number of Qur'ānic injunctions and traditions from the Prophet (peace be on him) relating to the distribution of the spoils of war, which have been summarised by Shāh Walī Allāh. In some respects, these rules bind the state to act in a certain manner, while in others, the state is permitted to act according to its discretion in the best interest of the community. In this connection, Shāh Walī Allāh identifies some basic objectives which the state ought to pursue by making use of proceeds from the spoils. These objectives too have been derived by Shāh Walī Allāh from a general survey of the relevant verses and traditions. These objectives are as follows: (1) to provide people with sustenance; (2) to protect the state from aggression; (3) to maintain law and order in the state; (4) to preserve the true religion by appointing *imāms* of mosques, preachers and teachers, etc. Keeping these general objectives in view, the state may appropriate those proceeds according to needs and in conformity with public policy.[373]

Shāh Walī Allāh also identifies some other general rules of conduct laid down in the traditions and which the state should observe while discharging its duties relating to *jihād*. Among them is the selection of commanders who are valiant, chivalrous, wise, and sincerely dedicated to the common cause of the Muslim community. Moreover, the following may not be included in the ranks: those who are under fifteen years of age, those who are in the habit of eulogizing the power of the infidels and thus causing demoralisation among the Muslim troops. In like manner polytheists and young women may not be included in the ranks of the army.[374]

To recapitulate, it is the duty of the state to have recourse to all lawful means of acquiring prestige and glory for the Muslims and making them a formidable power that can defend itself against the forces of unbelief. To accomplish this aim, the *khalīfah* should seek guidance from the conduct of the Prophet (peace be upon him). Where no precedent from the Prophet (peace be upon him) is available, the *khalīfah* should exert his own mind and follow a course of action according to his discretion.[375]

Part TWO

The Major Writings of Shāh Walī Allāh: An Introduction

1

A Survey of Shāh Walī Allāh's Works

Shāh Walī Allāh was a prolific writer. He wrote extensively on a wide range of subjects relating to what we now call Islamic studies. They include *Tafsīr* (Qur'ānic exegesis), *Ḥādīth* (traditions of the Prophet), *Fiqh* (law), *uṣul al-Fiqh*, (principles of jurisprudence), *'Aqā'id* (beliefs), *Kalām* (scholastics), philosophy, *Taṣawwuf* (spiritual sciences), history, biography, Arabic poetry, and grammar. He also wrote extensively on topics that are significant for the contemporary students of sociology, politics, psychology and ethical philosophy. But the main focus of his academic enterprise was on the Qur'ān, *Ḥadīth*, *Kalām*, socio-political and ethical philosophy and spiritual sciences. Indeed, his academic contribution is so original, profound and multi-dimensional that it can hardly be assessed merely by drawing up a list of works that could be classified according to any given categories. It rather calls for an in-depth and analytical study focusing on each individual work. Further, since his approach in almost all his writings is inter-disciplinary, in so far as he treats the problems from a diversity of angles and at the same time, a unity and cohesiveness pervades all aspects of his thought. It is difficult, therefore, to assign the works of Shāh Walī Allāh to definite fields of knowledge. The classification of his works is thus bound to be only relative and tentative.[376]

In the present study, we are mainly concerned with the socio-political aspects of Shāh Walī Allāh's thought. We would, therefore, present below a brief survey of his three works which are particularly relevant to our theme with a view to assessing their value as sources for the study of his socio-political ideas. However, we shall also mention, though quite briefly, selected titles from amongst his other prominent works, indicating

the broad area of the subjects dealt with in each of them.

Studies on the Qur'ān

- *Fatḥ al-Raḥmān fī Tarjamat al-Qur'ān*, Karachi, 1984. It is among the first popular renderings of the Qur'ān into simple Persian language. It was completed by the author in Ramaḍān 1151 A.H.

- *Al-Fawz al-Kabīr*, Lahore, 1951, 52 pp. It is a concise, but extremely valuable treatise on the principles of Qur'ānic exegesis. It is among the most popular works of Shāh Walī Allāh, which has made an outstanding contribution to the study and understanding of the Qur'ān. Originally written in Persian, it has been translated into Arabic, Urdu, Turkish, and English languages. It was first published in Delhi in 1898 A.H.

- *Al-Fatḥ al-Kabīr* (Arabic), Lucknow, 1314 A.H. It deals with the explanation of the difficult words used in the Qur'ān, with terms that are usually called *gharā'ib*, i.e. words that are not quite familiar in the common diction.

Ḥadīth Sciences

- *Al-Musawwā min Aḥādīth al-Muwaṭṭa'* (Arabic). It is a highly technical commentary in Arabic on this early collection of traditions compiled by Mālik ibn Anas (d. 179 A.H.). It was first published in Delhi in 1293 A.H.

- *Muṣaffā Sharḥ-i Muwaṭṭa'* (Persian). It is another commentary on the *Muwaṭṭa'*. It represents Shāh Walī Allāh's methodology in the teaching of *Ḥādīth*. It was first published in 1293 A.H. in Delhi in two volumes. It has been translated into Urdu by Sayyid 'Abd Allāh and was published from Calcutta in 1294 A.H.

- *Sharḥ Tarājim Ba'ḍ Abwāb al-Bukhārī* (Arabic), Hyderabad, 1949. In this treatise, Shāh Walī Allāh has discussed the wisdom of the topical headings adopted by Imām Bukhārī for different chapters of *aḥādīth* of this important compendium of traditions compiled by Imām Bukhārī (d. 256 A.H.). It was first published in Hyderabad (India) in 1323 A.H.

Law and Jurisprudence

- *Al-Inṣāf fī Bayān Sabab al-Ikhtilāf* (Arabic), Beirut, 1977, 114 pp. It is a juridical discourse on the compilation of the early compendia of *aḥādīth*, and the evolution of different schools of jurisprudence. It also discusses the nature of disagreement among the jurists and the principles of resolving various conflicting opinions so as to arrive at a synthetic view within the broad framework of Islamic jurisprudence. It was first published in Delhi in 1308 A.H. It was also translated into Urdu.

- *'Iqd al-Jīd fī Bayān Aḥkām al-Ijtihād wa al-Taqlīd* (Arabic), Delhi, 1925. This treatise discusses various dimensions of the issues involved in *ijtihād* and *taqlīd* and presents a balanced view on this oft-discussed and much-debated question. It was also translated into Urdu.

Philosophy and Scholastics

- *Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah* (Arabic), Cairo, 1933 It is the *magnum opus* of the author which has been universally acknowledged by Muslim scholarship as his most outstanding and epoch-making contribution. It constitutes a highly significant exposition of the Islamic worldview. We shall separately present an introduction to this work in some detail. It was first published in Bareily (India) in 1286 A.H. A number of Urdu translations of this work have appeared. It has also been recently translated into English under the title: *The Conclusive Argument from God* by Marcia Hermansen, and the first part of the translation has been published by E.J. Brill at Leiden in 1996.

- *Al-Budūr al-Bāzighah* (Arabic), Hyderabad, 1970. It is the second most important contribution of the author to a philosophical and rational interpretation of Islam after *Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah*. This work would be reviewed separately in the subsequent pages. It has also been translated into English by J.M.S. Baljon.

- *Al-Khayr al-Kathīr* (Arabic), Bijnaur, India, 1325 A.H. It is a brief but extremely valuable work of Shāh Walī Allāh in which he attempts to explain the fundamentals of faith with an approach combining rational and traditional arguments.

- *Maktūb-i Madanī* (Persian), Lahore, 1965. It is a long letter addressed by Shāh Walī Allāh to one Ismā'īl ibn 'Abd Allāh Rūmī. It deals with the

metaphysical dimensions of the concept of existence. The work explains the position of the author on the problem of existence which synthesises the views of Ibn 'Arabi and Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindī. This letter has also been included in *al-Tafhīmāt al-Ilāhiyyah* (at no. 15 below).

- *Al-'Aqīdah al-Ḥasanah* (Arabic), Lucknow, 1962, 72 pp. It is a plain and rational presentation of the fundamentals of belief in Islam. It has also been translated into Urdu.

- *Al-Muqaddimah al-Saniyyah fī Intiṣār al-Firqah al-Sunniyyah* (Persian), Delhi, (n.d.). This work attempts a rational exposé of the Sunnī theological doctrines in comparison with the doctrines of the *Shī'ah*. This is in fact Shāh Walī Allāh's introduction to the Persian translation of a treatise by Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindī entitled *Radd-i-Rawāfiż*.

Spiritual Sciences

- *Al-Tafhīmāt al-Ilāhiyyah* (Arabic and Persian) (Bijnaur India: 1936), 264 pp. This work is in two volumes and includes a number of stray writings of the author, in which he has explained subtle points of rational and spiritual import with regard to the teachings of the true faith. Some of these writings are in Arabic and others in Persian.

- *Alṭāf al-Quds* (Persian) Delhi, n.d. It deals with the basic principles of the spiritual sciences. It has been translated into Urdu (Lahore: 1975), and also English under the title: *The Sacred Knowledge of the Higher Functions of the Mind* (Lahore: 1982).

- *Saṭa'āt* (Persian) (Hyderabad: 1970), 54 pp. It discusses various aspects and dimensions of Divine theophany and attempts to explain the nature of the abstract and material worlds and their respective characteristics. It has also been translated into English and Urdu.

- *Fuyūḍ al-Ḥaramayn* (Arabic) (Delhi: n.d.), 144 pp. In this book, Shāh Walī Allāh relates his spiritual experiences during his sojourn in Makkah and Madīnah. It has also been translated into Urdu. The Urdu version was published in Lahore in 1947.

- *Anfās al-'Ārifīn* (Persian). It narrates the spiritual attainments of the author's forefathers and spiritual ancestors. It was first published in 1335 A.H. in Delhi.

History and Biography

- *Izālat al-Khafā' 'an Khilāfat al-Khulafā'* (Persian), 2 vols. (Karachi: 1286 A.H.) It is one of the most remarkable works of Shāh Walī Allāh on the early Caliphal model. We shall review its contents later in some detail. Its contents have also been included in *Anfās al-'Ārifīn.*

- *Qurrat al-'Aynayn fī Tafḍīl al-Shaykhayn* (Persian) (Delhi: 1320 A.H.), 336 pp. It discusses the significant achievements of the first two Caliphs and their place in Islam. The discussion is fully substantiated by reference to the relevant verses of the Qur'ān and traditions of the Prophet.

- *Al-'Aṭiyyah al-Ṣamadiyyah fī al-Anfās al-Muḥammadiyyah* (Persian). It is a short treatise on the biography of Ṣhaykh Muḥammad Phulatī, a great saint and maternal grand-father of Shāh Walī Allāh. Details as to the place and date of publication are not available.

- *Al-Imdād fī Ma'āthir al-Ajdād* (Persian). It is a biographical account of some ancestors of the author. Its contents have also been included in *Anfās al-'Ārfīn* (listed at no. 19 above).

- *Surūr al-Maḥzūn* (Persian), 24 pp. It is a short but comprehensive biography of the Prophet (peace be upon him). It was first published in Tonk, India in 1271 A.H.

- *Al-Juz' al-Laṭīf fī Tarjamat al-'Abd al-Ża'īf* (Persian). It is a short note on the autobiography of the author. It has been translated into Urdu by Muḥammad Ayyūb Qādirī and published in the monthly *al-Rāḥīm,* vol. II, no. 5, October 1964, pp. 18-26.[377]

2

Al-Budūr al-Bāzighah

This work of Shāh Walī Allāh is considered as one of the three main sources of his socio-political thought, the other two being *Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah* and *Izālat al-Khafā'*. While Shāh Walī Allāh's approach in the *Ḥujjah* is scholastic and juridical, it is mainly historical in *Izālat al-Khafā'*, as required by the latter's theme which is also indicated by its title. In *al-Budūr al-Bāzighah*, however, we find that the treatment is predominantly philosophical and metaphysical.

Unlike the *Ḥujjah, al-Budūr al-Bāzighah* does not contain any introduction from which one could have any clue as to what prompted Shāh Walī Allāh to write this work. Further, no student of Shāh Walī Allāh's thought or any of his biographers has brought forth any evidence on the basis of which a definite chronological order of the different works of Shāh Walī Allāh, particularly those of special relevance for our purpose, could be established. Although we have no external source of information to support our hypothesis, a look at the relatively rudimentary and concise form of *Budūr* suggests that it was written before the *Ḥujjah* and might have been intended to serve as an outline for the latter, which came out as a more comprehensive and gigantic enterprise.[378]

One of the remarkable traits which appears as a common feature of all the works of Shāh Walī Allāh, particularly of *Ḥujjah* and *Budūr*, is the development of a terminology of his own by the author for the articulation of his ideas. He, therefore, scarcely seems to confine himself to using the typical terms of Greek philosophy which had been a visible mark of many Muslim scholastic writings prior to him.

One of the striking features of Shāh Walī Allāh's thought which is fully reflected in his writings, is his reconciliatory trend whereby he attempts a blending of rational, traditional and spiritual points of view in an effort to arrive at a comprehensive and balanced perception of the reality. Shāh Walī Allāh appears all along to maintain an equilibrium in his thinking which combines these three elements in their proper proportions.

In *Budūr*, Shāh Walī Allāh's treatment of the problems of sociology and politics seems to be more inclined to an approach of ethical philosophy, which is not as pronounced as in the *Ḥujjah* and almost absent in *Izālat al-Khafā'*. For example, he goes into a detailed discussion of the essential qualities that characterise man as an 'ethical being'. Then he tries to identify the roots of the ethical traits of human personality in his natural instincts. Thereafter he proceeds to discuss the socio-political organisation of human society with a view to project its role essentially as a protector of the ethical values of the individual and as a promoter of their attainment by the society comprising those individuals.[379]

Al-Budūr al-Bāzighah (literally, 'full rising moons') consists of a preamble and three discourses. Both the preamble and the discourses are divided into different sections, mostly under separate topical headings but on occasions without them.

The preamble has been devoted to 'some basic issues in philosophy' and is divided into three sections. Following the pattern adopted in the *Ḥujjah*, Shāh Walī Allāh first of all sets out to define the doctrinal framework of Islamic theism, by presenting a philosophical view of the existence and unity of God. He opens the discussion by refuting the assumptions of some philosophers that the 'Ultimate Being' *(al-Wujūd al-Aqṣā)*, was just one unit among the many units of existence, which overwhelms them like the universal overwhelms each of its particular units. He goes on to refute the assertions of a number of philosophies about the 'Ultimate Being' one by one, and in this critical process, articulates Islam's metaphysical position on the total absoluteness of the Ultimate Reality. This reality, according to him, transcends all imaginable scope of human cognition. In this preamble Shāh Walī Allāh also states his views regarding the phenomena of existence as a reflection of certain Divine Attributes. According to him, all possible potentialities and existents flow from God's Attribute of Benificence epitomised in *al-Raḥmān*, (the Beneficent).[380]

Despite his sharp critical perception of the philosopher's views, Shāh Walī Allāh does not altogether deny their positive contribution to the understanding of the reality. He divides their ideas into three broad categories: (i) issues on which they fell into error of understanding; (ii) issues on which

they could not reach the utmost aim of their philosophical enquiry and were thus were unable to attain full perception of reality; and (iii) some matters concerning which they were absolutely right.[381]

This preamble is followed by the first discourse on "the issues pertaining to the archetypal man and his distinctive traits rooted in his nature, whereby he is guided towards morals, cultural attainments and healthy customs".[382] In this discourse, Shāh Walī Allāh identifies the characteristics of the archetypal man after describing the features of the animal world, of which man is the most perfect prototype. He also points to the qualities that distinguish man from animals, as he has done in the *Ḥujjah*. But here he goes into greater detail to describe the physical qualities and to analyse the natural psychological traits and the rational faculties of man.[383] He then proceeds to discuss the emergence of social organism, the gradual evolution of culture and the socio-economic dimensions of human social development as a natural and instinctive demand of the peculiar anthropological faculties and potentialities afforded to man by his primordial nature.[384]

Further, in this discourse of *Budūr*, Shāh Walī Allāh goes into a detailed analytical discussion of the ethical aspect of the human personality. He considers these to be deeply seated in man's psyche and which distinguish him from the rest of the animal species. In this connection, he discusses 'seven virtues' that constitute, according to him, the distinctive marks of developed, sound and normal human disposition. He regards these virtues as the "psychic characteristics of excellence".[385] He then proceeds to discuss another significant aspect of the issue which is also one of his important themes in the *Ḥujjah*,[386] namely, human psyche as the exclusive source of all external behaviour of man. The main conclusion which Shāh Walī Allāh has finally drawn from this discussion, both in the *Ḥujjah* and in the *Budūr*, is that any behaviour in itself is neither virtuous nor vicious. It is the particular psychic state prompting a behaviour which assigns it to either of the two categories.[387]

This is followed by a detailed discussion of the evolutionary stage of socio-cultural development *(irtifāqāt)*, the ways of improving them, their various spheres and departments, the sources of moral decay in the society leading to social and cultural set-backs, and the means of overcoming them. In this discourse, he also traces, as he has done in the *Ḥujjah*, the natural and healthy evolution of culture in a society from its primary social stages to the final stage of political origanisation. But unlike the *Ḥujjah*, we find that in the *Budūr*, his discussion is more or less confined to the Universal Paradigm of the state as such and does not progress towards any detailed

treatment of the Islamic state and its universal civilisational and ideological role which is a hallmark of the *Ḥujjah*.[388]

This is followed by a discussion of customs, their variables and different categories from psychological and ethical points of view. Shāh Walī Allāh's analysis of this problem brings him to the conclusion that corrupt customs originate essentially from the psychological deviations of man and his resultant defiance of virtuous deeds, which leads to decay in the *irtifaqāt* and a denial of *iqtirābāt*.[389] Shāh Walī Allāh ends this discourse with a note on the universal character of *irtifāqāt* which, according to him, can be fully substantiated by common human experience.[390]

The second discourse of the *Budūr* is devoted to "the issues pertaining to the archetypal man and his distinctive traits rooted in his nature whereby he is guided to attaining Divine proximity in knowledge and action and saving himself from the trials and travails of the grave and the Hell-fire and other related issues".[391]

As would be evident from its long title, this discourse concerns one of the most remarkably significant themes of this work namely, man's innate cognition of God and the fundamental eschatological truths that are, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, ingrained in his very nature. An acknowledgement of God and a sense of obligation to, or surrender before, Him, is thus deposited in the uncorrupted human conscience prior to its being supplemented by the revelational guidance provided through the Prophets.

The second discourse contains an extremely profound discussion in which Shāh Walī Allāh substantiates the above contention with rational arguments. In this discussion his reasoning is based on the psychological traits of the human soul which, according to him, attain perfection and complete fulfilment by reviving the latent potential of man's personality. Full gratification of man's soul, therefore, lies in responding to this spiritual urge of his own nature.[392]

The discourse then proceeds to present an analytical discussion of the foundations of belief *('aqīdah)*, the ways of spiritual purification, and the postulates of moral science of Islam from the simultaneous standpoints of reason and tradition. This bears the distinctive stamp of Shāh Walī Allāh's religious thought.

There appears to be a logical sequence and a natural growth in the contents of the first and the second discourse of the *Budūr*. While the first discourse sets forth the biological, anthropological, ethical, psychological, social and cultural traits of human life, the second spells out the spiritual, religious and other-worldly possibilities and prospects for the human mind and soul. The main thrust of Shāh Walī Allāh's argument is that man's

attainments in the social, cultural and political spheres cannot be properly streamlined along a healthy course without recourse to the fountainhead of religious guidance which is also an urge of man's own conscience.[393]

The third discourse of the *Budūr* is a logical continuation of the previous discourses in so far as it spells out the distinctive features of the religious dispensation, focusing on its macro level, after the author has explained the same phenomenon at the micro level. This discourse is, therefore, entitled: ..."On the explanation of religions and the codes of law prescribed therein".[394]

The third discourse opens with an analytical exposition of the concept of religion, the causes of its appearance as a social phenomenon, the elements that contribute to its growth, and the factors responsible for variation in the different forms and versions of it subject to the alternations of space and time. Here Shāh Walī Allāh draws a distinction between any religion *(millah)* and the 'True and Pure Religion' *(al-millah al-ḥanīfiyyah)* whose first perfect representative in the religious history of mankind was the Prophet Ibrāhīm (peace be upon him). It was by instituting his prophetic mission that God ushered in a universal era in the realm of religion. This True and Pure Universal Religion of God passed through various stages before reaching its point of culmination in the advent of the Prophetic era of Muḥammad (peace be upon him). In this discussion, Shāh Walī Allāh presents a comparative analysis of the components of various religions in order to explain, by contrast, the nature of the ideological mission embodied in the True and Pure Religion of God.[395]

Thereafter, Shāh Walī Allāh proceeds to discuss the basic characteristics and fundamental teachings of the Religion taught to humanity by the final Prophet Muḥammad (peace be upon him). He states that the attainment of God's pleasure was now contingent upon following this Religion alone, to the exclusion of all other religions and creeds. He also explains the philosophical aspects of this contention of Islam, and substantiates it with rational arguments.[396]

Although the *Budūr* is an extraordinary work of great academic ingenuity, a work of the same proportions as several other scholarly contributions of Shāh Walī Allāh, yet it could not receive sufficient attention and recognition in the academic circles. This might have been, perhaps, due to the fact that this work was overshadowed by the other more comprehensive and epoch-making contribution of the same author, namely, the *Ḥujjah*.

3

Izālat al-Khafā' 'an Khilāfat al-Khulafā'

In the Islamic tradition perhaps only a few works are as remarkable for having so comprehensively and systematically expounded the normative model of the *Khilāfah* as this extraordinary book of Shāh Walī Allāh. This model of the *khilāfah* was realized in history and concretized in the pious reign of the successors of the Prophet (peace be upon him) immediately after his demise. In accord with the consensus of the majority of Muslim scholars throughout the ages, Shāh Walī Allāh also recognises the constitutional pattern of statecraft developed by the earliest successors of the Prophet (peace be upon him) during the first three decades to be the ideal pattern of an Islamic state always and everywhere.

In *Izālat al-Khafā' 'an Khilāfat al-Khulafā'* (lit. 'Removal of Ambiguity about the Caliphate of the [Early] Caliphs',), Shāh Walī Allāh attempts to demonstrate the fundamental importance of this early model of *Khilāfah*, as one of the cardinal principles of Religion. Explaining the purpose of writing this book in its preface, he says:

> In this age, the heretic credulity of people has lent itself to the influence of the doctrines of the Shī'ah so much so that many people in this country entertain doubts regarding the validity of the installation of the Orthodox Caliphs. Therefore, Divine favour radiated the heart of this humble servant with a knowledge. It established with certainty the conviction that the accession to the caliphal office (*khilāfah*) by these early elders of Islam was one of the cardinal

> principles of Religion. Without strict adherence to this principle, no other principle of the *sharī'ah* could be sustained on any firm ground.[397]

Therefore, although this work chiefly constitutes an argument for the normative value and authentic character of the early *Khilāfah*, nonetheless the author in expatiating on this argument, has also delved deep in explaining the conceptual framework of the institution of *khilāfah* in Islam. Hence, *Izālat al-Khafā'* had generally been regarded as one of the main sources of Shāh Walī Allāh's political thought ever since its first publication in 1286 A.H.[398]

While Shāh Walī Allāh's treatment of this subject in the *Budūr* and the *Ḥujjah* is mainly metaphysical and juridical, as we have already noted, his discussion in *Izālat al-Khafā'* is focused on the actualisation of the socio-political ideals of Islam in history. From this historical analysis Shāh Walī Allāh derives the applied principles of state and government. There was another significant pragmatic motive in this academic undertaking on the part of Shāh Walī Allāh: it addressed an intellectual issue of contemporaneous relevance for his time. As we have noted in his own remarks cited above, Shāh Walī Allāh felt inspired to write this book in order to dispel the doubts cast on the institution of Caliphate under the influence of the Shī'ī theologians who questioned the validity of the early caliphal era as a normative model for the socio-political ideals of Islam in history. This perhaps explains why he chose to articulate his views in Persian, the *lingua franca* of the Muslim intelligentia of India at that time. For a number of his other works, however, he preferred Arabic, as in the case of the *Budūr* and the *Ḥujjah*, apparently because these works were primarily addressed to specialists in the Islamic lore all over the Muslim world whose intellectual medium of communication had always been Arabic.

Explaining the significance of his endeavour in the preface of *Izālat al-Khafā'*, Shāh Walī Allāh substantiates his contention that the conviction about the valid caliphal authority of the four early caliphs was one of the cardinal principles of Religion. In this connection, he argues that a large body of injunctions contained in the Qur'ān was brief and summarily expressed. Their full understanding and wider ramifications compel recourse to explanations and commentaries of the early pious authorities *(salaf ṣāliḥ)*. Further, for their interpretation we have to fall back on the traditions. These traditions cannot be admitted as an authentic record of the Prophet's exemplary pattern *(sunnah)* nor relied upon in juridical arguments, without their transmission and confirmation by these early authorities. Besides, no instrument of resolving the seemingly conflicting traditions is available to

us except our reliance on their verdicts. In all the above areas, the early authorities have strictly followed the acts and utterances of these Caliphs. Also the compilation of the Qur'ān and a consensus on its authentic reading was accomplished by the efforts of the early caliphs and under their supervision and guidance. Moreover, detailed rules with regard to the institution of the judiciary, the penal ordinances of the *sharī'ah* and the provisions in other fields of public law are based on their opinions and rulings. From these premises, Shāh Walī Allāh arrives at the conclusion that: "Whoever attempts to break away from this root (i.e. the early *khilāfah*), he indeed seeks to obliterate the entire corpus of the Religious Sciences".[399]

After a brief preface, Shāh Walī Allāh divides this work into two parts. Part one discusses the conceptual foundations and legal and constitutional framework of the *khilāfah*, with its two categories of *khilāfah 'āmmah* and *khilāfah khāṣṣah*, which have been discussed in the previous chapter in some detail. Part one further deals with the arguments for the validity of the early caliphal model and reconciles between the two apparently conflicting views with regard to the discretionary or mandatory character of *khilāfah*.[400] Part one also presents a detailed explanation of the relevant injunctions of the Qur'ān and the *Ḥadīth* on the basis of which Shāh Walī Allāh upholds the obligatory nature of the *khilāfah*. He then defines various modes of installation of the *khalīfah*, his requisite qualifications, functions and duties and mutual relations between him and the people in general.[401]

Shāh Walī Allāh then proceeds to discuss the main ingredients of the early normative model, i.e. *khilāfah khāṣṣah*. This term has been adopted by Shāh Walī Allāh to denote the textual evidence in favour of the four immediate successors of the Prophet (peace be upon him), as distinct from the Caliphs who came after them. He explains its mandatory character and substantiates it by citing a large number of verses and traditions that have a bearing on various aspects of the *khilāfah khāṣṣah*. Then he undertakes a historical appreciation of the role of *khilāfah* in the growth, progress and advancement of Islam's mission and the profound impact of its rich culture and universal civilisation on humanity, which was realised through the agency of *khilāfah* during the various stages of its history. In passing, Shāh Walī Allāh also surveys the rise and fall of the Muslim society during the different phases of caliphal history which, according to him, had always been commensurate with the degree of conformity or conflict between the pattern of *khilāfah* and the criteria provided by the early normative model.[402]

The second part of *Izālat al-Khafā'* deals with those aspects of the lives of the four early caliphs which point to the singularly excellent virtues

(faḍā'il) that make their political conduct an exemplary pattern in statecraft. Thus this work adopts a dual approach, one that combines the juridical and historical treatment of the subject. Further, it sets out to refute the political doctrines of the *Shī'ah*. This is not only the central theme of the book, but also the main motive of this study. Additionally, the book has a pronounced scholastic orientation.

Again in the second part, Shāh Walī Allāh presents an in-depth study of the verses of the Qur'ān and the Prophet's traditions that allude to the high status of the four caliphs in general and the first two among them in particular, either explicitly or implicitly. To this end, he not only interprets the relevant texts (*nuṣūṣ*), but also marshals additional evidence from the generally accepted principles of jurisprudence with regard to the interpretation of texts to support and substantiate his contentions. In this process, he takes notice of the many objections, real as well as hypothetical, that can be raised against these interpretations and then refutes them. He also refutes many political and theological doctrines of the Shī'ah by adducing traditional and rational arguments and controverts their assertions that belittle the status of these Companions and Successors of the Prophet (peace be upon him).

Shāh Walī Allāh also presents, in the second part of *Izālat al-Khafā'*, various authentic reports contained in the collections of traditions and in the annals of Islamic history. He supplements these reports with his profound analytical comments that go to prove the extraordinarily high moral, ethical and spiritual conduct of the early Caliphs. Further, he highlights their singular role in the reformation and guidance of the society and the expansion and promotion of the universal mission of Islam in their times. In addition to these aspects and dimensions of these personalities, Shāh Walī Allāh also throws light on the intellectual and academic contribution of the Companions of the Prophet, particularly in the fields of the Qur'ān, *Ḥadīth*, law, jurisprudence, international relations, Arabic language and spiritual guidance. All these constitute, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, an extension of the mission undertaken by the Prophet (peace be upon him).[403]

4

Political Epistles of Shāh Walī Allāh

It had been common practice in the past among many prominent scholars and religious reformers to communicate with their students, disciples and leaders of opinion through letters. They used this medium to educate and guide their addressees on various issues, especially those of current significance, and also to maintain personal liaison with them. The *maktūbāt* (letters) of Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindī, and Sayyid Aḥmad Shahīd (d. 1831) and the letters of Maulānā Ashraf 'Alī Thānwī (d.1943) to Qaid-i A'ẓam Muhammad Ali Jinnah (d. 1948), the founder of Pakistan, are some prominent examples in this regard.

Shāh Walī Allāh also followed this tradition and frequently wrote letters to his students, friends and the notables of his time. Out of a large number of these letters some two hundred and eighty-two have been preserved in the two volumes of collection prepared by Shāh Muḥammad 'Āshiq, a cousin, brother-in-law and close friend of Shāh Walī Allāh. This collection was further enlarged and edited by the former's son, Shāh 'Abd al-Raḥmān, who was also a student of Shāh Walī Allāh. The latter brought the number of these letters to three hundred and fifty-two.[404] A useful selection of political letters had been culled out from them by late Professor Khaliq Ahmad Nizami, which he had first published in 1951 in Aligarh, India. He later brought out another enlarged and edited version of his collection, containing some forty letters, with an introduction and Urdu translation of the letters in 1969.[405]

These letters of political significance were addressed by Shāh Walī Allāh to the compiler, Shāh Muḥammad 'Āshiq, and to some other notables, rulers and kings of his time. They, along with the other works of

Shāh Walī Allāh, provide an important source for the study of his political ideas in the context of the socio-cultural milieu of India at the time of their writing.

The focus of the present study is confined to the theoretical aspects of Shāh Walī Allāh's socio-political thought. It would, therefore, be beyond the scope of this work to attempt to explain the role played by Shāh Walī Allāh in shaping the political future of India, which indeed can constitute the subject of a separate work. However, it would be useful to note here some salient features of the political statements contained in these epistles to see how far Shāh Walī Allāh's response to the political life of his country was in consonance with the ideas he expressed in his other writings.

First of all, it is evident that Shāh Walī Allāh regarded the entire Muslim world as a single entity, even though it may have been under the suzerainty of different political rulers who were virtually independent of each other. This is explained, *inter alia*, by the fact that Shāh Walī Allāh invited the rulers of other countries to intervene politically and militarily in the affairs of India so as to rectify its deteriorating condition.[406] This attitude of Shāh Walī Allāh appears most pronounced in his letter to Aḥmad Shāh Abdālī (d. 1772), the founder of modern Afghanistan. Apprising him of the deplorable decay found in India, Shāh Walī Allāh appealed to this formidable military commander and ruler of the neighbouring Muslim country to bring his armies into India in order to suppress the forces of anarchy and disorder represented by the Jats and Marathas, the two organised and militant communities among Hindus.[407] Another important addressee of Shāh Walī Allāh's letters was Najīb al-Dawlah (d. 1770), a powerful Indian notable and chief who was a "close personal friend of Shāh Walī Allāh and a bastion of Muslim Orthodoxy in the Sub-Continent during post-Awrangzeb period".[408] From 1761 to 1770, the entire politics of Delhi revolved around this most prominent statesman and military commander of India and it was he who carried the entire system of government on his shoulders.[409]

Out of a total of forty letters compiled by Professor Nizami, seven were addressed to Najīb al-Dawlah. Apart from other specific details of their contents, certain points have been conspicuously stressed in these letters. For instance, in a long letter to Najīb al-Dawlah, he says:

> No wrong or maltreatment should be meted out to the city of Delhi. The people of Delhi have several times faced the plunder of their wealth and property as well as dishonour and disgrace. That is why the realisation of royal objectives has been delayed. For the cry of the oppressed does have its effects. This time if you want that the

> delayed works are done, you should strictly prohibit that no one is to vex or offend the Muslims and the *dhimmīs* of Delhi.[410]

Another distinctive trait of these letters is a strong emphasis on subduing, and if necessary, exterminating the organised forces of corruption in order to secure the community's peace and tranquillity from their increasing mischief. In the case of India at the time of Shāh Walī Allāh, these forces were represented by the Jats and Marathas. It was this concern of Shāh Walī Allāh to protect the future of Muslims from the treacherous designs of these evil forces which prompted him to address an appeal to Emperor Aḥmad Shāh Abdālī of Afghanistan for direct physical intervention.[411]

In one of his letters to Najīb al-Dawlah, Shāh Walī Allāh urges the latter to resolve in his heart to make the word of God exalted, to strengthen the Religion of the Prophet (peace be upon him), and to wage *jihād* against "these accursed people", i.e. the Jats and the Marathas.[412]

It is evident from these examples that the objectives which inspired Shāh Walī Allāh in his actual life were in conspicuous conformity with those he espoused in his writings. The most remarkable concern of his life seems to be the promotion of the universal mission of Islam which, in his opinion, could not be realised without waging *jihād* against the forces of oppression and infidelity. It is this paramount objective, which constitutes the *raison d'etre* of the socio-political organisation of Muslim society, embodied in the agency of the *khilāfah*.

5

Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah

This *magnum opus* of Shāh Walī Allāh, *Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah* (lit. 'The Conclusive Proof of God'), borrows its title from a verse of the Qur'ān (6:149). Explaining the background of this grandest academic venture of his life in its prologue, the author relates an extraordinary spiritual experience that he underwent during one of his meditations. Once following the Afternoon Prayers, he was overwhelmed by the spirit of the Prophet (peace be upon him), and felt covered by something like a robe. In that state of spiritual exaltation, a heavenly suggestion was instilled into his heart towards a re-statement of the faith. At the same moment, he found a light spreading gradually all through his bosom. After a span of time, he once again felt inspired by Divine Providence to rise and take up this task. He felt as if the whole earth had been radiated with Divine luminosity and lights were being reflected in its western hemisphere; and that the *Sharī'ah* revealed to Muṣṭafā, i.e. Prophet Muḥammad (peace be upon him), had reached the threshold of an era in which it will appear in the perfect garment of demonstrative proof. This experience was followed, after some time, by a dream while he was in Makkah. The author saw the two Imāms, Ḥasan and Ḥusayn, the maternal grandsons of the Prophet (peace be upon him), handing over a pen to him saying: "This is the pen of our maternal grandfather, the Prophet of God (peace be upon him)".[413]

After these successive experiences, Shāh Walī Allāh seriously pondered for some time over the idea of writing a book "which could provide understanding and guidance to the beginners and serve as a reminder for the learned".[414] This ambition was further reinforced by forceful pleading and persistent counsel of his closest companion, cousin and brother-in-law,

Shaykh Muḥammad ʿĀshiq, to the same effect. Thus, thanks to a combination of spiritual inspiration, academic devotion and strong intellectual zeal and ambition, this outstanding historic enterprise came to be realised.

These intuitional suggestions inspired Shāh Walī Allāh to produce a remarkable compendium covering a vast spectrum of themes ranging from the philosophy of religion, law, jurisprudence, ethics, psychology, mysticism, sociology, social anthropology and economics to the philosophy of state and government. He undertook a thorough discussion of numerous dimensions of the Islamic dispensation for human life covering almost all theoretical and practical issues involved therein. Indeed he went much beyond that and took up, for discussion and profound philosophical analysis, each important injunction pertaining to almost all significant areas of life such as those enumerated above. His frame of reference in all these discussions is mainly defined by the parameters of the Qur'ān and the traditions of the Prophet (peace be upon him), to which he strictly confines himself throughout this work. He endeavours to understand, analyse and present the teachings and principles of Islam in their pristine purity, without attempting to read into them any pre-conceived notions of speculative philosophy.

The work is mainly divided into two parts. The first part is like an introduction, as it were, to the second. In the first part, he sets forth the basic principles and premises of religious philosophy that provide the theoretical framework for subsequent discussion of detailed rules and injunctions of the Islamic dispensation presented in the second part.

The second part of the work takes up for discussion each important item of Islam's agenda for the life of mankind on individual and collective planes, in the spheres of personal ethics and public morality, ritual observances and spiritual purification, business, trade and economics, psychology and sociology, state, government and politics, law, judicature and international relations and finally the universal paradigm of a society founded on Religion.

In elucidating the guidance provided by Islam in these spheres of life, Shāh Walī Allāh adopts simultaneously a rational and traditional approach. First, he sets out to empirically survey the behaviour of the archetypal man, at the micro level. Then he develops the theme further to identify the common features of a universal paradigm of human society at the macro level. Thereafter he proceeds to give a rational explanation of the given features of the individual and social life of mankind. This is followed by identifying the sanctions of Religion that endorse this temperate individual and collective behaviour of man. Thus the final conclusion drawn by Shāh Walī

Allāh establishes an essential harmony between the healthy natural course of human life and the religious dictates of Islam.

In the course of interpreting the injunctions of Islam, Shāh Walī Allāh also corrects a number of misconceptions that distorted, over the course of time, its original teachings in the domains of belief and rituals and with regard to the nature of its ethical, spiritual, social, political and legal directives for mankind.

According to 'Abd al-Raḥīm, one of the translators of *Ḥujjah* into Urdu, who has added a useful introduction to the thought of Shāh Walī Allāh: "One of the most remarkable trends characterising the present age, is a strong insistence that a rational explanation, logical basis and the wisdom underlying each proposition be provided. This work of Shāh Walī Allāh is an antidote for this disease".[415] He further says that this work of Shāh Walī Allāh "furnishes authentic, elaborate and convincing answers to the questions of belief, ethics, social organisation, *irtifāqāt*, i.e. stages of cultural development, politics and principles of social life. But sophistry, prejudice, grudge and malice are incurable and no treatment is available for them in the whole world".[416]

Muḥammad Manẓūr Nu'mānī, another scholar who carefully studied the Islamic thought of India, brought out a special issue of the monthly journal *al-Furqān* on Shāh Walī Allāh, which has been an important source of studies on his thought, also paid rich tributes to *Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah* in the following words:

> This work can rightly be called a commentary on the whole of Islam. In all my life I have not been benefited by any human work, as much as God has enabled me to benefit from this book. It is through this work that I have been able to comprehend Islam as a well-knit scheme of life. A number of religious precepts of Islam, in which I used to believe merely as a matter of faith, are now part of my conviction, based on understanding and personal certitude. That was possible after studying this book.[417]

It is not possible to take note of all such tributes paid by scholars to this work of Shāh Walī Allāh, for these are simply innumerable. It would, therefore, suffice to conclude by reproducing another brief comment made by a leading scholar of Islam in the recent times namely, the late Maulana Abū al-Ḥasan 'Alī Nadvī (d. 1419/1999):

> We do not find a philosophical explanation of the entire legal system of Islam before Shāh Walī Allāh. Therefore, according to our

> knowledge, *Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah* is the first work dealing with this subject so extensively and comprehensively and with an intense emphasis which are all its own. Further, most of its subjects and themes are hitherto unparallelled. It is an exclusive distinction of Shāh Walī Allāh that he combined the varied discussions on philosophy, scholastics, Qur'ān, *Ḥadīth*, and *Taṣawwuf* with his own forceful contemplation, observation and dialectical vigour.[418]

In his brief preface to the *Ḥujjah*, Shāh Walī Allāh speaks about the main subject-matter of his work. According to him, the most authentic and paramount of all religious sciences, which occupies a fundamental position in the entire religious tradition of Islam, is no doubt, the science of *Ḥadīth* and its auxiliary branches. Different sections of this science and its many branches occupy varying levels of importance and significance in understanding the message of Religion. But the very core of all sciences, originating from this fountainhead of knowledge and wisdom (i.e. *Ḥadīth*), is what Shāh Walī Allāh terms *'ilm asrār al-dīn*, the science which enquires into the subtleties underlying the wisdom of religious injunctions. For it is through this science that the meaningful considerations permeating the Divine ordinances can be comprehended, and a clue can be found to their logical order and purposeful coherence. Further, it is through this science that the profound and subtle meanings of various acts of virtue prescribed in the *Sharī'ah* can be discovered. By coming to grips with this science one is able to attain the true perception of what the *Sharī'ah* stands for. One's understanding of Religion, then, becomes like that of a master of prosody for poetry, or that of a logician for the dialectics of philosophy, or that of a grammarian for Arabic language, or like that of a jurist for particular provisions of law.[419] This core of all *Ḥadīth* sciences and their elucidation constitutes the main subject-matter of *Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah* and, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, without pursuing its subtleties and grandeur, human bliss cannot be fully attained.[420]

Among the scholars of *Ḥadīth* prior to Shāh Walī Allāh, we hardly find anyone who so elaborately identified the inner dimension, as it were, of the traditions of the Prophet (peace be upon him), within a well-integrated rational framework. This unique approach to the interpretation of *Ḥadīth* is most prominently reflected in the themes of the *Ḥujjah* more than any other work of Shāh Walī Allāh.

Before proceeding to survey the contents of the *Ḥujjah*, it seems appropriate to note the author's own description of the thematic plan of his work. According to him, the work is divided into two parts. Part one deals

with the basic principles which govern the wise and beneficial considerations underlying the Divine Ordinances. These considerations that provide anchorage for the injunctions revolve around two main conceptual foundations. These foundations have been discussed in the discourse on virtue and vice *(birr* and *ithm)*, and the discourse on the philosophy of religious dispensations *(al-siyāsāt al-milliyyah)*. Again the nature of virtue and vice cannot be understood in the true perspective without first comprehending the philosophy of Divine recompense *(mujāzāh)*, *irtifāqāt*, stages of cultural development, and human felicity, which have also been discussed in separate discourses. Moreover, the first part deals with the essential components of the religious dispensation relating to *ḥudūd*, i.e. injunctions which aim at the preservation of morals in society. These discussions are followed by an explanation of the methodology for deducing injunctions from the established record of the Prophet's life. The second part of this book deals with the interpretation of the traditions pertaining to belief, knowledge, cleanliness, hygiene, prayers, *zakāt*, fasting, pilgrimage, spiritual excellence *(iḥsān)*, transactions of various categories, matters relating to household and family life, civics *(siyāsat al-mudun)* and economics, etc. This is followed by a discussion of miscellaneous subjects that have a bearing on the above themes in one way or the other.[421]

As we have noted, Shāh Walī Allāh has divided his work into two parts: part one deals with the basic premises from which the principles underlying the Divine Ordinances are to be deduced.[422] This part is subdivided into seven discourses *(mabāḥith)* covering the main subjects discussed in this part. These seven discourses are further subdivided into seventy chapters. Each chapter discusses a separate topic under a sub-heading.

Part two of the *Ḥujjah* deals with "detailed elucidation of the wisdom underlying the traditions transmitted from the Prophet (peace be upon him)". This part is again divided into eleven sections, for which Shāh Walī Allāh has adopted the nomenclature of the scholars of *Ḥadīth*, which they generally employ in classifying the subjects of their various compendia of the traditions namely *abwāb* and not *mabāḥith* as in part one.

In part one of the *Ḥujjah*, the first discourse is titled: "Factors responsible for charging man with obligations and providing recompense". This discourse, as would appear from its title, sets forth the distinctive features of the Divine cosmic phenomena, with God as the alpha and omega and the Creator and Sustainer of all beings, and then explains, in that perspective, the position of man as the creature charged with a well-defined set of duties.

In the various chapters of this discourse Shāh Walī Allāh attempts to establish, as a primary premise for his thesis, that religious dispensation comes essentially as a response to the urge rooted in the nature of man himself. He highlights the nature of human soul and its relationship with the spiritual world. He does so to show that man's own fulfilment calls for a transcendental religious guidance and an eventual anticipated return from the visible world of corporeality to the invisible realm of spirituality. He identifies a logical sequence between human accountability and Divine recompense. He then proceeds to discuss elements of variation in human moral traits and the differing capacities for attaining bliss. His analysis betrays an intense grasp of human psyche, the centre from which all actions originate, and shows that the value of all human acts is ultimately determined by the psychic states that prompt them. Thus the main conclusion of the discourse is that the prescription of a religious path for humanity, through revelational guidance, is fully in accord with human nature.[423]

The second discourse is devoted to a discussion of the philosophy of Divine recompense, both in this world and in the life Hereafter. In this connection Shāh Walī Allāh tries to find a link between the various acts of man and their necessary consequences. These consequences, according to him, are two-fold: material and spiritual. As there exists a causal relationship between acts and their results in this material phase of life so also there is a relation between every conscious human act here and its consequence that shall be manifest in the Hereafter. As material objects have been invested with certain properties by the nature ordained by God, so the abstract human acts have also been impregnated with definite characteristics by God. Man, therefore, is destined to encounter the inescapable consequences of his deeds. While the results of human acts that appear in the temporal world are somewhat limited, their outcome in the subsequent phase of the Hereafter is going to be total and in absolute measure. This, in a nutshell, is the conclusion of the second discourse of the *Ḥujjah*.[424]

In the third discourse, Shāh Walī Allāh discusses his theory of *irtifāqāt*, which is his singular contribution to socio-political thought. As we have already seen, he sets out first to establish that the attainment of *irtifāqāt* was an unavoidable natural course for every social organism at its primary level. He then traces the gradual growth of the socio-economic and cultural needs of human society that ultimately brings about its political organisation at the level of the city-state. He tries to show that each phase of human cultural development naturally paves the way for attaining higher degrees of culture and civilisation so as to finally reach the universal stage of socio-political organisation. The main focus of this discourse is on the

identification of a universal paradigm of a politically organised society, which finally attains, in the course of its healthy natural development, a stage of perfection in the form of *khilāfah.*[425]

The fourth discourse expounds the philosophy of human bliss. Shāh Walī Allāh, first of all, spells out the essence of bliss with reference to his conception of human nature as he identified it in the first discourse of this work.[426] True human bliss, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, is attainable by "the surrender of animality to the enlightened soul and submission of desire to intellect so that the enlightened soul controls animality while intellect dominates the desire".[427] In this connection Shāh Walī Allāh draws a clear distinction between "contingent bliss" *(sa'ādah bi al-'arḍ)* and the "real bliss" *(al-sa'ādah al-ḥaqīqiyyah)* which, according to him, are often confused with each other, leading to many misconceptions on this issue. He then identifies the various degrees of 'bliss', mentioning different approaches to its attainment and the varying capacities among people for its realisation. Thereafter he points to the main impediments that hinder the human pursuit of self-realisation, which leads to the attainment of 'bliss', and concludes the discussion by mentioning the appropriate means of overcoming these impediments.[428]

The fifth discourse concerns itself with the philosophy of virtue and vice *(birr* and *ithm).* This discussion is prefaced by an analysis of the essence of virtue and the nature of vice, an appreciation of which is regarded as central to any rational comprehension of the Divine ordinances by Shāh Walī Allāh. Because the entire corpus of religious mandates revolve around this cardinal principle in so far they either approve virtue or disapprove vice in varying degrees. In this context, Shāh Walī Allāh discusses the most fundamental postulate of Religion namely monotheism *(tawḥīd),* which he regards as the highest degree of all virtues. For its position "is pivotal in all attitudes of veneration and servitude to the Lord of the worlds"[429] This is followed by a discussion of polytheism (*shirk*) which is, as it were, an antithesis to monotheism. Shāh Walī Allāh considers polytheism as the worst form of all evils. He describes the relative degrees of virtue and vice and finally comes to the conclusion that all actions, ideas and attitudes that strengthen and promote monotheism in one form or the other fall in the broad category of virtue *(birr),* and any behaviour, act or notion which draws man any closer to polytheism in any manner, constitutes vice *(ithm)* in higher or lesser degrees.[430]

The sixth discourse pertains to the foundations of the religious dispensation. It opens with an explanation of the role played by the Prophets in

the religious guidance of human societies, which has a fundamental significance in the entire scheme of moral and spiritual reform of mankind envisaged by religion. Here, Shāh Walī Allāh defines Prophethood and explains humanity's need for Prophetic guidance. Thereafter, he proceeds to establish that the essence of all Prophetic teachings has been one and the same, right from the first Prophet, Adam (peace be upon him), until the final Prophet, Muḥammad (peace be upon him). The only difference between their teachings lay in the details of their legal codes and methodologies of reform. And that too did not represent any significant variation in substance but merely in forms and particulars. This identification of the common essentials of the religious mission of different Prophets is an important theme of Shāh Walī Allāh in the *Ḥujjah* to which reference has been frequently made by him in different contexts. He then points to some striking features of the religious dispensation which provided the immutable framework of the Prophetic reform of human society in all ages and climes.

Additionally, this discourse contains a discussion of the significance of abrogation *(naskh)* in the religious philosophy of Islam and explains the nature and rationale of replacing one injunction or set of injunctions by another, with particular reference to the teachings of the Final Prophet (peace be upon him).

Shāh Walī Allāh concludes this long discourse by a brief survey of the reforms introduced by the Prophet (peace be upon him) in the moral, spiritual, social and cultural life of his contemporary society, against the background of *jāhilī* ethos.[431]

The seventh discourse of the *Ḥujjah* sets forth the central theme of the work for which the previous discussions serve as premises. It deals with the principles of deducing injunctions from the traditions of the Prophet (peace be upon him). It is the investigation of these principles and their rational application to the problems of human life which, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, constitutes the very core of all *Ḥadīth* sciences.

After surveying the categories of knowledge imparted by the Prophet (peace be upon him) to the community, Shāh Walī Allāh discusses the conceptual difference between the underlying benefits *(maṣāliḥ)* and codes of law *(sharā'i')* and their mutual relationship. He then explains the methods of acquiring the knowledge and understanding of the code of injunctions *(sharī'ah)* from the Prophetic source. In this connection he mentions the degrees of authenticity of various compendia of *Ḥadīth*, and explains the modes of understanding the purport of the Prophet (peace be upon him), from his acts, utterances and approvals. Shāh Walī Allāh also discusses, in this connection, the principles that are to be applied in solving the problem

of traditions that seem to be at variance with each other and explains the nature of disagreement between the scholars and transmitters of *aḥādīth* on the one hand, and the jurists on the other. Here, once again, we come across the extraordinary genius of Shāh Walī Allāh, which expresses itself in his exceptional competence to synthesize the apparently conflicting traditions or their interpretations, and his superb ability to discern the common element of unity out of a huge mass of seeming diversity.[432] He ends this discourse with a note on the complexity of issues involved in *taqlīd*.[433]

In the seventh discourses of the first part of the *Ḥujjah*, Shāh Walī Allāh attempts to spell out the basic principles of the 'core science' of discovering the latent subtleties of signification in the Prophetic traditions. It is through the application of these principles that one is able to discern the weal and wisdom underlying the Divine injunctions that are deducible from the traditions.

The second part of the *Ḥujjah* constitutes an attempt by the author to present a detailed rational application of these principles to the traditions pertaining to different spheres of human life on the individual, familial, social, economic, political and spiritual levels.

As pointed out before, this part is divided into some eleven sections that have been designated as *abwāb*, the typical term in vogue among the early compilers of *Ḥadīth* for a subject-wise classification of traditions. Although the order and method of classification of traditions adopted by Shāh Walī Allāh here are more in keeping with the pattern of *sunan*,[434] it shares some of the traits of *jāmi'*[435] for its comprehensiveness and diversity of contents.

Indeed the scope of the subjects covered by the *Ḥujjah* (Part II) is much larger, since the classification adopted by Shāh Walī Allāh is more comprehensive than that of *jāmi'* and *sunan*. It includes such innovative headings of various sections which are not quite familiar in the *Ḥadīth* works, e.g.:

- the section on *iḥsān* (spiritual excellence);
- the section on earning livelihood;
- the section on civics/politics; and
- the section on economics.

It also includes such subsections as (i) *adhkār* (supplications) in the section on 'spiritual excellence'; and (ii) co-operation and social welfare in the section on earning livelihood; and (iii) a subsection on *khilāfah* in the section on civics/politics.

Thus Shāh Walī Allāh makes the thematic scheme of the second part so comprehensive as to encompass many areas of significance in the individual and social life of mankind wherein guidance could be available from the traditions of the Prophet (peace be upon him).

A large body of traditions discussed by Shāh Walī Allāh has been drawn from *al-Ṣaḥīḥ* of al-Bukhārī, *al-Ṣaḥīḥ* of Muslim, the *Jāmi'* of al-Tirmidhī, and the *Sunan* of Abū Dāwūd notwithstanding a few other sources that he has occasionally taken from other than the above four, as he points out himself in his opening remarks of the second part.[436]

Shāh Walī Allāh avoids going into the typical discussion of the doctors of *Ḥadīth* and the jurists of the classical times in his treatment of the traditions. Often he does not even quote the full text of a tradition. He merely confines himself to stating the central idea of the relevant tradition on a subject. Then he puts forth his interpretation of the tradition in question and explains its legal import, spiritual significance, and moves on to a discussion of the philosophical dimensions of the injunction contained or implied in it. This is supplemented by a rational argument which is sometimes reinforced by evidence from a sort of empirical inquiry into the customs and conventions that are universally followed in the human society and are accepted as established cultural norms.

At times Shāh Walī Allāh also substantiates his contentions by adducing supportive evidence from the psychological traits of human beings that are universally recognized almost as established facts. Thus, he is able to highlight a compatibility between the Divine injunctions and the human nature on the one hand, and between the Divine injunctions and the genuine temporal needs of the individual and the society on the other.

The above survey will have shown the vast canvas on which Shāh Walī Allāh attempted a re-statement of Islamic world-view in this celebrated work. In the intellectual history of Islam, both in recent times as well as before the time of Shāh Walī Allāh, there are hardly any noticeable instances of producing such comprehensive works, with such a holistic approach to human life and its problems, in both mundane and spiritual domains, as characterizes this *magnum opus* of Shāh Walī Allāh. This singular contribution by the great saint philosopher of South Asia was well received, not only in his own country, but in the Muslim world as a whole. The momentous response of Muslim scholarship to the *Ḥujjah* is evidenced, *inter alia*, by the numerous translations and several edited versions of the work which have appeared to this date. Moreover, the *Ḥujjah* has formed, and continues to form, an important part of the curricula of Islamic education

designed for specialists in Islamic disciplines in many a leading centre of Islamic learning in the world.

Moreover, apart from the purely academic significance of the work, which has been widely acknowledged, its message is of immense practical import with a conspicuous contemporary relevance. For it addresses itself to a number of problems which confront the present-day Muslim society in various fields of life, and offers feasible answers worthy of very serious consideration.

Part THREE

Selections from *Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah*

SECTION I

The Method of Deducing *Irtifāqāt*

1. It should be known that man is similar to the other members of his genus in his need to eat and drink, have sex, seek shelter from the sun and rain, and in requiring warmth in winter, etc. It is a Divine favour to man that God inspired him to derive benefit by the satisfaction of these needs. This inspiration he naturally receives by virtue of his formation as a human species, of which all the members are equal in this characteristic except those who might suffer from abnormal deficiency.

2. In the same manner, God inspired a bee how to partake of different fruits and make a dwelling where members of its species could live together and obey their drone, and then to make honey. Similarly, He inspired a sparrow how to collect grains, to reach water, to run away from cats and hunters, and to fight those who might obstruct the satisfaction of its needs and how its male should copulate with female in the hour of lust and also how the two of them should make a nest on the hills and cooperate with each other in the preservation of eggs and in feeding their young ones. In the same way, every other species has a prescribed course of life which is inspired to its members by their very formation.

3. In the same manner, God has inspired man to derive benefits in the satisfaction of his needs. But in addition to this, man has been endowed with three distinctive qualities by virtue of his higher formation.

4. The first of these qualities is that man's propensity to something stems from a universality of purpose, whereas a beast tends to

achieve an end grasped by its sense-perception or suggested by a temptation instinctively emanating from its nature like hunger, thirst and lust. Man, on the other hand, sometimes tends to achieve a rational purpose to which he may not be attracted instinctively. Hence, he endeavours to realize a good civic system, to perfect his morals, to civilize himself, to emancipate himself from the chastisement of the Hereafter or to establish his prestige in the minds of people.

5. The second distinctive trait of man, apart from these pursuits for social development, is his aesthetic sense. While a beast seeks only that which may quench its thirst and satisfy its instinctive needs, man often requires contentment and pleasure beyond his instinctive needs. For instance, he desires a beautiful spouse, delicious food, elegant dress, and lofty house, etc.

6. The third distinctive quality of man is that among the human species there are people gifted with exceptional reason and perception who discover, by employing their rational faculties, certain beneficial stages of social development. Similarly, there are others among the human species who feel an urge to achieve the same end, but they are not capable of any innovations. But when such people come across some wise men and learn what they have discovered, they wholeheartedly adopt their ideas because they find them in conformity with their own general understanding.

7. For instance, there is a man who feels hunger and thirst, but finds nothing to eat or drink; he undergoes hardship until he finds food and drink. Such a person strives to develop a method to satisfy these needs, but fails to discover the means to do so. Perchance, he comes across a wise man who, having encountered the same difficulty, discovered methods of overcoming it. So he learnt from him about seeds of food and understood methods of growing, weaving, reaping, threshing and refining them and then preserving the produce for the hour of need. Similarly, that wise man explained to him the methods of digging wells in lands which are far from springs and streams, making earthen water pots, skin bags and other big containers to carry and preserve water. Thus he discovers a method of satisfying his needs in an organised and intelligent manner. Then he attempts to crack these seeds as they are with his teeth and to swallow raw fruit, but they do not digest in his stomach. He then strives to overcome these difficulties, but does not find the means. He then comes across another wise man, who has already discovered methods of cooking,

frying, grinding and baking. He learns from this wise man yet another means of satisfying his needs in an organised and intelligent manner.

8. By analogy we can comprehend that in the same manner, man gradually learns to satisfy his needs. A perceptive man observes, as we mentioned, the evolution of many facilities and amenities in human societies from their very inception; then he further observes that centuries pass over humanity being engaged in these practices until a stage comes when a useful set of intuitional knowledge is developed which is reinforced by human cultivation. Humanity becomes attached to its application and lives and dies with it. The essential intuitions of man are related to these three qualities, just like the beating of pulse is related to human life; while their qualities are comparable to the varying degrees of the longness or shortness of the respiratory capacity.

9. These three qualities are not found equally in all human beings. Therefore, it is either due to varying temperaments or differing degrees of intelligence that prompt them to be motivated by a universality of purpose, aesthetic drive and an urge to discover the means of social development, and to pursue them, or due to the variation which exists in their devotion to reasoning and contemplation. These and other causes of variation demand that social development should have two levels.

10. The first level of social development is an essential characteristic of small social groups, like those of the bedouins and the dwellers on mountain peaks and people of the areas which are distant from the virtuous realms. This level of social development is what we call the first stage of *irtifāq*.

11. The second stage of *irtifāq* is that which is possessed by people living in urban areas and civilised cities belonging to those virtuous realms that raise men of excellent morals and wisdom. In such places human social organisation tremendously expands, giving rise to increasing needs and requirements of life. Hence their experience widens and a large number of social practices are developed in the course of their evolution. People living in such societies adopt these practices and follow them consistently. The highest degree of the second stage of *irtifāq* is that which is practiced by kings and rulers who possess higher standards of comfort. They are visited by wise men of various

communities from whom they acquire virtuous practices. This, we would call the second stage of *irtifāq*.

12. When this second stage of social development is achieved, it leads to the third stage. This stage is reached when various transactions take place between human beings in the society, and elements of greed, jealousy, procrastination, and denial of each other's rights crop up, giving rise to differences and disputes. In such a state of affairs, there appear some individuals who are ruled by low passions and are disposed to commit murder and loot. Besides, there are some stages of social development *(irtifāqāt)* of which the benefits are shared by all, but no single individual among them is able or ready to achieve them easily. Therefore, they are compelled to instal a ruler to resolve their disputes and administer their affairs in a just manner, to deter those who commit contravention, to confront all those who have criminal tendencies, and to collect necessary taxes from them, in order to spend their revenues in the proper places.

13. The third stage of social development *(irtifāq)* again leads to the next stage, the fourth stage. It comes about when each ruler tends to become independent in his domain, controls the collection of wealth by way of taxes, etc. and secures the services of gallant men. At this stage, elements of niggadliness, greed and hatred intervene and people start quarreling and fighting each other. In such a state of affairs, they are compelled to instal a *khalīfah* (superior authority) and to follow someone who can exercise the powers of *al-khilāfah al-kubrā* (supreme authority) over them. By *khalīfah* I mean someone who acquires such power and prestige that it is almost impossible for anyone to depose him except after many alignments involving expenditure of huge amounts of wealth, which may not be possible for anyone to undertake except once in a long stretch of time. Each individual *khalīfah* should be different, according to the habits and character of his subjects. The communities whose temperaments are stronger and sharper are always in greater need of rulers and *khulafā'* [plural of *khalīfah*] than those which are on a lesser degree of greed and grudge. We would like to explain to the reader the principles of these *irtifāqāt* and the categories of their various stages as perceived by the minds of virtuous communities, that possess high standards of morals and have well-developed and well-established practices which are unquestionable by anyone among them, whether great or small. Now, therefore, listen carefully to what is being said.

SECTION II

The First Stage of *Irtifāq*

14. The primary attainment in this stage of social development *(irtifāq)* is language which is an instrument of expressing something that dawns in the mind of man. The essence of language is that there are certain acts, forms, postures and physical objects associated with a certain sound, either by proximity, causality or some other factor. This sound is then spoken as it is. Thereafter, etymological alterations are made in it through the derivation of various forms and tenses according to variation in meaning. Things which have a bearing on the vision, or which create certain mental images, are likened to the first kind, and a sound similar to it is attempted. Then languages expand beyond the scope of similarity, proximity or any other relationship. Besides, there are some other principles which you will find explained in some of our discussions elsewhere.

15. Another attainment in the first stage of *irtifāq* is cultivation of land, plantation of trees, digging of wells, manners of cooking and enriching food, making of pottery and water containers. It also includes taming of beasts and their preservation in order to utilise their backs, meats, skins, hair, furs, milks and their offspring. Similarly, in this stage man acquires the ability to build a dwelling which can provide shelter from heat and cold. The dwelling might be a cave, nest or anything similar to them. He also acquires the ability to make dresses which serve the same purpose for him as feathers for birds or skins for animals or leaves for trees or anything else which man is able to make manually. Another attainment is the identification of a spouse, in whose partnership he is not disputed by anyone, and through whom he satisfies his sexual urge, procreates his progeny, and is assisted by her in his domestic needs, including the raising

of children. Non-humans, on the other hand, do not identify their spouses, except by chance or by living together as twins and gradually reaching the stage of companionship. This stage of *irtifāq* also includes a discovery of such instruments as are necessary for cultivation, plantation, digging and taming of beasts like mattock, bucket, plough and ropes, etc. Man's ability to exchange and barter things and to perform certain acts through cooperative activity is also another attainment in this stage.

16. Also in this stage, an individual, who is most sound in opinion and strongest in controlling human affairs, comes forward. He subdues the rest of his people and becomes their leader, in one way or the other. Similarly, this stage of *irtifāq* includes an established practice for settling disputes and for preventing injustice and exploitation, and repulsing those who commit aggression. It is essential that in every community there are some individuals who are able to discover methods of *irtifāq* in matters which concern them all, and then the rest of the community should follow them. It is also essential that there are some individuals in the community who love beauty, comfort and luxury, in one way or the other. Similarly, there are others who are proud of their moral traits such as bravery, generosity, eloquence and sharp intelligence, while there are others who crave for spreading their fame and exalting their prestige. God Almighty has favoured His servants by revealing various elements of this first stage of *irtifāq* in His great Book because He knows that prescribing obligations through the Qur'ān includes all groups of mankind and also that it is only the first stage of *irtifāq* which concerns all humanity.

SECTION III

The Science of the Manners of Living

17. This science contains the wisdom to discover methods of *irtifāq* in respect of needs pertaining to the second state of *irtifāq,* as we explained before. The basic idea is that when the first stage of *irtifāq* is attained, it is subjected to the scrutiny of the right experience in every sphere of activity. Then modes of behaviour that prove more beneficial and less harmful are adopted, and the rest are dispensed with. In the same way, the activities pursued at this stage of *irtifāq* are compared with high standards of morals to which people of perfect temperaments are disposed. Then the activities that are compatible with those standards are retained and the rest are eschewed. Similarly, all the activities which fulfil the requirements of sociability and amicable dealing among people and conform to the aims arising from the universality of purpose are adopted.

18. The main issues involved in this sphere are the manners of eating, drinking, walking, sitting, sleeping, going to lavatory, conjugal life, dressing, maintaining household, cleaning, beauty care, conversation, use of medicines, and incantation for the cure of diseases, foretelling future events, feasts on happy occasions like birth, marriage, festivals, return of a traveller, mourning on grievous occasions, visiting the sick, burying the dead, etc.

19. There is consensus among the inhabitants of civilised societies with healthy temperaments whose example is worthy of notice, that filthy food such as the flesh of dead animal, rotten food or [flesh of] animals whose temperaments are unbalanced and behaviour unsound, should not be eaten. Such people also prefer that food is served in utensils, and is placed on a dining table; and when they intend to

eat, face and hands should be cleaned, and that improper postures and greedy feelings be avoided, such being acts which may generate feelings of rancour among the participants of the meal. They also prefer to abstain from drinking stinking water and to avoid drinking from lips without recourse to the use of hands and pots and gulping down a drink. They also have a consensus on the desirability of cleanliness of body, dress and habitat from all contaminations of filth and dirt. That includes the uncleanliness which grows naturally like odours of mouth which are removable by cleaning of teeth, hair growing under armpits, and pubic hair, dirt of dress, and overgrowth of vegetation around the house.

20. There is also a consensus that a person should be distinguished among people for being properly dressed, with his hair and beard combed and that a woman, when attached to a man in matrimony, should beautify herself with dyestuff and jewellery and similar other means. They also agree that dress is grace and nakedness disgrace, and exposure of private parts is shameful, and that the best dress is that which covers most of the body. This is so because a dress which conceals merely the private parts cannot sufficiently cover the whole body. There is a similar agreement on foretelling future events by one means or the other, through dreams, stars, foreboding, prognosticating by the flight of birds, soothsaying, geomancy or similar other means. In the same way, whoever grows with a healthy temperament and sound taste, of necessity chooses in his speech words which are not disgusting to hear or cumbersome for the tongue to pronounce. He also chooses expressions and phrases which are sound and faultless, and adopts a style which charms the audition of the listeners and attracts their hearts. Such a person is considered a standard of eloquence.

21. In short, in every department of life, there are some universally accepted ideas among people of different societies, however remote they might be from each other in time and space. People, however, differ in developing detailed principles of these mores and etiquettes. A physician, for instance, will develop them according to the priorities of medicine; an astrologer will base his ideas on the properties of stars and a theologian will derive his thoughts from the principles of spiritual excellence *(iḥsān)* as you can find in their literature in

detail. Every community has an apparel and etiquette of its own, according to its temperament and habitude, by which its members are distinguished from others.

SECTION IV

The Management of Household

22. By the management of household we mean the wisdom to discover ways and means of preserving the relationship existing between the people of one house at the second level of *irtifāq*. Four issues are involved in this discussion, namely, marriage, birth of children, possession and companionship. The root of this development is that the instinctive need to sexual intercourse necessitates a contact and fellowship between man and woman. Then their affection towards children necessitates their mutual cooperation in their upbringing. By nature a woman is abler to nurse children. Moreover, she is of lighter intellect, more evasive from hardships, more complete in modesty and attachment to the house. She is also more skilful in looking after ordinary matters and has a greater capacity for sacrifice. A man, on the other hand, is more accurate in intelligence, has a stronger ability to protect himself from disgrace, and has greater courage to undertake challenging tasks. He also has more capacity to wander about, assert himself, to debate with people and to jealously pursue his aims. Moreover, neither the life of a woman is complete without man, nor can a man dispense with woman.

23. Natural rivalries and jealousies among men over women require that these affairs be resolved by proper attachment of a woman to a man as the latter's wife in the presence of witnesses. Similarly, man's interest in woman, her sanctity in the eyes of her guardian, and her protection by him demand that there be dowry, proposal and a guarding restraint on the part of the guardian. Further, if the doors were open for the guardians to desire their unmarriageable relations *(maḥārim)*, it would have led to the great harm of preventing women from marrying whomsoever they desired. In this case, there would

not have been anybody to solicit her matrimonial rights on her behalf in spite of her importunate need for such a person. Besides, it would have given rise to controversies about the establishment of kinship, etc. Apart from these considerations, healthy human temperament is disposed to the least desire of the companionship of a mate from whom he is born or who is born from him, or who has grown with him like the two branches of one tree.

24. Moreover, modesty prevents express mention of the need to sexual intercourse, and demands that it should be euphemistically conveyed with reference to a point of fulfillment , which both of them aspire, as if they were created to attain it. Further, civilised way of publicising the affair and symbolising the rise of man and woman through their betrothal requires that a feast be organised to which people should be invited and entertained with music and songs, etc. to mark the event. Hence, for reasons many of which we have mentioned and others omitted counting on the understanding of the intelligent, marriage in the conventional form, I mean, the one between those other than the relations in the prohibited degree, in the presence of people, with payment of dower and previous proposal, having regard to proper match, with the indulgence of guardians, and with a feast to mark the event, has been a well-established practice.

25. Similarly, the custodianship of men over women and their being responsible for women's living, and the latter's serving the household, nursing children and being faithful spouses, is also an essential characteristic of human habit and disposition which God has inculcated in the very nature of men. In this matter, there is no difference between Arabs and non-Arabs.

26. Each spouse strives to strengthen matrimonial cooperation in such a spirit of camaraderie that each regards the gain or loss of the other as his own. Success in this striving depends on their ability to adapt themselves to a lasting matrimony. At the same time, it is necessary to keep the door for deliverance open in case the two of them are not happy with each other and are unable to care for each other, notwithstanding the fact that divorce is the most detestable of the permissible acts. It is necessary to impose certain restrictions on divorce and to prescribe the intervening period (*'iddah*), both in case of divorce or death of the husband. Prescription of *'iddah* after the termination of marriage is meant to honour the institution of marriage, to emphasize its significance in the minds of people, to show consideration for the

long association and companionship between the spouses, and lastly, to protect the lineage from confusion and doubt.

27. The need of children for their fathers and the latter's favourable inclination towards them by instinct, demand that they [that is, the children] are trained to act in a manner beneficial to them according to their nature. Similarly, the advancement of the fathers in age by virtue of which they acquire more wisdom and experience alongside the dictates of right morality, i.e. repaying good with good, since the parents undergo in the upbringing of their children hardships which are well-known, it became an essential practice in civilised human societies to practice kindness toward parents.

28. The varying capabilities of the descendants of Adam demand that there be among them individuals who are leaders by nature. They are shrewd and able to maintain an independent living. By instinct, they have an aptitude to dominate and to live in comfort. Similarly, there should be other individuals who are servants by nature. The latter are people of weak intelligence and are inclined to act as they are commanded by others. The living of both these groups of individuals cannot be complete without their mutual concord. It is, therefore, necessary that both of them commit themselves firmly to a durable cooperation in pleasant times as well as in hours of adversity. By some coincidence, one of them captures the other and is able to sustain this captivity, and thus this possession becomes an established practice. Then there arises the need to prescribe certain rules governing this relationship by which both the possessor and the possessed should voluntarily abide, and on the violation of which they may be held to censure. However, there must remain a way out in one form or the other to secure deliverance from this servitude, either in return for some consideration or otherwise.

29. The incidents of this life drive man to face countless needs and problems resulting from disease and other adversities. Moreover, man has to perform his obligations to others. He cannot cope with all these problems of life single-handedly, and is constantly dependent on the cooperation of his fellow beings. All men are equal in this need for cooperation from fellow beings. Therefore, mankind felt the need to establish a lasting congeniality among them to prescribe rules of conduct to help the needy and aid those in trouble. These are binding upon them and on their violation they incur social censure.

30. These needs have two levels. The needs of the first level cannot be satisfied, unless everyone regards the loss and gain of the other as his own and exhausts all his energies in support of the other through obligatory expenditure and mutual inheritance for each other's benefit; in short, through such other acts as are equally binding on both sides. This established the principle that: "entitlement to a benefit incurs a liability as well". Out of all people, this first level of mutual support is most properly applicable to relatives because their mutual love and companionship is a natural thing. The other level involves a lesser degree of mutual support and assistance. Therefore, it was necessary that the help and aid of the disabled and the depressed should be a unanimously accepted practice among people, while cooperative relationship among kith and kin should be further strengthened and emphasised to greater degree than the preceding category.

31. The main issues which form part of this subject (i.e. household management) include an understanding of: (i) the factors which prompt people to marry; (ii) the factors which impel the abandonment of marriage; (iii) the common practices of matrimony; (iv) the qualities required of the spouses, including the obligations of the husbands, which consist of the ability to live amiably with their spouses; protecting the sanctity of private life from indecency and disgrace; and the obligations on the part of the wife, comprising chastity, fidelity to the husband, and expending her energies in looking after the general welfare of the house; (v) modes of re-conciliation between spouses who violate matrimonial duties; (vi) procedure of divorce and the practice of mourning over the deceased husband; (vii) nursing and up-bringing of children; (viii) kindness to parents; (ix) control of slaves and servants and kind treatment to them including service of the masters by the slaves and the procedure of manumission; (x) observance of obligations toward kith and kin and neighbours; (xi) help and assistance to the poor members of the society, and cooperation in providing aid to them in calamities and adversities; (xiii) respect for the chief of the community or clan and his pledging himself to look after the welfare of his community; (xiv) distribution of heritage among the heirs; and (xv) protection of lineage and descent.

32. You will never find any community of human beings which does not subscribe to the principles of these activities as enumerated above and does not strive to establish them, irrespective of religious differences or geographical distances that might set them apart.

SECTION V

The Science of Human Transactions

33. This science embodies the wisdom to discover the ways and means of establishing exchange and mutual cooperation and earnings pertaining to the second stage of *irtifāq*. The fundamental principle in this respect is that when human needs multiplied and man sought to attain excellence in their satisfaction so as to provide comfort to the eye and pleasure to the soul, it became difficult to achieve this purpose by individual effort. For instance, if someone found food in excess to his needs, but could not procure water, while another person obtained excessive quantity of water, but could not obtain food, each of them sought what the other possessed. So they found no other way to solve their problem except by recourse to exchange. Thus originated the idea of exchange and barter in response to human need. This necessitated an agreement between human beings under which everyone undertook to provide a certain need, to excel in it, and to strive for providing all instruments necessary for it. Then he made it a means to acquire all his other needs through exchange. Thus exchange became an established practice among people.

34. There were a lot of people interested in certain things but not interested in others. When, in such a circumstance, they could not find anyone with whom to make transactions they had to adopt a *modus operandi* for this purpose. They agreed to adopt durable metallic objects as means of exchange between them and this became an established custom among them. The best of metallic objects used for this purpose were gold and silver, as they were small in size and their units were identical in value. Besides, they were tremendously, beneficial for the human body and were also utilised as means for

beautification. Therefore, gold and silver came to be naturally used as real money, while other things were used as money by agreement.

35. The chief means of earning are cultivation, grazing, acquisition of valuable minerals, cultivation of vegetables, and breeding of animals from land and sea. They also include various crafts such as carpentry, smith craft, weaving, and all such other crafts and vocations whereby various natural substances are put to use for achieving the purpose of the requisite *irtifāq*. Then trade became a source of earning. So also all pursuits for the welfare of the society and every other activity to provide people with their needs became sources of earning. As human souls attain refinement and go deeper in the love of pleasure and comfort, sources of earning diversify and each person specializes in a particular vocation. This specialisation is determined by either of the two factors:

(i) the capacity of the person. Hence we find that war suits a brave man, arithmetic suits a shrewd man having good memory, while lifting of weights and carrying out tough manual jobs suit a man of strong physique;

(ii) chances that arise and determine a person's induction in a particular vocation. For instance, the son of a blacksmith and his neighbour can find opportunities of smithcraft more easily than any other profession and more conveniently than other people. In the same way, a dweller of coastal areas can take to fishing more easily than any other vocation and more conveniently than other people. There remain some individuals who do not have enough moral strength to strive after legitimate means of earning and they degenerate to pursue the means of earning, which are harmful for the society such as theft, gambling, and beggary.

36. Exchange either takes place between one material thing and another, which is called sale, or between a material thing and usufruct which is called leasing and hiring. Since the solidarity of a society is difficult to be maintained without developing mutual congeniality and love among its members—which often depends on providing what is needed without return there emerged the practices of gift and lending. The solidarity of a society also demands that its poor members be helped and assisted. Therefore, there arose the practice of charity and almsgiving. This attitude of mutual help and assistance is all the

more required because of the fact that there are always some individuals who are clumsy while others are competent; some are bankrupt while others are rich; some disdain trivial tasks while others do not disdain from them; some are burdened with needs while others relax in leisure. The living of the members of a society, therefore, cannot be maintained without mutual cooperation. This cooperation is not possible without certain contracts and stipulations and a general agreement on the established conventions. Thus, there emerged the practices of crop-sharing, profit and loss sharing, hire, partnership and agency. Similarly, there arose needs which led to mutual loans, credits and deposits. When people experienced breach of obligations, evasion and procrastination in their dealings, they resorted to calling people to witness, to writing of deeds and documents, mortgages, sureties and bills of exchange. As people rose in their level of comfort and luxury, diverse forms of cooperative activities developed. You cannot find a community of human beings which is not engaged in such transactions and which does not distinguish justice from injustice.

God knows best.

SECTION VI

The Administration of the City-State

37. *Siyāsat al-madīnah* (civics) is the wisdom concerned with the methods of preserving the relations existing between the members of the city-state. By city-state I mean a socio-economically homogenous group of people who have regular transactions with each other, and who are distributed into various houses. The basic principle underlying *siyāsat al-madīnah* is that the entire society is one single person from the point of view of the relationship which binds it together. This 'person' is composed of various parts and a social organism. Every composite is likely to face some flaw or defect in its substance or form, or to suffer from some malady, that is, a condition from which another condition is better for its peculiar constitution, well-being, improvement and appearance.

38. The city-state consists of a large number of people whose unanimous agreement on just and fair conventions is not possible, nor can they deter one another except through achieving the distinction of an office, an office without which disputes are likely to erupt. Therefore, it is necessary for the proper administration of the affairs of the city-state that there be someone on whose obedience all men who are capable of exercising the ability to hire and fire, should agree. Such a man should enjoy glory and prestige and the cooperation of aides.

39. People who are more narrow-minded, are more violent, have greater tendency to kill, and are inclined to be seized by fury, are in greater need of a coercive political authority. It is a source of great disorder that some wicked individuals attaining ascendancy and prestige should join together to pursue their desires and violate the established norms of fairness and justice. Such people either pursue their

wicked ways out of greed for the wealth possessed by others and become highwaymen, or they inflict injury on the people out of mere contempt or jealousy, or out of a desire to capture political authority. Apprehension of such a disorder necessitates marshalling of human resources and preparation for war.

40. These evil deeds of disorder include attempts by some cruel people to deprive someone of his life, or to cause any hurt or harm to him or his family by making advances towards his spouse, or illegitimately desiring his daughters or sisters. Such activities also include attempts to openly usurp someone's property or to secretly steal it as well as attempts to defame someone, by attributing to him something abominable which deserves censure, or by using rough and rude speech to him. They also include activities that bring invisible harms to the society and its members such as practice of magic, surreptitious administration of poisons, spreading corruption and perversion among people and instigating subjects against their rulers, servants against their masters and wives against their husbands. Similarly, they include practices of moral turpitude that involve neglect of obligatory *irtifāqāt* such as sodomy, tribady, and sexual intercourse with beasts. Such practices obstruct the avenues of legitimate matrimony and drag man completely away from healthy nature. They amount to the reversal of human nature like turning a male into a female and *vice versa*.

41. Other forms of disorder include a wide range of disputes and quarrels, like rivalries over women without legitimate attachment to them, and addiction to wine, etc. They also include such harmful activities for the society as gambling, usury and its doubling and redoubling, bribery, cheating in weights and measures, forgery through concealing defects in commodities, monopoly, hoarding and deceiving customers in sale.

42. Disorder in society also takes place through complicated disputes between different individuals. Each individual clings to some legal lacuna and tries to get the benefit of doubt and thus the truth of the matter does not crystallise. This requires adherence to proofs, oaths, documentary and circumstancial evidence and similar other means. All these modes of finding truth are governed by recognised principles and conventions so as to discern the cause of preference and to understand the tricks of litigants, etc.

43. Disorder also occurs when people stick to ruralisation and become content with the first stage of *irtifāq*, or adopt a civic system altogether different or when the allocation of various vocations among them becomes unbalanced and harmful to the society. For example, most of the members of the society engage themselves in trade and abandon agriculture, or most of them start making their living out of military service alone. What ought to be done instead is that while the agriculturists play the role of producing food for the society, other craftsmen like manufacturers, carpenters and government functionaries should supply the digestive salt for that food. Disorder is also created sometimes by the spread of predatory animals and vermin, which warrants necessary measures to eliminate them.

44. Among various protective steps that are taken for the common benefit of all members of the society is the construction of buildings, such as erecting of walls around the city, inns, forts, ports, bazars, building of bridges, digging of wells, discovery of fountains, provision of boats on river banks, etc. These steps include giving incentives to traders and merchants to continue supplies through cordial persuasion and inducing people of the city to deal amicably with outsiders because such an attitude opens the way for their frequent visits. These steps also include prompting farmers not to leave any land barren, the craftsmen to excel in their products and improve them, and the people of the society in general to go for the learning of various arts and sciences, such as calligraphy, mathematics, history, medicine, and other useful branches of knowledge.

45. These also include being aware about the general conditions of the society so that those who are corrupt and those who are honest may be identified. This awareness is also necessary so that those in need are identified and may be assisted, and those who are masters of some useful art or craft may be discovered and their services utilised.

46. The chief causes for the ruin of the city-states in our times, are two:

(i) Some people over-burden public exchequer, and become habitually dependent on it for their living under the pretext that they are warriors, or scholars with a claim to being financed by the public exchequer. They also include people who are generally close to the rulers like ascetics and poets and all such people who depend on parasitical means for their living. The essence of their attitude is earning a living without performing any service. Each group of such parasites

is succeeded by another group and becomes an unpleasant burden on the society.

(ii) Heavy taxes are imposed on farmers, merchants and artisans creating difficult conditions for them. This leads to ruinous injustice to law-abiding and responsible people and gradually to their elimination, while strong and militant elements become increasingly invincible and treacherous.

47. The society's affairs can improve only by establishing a fair and convenient system of tax-collection and maintaining the strength and size of the controlling machinery of the government in proportion to the demands of necessity. Let the people of our times take note of this significant point.

God knows best.

SECTION VII

The Conduct of Rulers

48. It is necessary for the ruler to possess good moral qualities or else he will be a burden on the state. If he is not brave, he will show weakness in confronting aggressors, and his subjects will look down upon him. If he is not forbearing and gentle, the subjects are likely to collapse under his overpowering authority. Similarly, if he is not wise enough, he will fail to formulate proper public policies. It is also necessary that he is sane, adult, male, and a person of understanding, who is able to listen, observe and express himself eloquently. Besides, he should be one of the nobility and should be recognised as such by the people, who should also acknowledge his noble deeds and those of his ancestors. People should also have known him for his dedication and untiring efforts for the well-being of the society.

49. All these characteristics of a good ruler are not only proven by reason but have also been universally recognized by mankind, notwithstanding any geographical distance or religious differences between them. This is because all of them realise that the objectives for which rulers are installed cannot be achieved except through possessing these qualities. They also observe that whenever there has been a disregard of these qualities, the consequences were always unpleasant and people detested the state of affairs in their hearts. Even when they kept quiet, they did so with resentment and indignation.

50. It is essential for the ruler to establish his prestige and glory in the minds of his subjects and to sustain it, and avert factors that belittle this prestige and glory through suitable measures. Whoever endeavours to establish his prestige should himself with excellent morals befitting his position of leadership. For example, he should possess

the qualities of bravery, sagacity, generosity, and clemency for those who might commit injustice. Further, he should constantly pursue the end of public welfare.

51. He should deal with people in the same manner in which a hunter deals with wild animals. As a hunter goes to a jungle and looks for deers, he contemplates the appearance which is suitable for the peculiar temperaments and habits of deers. Then assuming that appearance, he confronts them from a distance. He focuses his gaze on their eyes and his attention on their ears. Whenever he feels any awakening in them, he sticks to his place and becomes standstill as if he were a motionless inorganic body. As soon as he notices any inadvertence on their part, he creeps toward them and sometimes enchants them by a melody and throws in front of them the most favourite of their fodder, as if he were generous by nature and does not mean thereby to hunt them.

52. Benefaction generates love of the benefactor, and the ties of love are stronger than the chains of iron. Therefore, the man who presents himself before the people as a leader, ought to adopt an appearance in his dress, speech and good manners that should attract them. He should come near to them imperceptibly and should gently show his sincerity and love for them, without giving them the slightest indication that all this was meant to hunt them. He should then make them know that his equal was almost impossible for them to find until he can see that they are convinced in their minds about his superb abilities and competence, and their hearts are filled with love and veneration for him, and they become embodiments of humility and submissiveness to him. He should then maintain this position and should do nothing which might change the public attitude toward him. If there is any failure on his part, he should make it up with kindness and grace, and should indicate clearly that his action was motivated by public welfare, and that it was in their interest and not against it.

53. Additionally, a ruler also needs to impose his obedience by retaliatory action against the disobedient. Also, whenever he notices that somebody has proved his expertise in war, or his efficiency in the collection of taxes, or in some other sphere of public management, he should increase his emoluments, enhance his position and should display nice and friendly attitude toward him. At the same time, whenever he suspects any treachery, slackness, or omission in the

discharge of duties on the part of anyone, he should decrease his salary, lower his position, and should turn away from him.

54. Moreover, a ruler is in greater need of comfort than others, provided that this comfort does not bring hardship for the people. For instance, he may cultivate a barren land or settle in a far off place in order to ensure his security. Further, he should not take action against anyone except after convincing the people who are qualified to 'loosen and bind' (*ahl al-ḥall wa al-'aqd*) that he deserved it and that public policy demanded it. In addition to this, a ruler should possess sufficient intuitive understanding of human nature to know what is in the minds of people. He should be so shrewd that his assessments prove correct as though he has actually seen and heard. It is also important that he does not defer an imperative action to the morrow. He should not wait if he senses a concealed animosity from somebody, before liquidating his power and thus rendering him unable to pose any threat.

SECTION VIII

The Policy with Regard to Aides and Lieutenants

55. Since the ruler does not have the ability to single-handedly achieve these objectives of public policy, it is necessary that in respect of every business of the state, he is assisted by some aides. Among the qualifications of aides is their honesty and competence to carry out what they are ordered, to be submissive to the ruler and to be his well-wishers in public as well as in private. Whoever fails to fulfil these conditions is liable to removal from his office. If the ruler neglects his removal, he becomes guilty of treason to the state and responsible for corruption in his system of government. The ruler should not appoint aides from amongst those whose dismissal would be difficult for him, or to whom he has any obligation for reasons of kinship or otherwise on account of which their removal might be disliked.

56. Moreover, the ruler should differentiate between his admirers. Some of them might admire him, either out of fear or self-interest. Such individuals should be brought close through subtle means. There may be other individuals who admire him for his own sake and consider his gain and loss as their own. Such admirers are truly sincere. Every human being has a peculiar natural disposition and is conditioned by a particular behavioural pattern. Therefore, it is not advisable for the ruler to expect from anyone what might be beyond his natural capacity.

57. The aides are of various categories:

(i) Those who provide protection from the treachery of the enemies. They are like the two hands in the human body that carry arms.

(ii) Those who manage the civic policies. They are as important as the natural faculties in the human system.

(iii) Those who are advisors to the ruler. They are like the intellect and sensory apparatus for a human being.

58. It is essential for the ruler to apprise himself about the developments of each day and to remain aware of any improvements or otherwise in the affairs of the state. Since the ruler and his aides and lieutenants perform useful duties on behalf of the state, their sustenance should necessarily be the responsibility of the state.

59. It is necessary that for the collection of various taxes an even and equitable practice is followed, one that serves the interests of both the individual and the society. Taxes should not be levied on everyone nor on every property. For certain reasons the rulers of the communities of east and west all agree that taxes should be collected from prosperous people, who hoard treasures of gold and silver. Similarly, they should be levied on self-growing property, like procreant cattle, agriculture and trade. If there is need for more revenue, then tax may also be levied on the highest earning groups.

60. It is necessary for the ruler to keep his armies under control. The method of exercising this control is similar to the technique adopted by an expert tamer with his horses. The tamer learns different forms of the horse's stride, like galloping, quick pace and running in race, etc. At the same time, he learns their bad habits such as stubbornness. He also knows how to effectively caution the horse through pricking, holding back, or using whip. Then he observes the horse, and whenever he finds it doing something he does not want it to do, or not doing something that he wants it to do, he warns it in a manner suitable to its nature whereby its vehemence is subdued. But the tamer should also see to it that he does not hurt the feelings of his horse. The horse should not be allowed to understand why it has been beaten. The image of the command given to it should be reflected in its mind and instilled in its heart. It should also be made apprehensive of the retributory consequences of its acts. Moreover, even when it performs the desirable acts and shuns the undesirable ones, taming should not be abandoned until the tamer is satisfied that the required attitude has become part of its habit and temperament so much so that even when there is no admonition it will not follow the contrary course. In the same manner, a tamer of armies must know what

commissions and omissions constitute the right course for them. He should also know the manner in which warning should be given to them. He should, on no account, neglect any of these considerations.

61. There is no limit to the number of aides. Their number may vary with variation in the requirements of the state. Sometimes there might be need to appoint two aides for one purpose, while at other times one aide might be sufficient for two purposes. Generally chief aides are five:

(i) *Judge*: He should be free, male, adult, sane, competent and possessing knowledge of the established conventions of human transactions and the tricks of litigants in their litigations. He should be firm but also mild and patient. He should always take the following aspects into consideration. Firstly, he should see the overt circumstances of every case. These may be represented by a contract, some wrong committed or other antecedents between the litigants. Secondly, he should find out what each litigant demands from the other, and which of the two demands is more legitimate and justifiable. He should be fully aware of those causes and factors that led him to the understanding of a certain fact. Because sometimes there is some evidence available, which people do not doubt, and which demands a clear verdict. At other times, there is an evidence at variance from the former evidence which had warranted a different verdict.

(ii) *Commander of the soldiers:* He should essentially possess all knowledge about war and the formation and organisation of gallant and brave men. He should know the extent to which each individual under his command can be useful, and also how to equip the army and deploy spies and informers about the tactics of the enemy.

(iii) *Administrator incahrge of internal affairs:* He should be an experienced man who knows fully about the policies that could lead to the progress of the state and also the actions that might cause its degeneration. He should be firm and patient and should belong to the kind of people who do not keep quiet when they see something they abhor. He should appoint for every group of functionaries a chief from amongst them, who is fully informed about their affairs so that the interests of that group are properly looked after, and their chief may be held responsible for everything concerning them.

(iv) *Tax-Collector:* He should know the ways and means of collecting revenues and their distribution among those who are entitled to receive the benefits.

(v) *Secretary responsible for the living of the ruler:* Because the ruler with all the preoccupations that engage him cannot attend to catering for his own living, he needs to be assisted by a secretary.

SECTION IX

The Fourth Stage of *Irtifāq*

62. This section contains the science which discusses the political and administrative patterns of governors and rulers of states, and the ways and means of maintaining the relationship between the peoples of different areas.

63. When every ruler becomes independent in his domain, controls the collection of taxes, and secures the services of fighting men, the varying temperaments and different capabilities of the various rulers, lead to injustice and renunciation of civilised conventions in their mutual dealings. They start entertaining ambitious desires toward each other's domain and tend to feel jealous of each other. They even go to war against one another, being driven to it by immediate personal interests such as greed for wealth or land, or merely on account of jealousy and rancour. When such tendencies become common, people are compelled to instal a *khaḷīfah.*

64. *Khalīfah* is someone who secures the services of sufficient forces and commands the support of such large numbers of people that it is almost impossible for anyone to dispossess him of his office. Because any thought to do so would involve widespread troubles, hardships, mobilisation of people on large scale and expenditure of huge amounts of wealth. Such measures are generally beyond human capacity and are practically almost impossible. Once a *khalīfah* is installed in office, and he sets virtuous patterns of conduct in the land, subjugates all contenders for power and is obeyed by different rulers, life is endued with prosperity and contentment. The *khalīfah* is also compelled to make preparations for war to protect his people from the harm which may be inflicted by individuals possessed of brutish

nature, who might plunder their properties, arrest their progeny and bring disgrace to them. It is precisely this need which made the Children of Israel say to one of their Prophets: "Raise up for us a king that we may fight in the way of God".[1]

When lustful individuals or those with a brutish nature perpetrate evil and spread corruption in the land, God decrees, either directly or through Prophets, that their power be destroyed and those among them who prove incapable of reform and rectitude, be killed. The presence of such people among mankind is like a limb of human body affected by gangrenous sore. It is precisely this need, which has been referred to in the following verse of the Qur'ān: "...and if Allah did not repel some people by others, cloisters, and churches and synagogues, and mosques in which God's name is much remembered, would have been pulled down".[2]

The same has been referred to in the following verse: "And fight them until there is no persecution".[3]

65. The *khalīfah* is not expected to fight tyrant and oppressive rulers and destroy their might and power except through men and material. This requires an understanding of the factors that warrant warfare and those that call for truce, imposition of land tax, or tribute. The *khalīfah* should first of all give a careful consideration to the reasons of waging war. These reasons may include repulsion of some injustice, extermination of those wicked and brutish elements whose reform is beyond [normal] expectation, suppression of the elements that are on a lesser degree of wickedness, by demolishing their power, curbing the activities of groups of wrong doers by killing their big chiefs, or imprisoning them or by confiscating their lands and properties and thus turning the attention of subjects from such corrupt elements.

66. It is not appropriate for the *khalīfah* to take any strong action which is not warranted by the purpose that he seeks to achieve. For example, he should not eliminate a virtuous group of supporters for the sake of acquiring some properties. It is also necessary for him to win over the hearts of the people and to know the level of usefulness of everyone. Thus he should not depend on anyone beyond his capacity. He should acknowledge the esteem of leading and wise personalities and should give impetus to war, both through hope and fear. He should pay his utmost attention to dispersing the collusion of rulers, to blunting the edge of their possible opposition, and to

inspiring awe in their hearts so that they all submit to his authority and have no other option. When he succeeds in this, he should verify his doubts about them before waging war. If he apprehends that they will create disturbance once again, he should impose heavy taxes and tributes on them, demolish their fortifications and render them incapable of pursuing such a course again.

67. Since the *khalīfah* is the protector of a system brought into existence by a combination of heterogenous elements, it is necessary for him to remain alert, to despatch spies to every corner, and to utilise his penetrating acumen. Whenever he sees any alliance taking place in the armies, he should immediately form a similar alliance comprising those people whose affiliation with the rebels is normally impossible. When he notices that some individual is seeking the office of *khalīfah*, he should hasten to take preventive measures against his possible moves. He should destroy his power and should weaken his strength. He should constantly work for making his own authority acceptable among people so that their general consensus in his favour becomes an established principle with them. Mere acceptance of authority should not be considered sufficient; rather, there should be some evident signs of this acceptance. For instance, prayers for him and a public acknowledgement of his authoritative position should take place in big gatherings. People should also adopt forms and conventions prescribed by the *khalīfah* e.g. circulation of coins engraved with the name of the *khalīfah* as is the custom in our time.

SECTION X

Universal Consensus on the Principles of *Irtifāqāt*

68. It should be borne in mind that there is no civic system throughout the inhabited world, nor has there been any community of people, possessing balanced temperaments and virtuous morals since the time of Adam (peace be upon him) nor will there be one till the Day of judgement which is devoid of *irtifāqāt*. The principles of *irtifāqāt* have been unanimously accepted by all communities with consistency through successive centuries and generations. Those who have ever violated these principles were strongly condemned by humanity at large, which considered these principles too obvious and axiomatic to be ignored. Notwithstanding the apparent differences between various communities in certain forms and branches of *irtifāqāt*, they are all agreed on basic principles.

69. For example, there has been a general agreement on removing the malodour of the dead and on the covering of the private parts. While agreeing upon these basic principles, people have differed in regard to the forms. While some of them chose to bury their dead in the earth, others preferred to put them to fire. Similarly, there has been an agreement on publicising the event of marriage in the presence of witnesses and its distinction from fornication, but then people differed in certain exterior forms. While some of them adopted the procedure of witnesses, proposal and acceptance and a feast, others went for playing tambourine, singing songs and wearing such splendid dresses as are normally worn on the occasions of big feasts. In the same manner, there has been a general agreement on reprimanding the adulterers and thieves, but there has been difference in the

modes of achieving this purpose. While some people followed the mode of stoning and cutting off of the hand, others had recourse to painful beating, rigorous imprisonment and heavy fines.

70. The violation of these principles of *irtifāqāt* by two groups must not mislead the reader. The first of these is the group of thick-headed psychopaths who are in close proximity to beasts. The majority of people does not doubt that they are people of lower temperament and deficient intelligence, as they can see it evidenced by their non-observance of social and moral limits and restrictions that are dictated by the requirements of *irtifāqāt*. The second is the group of debauches who, on an examination of their minds, would appear to believe in *irtifāqāt*. Overcome by carnal desires, however, they violate them, bearing witness to their debauchery against themselves. They commit adultery with the daughters and sisters of people, but if adultery is committed with their own daughters and sisters, they would almost burst into fury. They know for sure that people feel tormented exactly as they themselves would feel tormented.They also know that the commission of such acts interferes with the integrity of the society, but they are blinded by their low desires. The same explanation applies to acts of theft, usurpation, and other forms of exploitation.

71. This should not be construed to mean that consensus among peoples on these matters has taken place without any solid basis, or it is like an agreement between the people of east and west to feed themselves by one particular food. For there would not be a graver sophism than this. In fact sound human nature demands that people agree on these matters, notwithstanding the differences in their temperaments and habitats and variations in belief, due to a natural harmony emanating from the peculiar form of their species, and in response to the recurring needs which confront all members of the species alike. This harmony also stems from a morality prescribed by the healthy formation of the species and is embedded in the temperaments of its individuals. If a man were to grow in a desert far from the society and does not learn any custom from anyone, he would certainly feel the urges of hunger, thirst, and sex. Then he would certainly also feel the desire for a woman. If they both are in a healthy condition, they would naturally give birth to children. Then all the members of the family shall join together. This would give rise to various dealings between them. Thus the primary level of *irtifāq*

would be established. As these people would increase in number, it is natural that there would appear among them individuals possessing excellent morals. These individuals will be naturally confronted with different situations which would give rise to the subsequent stages of *irtifāq*.

SECTION XI

The Conventions prevailing among People

72. It should be noted that conventions occupy the same place in *irtifāqāt* as heart in the human body. Further, it is conventions which have been the chief concern of the Divine dispensations and they addressed them *per se*. These have constituted the main theme of the Divinely ordained codes of conduct wherein they are frequently referred to.

73. There are certain factors which bring conventions into existence. They are either discovered by men of wisdom or inspired by God in the hearts of those who are aided with an angelic light. There are, at the same time, some other factors due to which conventions become prevalent among people. For instance, these might form part of the established patterns set by a grand ruler to whom heads of people bow in submission. These conventions are sometimes wholeheartedly adopted by the people, because therein they see a realisation of what they already aspire after in their hearts. There are also some causes for the sake of which a people consistently adhere to a set of conventions. These causes include an experience of Divine retribution over their abandonment or spread of corruption on their negligence or censure by the people blessed with right thinking, etc. A perceptive mind would not fail to ascertain these facts by observing the benefits of reviving good conventions and noticing the adverse effects of their nullification in many societies in the light of what we have explained above.

74. The prevalent conventions, so far as their essence is concerned, are right since they preserve virtuous *irtifāqāt*, and are conducive to their

theoretical and practical perfection by human individuals. But for these customs and conventions most of the people would join the community of beasts. There are so many people who perform marriage and enter other human transactions in the required manner, but when asked as to why they restrict themselves by these limits [of conventions] they find no answer except that they follow the community. The utmost level of understanding which such people can attain is a summary knowledge which they cannot even fully articulate, not to speak of formulating the *irtifāq*. Such people, if they did not abide by an established set of conventions, would have almost joined the beasts.

75. Nonetheless, conventions are sometimes confused with wrong practices as a result of which people tend to lose sight of the right patterns of life. This happens when a group of people, dominated by individual purposes rather than universal purposes, manages to get ascendancy. They commit brutish acts like robbery and usurpation or lustful acts like homosexuality and feminisation of males, or indulge in harmful earnings like usury, and cheating in weights and measures. They also adopt those habits in dresses and banquets that lead to extravagance, and force an excessive dedication to earning. Such people also indulge in extravagance in entertainments which results in the negligence of the responsibilities of this world as well as those of the Hereafter, such as playing music and chess, hunting and catching pigeons. They also impose heavy taxes on travellers and cumbersome land taxes on the subjects. Thanks to their policies, mutual greed and jealousy become common among people. These people justify to themselves this treatment with others, but they would detest the same treatment if it were meted out to them. No one dares to condemn this attitude of theirs due to their power and glory. Perverted people in the community come forward to follow and support them and exhaust their efforts in the propagation of such evil practices.

76. Similarly, there appear people whose minds are devoid of a definite and strong tendency to do any virtuous or non-virtuous deeds, and they cling to these evil practices, merely because they find their rulers doing the same, or perhaps because they become weary of the healthy course of conduct. At the same time, there are some people who maintain a sound disposition, but they stay in the rear ranks of the community in seclusion from the rest and keep quiet over this

state of affairs although they disapprove of, and feel angry about it. Thus a bad pattern of conventions is formed and becomes gradually consolidated. It is then an obligation on the part of the people dedicated to universal purposes (as against individual purposes) of life, to continuously strive for the popularisation and enforcement of truth and for weakening and hindering falsehood. This is sometimes not possible without disputes or even fights. And in such a case, these disputes and fights are to be reckoned as the most preferable of all acts of piety.

77. Once right conventions are established and are accepted by the people and the succeeding generations, they live and die on these conventions and their thoughts and emotions become firmly attached to them, so much so that they consider them *sine qua non* for the universally recognised norms of life, that is, if these conventions are present these norms would be deemed to be in force; otherwise not. In such a case, their violation is committed only by those whose souls are unclean and intellects deficient, and who are totally dominated by lowly passions. When such people commit these contraventions, their hearts bear testimony to their immorality and a curtain is placed between them and the universal weal (*al-maṣlaḥah al-kulliyyah*). When they complete their acts of contravention, this betrays their psychological disease and becomes a black spot on their religious faith and fidelity. When this attitude becomes manifest, the prayers and supplications of the heavenly community rise in favour of those who follow the virtuous conventions and in opposition to those who violate them. Thereupon an approval is formed in Paradise for those who practice them and a disapproval for those who go against them. These conventions are so important that they have been considered an inherent part of the nature made by God on which He has created men.

God knows best.

SECTION XII

The Need for Guides of Paths and Founders of Religious Communities

78. God has said: "Verily you are only a warner and for every community, there is a guide".[4]

    Let it be known that the deeds which conduce human beings to a subordination of their beastly nature to their angelic consciousness, and the sinful acts that are contrary to those deeds are often neglected by people. They are neglected even though these are identified by sound intellect, which perceives the benefits of the former, and the harms of the latter. The reason for it is that their vision is blurred, which spoils their intuition like bilious. Thus they become incapable of appreciating the required condition of their life with its attendant benefits. Nor can they apprehend the predicamental state and its consequential plagues. Hence they stand in need of a bearer of the authentic knowledge of the right patterns of life who might discipline them, enjoin upon them the ways of virtue, urge them to follow those ways, and to hold them to censure when they violate those ways.

79. There are some individuals whose judgement and understanding is corrupt. They pursue nothing for its own sake, except that which is contrary to the required manners of life and thus they go astray and cause others to go astray. The affairs of the community cannot be properly directed except by curbing such individuals and rendering them ineffective. There are, at the same time, individuals who receive an incomplete guidance. They preserve part of the guidance, while there remain things that escape their attention, or they suppose that they were already perfect and did not need anyone else to perfect

them. Such people are in need of someone to warn them against their ignorance.

80. In short, people inevitably do stand in need of a truly knowing person whose knowledge and judgement are not liable to error. A city-state, in spite of the free application of worldly wisdom possessed by so many people who understand the appropriate mechanisms for serving the interests of the city-state, still remains in need of a person who fully knows the collective interests of civilisation and is able to organise the affairs of the city-state. If such is the state of affairs, then you can form an idea about a huge community of people combining varied abilities. Obviously, such a huge community of people stands in far greater need of guidance and that too in a sphere which cannot be adequately comprehended, except by the highly intelligent ones who possess a clean and pure disposition and who have an exceptional ability to form abstract conceptions. Nor can anyone guide others in this sphere of knowledge and guidance except individuals of a very high quality who are very few. Likewise, such vocational skills as carpentry and smithcraft and the like cannot be mastered by the common folk except through following the patterns set by their predecessors and teachers who guide and direct people in these fields. That being the case, you can imagine the lofty and noble purposes to which only the few gifted ones have an access and establish their abiding commitment thereto.

81. Moreover, it is also essential for such a truly knowing person to come forth with a universal evidence that he possessed the knowledge of the right patterns of life and that he is immune in what he utters from error and misguidance. At the same time, people should find testimony that he is also free from a partial understanding of the reform which might exclude other essential parts thereof. This phenomenon [of prophethood] is subject to either of the two conditions: that some learned men speak on the authority of that personality before them beyond whom there remains no scope for further argument and reasoning; this is because the community has a consensus regarding his perfection and immunity from error, and because the tradition of such a person had been preserved with them. It is then possible for these learned men to hold the community accountable on the basis of what the members of the community believe, and to argue with them on that ground and confute them. Or the person who is placed

at the culminating point of argumentation and is himself present and the community unanimously accepts him as such.

82. In short, a community necessarily requires a person who is immune from error and is acknowledged as such unanimously by the community. He may be present in their midst, either in person or through his preserved tradition. The knowledge and understanding of such a person about the attitude of submission (to God), his setting practical examples of this attitude, and the beneficial dimensions of this attitude, and also his knowledge of sins and their harmful dimensions, all this cannot be attained merely with the help of reason or of the kind of intelligence employed in the pursuit of worldly aims or just by means of sense-perception. On the contrary, these are the things the reality of which is discovered only by higher intuition. Even things such as hunger, thirst and the effects of warm and cool drugs cannot be comprehended without intuition. Then surely the knowledge about harmony between something and its spirit or any inconsistency between the two [cannot be perceived without intution]. There is no way to understand them except by sound and healthy taste.

83. The immunity of such a person from error rests in his own eyes on an essential knowledge granted by God to him, that all that he perceives and comprehends is true and is in accordance with the reality. It is like the aim of a beholder at the moment of beholding. When he beholds something, he does not contemplate any possibility that his eyes could be stricken by an epidemic, or that his beholding something could be contrary to reality. It can also be likened to the knowledge of linguistic matters. For instance, an Arab does not doubt that the word *mā'*(water) is used to connote this particular substance, or the word *arḍ* (earth) is used for a particular object even though it is not established for him by reason, nor is there any logical intrinsicality between the two. Despite that, a necessary knowledge to this effect is cast in his mind. This necessary knowledge is attained often through the formation of an instinctive ability whereby his inutitional understanding invariably leads him to the right patterns of behaviour. As this intuitional understanding persists and the experience recurs, the former is testified by the latter.

84. As to the immunity of such a person from error in the eyes of the community, it is established by their verification through various modes of rational and demonstrative proofs that whatever he calls

for was indeed true and that his conduct was virtuous and free from any element of falsehood. They are also able to witness in him signs of Divine proximity like miracles and grant of supplications so that they remain in no doubt, that his soul was from among the blessed ones and elevated to the position of closeness to angels. They also realise that it does not befit the like of him to attribute any falsehood to God, nor to commit any act of disobedience to Him. Thereafter there occur events which unite them in greater cohesion. These events become dearer to them than all their possessions and even their children and more desirable than cold water for the thirsty. All these things are so important, that it is not possible for a community to become oriented in the required conditions of life without them. This is why all those who have been engaged in one form of religious devotion or another associate their tradition with the one concerning whom they believe that the conditions explained above are found in him. Whether they believe so rightly or wrongly.

God knows best.

SECTION XIII

The Essence of Prophethood and its Attributes

85. It should be borne in mind that the highest kind of people are *mufhamūn,* those who have been endowed with extraordinary understanding. They are the individuals who are able to effect a conciliation and complementarity between their angelic consciousness and animal disposition. Also, they possess a high degree of angelic consciousness. On such people there descends, from the Heavenly domain, an understanding of the Divine states. They are capable of being driven towards the establishment of the required system of life by Divine inspiration. Among the traits of people who have been endowed with such extraordinary understanding is a balanced temperament and soundness both in physical constitution and moral make-up. They neither waver under the influence of personal interests nor do they possess that kind of abnormal intelligence which would prevent them from going from the universal to the particular, and from the substance to the form. Nor do they lack intelligence to an extent that they would be unable to be emancipated from the clutches of personal interests to attend to the universal purposes and to reach the substance of things beyond their forms. Such people are most advanced in abiding by the guided patterns of life. Their religious observances are in the right direction. They are just and fair in all their dealings with people. They love the Divinely ordained universal scheme and are deeply interested in public welfare. They do not aggrieve anyone except when the popular weal depends on it, or when such an attitude is essential to the requirements of public policy. They always have a predisposition for the unseen world

which is apparent from their speech, countenance, and all their actions. It appears as if they are aided by the unseen forces and are able through slight exertion to find their way to a level of communion and contentment which is unattainable by others.

86. Such individuals, who are 'endowed with extraordinary understanding', are of many categories and varying capabilities:

(i) He whose highest attainment is to receive from the True i.e. God Almighty, knowledge of the rectification of soul through devotional services is called *kāmil.*

(ii) He whose highest attainment is to receive virtuous morals and knowledge of the management of the household and the like is called *ḥakīm.*

(iii) He whose highest attainment is possession of the knowledge of universal norms of civics and statecraft, and then he is able to establish justice among people and to ward off injustice from them, is called *khalīfah.*

(iv) He who becomes a centre of attention from the *higher assembly* and is taught and addressed therefrom; and the *higher assembly* becomes visible to him, and there appear in him forms of *karāmāt*[5], is known as 'the one aided by the *holy spirit*'.

(v) He whose tongue and heart have been blessed with light, and he who benefits people by his company and good counsel, and contentment and luminosity are transmitted from him to his disciples who attain through him a place of perfection; and he, on his part, is ever keen to guide them, such a person is called *hādi* and *muzakkī*, guide and purifier.

(vi) He whose highest degree of knowledge is understanding the principles of the Religious Community and its welfare, and is keenly interested in achieving this welfare, whenever it is extinct, is called *imām.*

(vii) He who has been inspired to make mankind apprehend the disaster awaiting them in this world, or was able to discern Divine curse [ready to inflict] a community, could learn by intuition what shall be the state of men in grave and upon their resurrection, and then informed them about it, such a person is called *mundhir*, 'warner'.

(viii) If the Divine wisdom wills that one of those individuals, who have attained understanding, be sent to the people so that he becomes instrumental in their deliverance from darkness into light, and God prescribes for His servants the obligation to surrender themselves entirely with their hearts and souls before him, and it is decided in the *higher assembly* that those who follow him are approved, and those who defy him are accursed, and he informs the people accordingly and makes their obedience to him an essential obligation for them, such an individual is *nabī*, Prophet.

87. The greatest of all Prophets is he whose Prophethood is instituted for a dual objective, namely, he is meant by God to be instrumental in delivering people from darkness into light on the one hand, and on the other, his followers are meant to form the best community raised up for mankind. Thus his investiture entails the raising of a full-fledged religious community.

88. To the former kind of the institution of Prophethood reference has been made in the Qur'ānic verse: "He it is who raised among the unlettered ones, a Messenger from amongst themselves, who recites to them His messages, and purifies them, and teaches them the Book and the wisdom although they were before, certainly in manifest error".[6]

As for the latter kind, reference is found in the following verse: "You are the best community raised up for mankind".[7]

The following statement of the Prophet (peace be upon him) refers to the same: "Verily you have been commissioned to facilitate things, and not to render things difficult".[8]

89. Our Prophet (peace be upon him) encompassed all the excellences of the individuals who have been endowed with extraordinary understanding (*mufhamūn*). Thus he combined in himself the perfection of both the kinds of the institution of Prophethood explained above. Among the Prophets who preceded him, there are some who achieved one or two excellences.[9]

90. It should also be borne in mind that the Divine wisdom wills the investiture of a Prophet because the relative good which is required in the Divine scheme is confined to this instrument only. The truth of this matter is known only to the Knower of the hidden secrets. We, nevertheless, know definitely that there are certain factors that are

inseparably linked with every such investiture. Obedience is prescribed because God knows that the well-being of a community was dependent on their obeying God and serving Him and also because their own souls are incapable of receiving guidance directly from God Almighty. Since the welfare of a people and their well-being rest solely on following the Prophet, God Almighty determines in the holy enclosure, *ḥaẓīrat al-quds*, the obligation of following the Prophet and the matter is decided there.

91. It so happens that either the time is ripe for the rise of an empire, and other empires are destined to be subdued by this new one; then at such a juncture, God sends someone to reform the religion of the people of such empire, like the raising of Prophet Muḥammad (peace be upon him). Or when God wills the survival of a people and prefers them to the rest of mankind, He raises someone to set their diversions right and to teach them the Book or their prescribed course of conduct as was the case in the sending of Prophet Mūsā (peace be upon him). Or when continuity is granted to a community in respect of its empire or religion which requires the raising of a reformer (*mujaddid*) like the sending of Dā'ūd and Sulaimān and a number of other Prophets among the Children of Israel. These were the Prophets whose victory over their enemies, was destined by God, as He says: "And certainly our word has already gone forth to our servants, to those sent, that they, surely they, will be helped, and that our hosts, surely they, will be triumphant".[10]

    Apart from these categories there are individuals who are raised among mankind for the sake of completing Divine argument against them. God is the best knowing.

92. When a Prophet is sent it becomes obligatory for those to whom he has been sent to follow him, even though they might have been already pursuing the rightly guided course. For the defiance of such a highly placed person occasions a curse from the *higher assembly*, and a consensus takes place there over their damnation. Doors to Divine proximity are shut upon them, and all their efforts are reduced to naught. When such people die, their souls are engulfed in curse. This, however, is only a hypothetical condition, and in point of fact, it does not occur. You have a clear example of this in the case of the Jews. They needed the raising of Prophets more than any other creatures of God due to their religious extremism and their distortions of the scriptures.

93. God's argument against His servants is established by the fact that the majority of mankind are created in such a way that it is not possible for them to receive the knowledge of their rights and obligations or things that are harmful or beneficial to them without certain intermediation. Their preparedness to know and accept the truth is either weak which needs to be strengthened through their education by the Prophets. Or there are among them evils that cannot be curbed except through coercive measures, despite themselves. Further, since their condition is such that they will be held liable for it in this world and in the next, God's grace requires, after the joining together of certain higher and lower factors, that He inspire the purest individual of the community to guide them to the truth and call them to the straight path. In this respect, he is like a master whose servants fall sick, and he commands some of his close associates to require them to take some medicine, whether they desire it or not. If he [the master] compels them to take the medicine, he would be right. But extreme kindness demands that he should first let the servants know that they were sick, and that the medicine prescribed for them was beneficial for them. Then he should perform some extraordinary acts in order to convince them that he was truthful in what he would say. He should also coat the medicine with sweetness. Then the servants would act as commanded with understanding and interest.

94. Therefore, miracles and the grant of supplications and the like are things that are outside the core of prophethood, but at the same time, they are often concomitant to it.

95. The appearance of most miracles is mainly due to three reasons:

    First, the person concerned is one of those who have been endowed with extraordinary understanding, *mufhamūn*. This state leads to his discovery of some events and he becomes a cause for the grant of prayers as well as the appearance of blessings in those things in which he seeks them. Blessing means that either the utility of something multiplies e.g. it appears to the people [his enemies] that his army is enormous in number and thus they are defeated. Or through conversion of some food by itself into a rich and balanced diet, whereby that food becomes so potent as when that food is taken by someone in much larger quantity. Blessing may also appear in an increase in the very substance of a thing through conversion of airy element into a certain form due to its being permeated by a force

which gave it that form. There are similar other factors that are difficult to count.

Second, that a consensus takes place in the *higher assembly* to advance that cause, which results in inspirations, transformations and approximations that were not known about him before. As a result his friends are helped and foes subdued and the cause of God prevails even though the infidels might abhor it.

Third, that there occur some events by external factors such as the punishment of the disobedient, and extraordinary incidents take place in the environment which are designated as his (i.e. the Prophet's) miracles in one form or the other, either through his prior knowledge of those events or by the immediate award of Divine Punishment over any violation of his command, or through a correspondence between those incidents and his tidings about the Divine practice of recompense, or about anything similar to this.

96. Infallibility of a Prophet rests on three principles:

First, that he is born clean of all base desires, and with a magnanimity of the soul, especially in the preservation of the boundaries of the *sharī'ah*;

Second, that he is Divinely inspired with an understanding of the goodness of the good and the evilness of the evil;

Third, that God draws a barrier between him and any base desires that he might think of.

97. It should be borne in mind that one of the distinctive features of Prophets (peace be upon them) is that they do not command contemplation about God and His attributes because it is something beyond the capacity of the majority of people. This is evidenced by the following saying of the Prophet (peace be upon him): "Contemplate over the creation of God, but do not contemplate over God".[11]

Further, commenting on the verse: "and to your Lord is the goal",[12]

the Prophet (peace be upon him) is reported to have said: "There should be no contemplation over the Lord".[13]

98. Another distinctive feature of such personalities is that they address human beings according to the latter's native intellectual capacities, and also within the terms of the natural fund of knowledge available to their addressees. The human species, wherever it may be

found, possesses, on account of its original constitution, a degree of perception in excess to the rest of animal kind, notwithstanding those extraordinary individuals whose temperament might be at variance from the normal course. Human species, at the same time, is also capable of possessing certain categories of knowledge that are attainable by it only through breaking the rules of the normal course of nature. These categories are like the kinds of knowledge attained by the pure souls of Prophets and saints, or the knowledge attained through strenuous exercises which prepare man for perceiving that which he cannot attain by his own mathematical calculation, or through the application of the principles of philosophy (*ḥikmah*), scholastics *(kalām),* jurisprudence (*uṣūl al-fiqh*), etc. even if it be for a long time. That is why the Prophets did not communicate with mankind except according to the simple mode of the latter's perception which had been granted to them in their original creational form.

99. Further, they [i.e. the Prophets] did not address themselves to anything rare which scarcely takes place. Hence they did not charge people with the duty of knowing their Lord through theophanies (*tajalliyāt*) observations, argumentation or analogical reasoning, nor with knowing Him as free from all directions. Such a knowledge is well nigh impossible for those who are neither engaged in that exercise, nor did they ever have the opportunity of mixing with men of reason for a considerably long time. Similarly, they [i.e. the Prophets] did not direct people to the processes of deduction and reasoning, to the different aspects of *istiḥsān*, or the difference between legal parallels (*ashbāh*) and precedents (*naẓā'ir*) discernible through subtle premises and complex reasoning. Nor did they direct people to all those things whereby the followers of the school of rational judgement (*Aṣḥāb al-Ra'y*) establish their supremacy over the school which adheres to the literal import of traditions (*Ahl al-Ḥadīth*).[14]

100. Another distinctive trait of the personality of the Prophets is that they do not engage in anything which does not pertain to the reformation of soul and organisation of the community's collective affairs, like explaining the causes of environmental incidents such as rain, sun eclipse, halo and the wonders of vegetable and animal world or the measurement of the movements of the sun and the moon, the causes of the events in the daily life and the histories of the Prophets, kings and countries, etc. except pronouncing brief phrases with which the ears of people are familiar and which their minds are predisposed to

accept. Even these brief phrases are employed for the sake of reminding them about the bounties of God and the Divine interventions in history by way of excursus. And in such concise manner of speech, the use of metaphorical and figurative expressions is considered sufficient. It is because of this principle that when the Prophet (peace be upon him) was asked about the cause of the decrease and increase in moon, God, leaving the precise query aside, confined His speech to an allusion to the benefits of months. He said: "They ask you about the new moons. Say: they are times appointed for men and for the pilgrimage".[15]

101. You will find many a person whose taste has been spoiled due to pre-occupation with these sciences, and with other systems of causality, which prompted them to produce such interpretations of the Prophets' statements which were not intended by the Prophets themselves.

God indeed knows best.

SECTION XIV

The Origin and Essence of Religion is One, but the Prescribed Laws vary

102. God has said: "He has made plain to you the Religion which He enjoined upon Nūḥ and which we have revealed to thee, and which we enjoined on Ibrāhīm and Mūsā and 'Īsā to establish Religion and not to be divided therein".[16]

In his commentary on the above verse, Mujāhid says: "We have taught you [O Muḥammad] and them the same one Religion".[17]

God says: "And surely this your community is one community, and I am your Lord, so keep your duty to me. But they became divided into sects, each party rejoicing in that which was with them".[18] This means that the community of Islam is your community; as to those who became divided, they were polytheists, Jews and Christians.

God also says: "For everyone of you, We appointed a law and a method".[19] Explaining the above verse, Ibn 'Abbās says: "God has appointed the way and the prescribed pattern *(sunnah)*".[20]

God also says: "To every community We appointed acts of devotion which they observe."[21]

103. It should be borne in mind that the origin and essence of the Religion is one. All the Prophets (peace be upon them) were agreed on it. The difference lay in the codes of prescribed law and the methods of reform. To explain this point further, we would say that all the Prophets (peace be upon them) are agreed on the following:

(i) That God is One and Unique in an absolute sense, which means that no one else is worthy of servitude, nor of being approached for help. It also implies His purity of anything that does not befit His Honour and Glory and the prohibition of violating the sanctity of His attributive names.

(ii) That it is the right of God and the obligation of His servants to glorify Him with a glory and reverence that is unblemished by any negligence.

(iii) That they [the servants of God] should turn their faces and hearts in submission to Him.

(iv) That they should seek His proximity by following His symbolic ordinances *(sha'ā'ir)*.

(v) That He has pre-destined all events before creating them.

(vi) That the angels are under His full control: they do not disobey Him in any of His commands, and strictly carry out what they are commanded.

(vii) That He sends down the Book [i.e. His Revelation] to whomsoever He pleases from amongst His servants thereby prescribing for people the ways of obeying Him.

(viii) That the Doomsday *(Qiyāmah)* is true, the resurrection after death is true, the Paradise is true, and the Fire is true.

In like manner, there is complete unanimity among all the Prophets regarding:

(i) Various categories of virtuous acts of piety such as cleanliness *(ṭahārah)*, prayers, *zakāh*, fasting, pilgrimage, seeking Divine proximity through superogatory acts of obedience like supplication, remembrance of God, and recitation of the Book revealed by God; and

(ii) Marriage, prohibition of adultery and fornication, establishment of justice among people, prohibition of all forms of injustice, enforcement of prescribed punishments against the disobedient, *jihād* against the enemies of God, exhausting mental and physical energies in the propagation and exaltation of the cause of God and His Religion.

104. All these things enumerated above constitute the essence of Religion. This is why the glorious Qur'ān did not discuss the rationale of these postulates except what God willed. This is because these postulates were already accepted among the people in whose language the Qur'ān was revealed. The variation between the messages of different Prophets takes place only in the outer forms and exterior semblances of these postulates. For example, according to the

sharī'ah of the Prophet Mūsā (peace be upon him) it was necessary to turn the face towards Bayt al-Maqdis in prayers, while under the *sharī'ah* of our Prophet it is towards Ka'bah. In the *sharī'ah* of the Prophet Mūsā, the punishment of stoning alone (both for adulterers and fornicators) was prescribed while our *sharī'ah* came with the prescription of stoning for the married offenders and lashes for others. The *sharī'ah* of Mūsā (peace be upon him) provided for *qiṣāṣ* alone, while our *sharī'ah* provided for both *qiṣāṣ* and *diyah*. Similarly, there has been variation [between different religiously prescribed codes of law] in the timings of worship, their etiquettes and ingredients. In short, the peculiar states in which various categories of virtuous acts of piety and *irtifāqāt* have been prescribed constitute the *sharī'ah* and the method of reform.

105. It should also be borne in mind that the acts of obedience commanded by God in successive religions are in fact acts emanating from certain psycho-spiritual states that are beneficial or harmful to the soul in the Life Hereafter. These acts either promote those states, or explain them, or those states are reflected and exemplified in those acts, and the latter are nothing but apparitions of the former. There is no doubt that the criterion and the very basis of all acts of obedience are these states. Whoever fails to comprehend them shall also fail to make a perceptive appreciation of these acts. He then might become content with an insufficient degree of appreciating and applying these acts. He (for example) might offer prayers without recitation of the Qur'ān, rendering his exercise futile. It is, therefore, necessary that directive guidance be provided by the possessor of the most authentic knowledge, the highest knowing personality, who can precisely define the hidden and doubtful matters with clear indications to make them so clear and tangible as to be comprehended by every big and small so that they remain in no doubt concerning those matters. Then the people may be required to act accordingly, and may be held accountable on the authority of God's evidence, according to their capacities.

106. Also sinful acts sometimes are confused with acts that are not sinful. For instance, the polytheists said: "Trading is only like usury".[22] This happens either due to lack of knowledge or on account of some worldly ends which corrupt their understanding. This problem calls for some clear indications by which a sinful act may be distinguished from a non-sinful act. If there were no fixed timing,

some people would have multiplied the small amount of prayers and fasting, which would not have been of any avail for them, nor would it have been possible to punish them on their omissions and evasive mechinations. If ingredients and conditions [of various acts prescribed by Religion] were not clearly defined, people would have acted irregularly. Similarly, if there were no *ḥudūd*, criminals could not be deterred. In short, the majority of the people cannot be charged with religious obligations properly, without specification of timing, ingredients, conditions, punishments, and injunctions of general application and similar other measures.

107. If you want to understand the criteria underlying the Divine legislation, you should consider the case of an expert physician who exerts himself in looking after the well-being of his patients and informs them what they do not know, and makes them responsible for something of which they do not possess an accurate knowledge. You should consider how the physician attains the cognition of the tangible exterior of the human physical system which represents the concealed interior. For example, he takes the reddening of face and the bleeding of gums, as signifying excessive rise of blood. Similarly, he takes the intensity of the disease, patient's age, his environment, his family history, the potency of the medicine, and all other relevant facts into consideration. Then he forms an idea about the particular quantity of the medicine which suits his patient's condition and prescribes it for him. Sometimes the physician makes a general rule whereby he discovers the cause of a disorder based on his assessment of the patient's condition. Then he designates a particular quantity of medicine estimated by him as the removing agent for the painful element or as the catalyst for the disorderly condition. For instance, he would say that whoever complained of a reddening face and bleeding gums will be required by the rule of medical science to drink on an empty stomach the syrup of jujube or to take a drink of honey, failing which he would be on the brink of death. Or he might say, for instance, that whoever took a certain quantity of such and such confection, would be cured of a given disease and would be immunised from a certain disorder. These kinds of general rules will then be described on the authority of that experienced physician, and God will invest them with tremendous benefits.

108. You should also reflect over the case of a wise ruler who is concerned with the welfare of a state and the administration of an army: how he

looks after lands and their yields, sustenance of the farmers and the maintenance of guards. He levies *'ushr* and *kharāj* accordingly.[23] He also takes tangible conditions (in different individuals) as pointing to the varying levels of integrity and capacity that ought to be possessed by his aides and lieutenants, and then appoints them accordingly. You should also reflect, how he ponders over public needs which have to be satisfied, and deliberates over the aides and their multiplicity and deploys them to serve the required purposes without putting unnecessary burden on them.

109. You should also consider the position of a teacher of children *vis-à-vis* his young students and that of a master *vis-à-vis* his servants. The former endeavours to teach them [children], and the latter seeks to satisfy the requisite needs through their [servant's] labour, while they themselves [children and servants] do not comprehend the true nature of the benefit pursued by them through their prescribed activities. Nor are they interested in the achievement of the benefit, and often they even escape from their duties by making excuses and playing tricks. You should see how the two of them [the teacher and the master] anticipate the time of the loss before its actual occurrence and take precautionary measures in advance. They do not address them [the children and the students] except in a manner which makes their duties crystal clear so that they find no trick to escape. This manner of assigning to them their tasks leads to the achievement of the requisite objective, whether they know about it or do not know.

110. In short, whoever assumes the responsibility of reforming a large number of people with varying capacities who neither comprehend the issue nor does it interest them, is compelled to measure and determine the time and define the conditions and forms of the work. He makes these terms the basis for charging his people with duties and then impeaching them on the violation thereof.

111. It should be noted that God willed by raising messengers to deliver mankind from darkness into light. He, therefore, revealed to them His Commands, overwhelmed them with His light, and inspired them with an urge to reform the world. Also since the guidance of each people in their respective era was not possible to achieve, except in the presence of certain factors and necessary conditions, it became necessary in Divine wisdom to incorporate all that in the very scheme of each prophetic mission. Moreover, the imperatives to obey and follow the Prophets were linked with the presence of those

factors and conditions of the reform. This was because whatever is intrinsic to something by reason or convention, is an inseparable part of that whole. Nothing is hidden from God, nor anything in His Religion, is prescribed at random. Therefore, nothing has been ordained therein to the exclusion of its analogues, except in pursuance of certain wise considerations and factors known to those who are profound in knowledge. We would now attempt to invite the reader's attention to a useful set of these wise considerations and factors.

God is the best knowing.

Causes of the Revelation of a *Sharī'ah* Peculiar to a particular Era and Community

112. The cardinal principle in this regard has been provided in the following words of God: "All food was lawful to the children of Isrā'īl, before the Torah was revealed, except that which Isrā'īl forbade himself. Say: Bring the Torah and read it, if you are truthful".[24] The background to the above verse is that once the Prophet Ya'qūb (peace be upon him) fell seriously ill; thereupon he vowed that if God cured him, he will prohibit for himself his most favourite food and drink. When he was restored to health by God, he prohibited meat and milk of camel for himself. His sons followed in his footsteps and many centuries passed on this. Subsequently they [the Children of Isrā'īl] started concealing in their minds a defiance toward their prophets and eventually they opposed them by eating those things. When our Prophet Muḥammad (peace be upon him) stated that he belonged to the same faith as Ibrāhīm, the Jews said: how could he belong to the same faith and take camel's meat and milk at the same time! God answered them by saying that all food was originally permissible, but the camel's meat was prohibited due to something accidental to the Jews. When prophethood appeared in the children of Ismā'īl, who were free from that accidental impediment, it was no longer necessary to take that aspect into consideration.

113. Similar is the statement of the Prophet (peace be upon him), concerning *tarāwīḥ* prayers: "This act of goodness [i.e. *tarāwīḥ* prayers] has become such a regular feature of your life that I feared that it might be made obligatory for you; and if it were made obligatory, you would not have performed it. O men, perform it, therefore, at your homes".[25]

114. So the Prophet (peace be upon him) discouraged them from spreading and adopting it as a regular practice among themselves so that it does not become one of the symbolic signs of Religion the abandonment of which they might consider an omission toward God, whereupon it might be made obligatory for them. Also there is a saying of the Prophet (peace be upon him): "The greatest wrong committed by a Muslim against fellow-Muslims is done by the one who asks a question about something, and it is prohibited for his asking".[26]

115. There is another saying of the Prophet (peace be upon him) which would elucidate the point further: "Verily Ibrāhīm made Makkah a sanctuary and prayed for it, and I made Madīnah a sanctuary, as Ibrāhīm made Makkah a sanctuary, and prayed for its prosperity as Ibrāhīm had prayed for Makkah".[27]

116. Also relevant to this discussion is the reply of the Prophet (peace be upon him) to someone who had asked him the following question concerning pilgrimage: "Is it obligatory every year?" The Prophet (peace be upon him) replied: "If I had said yes, it would have become obligatory [i.e. every year], and if it had become obligatory, you would not have performed it, and if you had not then performed it, you would have been chastised".[28]

117. It should also be borne in mind that the ordinances of God are designated as symbolic signs of Religion, *sha'ā'ir* according to the the mental readiness of the people to absorb them, and also that the quantitative standardizations are laid down in view of the conditions and customs of the people who are charged with obligation.

118. Since the temperaments of the people of Nūḥ were extremely rigorous and tough, as pointed out by God, they needed to be commanded to fast permanently[29] in order to counteract their excessive animalistic force; and since the temperaments of the people forming the present *ummah* are weak, they are forbidden from that. That was why God did not permit the earlier communities to capture booties of war whereas He permitted it for us, having regard to our weakness. Since the aim of the Prophets (peace be upon them) was to reform the existing *irtifāqāt*, their reformatory measures did not deviate from the familiar course except where God willed.

119. The methods of reform vary with the change of time and custom; hence the justification of abrogation *(naskh)*.[30] The example of a

Prophet is like a physician whose aim is to maintain moderate temperament in all conditions. A physician's instructions may differ with the change of his patient as well as the time of his treatment. He, therefore, would advise a young man something which he would not advise an old man. He would advise sleep in the open space during summer, because he would know that open space at that time is a place of moderation. But in winter he would advise sleep inside the house, as he would know that open space is a cold place at that time.

120. Therefore, whoever attains an understanding of the essence of Religion and the factors determining variations in the method of reform will not see any change or alteration. That is why each *sharī'ah* was attributed to its community, and that community became liable to censure on account of its preparedness for that *sharī'ah* to such an extent that its existential conditions were an open expression of their demand for the prescription. This is precisely the sense conveyed in the words of God: "...but they became divided into sects, each party rejoicing in that which was with them".[31] Thus the distinction of the Community of our Prophet (peace be upon him) is established by the fact that they deserved the appointing of Friday, as they were an unlettered people, innocent of the acquired sciences. On the other hand, the Jews deserved Saturday due to their belief that it was the day when God had completed the act of creation, and that it was the best day for worship. This is in addition to the fact that all this was due to, and in accordance with, God's command and revelation. The example of codes of law, *sharā'i'* in this respect is like a regular injunction which is laid down, then there appear excuses and difficulties as a result of which concessions are allowed. That is why a degree of censure extends to people because their own attitude is responsible for this concession. God says: "Surely Allāh changes not the condition of a people, until they change their own condition".[32] Moreover, the Prophet (peace be upon him) has said: "I have not seen any woman deficient in intelligence and religion abler to rob an intelligent and prudent man of his intelligence than each of you..." Then he explained the deficiency of religion and said: "Did you see that when she passes through menstruation, she is obliged neither to pray nor to fast".[33]

121. Let it be understood that the causes responsible for the revelation of reformatory methods in particular forms, though numerous, generally revolve around two main factors:

The first is a natural compulsion demanding that people be charged with the injunctions contained in the reformatory method. This is because all members of the human race have a common nature, and they all undergo some conditions requiring them to be charged with certain obligations. For instance, one born blind does not have in the storehouse of his imagination any colours or images, but has only words and tangible objects. When he receives from the unseen a knowledge in dream or in reality or anything of the sort, he figures this knowledge only in a form preserved in his imagination. Similarly, an Arab who does not know any language other than the Arabic language, when he learns something in the form of a word, it is conceived by him in the Arabic language rather than in any other language. In the same way, for the inhabitants of the areas where elephants and similar other beasts of ugly appearance are found, the coming of jenie and eerie of devils takes the appearance of these animals. This is unlike other areas where these animals are not found. Similarly, for the people of the areas where certain things are considered important and certain delicacies of food and niceties of dress are relished, the bounty and the joy of angels is represented by those forms of food and dress, unlike other areas. For example, when an Arab intends to do something or is bound for some destination in a journey, when he hears the words *rāshid* (i.e. guided), or *najīḥ* [i.e. permanently successful], these words augur good prospects for him in his endeavour, unlike a non-Arab for whom these words carry no meaning. The *sunnah* has also alluded to many things to the same effect.

The second consists of the sciences preserved by a community, the ideas latent among them, and the habits which persist with them like rabies; these are also taken into consideration in the prescription of the various codes of law.

122. Hence camel's milk and meat were prohibited for the Children of Isrā'īl rather than the Children of Ismā'īl. That is why the distinction between good and bad in food was linked with the Arab habitude. That is also why the daughters of sisters were prohibited for us but not for the Jews, because they considered them to belong to their fathers, and did not mix with them, nor maintain any association or companionship with them.[34] They were, therefore, like strangers for them, which was not the case with the Arabs. The same was the reason for prohibiting the cooking of calf in the milk of its mother for the Jews, but it was not prohibited for us, for the act of cooking calf in

its mother's milk amounted, in the Jewish perception, to interfering with the creation of God and going against His scheme. To them [i.e. the Jews] it meant abuse of something that was created for the fosterage and growth of a calf, for the purpose of dismantling its own limbs and physical constitution in the process of cooking.

123. This belief remained consistently deep-rooted in the generations of Jews. The Arabs, on the other hand, were farthest of all the creatures of God from this idea. Even if this idea were communicated to them, they would not have understood it, and could not have comprehended the appropriate basis of the injunction.

124. In the revelation of the codes of law it is not only the sciences, circumstances and beliefs, as they are cast in the minds of people, that are taken into consideration. But the most important consideration and the foremost determinant is the pattern on which certain people have grown and to which their minds are disposed, whether they are conscious of it or not. This you can see in the relationship of two such things, one of which is represented by the external form of the other. For instance, the prohibition to practice magic assumed the form of sealing mouths, because putting a seal was the sign of prohibition for those people, whether this was fresh in their recollection or not.

125. Moreover, the primordial obligation of the slaves of God to Him is to glorify Him to the highest degree and not to commit contravention of His command in any manner. Their obligation toward their fellow-beings is to uphold the purpose of maintaining congeniality and cooperation among them, and that no one should wrong the other except when a punitive measure is dictated by some universal purpose. That is why anyone who makes a sexual advance toward a woman knowing that she was a stranger draws a curtain between himself and God, and this act of his shall be recorded in the book of his deeds as a defiance of God, even though that woman happens to be his own wife. This is so because he, on his part, had committed a violation of God's command. Similarly, he who makes an advance toward a woman who was a stranger, thinking that she was his wife, shall be entitled to pardon in the sight of God.

126. In the same manner, he who makes a vow to fast shall be held accountable for that, unlike the person who has not made such a vow. Whoever shows rigidity in religion, it is made rigid for him. To slap

an orphan in order to train him in good manners would be treated an act of virtue, but to do so for the sake of torture shall be regarded as an evil act. Similarly, those who do some wrong by mistake or fail to perform a duty out of mere forgetfulness have been exempted from liability in a number of injunctions. This is a principle which is recognised both in the sciences and in the conventions preserved by the community whether these might be latent or visible. The prescription of codes of law in respect of that community will be in accordance with those conventions and sciences.

127. It should also be borne in mind that most of the latent customs, conventions and sciences are common between Arabs and non-Arabs as well as between the rest of the inhabitants of the balanced areas and those who have temperaments that are predisposed to virtuous morals. For example, mourning over the dead and the desirability of leniency with them, pride over one's lineage and prestige, sleeping after lapse of one third or a quarter of the night and awakening at dawn, and similar other customs to which we have pointed in the discourse on *irtifāqāt*, can be cited in the present context. These customs are most worthy of being taken into consideration. After that, there are customs and beliefs that are confined to the people to whom a Prophet is sent.These customs and beliefs are also taken into consideration. Indeed Allāh has appointed a measure for everything.

128. It should also be noted that Prophethood is often instituted under a *millah*, religious community as God has said: "The Religious Community of your father Ibrāhīm".[35] Likewise He said: "And surely among those who followed him, was Ibrāhīm".[36] The underlying idea is that people across many generations live in a religious tradition and the glorification of its symbolic commands and its injunctions becomes so well-known and widespread as to become nearly like the primary axioms that they are almost beyond denial. Then there is instituted another Prophethood to set right the deviations in the earlier tradition and to reform the areas into which corruption has crept and confusions have distorted the teachings of their earlier Prophet. Thereupon well-known injunctions found among them are investigated. What is found correct, healthy and in conformity with the principles of religious weal is retained by the new Prophethood. The latter not only upholds it, but also provides further incentives for it. What is found sick and distorted is changed to the extent that

such change is warranted. Where multiplicity is required, it is effected in respect of that convention which is already possessed by them. Often this new Prophet argues in his demands on the basis of the vestiges of the former code that are extant in the community. It is then proclaimed that this new Prophet also belonged to the same religious community under which these Prophets of the past had been commissioned.

129. The second category [of the revelation of prescribed codes of conduct, as may be defined from the point of view of the factors that cause such revelations], consists of such prescriptions as are revealed pursuant to certain contingent and accidental causes. It is to be explained thus: that God, even though He transcends time, also has some kind of relation with time and temporality. The Prophet (peace be upon him) has informed us that God decrees at the end of every century to make a great incident happen. Also, we find the Prophet Adam and other Prophets (peace be upon them) have informed in the *ḥadīth* pertaining to intercession something to this effect. In this *ḥadīth*, each of them is reported to have said: "Verily my Lord, the Blessed and the Most High, has become so wrathful today as He had never been before, nor shall He ever be so again".[37] Therefore, when the world becomes prepared for the emanation of Codes of Law (*sharā'i'*), and for the determination of the norms for human action, the truth manifests itself to them in the revelation of their religion, and the *higher assembly* is filled with a strong intent. Then, at such a stage, a minor accidental cause becomes sufficient to knock at the door of the Generous, and whoever knocks at the door of the Generous, it is opened for him. In the season of spring, you may find an illustration. In this season, the smallest scale of planting and sowing of seeds is so effective as many times more of it is not in other seasons.

130. Further, the Prophet's own intent, his eager and earnest quest for something, his supplications, craving, and pleading for it is also a strong cause for the revelation of the Divine decree in that respect. If the Prophet's supplication can terminate a drought, overpower a large party of people, tangibly increase the quantity of food and drink, then you may well imagine the revelation of a Divine decree which is a delicate spirit and is defined in the symbolical form of pre-figuration. From this premise it can be adduced that the incidence of a great and extraordinary event in that period about which

the Prophet (peace be upon him) was anxious, like the incident of 'falsehood' (*ifk*),[38] or the queries of a questioner who repeatedly questioned the Prophet (peace be upon him)and argued with him which made him thoughtful, as was in the case of *ẓihār* also becomes a cause for the revelation of Divine decrees.[39] Moreover, the sluggishness of a people in obedience, their apathy for submitting to Divine decrees, their perpetuity in disobedience, and similarly their desire for and deep attachment to it and the belief that by abandoning it they will fall short of their duty to God is also a cause for stern treatment, through strong prescription and strict prohibition. The example of all this in beseeching the showering of generosity is like a pious and resolute man: when he looks forward to the hour in which spirituality and force of bliss is disseminated, and he supplicates to God in that hour with utmost concentration, then the grant of his supplications is not delayed. It is these significations that are contained in the words of God: "O you who believe, ask not about things which, if made known to you, would give you trouble; and if you ask about them when the Qur'ān is being revealed, they will be made known to you".[40]

However, in the original Divine scheme this category of the causes for the revelation of decrees is kept at the minimal degree. Since this peculiar set of causes is conducive to the revelation of such decrees wherein the requirements of the common weal peculiar to that time [of revelation] are dominant, it often leads to inconvenience for those who come later. That was why the Prophet (peace be upon him) used to abhor unnecessary queries and used to say: "Leave me as long as I spare you, for your predecessors perished due to excessive questioning and their disputations with their Prophets".[41] He has also said: "The greatest wrong committed by a Muslim against fellow-Muslims is done by the one who asks a question about something, and it is prohibited for his asking".[42]

It is also reported in a tradition: "If the Children of Israel had slaughtered any cow they wished, it would have been sufficient for them. But since they became strict, they were also treated strictly".[43]

God is the best knowing.

SECTION XVI

Causes for Impeachment concerning the Methods of Guidance

131. A discussion of the methods of guidance and the codes of law prescribed by God for His servants, involves the question whether reward and punishment are given with regard to them, as they are given on the basis of the roots of the Good and the Evil, or they are given exclusively on the basis of what has been designated as occasions, forms or exterior modes for them. For example, if someone leaves the Prayers of a certain time, while his heart is overwhelmed with submission to God, shall he be punished for having left the Prayers? Similarly, someone who performs the Prayers of a certain time, completes all its constituents, and fulfils all its conditions in a manner which may relieve him of the obligation, but he does not attain any state of humility and submission to God and it does not permeate the interior of his heart, shall he still be rewarded for such an exercise?

132. The discussion here does not pertain to the precept that violation of the methods of guidance constitutes a great corruption from the point of view of its being a detraction from the guided pattern, its opening the gateway to sin, its being a betrayal of the community of Muslims, and its involving a great loss to the locality, city, and the state. For example, a dam is erected to stop a flood, and somebody comes and makes a hole in it: he saves himself and destroys the city. But the present discussion concerns the good or bad results which would envelop the individual's soul as a consequence of his own acts.

133. In this respect, people of all religious traditions hold that the methods of guidance and the codes of law themselves bring reward and punishment in their wake. Moreover, men of profound thinking and those well-versed in knowledge and the disciples from amongst the Companions of Prophets (peace be upon them), also recognize along with it, the aspect of compatibility and relationship between

the external forms and modes and their roots and spirit. The common possessors of the knowledge of religion and those who understand the codes of law remain content with the former. The philosophers of Islam, however, hold that reward and punishment are contingent upon the psychic states and moral conditions that cling to the spirit. The mention of their modes and forms in the codes of law merely aims at making the subtleties of the meanings hidden therein comprehensible to the human mind. So much for the statement of the position held by the philosopher's community.

134. I believe, however, that the truth lies where the wise men of the communities have gone. Their position may be explained as follows: the prescribed codes of law (*sharā'i'*) are governed by some factors and causes that determine their various injunctions and establish preference of certain admissible significations over others. And God knows that the community cannot practice religion except through these prescribed codes of law (*sharā'i'*) and methods of guidance (*manāhij*), and He also knows that these are the conditions in which they ought to live. This fact is eternally registered in the Divine consideration. When the world becomes prepared for the showering of the forms of *sharā'i'*, and for the creation of their symbolic designators, then these are created and showered and their scheme is definitely decided. These forms then become part of the established foundations.

135. Then God exposes the higher assembly to this knowledge and gives them intuition to the effect that the occasions occupy the place of foundation and that these are the forms and symbols representing the foundation, and that people cannot be charged with duties except through them. Thereafter there takes place, in the holy enclosure (*ḥaẓīrat al-quds*), some kind of consensus on the fact that these occasions are like a word in its relationship with the sense for which it has been coined, and like a mental picture in its relationship with the external reality manifested by it, and like a pictorial image in its relationship with the thing projected thereby, and like a calligraphic specimen in its relationship with the words inscribed in that specimen. Since in all the above illustrations, there is a strong relationship between the signifier and the signified, so that each is essential to the other and a close nexus is established between the two, a consensus takes place somewhere that, that is it. Then an apparition of this knowledge or its essence is cast in the cognition of mankind, Arabs

and non-Arabs alike. And they all agree on it. Therefore, you can never find anyone without having preserved a part of this knowledge in his mind. Sometimes we give it the name of an entity similar to the original. Sometimes this entity has amazing effects which would not be hidden from those who pursue them. Some of these have also been taken by the *sharā'i'* into consideration. That is why *ṣadaqah* has been regarded as the dirt of those who perform it and the ugliness of a task permeates the wage paid for it.

136. When the Prophet (peace be upon him) was sent and was supported by the holy spirit, and his heart was inspired to reform the community, and a wide field was opened before the substance of his spirit toward a strong intent for the revelation of the *sharā'i'*, and the symbolic designators were issued, he established his strong and utmost determination in that direction. He also supplicated for those who supported his mission and prayed against those who opposed it with extreme resoluteness. For the Prophets are those individuals whose resoluteness pierces through the seven heavens alike. They pray for rain when no piece of cloud is visible, and suddenly there appear clouds like mountains. Similarly, the dead are returned to life by their supplications. Hence it is an established fact that the pleasures and displeasures in the holy enclosure do take place persuent to the cause of the Prophet and as a consequence of his supplications. This is the sense which has been alluded to in the supplication of the Prophet (peace be upon him): "Verily Ibrāhīm, thy Prophet and servant prayed for Makkah and I pray for Madīnah".[44]

137. Therefore, when a servant knows that God commanded him to perform such and such deeds, and that the higher assembly supports the Prophet (peace be upon him) in all that he commands and forbids, and the servant also knows that omission in the performance of this deed or daring in the commission of that act was a defiance of God and a serious negligence in the discharge of his duty to Him, yet he commits an act which is forbidden, intentionally and deliberately, while he sees and observes, then this cannot be without being blinded by the heavy cover of evil and a complete breakdown of his angelic disposition. This will necessarily result in the rooting of sinfulness in his inner self. In the same way, if he endeavours to perform a strenous duty from which his temperament refrains and does so not for showing off to the people, but for the sake of attaining Divine proximity and achieving His approval, then this cannot be without

a heavy shield of *iḥsān* (spiritual excellence), and a complete subdual of his beastly disposition. This is bound to establish virtue in his inner soul.

138. As to the one who fails to pray at a certain time, he ought to investigate as to why he did so, and what reason prompted him to commit that failure. If he forgot it, or slept at that time, or was ignorant about its being obligatory, or was distracted from it by some unavoidable pre-occupation, then the verdict of Religion would be that he is not a sinner. But if he fails to perform it, while he knows and remembers, and his circumstances are in his own control, then this act must be due to some abhorrence for Religion and a satanic or selfish veil having clouded his vision. The blame in this case shall be incurred by that individual himself.

139. As to the one who has performed his Prayers, absolving himself of the obligation enjoined upon him, he should also investigate into the nature of his performance. If he has performed it for showing off, or to acquire good reputation, or just in order to follow a practice prevalent among his people, or he did it merely as a pastime, then the verdict of Religion would be that he is not an obedient believer. Nor would this act of his be regarded with any worth. But if he performed this act of praying for the sake of attaining Divine proximity, and endeavoured to realize it with complete faith, while fully anticipating the promised reward, and had a pure intention and a feeling of sincere loyalty to God, then no doubt there shall be opened between him and God Almighty, an avenue even though it may be equal to the head of a needle. As to the person who destroyed the city [by making a hole in the dam] and saved himself, we do not accept that he saved himself. How could this be possible when we know that there are in the service of God angels whose utmost concentration is focused on supplicating in favour of those who struggle for improving the conditions of this world, and against those who strive to spread mischief in it. Their supplication opens the doors of Divine generosity and becomes conducive to the conferment of reward in one form or the other. Moreover, God has a gracious consideration for mankind which prompts the conferment of this reward. Since this point was too subtle for human comprehension, we had to explain it with reference to the supplication of angels, as it is among the symbolic signs for the causes of Divine recompense.

God is the best knowing.

The Subtle Meanings of an Injunction

140. It should be known that certain acts performed by the servants merit the pleasure of the Lord of the worlds, and certain acts incur His wrath. There are, at the same time, acts that neither merit His pleasure nor incur His displeasure. Therefore, His profound wisdom and infinite mercy willed that He send Prophets to inform His servants through them about the relationship of His pleasure and wrath with those acts; and then to demand from them the first category of acts, and to forbid the second category; and also to tell them about the acts that fall outside the two categories. This was done so that those who wanted to perish might do so after a clear sign had been given and those who wanted to live, might live after a clear sign had been given.

141. Thus it will be seen that the relation of an act to Divine pleasure or wrath, or its non-relation to any of them, and the demand of something from the servants, or forbidding them something, or their freedom of action in respect of something, in whatever manner you might express it, this is what is termed as *ḥukm* i.e. injunction. Moreover, there is a certain classification of the acts that are required:

(i) There are certain acts whose performance is required as an imperative. Such acts, when performed as required, merit pleasure and reward; and when omitted incurs wrath.

(ii) There are certain other acts the performance of which is required, but not as an imperative. Such acts, when performed as required, merit pleasure and reward; but omitting them does not incur any displeasure.

Again, there is a similar classification in regard to interdictions:

(i) There are certain strong interdictions. A conscious abstention from acts that fall in this category on account of their being interdicted

merits Divine pleasure and reward, and a commission of those acts that are interdicted, incurs God's wrath and punishment;

(ii) There are certain interdictions which are not so strong. A conscious abstention from them merits pleasure and reward, but a commission of those acts does not incur any wrath or punishment.

142. For example, if you consider the words you have for denoting prescription and prohibition, and look at the common usage of people, you will find a suggestion of pleasure and displeasure in relation to a pronouncement. This is an inescapable natural fact.

143. The injunctions are, therefore, classified into five categories: (a) obligatory, (b) recommended, (c) permissible, (d) reprehensible, and (e) prohibited. Obviously, the mode which could be employed for ordering the lives of mankind, could not possibly indicate the condition of each individual act separately, among the infinite conditions of those individuals who are charged with duties. Because human beings are incapable of encompassing their detailed knowledge. It was, therefore, necessary that people be ordered with reference to general principles, whereby a unity may regulate a multiplicity so that they [the people charged with duties] may be able to encompass that knowledge, and to understand through it, the value of their acts. In the generalisations adopted in various disciplines, you can find an illustration of this. These generalisations are employed as rules governing particular conditions. For instance, a grammarian says: *al-fā'ilu marfū'un* (a subject is in the nominative case). His listener comprehends this statement and accordingly understands the position of Zayd in the sentence: *qāma Zaydun* (Zayd stood up) and that of 'Amr in the sentence: *qa'ada 'Amrun* ('Amr sat down), and so on. Now this unity, which regulates a multiplicity, is called the *'illah,* or cause, around which an injunction revolves.

144. The cause (*'illah*) is classified into two categories:

(i) First, a condition present among those charged with duty, is taken into consideration. But this condition cannot possibly be so permanent as never to disappear from them. For, if it were so, the purport of the command would have been to permanently charge them with something, which they are not capable of, except, of course, in matters of belief. It is, therefore, necessary that the condition which is to be taken into consideration, should be a composite condition. It

should be a combination of: (a) an intrinsic characteristic, among those charged with duty, on the basis of which it may be appropriate to address a command to them, and: (b) an incidental state in which they find themselves occasionally. This category is mostly discernible in matters of worship. The state referred to above is either time, or current capacity, or an occasion of difficulty(*ḥaraj*), or an intention to do something, or anything else of a similar nature. For instance, the *sharī'ah* has prescribed the following: Whoever attains the time of a Prayer, while he is sane and adult, it will be obligatory for him to perform that Prayer. Whoever witnesses the month of Ramaḍān, while he is sane, adult and physically fit, it will be obligatory for him to fast throughout that month. Whoever owns the specified amount of wealth (*niṣāb*) and retains the ownership of that amount for one whole year without interruption, it will be obligatory for him to pay *zakāt* out of that amount. Similarly, whoever is travelling, it would be permissible for him to shorten his Prayer and to postpone fasting. In the same way, whoever intends to perform the Prayers, while he is in a state of minor ritual impurity, it will be obligatory for him to make *wuḍū'* (ablution). In this category, the characteristics that are taken into consideration in most of the injunctions are sometimes dispensed with, and only that characteristic is considered relevant whereby one injunction is distinguished from another. Such a characteristic is liberally designated as *'illah* or the cause. For instance, it is said that the cause for Prayer is the advent of the time [fixed for that Prayer by the *sharī'ah*], and the cause of fasting is the witnessing of the month [of Ramaḍān]. Sometimes the Lawgiver makes some of these characteristics effective, and leaves the others, as is the case in the permissibility of the payment of *zakāt* for one year or two years in advance, only for those who own the specified amount of wealth, while this allowance is not given to those who do not own the specified amount. Thus a jurist gives due regard to every dimension of the question at issue, and designates some of its features as a cause and others as condition precedent.

(ii) The second category of cause is that in which the condition of some thing, which is affected by an act or which has some relationship with that act, is taken into consideration. This condition is either an essential feature of that act, as exemplified in the following command of the *sharī'ah*: "Eating of every beast having canine tooth and every bird having claws is prohibited". Or that condition is an incidental feature relative to that act, as illustrated in the command

of God: "As to the thief, male and female, cut off their hands".[45] The same is in the case of the command of God: "The man and the woman guilty of fornication, flog each of them with a hundred stripes".[46]

145. Or sometimes two or more conditions of the thing affected by an act are taken into account, as may be illustrated by the following command of the Lawgiver: "It is obligatory to stone the adulterer and to flog the fornicator".[47] Similarly, there are occasions where both the condition of those charged with duty and the condition of the thing affected by the act, are taken into consideration at the same time. This may be illustrated by the following command of the Lawgiver: "Wearing gold and silk is prohibited for the males of the *ummah*, but it is not so for the females".[48]

146. Nothing in the Religion of God is at random. Therefore, pleasure and displeasure over these acts do not come about except for a definite reason. To elaborate this point a little further, we would say that pleasure and displeasure are in fact linked with certain factors These factors may be divided into two categories:

(i) One is to be identified with good and evil stages of social evolution *(irtifāqāt)* and their dissipation, and other things similar to them.

(ii) The second category can be identified with the aims of closing the door of distortion and abstinence from trickery that are related to the prescribed sets of law and the methods of guidance, and similar other factors.

147. These factors have some contexts and corollaries that are indirectly related to them, and are attributed to them in a wider sense. An example of this is our statement that the cause of cure is the use of medicine, whereas in reality, the cause is the ripening of the four humours of the body, or their emission which, in the usual natural course, takes place after the use of medicine. Thus the cause of cure is not exactly as contended. Similarly, it is often said that sometimes the cause of fever is sitting in the sun, or sometimes it is tiresome physical labour, or sometimes it is the use of strongly hot food. But in fact the real cause is the warming up of the humours. Thus the real cause remains one in itself. However, the other causes generally assigned are conducive to it and are merely external manifestations of it.

148. Noticing exclusively the basic principles and disregarding the plurality of modes and occasions is the distinction of the language employed by those who have profound understanding of theoretical sciences. The same is not the case with laymen. But the *sharī'ah* has been revealed in the language comprehensible to the common people. It is, therefore, necessary that the *'illah* (cause) of an injunction is something understood by the commonality who should be able to ascertain its real nature, and to distinguish its existence from its non-existence. Moreover, it should be representing one of those principles to which pleasure and displeasure are linked, either because those principles are conducive to it or in close proximity with it or something like that. For example, drinking of wine is an occasion for a number of evils connected with Divine wrath like evasion from virtuous conduct, losing one's moral equilibrium, and disturbing the order and peace of society and home. Since these consequences are often essential to this act, therefore, prohibition was directed to the genre of wine itself. If there is something which has many means and necessary consequences then only that aspect of it will be designated as cause (*'illah*) which is more prominently conspicuous, or more consistent, or which is closer to the principle. For instance, the concession of shortening the Prayers, or the postponing of fasting, has been made contingent upon travelling or sickness in disregard of all other occasions of difficulty. Indeed, there are some vocations involving hard labour like farming and smithcraft. These vocational pursuits are normally accompanied by hardships and difficulties. But it would interfere with proper obedience if these were recognised as *'illah* (cause). This is because those who earn their living out of these vocations have to perform these functions regularly and their livelihoods depend on these functions. Similarly, to feel heat or cold are not consistent factors and may vary in degree. It is difficult to reckon all of them, and to determine something definite on that basis through clear signs and indications.

149. A deeper probe into this issue would reveal that only such occasions are taken into account as have been common and well-known among earlier communities. Travelling and sickness were two such factors which earlier communities understood without confusion. Nevertheless, some confusion has crept into this understanding in our times, vitiated due to the extinction of the early Arabs. People now tend to probe deeper into hypothetical issues. This tendency has corrupted

their sound taste once possessed by the original Arabs.
God is the best knowing.

SECTION XVIII

The Establishment of *Irtifāqāt* and the Reformation of Customs

150. In the preceding chapters, we have made explicit or implicit reference to the fact that the second and the third stages of *irtifāq* (social development) are an inseparable part of the instinctive nature of human beings whereby they are distinguished from the rest of animal species. It is impossible that human beings should eschew them, or disregard them altogether. For the attainments of these stages of *irtifāq*, in many respects, they are in need of a wise man, who is fully aware of human needs and the manner of serving those needs, on a collective scale. Such a wise man is always strongly motivated by the considerations of the universal weal. Either he infers his ideas through contemplation and observation; or by virtue of instinctive possession of an angelic force he becomes receptive to the communication of a definite knowledge from the *higher assembly*. The latter constitutes more complete and authentic source of acquiring this knowledge.

151. It should also be borne in mind that social conventions have the same relation to the *irtifāqāt* as the heart to the body. Sometimes evil elements dominate these conventions through the ascendancy of a group of people who, being impervious to universal intelligence, are apt to go for savage, perverted and diabolical pursuits, and popularize them in the society. The result is that most people start following them. Moreover, evil elements infiltrate into the conventions from other sources also. Therefore, the need arises for a strong personality who is supported by the unseen world is motivated by the dictates of universal weal, and can set the pattern of these conventions on the right course through sagacious measures. Most often only those individuals who are supported by the holy spirit are guided to these wise measures

152. If you have fully understood the foregoing discussion, then you will also be able to appreciate the essential purpose of the raising of Prophets. Though it primarily aims at the teaching of the forms of worship for their own sake, yet there may be joined to this the additional objective of obliterating corrupt conventions and giving impetus to the development of various forms of *irtifāqāt*. This may be illustrated by the saying of the Prophet (peace be upon him): "I have been sent to eradicate stringed instruments".[49] This is further illustrated by the following saying of the Prophet: "I have been sent to perfect noble morals".[50]

153. You should also bear in mind that the pleasure of God does not lie in the negligence of the first and the second stages of *irtifāq*, nor did any of the Prophets enjoin that. The truth of the matter is not, as supposed by the people who flee to the mountains and shun every social intercourse altogether, for better or for worse, and thus degenerate into a condition close to that of savages. That was why the Prophet (peace be upon him) rejecting the stance of those who sought monasticism, said: "I have not been sent to establish monasticism, but I have been sent to establish the True and Tolerant Religion".[51]

154. On the other hand, the Prophets (peace be upon them) have enjoined the regulation of *irtifāqāt* in a manner that people neither immerse themselves in comforts and luxuries like the monarchs of Persia, nor come down to the level of the dwellers of mountain tops who are close to the condition of uncivilised savages.

155. Here one is confronted with two conflicting approaches:

(i) The first is that luxury is good to maintain the adroit human temperament and to keep the morals on the right course. Moreover, it exhibits the qualities whereby man is distinguished from the rest of the creatures of his genus. Furthermore, stupidity and debility arise from malmanagement.

(ii) The second approach is that luxury is bad, because it gives rise to quarrels, partisanship, strenuous conflicts, tiresome labour and negligence of the transcendental aspects of life and of concern for the Hereafter.

156. Therefore, the Divinely approved attitude is that of moderation and preservation of *irtifāqāt*, and to cater, at the same time, for the requirements of the remembrance of God, and the acts of devotion and

utilisation of opportunities for concentration of the souls toward the Omnipotent.

157. In this respect, the practice of all the Prophets, which has been sanctioned by God, has been to survey the entire corpus of customs and etiquettes of eating, drinking, dressing, construction of houses, forms of embellishment, manners of marriage, conventions obtaining among spouses, procedures adopted in sale and purchase, deterrent measures for acts of disobedience and settlement of disputes, etc. which are already prevalent in the community. If these are found in conformity with the prescribed course, as dictated by the universal weal, then there is no need to replace any of them or to make any departure from them. Rather, people are given further impetus to adhere to them. Moreover, their application of these customs is further streamlined and they are guided as to the benefits underlying them.

158. At times these customs might not conform to the prescribed course and there arises a need to alter or inactivate something in them because it leads to the suffering of some people at the hands of others, or to immersion in the pleasures of the temporal world. Or it might arise because of any deviation from the excellent and virtuous conduct *iḥsān*, or because it is conducive to excessive entertainment and pastime resulting in the negligence of the vital interests of this world and the next, and similar other reasons. In such cases it is not expedient to prescribe for them a pattern which is altogether different from what they are already familiar with. On the contrary, their practice then should be changed into a pattern in respect of which some precedent already exists among them, or of which there is an example set before them by the pious men who are commonly acknowledged by that community to be on the right path.

159. In short, such new patterns should be provided to a community that are acceptable to its conscience, and they are satisfied as to their conformity to the truth. It is in this sense that the prescribed sets of laws borne by different Prophets varied from each other. Those who are firmly rooted in knowledge know that the *Sharī'ah* has introduced nothing in respect of marriage, divorce, human transactions, dress, judicature, *ḥudūd* and the distribution of booty, etc. which is not already known to the people or concerning which they might feel any reluctance if it is prescribed for them.

160. Of course, rectification of deviations and alleviation of ills did take place. For example, *ribā* (usury) had become rampant among them [i.e. the Arabs], so they were forbidden from it. They used to sell fruits before their ripening and used to litigate and argue on the basis of any plague that would strike them so they were forbidden from that sale.[52] Similarly, the *diyah* (blood money) at the time of 'Abd al-Muṭṭalib [the Prophet's grand-father] was ten camels. When he found that people are not thereby deterred from murder, he increased it to one hundred, and the Prophet (peace be upon him) upheld it.[53] In the same way, the first case of *qasāmah* took place by the order of Abū Ṭālib [the Prophet's uncle].[54] Similarly, the head of the community was entitled, under the conventions of pre-Islamic Arabia, to receive the earliest offspring of camels from the booty captured in each expedition. The Prophet (peace be upon him), therefore, prescribed a portion of one fifth out of every booty.[55] Also Qabādh and his son Anūshīrwān [two Sassanid Kings of Persia] had levied *kharāj* [land tax] and *'ushr* [one tenth of the agricultural produce], so the *Sharī'ah* also prescribed similar duties.[56] In the same way, the Children of Israel used to stone the adulterers to death, cut off the hands of thieves, take life for life[57], so the Qur'ān was also revealed with the same prescriptions. These examples are quite numerous and cannot escape the notice of any observer. Nay, if you are intelligent enough to comprehend all the dimensions of the injunctions, you will understand that the Prophets (peace be upon them) did not introduce anything in the domain of *'ibādāt* [worship] that was not already known to their people, either in the same form or in a similar form. They only did away with the distortions of the *Jāhiliyyah*, regulating, by timing and identifying ingredients of various acts, what was ambiguous and also re-popularized among people that which was fading away.[58]

161. It should also be borne in mind that when the Persians and the Romans held the reins of power and governmental authority for many centuries, they immersed themselves in the pleasures of the temporal world and became totally oblivious of the life hereafter. The devil thus gained complete mastery over them and they became fully engrossed in the luxuries of life and proudly boasted to each other about them. Experts thronged to them from all corners of the world, discovering for them delicacies of life and modes of providing comforts in it. They constantly worked at it, competed with each other in maximising luxuries, and boasted to each other about them. So much

so that if a notable among them wore a belt or crown worth less than one hundred thousand *dirhams*, or did not own a lofty palace, expensive wash bowls, swimming pools and gardens, did not keep swift animals and fair boys, and did not maintain extensive cuisines and exquisite dresses, he felt ashamed of himself. A detailed description of this would take too long to complete. What you can observe in the living styles of your own country's kings and emperors would sufficiently substitute their description. All these practices crept into the very roots of their lives, and it became impossible to remove them from their hearts, without tearing their hearts apart. This attitude gradually developed into a chronic disease infecting each organ of the state and all strata of the society. All this assumed the form of such a colossal epidemic that it struck everyone, whether he inhabited an urban or rural area, and whether he was rich or poor. It overtook everyone and rendered him helpless. It brought in its wake anxieties and worries that knew no bounds.

162. These conditions of luxury could not be maintained without spending huge amounts of wealth. And this wealth could only be acquired by maximising taxes on farmers, traders and the like, and keeping them constantly under a heavy and oppressive burden. If they resisted such moves, they were persecuted and tortured by their rulers. And if they obeyed them, they were treated like donkeys and oxen which are utilised for watering, threshing and harvesting, and are considered useless except for these purposes. Moreover, these people were not spared from this labour even for a moment until they became unable to pay any attention whatsoever to the bliss of the life hereafter. At times there existed vast territories which were devoid of even a single soul concerned with religion.

163. Moreover, these luxuries could not be attained without there being a group of people who made their living by working exclusively for the provision of these foods, dresses and buildings, and neglected the basic vocations on which the system of this world rests. The common folk who frequented their quarters were constrained to imitate the notables of the court in these matters. Otherwise, they found no favour or notice from them. Thus the majority of the people became dependent on the ruler. They begged from him, either because they were among warriors or administrators of the state, adopting their typical manners, not for satisfying any legitimate need, but merely

for the sake of following the pattern of their predecessors. Sometimes they begged from the ruler, on the pretext of their being poets whom the royalty had long been used to patronise and reward. Or they begged because they were thought to be ascetics or friars, and it was considered unbecoming of a ruler not to look after them. Thus they vexed each other, and their living became wholly contingent upon the company of kings. These people became dependent on entertaining the kings, engaging them in pleasing pastimes, and flattering them. This became the art on which they concentrated all their thoughts most indulgently and thus wasted their time. As people persisted in this habit, ugly forms were reflected in their souls, and they altogether turned away from virtuous morals. If anyone wants to understand the real nature of this sickness, he should look at a people among whom there is neither any government nor they are immersed in the delicacies of food and dress. He would find everyone in control of himself, and none burdened with taxes beyond his endurance. Such people can free themselves for religious pursuits and the upliftment of the religious community. Then he should also imagine the condition of these very people, if they had a government among them, and had, through the means of controlling this government, subjugated their subjects under an oppressive authority.

164. As this curse increased and the malady intensified, they earned the wrath of God Almighty, and that of the angels in His proximity. God then willed that this malady be treated by cutting off the sick element. So He sent a Prophet who was unlettered, who had neither mingled with the Persians or the Romans, nor had he been influenced by the customs of either. God made this Prophet the criterion, whereby it was possible to distinguish the right path of guidance approved by God from that which He disapproved. Moreover, God inspired this Prophet to condemn the customs of the Persians, and to abhor immersion in this material world and exclusive contentment with it. Further, he was directed by God to prohibit some prominent practices, to which the Persians had habituated themselves, practices about which they used to boast to each other, such as wearing silk, or cloth of flax mixed with silk and the use of purple saddles made of silk brocade, or the use of utensils and jewellery of gold and silver (excepting such jewellery of gold and silver in which gold or silver was in insignificant quantity), and garments bearing pictures, and ornamentation of houses, etc. Further, God decreed the fall of their empire at the hands of his empire, and the replacement of their

rule by his. He also declared that "The Chosroes are doomed to perish and there shall never be any Chosroes thereafter. The Caesars are destined to perish and never shall there be any Caesars thereafter".[59]

165. It should also be borne in mind that among the people of the days of *Jāhiliyyah* there were disputes that were quite irksome and brought a number of problems and difficulties in their wake for the community. It was not possible to solve them without eliminating the root of these disputes, for example, the retaliation of murder. A man would kill another man, and the victim's heir would kill the murderer's brother and so on, and then a person on behalf of the former would assassinate someone from amongst the other party, and thus the dispute continued indefinitely. The Prophet (peace be upon him), therefore, declared: "All blood claims are hereby nullified and the first blood claim that I declare null and void is that of Rabī'ah".[60] Another example is that of inheritance. The chieftains of the community used to pass varying judgements. Besides, people did not refrain from such practices as usurpation and usury, and strayed far away from the virtuous conduct due to these practices. The succeeding generations used these practices as precedents in their argument. Therefore, the Prophet (peace be upon him) annulled all disputation between them, and declared that anything acquired in the Islamic era shall be distributed according to the verdict of the Qur'ān, and whatever will have been distributed or possessed by anybody during the days of *Jāhiliyyah* in any manner, shall be regarded as irreversible. Another example is the practice of *ribā,* under which a person used to loan a capital to someone, stipulating an increase. Then the lender vexed the borrower and made, both the lent capital and the stipulated increase, the principal, and stipulated further increase in it. This increment continued till it multiplied many folds. Therefore, the Prophet abolished *ribā* altogether, and decreed that only the principal shall be payable in all loans, so that "neither the lender wrongs, nor is he wronged".[61] There are many other instances of such practices which, could not have been eliminated but for the Prophet (peace be upon him).

166. It should also be noted that sometimes a practice is prescribed in order to abolish sources of hatred and grudge among people, like starting from the right side while offering a drink. This is so because they may dispute with each other, and no one among them might be acceptable to the other as worthy of preference. This situation

would continue indefinitely unless such measures are adopted. Another example of such wise measures for settling similar disputes is the privilege of the host to lead the Prayers and the precedence of the owner of a riding animal over his companion, should both of them ride it, and similar other instructions of the Prophet (peace be upon him).

Need for a Religion which Abrogates Other Religions

167. If you survey the religious communities that are found on the earth, you will not find any difference from what I have explained to you in the preceding chapters. Indeed, there is no religious community which does not have faith in the truthfulness of its own founder, and a belief in his greatness, and that he was perfect and unequalled. This is so because the people of the community find him steadfast in acts of obedience, notice supernatural events in his life, and witness the grant of his supplications.

168. Similarly, no religious community exists without a system of *ḥudūd*, a set of laws, and such other deterrent measures as are necessary for regulating the conduct of the community. Thereafter, there are certain other things that contribute to facilitating the observance of the above obligations, and similar other traits that are among the essential features of a religious community. Moreover, every people have an exemplary pattern of life (*sunnah*) and a prescribed legal code (*sharī'ah*), wherein the traditions of their elders are followed and the examples of the teachers and leaders of the community are adopted. Thus the foundation of these beliefs is solidified and its pillars are strengthened. Members of the religious community, then, support these pillars and struggle in unison for furthering the cause of the community and for preserving its safety and well-being. They become prepared to sacrifice their lives and properties for the larger interests of the collectivity. All this takes place pursuant to certain wise considerations and well-conceived benefits that are beyond the comprehension of the commonalty.

169. Then, with the passage of time, every people become independently distinct with their own religion, evolving different practices and patterns of behaviour. They defend them with their tongues and fight for

them with their swords. Consequently, injustice becomes the order of the day. This happens either due to the ascendancy of those who do not qualify for the leadership of the community, or due to a confusion created by heretic codes of law in which people become deeply engrossed. This may also happen due to a negligence by the leaders of the community who omit a great deal of what should not be omitted so that nothing but vague remnants of the original religious teachings survive. Each community, which starts following its own independent course, curses the rest of the communities. The communities thus engage themselves in mutual condemnation and war. Truth becomes gradually concealed. At such a stage, there arises the need for a righteous leader who can deal with different communities, as a guided ruler deals with tyrannical kings.

170. In what the translator of the work *Kalīlah wa Dimnah* from Hindi into Persian has mentioned you can find a good example of the confusion of religions.[62] He tried to ascertain the truth, but could not do so except very partially. Similar examples can also be found in the accounts of historians and chroniclers who have related the conditions of *Jāhiliyyah* and the confusion which had crept into their creed.[63]

171. Moreover, a leader *(imām)* who can unite many religious communities in the fold of one religion also needs to establish some other foundations in addition to what have been enumerated above. These include a call from him to his people toward virtuous patterns of living after their purification and reformation by him. Thereafter, he makes them instrumental in his reformative scheme, and they support him like his limbs. He then undertakes a struggle with the people of the earth, for which purpose he spreads his reformed men in all corners of the earth. This, precisely, is what has been implied in the verse of the Qur'ān: "You are the best community raised up for mankind".[64]

172. Now this *imām* [leader of the community] cannot struggle with an unlimited number of people. This being so, it is essential that the substance of his *sharī'ah* be like a natural course of life for the people of virtuous realms, whether they be Arabs or non-Arabs. Again the substance of this *sharī'ah* should also conform to his own community's existing heritage of the knowledge of *irtifāqāt*. In ascertaining this conformity the conditions of the majority of the people of his own community is to be kept in view. The *imām* shall, then, inspire

mankind to follow that *sharī'ah*. For it is not possible to leave this matter of following a proper *sharī'ah* to the choice of each people, or to the leaders of every age, because this would not at all serve the purposes of prescribing the *sharī'ah*. It is also not possible for the *imām* to survey the existing heritage of all peoples, experiment with each of them, and then prescribe a different *sharī'ah* for each social group. It is well nigh impossible to encompass their diverse habits and inherited customs and the variation in their habits and religious backgrounds. When most of those engaged in the task of recording the injunctions of one *sharī'ah* are unable to totally grasp the details of that particular *sharī'ah*, you may well imagine the impossibility of encompassing the various *sharī'ah*s. Moreover, often the people of other regional, social and religious backgrounds submit to a *sharī'ah*, after a long time, beyond the life span of the Prophet who introduces that *sharī'ah*. This can be clearly illustrated by the living *sharī'ah*s of today namely, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. In each of them, the early followers were few in number and their number increased only afterwards.

173. Therefore, nothing can be better and more convenient than considering the customs of the people among whom the Prophet is raised, for prescribing symbolic commands, penal laws *(ḥudūd)*, and modes of socio-cultural development *(irtifāqāt)*. At the same time, consideration should be given to those who come after them (i.e. those who enter the fold of religion after the Prophet's era), so that these prescriptions are not difficult for them to apply. Thus these commands remain valid in toto for all.

174. For the early followers of a religion it is easy to practice the teachings of that religion because they are supported by the testimony of their hearts and by a compatibility between those teachings and their own customs. The latter followers of that religion find these teachings easy to practice because of their admiration for the life-patterns of the early elders of the religious community and the successors of that Prophet. This attitude is a natural trait of every community in every era, whether in antiquity or in later times.

175. Now the realms that were found suitable for the birth of balanced temperaments were held together under two prominent emperors at that time [i.e. the Prophet's time]. One of them was Chosroes. He controlled Iraq, Yemen, Khurāsān and the neighbouring areas. Potentates in Transoxiana and India were under his suzerainty, paying

tribute to him every year. The other was Caeser who controlled Syria, Byzantium and the adjoining territories. Kings of Egypt, North African potentates, and other African rulers were under him and paid him the tribute.[65]

176. Demolishing the empires of these two powers and gaining control over their dominions was, at that time, tantamount to dominating the whole world. Their customs of luxurious living were prevalent in all the areas that were controlled by them. A change in these customs and deterring people of these dominions from them was like awakening all areas about these things, even though they might have subsequently deviated from the required course. Harmazān had pointed to some of these aspects when 'Umar (may God be pleased with him) consulted him with regard to the soldiers of Persia.[66] As to the rest of the areas situated far from the [realm of] balanced temperament, they did not count much in the universal expediency. That was why the Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "Spare the Turks as long as they spare you, and leave the Ethiopians as long as they leave you".[67]

177. In short, when God willed to set the deviating community straight, and to raise a religious community *(ummah)* for mankind that would enjoin good to them and forbid evil and change their corrupt practices, it was all contingent upon the fall of these two empires. The above objective was possible to attain only by addressing the conditions of these two empires, because their typical conditions had more or less permeated all the virtuous realms. Therefore, God decreed their fall and the Prophet (peace be upon him) foretold this fall in these words: "...Chosroes are doomed to perish, and there shall never be any Chosroes thereafter. The Ceasers are doomed to perish and there shall never be any Ceasers thereafter".[68]

178. Accordingly, Truth was revealed in order to subdue every falsehood. This was realized by the triumph of the Prophet (peace be upon him) and his Companions over the falsehood of the Arabs, and the triumph of the Arabs (Muslims) over the falsehood of these empires. In the same way, the triumph of the True Religion over the rest of the world was achieved by the conquest of both these empires, and God's is the strong argument.

179. Further, one of these principles is that his (the Prophet's)teaching of Religion is integral to the establishment of 'general vicegerency'

(al-khilāfah al-'āmmah), and that he designates from amongst his own compatriots and kinsfolk successors who are fully attuned to those traditions and practices. For, the mere smearing of one's eyes with kohl is not like kohl. Also because their religious zeal was inseparably linked with their ethnic loyalties. Ascendancy of their rule and prestige of their position meant the ascendancy and prestige of the Leader of the Community (i.e. the Prophet). This is the purport of the Prophet's sayings: "Leaders are (to be) from amongst the Quraysh".[69]

180. Further, he (i.e. the Prophet) should commission his successors to establish and popularize Religion as implied in the following statement of Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq (may God be pleased with him): "You would remain attached to the Religion as long as your leaders are steadfast with you ..."[70]

181. One of these principles is that he (the Prophet) establishes the supremacy of this Religion over all other creeds and cults. He should leave none unless it is overpowered by the True Religion, either gracefully or by force. Thus people shall become divided into three groups: (1) those who will submit to the True Religion openly as well as secretly; (2) those who will be forced to submit openly, because they simply cannot turn away from it; and (3) those disbelievers who will be subdued by the *imām*. They are to be employed by him in harvesting, threshing and all other vocations, as beasts are used in the cultivation of land and lifting of weights. Also he (the *imām)* shall prescribe for them a deterrent code of conduct. They shall also be required to pay tribute in acknowledgement of the supremacy (of the True Religion), while they are under the tutelage of the *imām*.[71]

182. Supremacy of the True Religion over other religions becomes manifest through the emergence of certain conditions. Among these conditions is the prominence of the symbolic commands of this Religion over the symbolic commands of other religions. By 'symbolic command' we mean an evident characteristic of the Religion whereby its followers are to be distinguished from the other religions e.g. circumcision, reverence for *masjid*, call to Prayers *(adhān)*, Friday congregation and daily congregation in the Prayers.

183. Among these conditions is that people are rendered unable to give prominence to the symbolic commands of all other religions and that Muslims are not treated at par with disbelievers in matters of

qiṣāṣ, diyāt, marital transactions and in playing a leading role in the society; so they have no choice but to have recourse to faith. These conditions also include that people are made responsible to carry out their religious obligations with regard to virtue and vice in the prescribed forms. These forms should be made essential to obligations without much allusion to the spirit underlying these forms. The *imām*, therefore, should leave no discretion with the followers of the Religion in respect of their obligations under the *Sharī'ah*. Moreover, he should make the science of the subtle meanings of *sharā'i' ('ilm asrār al-sharā'i')*, a reserved science, accessible only to those who are well-versed in the understanding of Religion, because most of the followers of the Religion neither comprehend, nor are they capable of comprehending the great beneficial considerations underlying the injunctions of the *Sharī'ah*. These could be comprehended only if these were regulated by definite rules, and thus had become so perceptible that it could be attained by anyone pursuing them. Had there been any option to omit any part of the *Sharī'ah*, or it were explicitly stated that the real purpose of the *Sharī'ah* was other than these forms, avenues would have been opened wide for vain debates, and people would have plunged themselves in great disputation and controversy. In such a condition, it would not have been possible to realise the Divine scheme chosen for them.

184. Also, included among these conditions is the consideration that since subjugation by sword alone cannot remove the rustiness of their [i.e. the disbelievers'] hearts, and it remains likely that in the event of mere use of the sword, they might soon return to their earstwhile state of infidelity, it becomes essential that by employing various modes of reasoning and demonstrative proofs it is established in the minds of the general masses that those [other] religions are not worthy of being followed because they are either not sanctioned by an infallible authority, or they are not practicable in the existing conditions of the community, or because there is some distortion or misapplication in them. With these considerations in view, deviations are openly rectified and the priorities of the True Religion are clearly set forth. It is, then, made clear that the comparatively hidden teachings of the Religion are also as evident as the light of the day, the prescribed patterns are most beneficial for the masses, and that they are almost identical to the examples set by the earlier Prophets (peace be upon them), and similar other distinctive traits of the Religion are underlined. God knows best.

The Conditions of *Jāhiliyyah* Reformed by the Prophet

185. If you want to gain insight into the purport of the *sharī'ah* of the Prophet of God (peace be upon him), you should first of all enquire into the conditions of the unlettered people among whom he was sent, for they were the initial object for the prescription of a code of life by him. At the same time, you will have to probe into the mode of reforming that object according to the principles explained in the chapters related to the prescription of injunctions, the considerations of providing ease in the injunctions of the *sharī'ah*, and the commands relating to the religious community. You should, therefore, bear in mind that the Prophet (peace be upon him) was raised in the upright Ismā'īlī tradition of religion, to set its deviations right, to rectify its obliquities, and disseminate its light. To this aspect of the Prophet's mission reference has been made in the Qur'ānic verse: "... the faith of your father Ibrāhīm ...."[72]

186. That being so, it should necessarily follow that the principles of this religious tradition are already recognised, and its pattern of life well-defined. For when a Prophet is sent to a people possessing the remnants of a rightly guided pattern of living, then nothing justifies any change or alteration therein. Far from that, continuity is sanctioned in favour of the existing tradition as it is more in tune with their religious consciousness and easier to serve as a basis for argument with them.

187. The Children of Ismā'īl had inherited the pattern of their progenitor Ismā'īl. They continued to follow his prescribed code of life *(sharī'ah)* until there appeared one 'Amr ibn Luḥayy who introduced certain things of his own misconceptions in their tradition. Thus he himself strayed and led others astray.[73] He preached idol worship,

and such [polytheistic] practices as leaving beasts scot-free to pasture and she-camels with their ear slit (*sā'ibah* and *baḥīrah*) with all their attendant superstitions.[74] Here religion became nullified and right was confused with wrong, and these people were soon dominated by ignorance, polytheism, and infidelity. God, therefore, sent our master Muḥammad (peace be upon him) to set their deviations right and to reform their corrupt practices. The Prophet (peace be upon him) surveyed the existing body of the *sharī'ah* possessed by them. What he found in conformity with the pattern of Ismā'īl or what was from among the symbolic commands (*sha'ā'ir*) of God, was retained and whatever represented any deviation or corruption or was among the symbols of infidelity, was expressly abolished by the Prophet (peace be upon him).[75]

188. Similarly, whatever pertained to the category of *'ibādāt* and other related matters was streamlined by prescribing its manners and etiquettes, on the one hand, and on the other hand by specifying certain reprehensible elements in it that ought to be eschewed in order to eliminate wrong practices. The Prophet (peace be upon him) also prohibited some corrupt customs and prescribed good and healthy ones in their place. Also, all the original and practical things in religion that had been abandoned in the intervening period between two revelations were revived afresh by the Prophet. With these actions, the bounty of God was completed and His Religion was restored to its pristine purity.

189. The people of *Jāhiliyyah* at the time of the Prophet recognized the possibility of the raising of Prophets, believed in the final accountability with a conception of reward and punishment, and accepted the principles which provided the bases for various categories of virtue, and dealt with each other on the basis of the second and third stages of social development (*irtifāqāt*).[76]

190. What we have stated above does not rule out the presence of two types of people among them. One of them consisted of perverted sinners and atheists. These sinners used to commit beastly or predatory acts which conflicted with their religious norms because their egos held sway over them and they lacked religiosity.

191. Such people, in fact, fall outside the socio-religious order, bearing witness to sinfulness against themselves. The atheists suffer deficiency of understanding which becomes part of their nature. Thus

they render themselves unable to fully appreciate the objectives pursued by the founder of the community. They keep wavering in their doubts under the fear of their chiefs. Humans always condemn them and consider such people outside the pale of religion as they snatch its noose from their necks. With this bad state of infidelity, in which they land themselves, their fall-out is of no harm.

192. In the second category, we may count those ignorant and neglectful people who never paid any attention to religion, which was immaterial in their lives. Such were the majority of people among the Quraysh and those who were associated with them because historically they were quite distant from the age of the Prophet. The Qur'ān also makes a mention of this in the following verse: "... that you may admonish a people to whom no warner has come before you".[77]

These people, however, did not estrange themselves so completely from the right path that no argument could work with them, nor did they become so incapable of being charged with obligations that no proof would be profitable with them.

193. The following were among those principles of religion that were already well-known:

(a) The affirmation that God, the Most High, has no partner in the creation of the heavens and the earth and the substances that are in them. Nor does He have any partner in the governance of great affairs; and that no one can turn away from His command and that nothing can deter His judgement when He settles and decides it. This is what has been stated in the following verses of the Qur'ān:

(i) "If you ask them, who it is that created the heavens and the earth, they will certainly say God".[78]

(ii) "Nay, it is Him alone that you would call ..."[79]

(iii) "Those that you call beside Him leave you in the lurch..."[80]

But their atheism prompted them to think that there were certain beings, from among the Angels or Spirits, who do regulate and control the inhabitants of the earth in certain less important matters. Such matters include improving the spiritual state of a worshipper in his very personal experience, and the conditions of his progeny and property. They likened these beings to the position of small kings *vis-à-vis* an emperor, and regarded them as equivalent to intercessors

and confidants in relation to a ruler who manages his domain by oppressive authority. These misconceptions may be traced back to what has been stated in the *sharā'i'*, about commissioning Angels with given duties and granting of supplication to those who have attained Divine proximity through worship. By observing this, these people supposed that they (i.e. these commissioned Angels and attainers of divine proximity), can do certain things of their own accord, like small kings of this world. Their fallacy lay in drawing analogies from the 'seen' for the 'unseen'.[81]

(b) The notion that God Almighty may not be invested with attributes which are not worthy of His Honour and Glory, and that the sanctity of His Names may not be violated. But their atheism prompted the supposition that God made the Angels His daughters, and the Angels have been made the instrument, through whom God acquires a knowledge, which is not available to Him. Again this supposition was an outcome of the analogy of spies in their relation to kings.

(c) The belief that God predestined all events prior to their creation. This is also supported by the statement of Ḥasan al-Baṣri that the people of *Jāhiliyyah* had been consistent in referring to predestination in their oration and poetry, and the *sharī'ah* merely confirmed it.

(d) The belief that there was a certain sphere where gradual incidence of events is decreed. And that the supplication of the Angels, who are admitted to Divine proximity, and the prayers of virtuous children of Ādam do have some sort of effect. But this idea was cast in their minds, with an attendant illustration of intercession to a king by his confidants.

(e) The belief that God has charged His servants with whatever duties He willed. Therefore, it is He who permits and forbids, and that man receives a return for his deeds: if they be good, he shall have a good reward, and if evil, he shall be retributed with evil. Also that God has some Angels who are close to His presence, and they are important functionaries of His kingdom. They carry out certain regular duties in the world with the permission of God and "do not flinch from executing the commands they receive from God, but do precisely what they are commanded".[82] They neither eat, nor drink, nor defecate, nor marry. They sometimes appear before virtuous individuals to give them good tidings or to warn them. That God, in His generosity and grace, may send to His servants, a man from amongst them

and transmit His revelations to him. Angel descends on such a man for this purpose (i.e. transmission of revelation). He [i.e. this man] is to prescribe for the people obedience of God. Once he has done that, they have no choice but to accept.

194. In the pre-Islamic poetry, references to the higher assembly *(al-mala' al-a'lā)* and the bearers of the throne of power *(ḥamalat al-'arsh)* were frequent. According to Ibn 'Abbās, the Prophet (peace be upon him) approved of Umayyah ibn Abī al-Ṣalt in two lines of his poetry: "Whether it is man, ox, eagle or lion, all of them are but under the power of the All Powerful". Upon hearing it, the Prophet remarked: "Truly spoke he!" The same poet further said: "When the sun rises at the end of each night, it blushes and reddens its colour. In spite of its disdain to rise gently (of its own accord), it is forced to rise; for otherwise it will be flogged' [i.e. it has no choice but to obey God's command to rise]".[83]

Again, the Prophet (peace be upon him), remarked that Umayyah was right.

The people in the days of *Jāhiliyyah* believed that the bearers of the throne of power (*ḥamalat al-'arsh*) were four angels. One of them was in the form of a human being. He would be the intercessor for the children of Adam with God. The second one took the form of an ox. He would be the intercessor for beasts. The third one was in the form of an eagle. He would be the intercessor for birds. And the fourth one assumed the form of a lion. He would be the intercessor for beasts of prey.

The *sharī'ah* also stated something close to it. But here they have been designated as mountain goats. This is in accordance with their forms in the world of illustration (*'ālam al-mithāl*). So all this was already known to them along with what they added thereto by way of analogy of the seen for the unseen and the adulteration of their conventional superstitions with rational facts.[84]

195. If you are in any doubt concerning what we have stated above, you should look at what God has narrated in the great Qur'ān. The Qur'ān argued with them (i.e. the Arabs) on the basis of the vestiges of knowledge possessed by them and clarified the confusion and doubt created by them. When they denied revelation of the Qur'ān, God said: "...say, who then sent down the Book which Mūsā brought"?[85] Similarly, when they said: [as reported by the Qur'ān in the following verse]: "...and they say: what sort of an apostle is this, who eats

food and walks through the streets"![86] The Qur'ān replied in the following words: "...Say: I am no bringer of new-fanged doctrine among the apostles"![87] There are also other verses in the Qur'ān to this effect.

196. This much would sufficiently explain to you that the polytheists, even though they had gone far away from the straight path, yet they were such that it was possible to establish, on the premises provided by the vestiges of the knowledge possessed by them, a basis for argument with them. Besides, you should also regard the contents of the orations of their sages like Quss ibn Sā'idah al-Ayādī,[88] Zayd ibn 'Amr ibn Nafīl[89] and the reports pertaining to those who were before 'Amr ibn Luḥayy, you will find the above statement substantiated by these sources.[90] Moreover, if you undertake a more thorough investigation of the subject on the basis of these reports, you will find their elders and wise men believing in the Hereafter, the Guardian Angels, and similar other doctrines. These people also affirmed monotheism in its original form, so much so that Zayd ibn 'Amr ibn Nafīl said in one of his poems:

> Thy servants err; but thou art the Sustainer; in thine hands are placed the deaths and the destinies;
> One single Lord or a thousand of them should I serve, when all matters diverge?
> I eschewed Lāt and 'Uzzā altogether for that is what a wise man ought to do.[91]

It was the Prophet (peace be upon him) who remarked about Umayyah ibn Abī al-Ṣalt: "His poetry embraced faith but his heart relented".[92] All these ideas were a legacy of Ismā'īl (peace be upon him) which persisted among the Arabs. Some of them came from the sources of the People of the Book.[93]

197. It had also been an acknowledged fact among them that the perfection of man lies in submitting himself entirely to his Lord, the Sustainer, and in worshipping Him to his utmost capacity. They also knew that purity and cleanliness constituted a necessary part of worship. Similarly, obligatory bath after sexual intercourse was an established practice among them. The same was the case of circumcision and all other requirements of natural hygiene. In Torah also there is found a statement to the effect that circumcision had been made a designator for Ibrāhīm and his progeny.[94]

198. Moreover, this form of *wuḍū'* (ablution) is also practiced among Magians, Jews and others. The wise men of Arabia also practiced it. Prayers were also in vogue among them. Abū Dharr (may Allāh be pleased with him) had already been praying for three years before he came to the Prophet (peace be upon him). Similarly, Quss ibn Sā'idah al-Ayādī used to pray. As to the form of Prayer obtaining among the communities of Jews, Magians, and the rest of the Arabs, it consisted of certain acts of veneration, particularly prostration and some phrases of supplication and invocation.[95] In the same way, *zakāh* was known among them. Its practical form was hospitality for guests and wayfarers, alms-giving to the poor, maintaining one's relatives, observing obligations to the kith and kin, and supporting the cause of truth. People were praised among them for having such qualities, as they recognised them to be the components of human perfection and bliss.[96] This is evidenced by the famous remarks made by Khadījah (the wife of the Prophet) when she learnt about the Prophet's first experience of receiving revelation: "By God, God shall never let you down, as indeed you are the one who joins the ties of kinship, you extend hospitality to the guests, you carry the burden of your relations, and you support the cause of justice".[97]

Equally significant in this context are similar remarks made by Ibn al-Daghinnah [Suba'yah ibn Rāfi'] concerning Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq (may Allah be pleased with him).[98]

199. Also fasting from dawn to sunset was in vogue among the Arabs.The people of Quraysh used to fast on the day of 'Āshūrā' in the time of *Jāhiliyyah*.[99] Also the practice of seclusion for meditation in mosque existed at that time. It is reported that 'Umar (may Allah be pleased with him) had made a vow during *Jāhiliyyah* that he would observe *i'tikāf* for one night, and later he sought the Prophet's counsel about it.[100] Also 'Āṣ ibn Wā'il had made a will that a certain number of his slaves should be freed.[101]

200. In short, people in the time of *Jāhiliyyah* used to practice piety and acts of devotion in a variety of ways. In this respect,[102] pilgrimage to the house of God, veneration of its symbols and observance of sacred months are too obvious examples to escape notice.

201. Besides, the Arabs practiced a number of charms and talismans also. [In respect of slaughtering animals], they consistently followed the practice of cutting the throat, or striking at the upper part of

the chest, and refrained from strangulating or killing the animal by shock. They remained attached to the remnants of the religion of Ibrāhīm (peace be upon him), in eschewing stars and contemplating over the subtleties of natural phenomena, except what was dictated by obvious necessity. In prognostication, they relied on dreams and good tidings given by earlier Prophets. It was at a later period that soothsaying, divination with arrows and foreboding found their place among them.[103] Yet they remained conscious that these things did not form part of the original religion. This is supported by a tradition of the Prophet as well. On seeing a picture of Ibrāhīm and Ismā'īl carrying arrows in their hands, the Prophet (peace be upon him) remarked: "These people knew that they (i.e. Ibrāhīm and Ismā'īl) never divinated".[104] So the Children of Ismā'īl remained attached to the pattern of their progenitor until 'Amr ibn Luḥayy appeared among them,[105] and that was about three hundred years before revelation came to the Prophet (peace be upon him).

202. The pre-Islamic Arabs possessed certain definite patterns of life and used to censure each other on omitting them in their eating, drinking, dressing, feasts and festivals, burial of their dead, marriage, divorce, period of waiting, *('iddah)*, mourning, sales, and other transactions. They were also consistent in prohibiting marriage with the unmarriageable like daughters, mothers and others. They also had penal measures for crimes like *qiṣāṣ, diyāt* and *qasāmah* and punishments for adultery and theft. Through their contact with Persians and Romans, they had also been exposed to the sciences and crafts of the third and fourth *irtifāq*. Then came a time when various forms of crime and mischief such as abduction and looting, widespread commission of adultery, invalid marriages and usury, became a feature of their life. As to prayers and acts of invocation, they had ere long abandoned and neglected them. While this was their state of affairs, the Prophet (peace be upon him) was sent to them.

203. The Prophet (peace be upon him) looked into the existing socio-religious conditions of the Arabs. He retained the surviving vestiges of the True Religion, and explicitly urged people to adopt them. Moreover, he regulated *'ibādāt* by prescribing their occasions, timings, conditions, ingredients, manners and decorum, and by identifying their prohibited elements by laying down the highest and lowest levels of devotion and rules for timely and late performance of obligations. Similarly, the Prophet (peace be upon him) identified

sinful acts and explained their ingredients and conditions. He also laid down *ḥudūd* and other deterrent measures and identified ways of atonement. Besides, he provided ease in following the commandments of the True Religion by promising good reward for good deeds and by pointing to evil consequences of evil acts. In addition to this, he taught how to close the avenues of sin and gave incentives to all acts that would promote good and virtue, and similar other things that we have enumerated before.

204. The Prophet (peace be upon him) went to the greatest length in disseminating the upright *Ḥanīfī* Religion and making it prevail over all other religions. He also abolished all distortions and perversions permeating it and exhausted his efforts in accomplishing this. And whatever was from amongst the right *irtifāqāt* was ratified and confirmed by the Prophet (peace be upon him). He also prohibited all corrupt customs and prevented people from following them.

205. Further, he established the supreme authority of the state, and struggled alongwith those who were by his side against those who stood in opposition to his noble mission until it was accomplished in spite of the enemies.

206. It has been said by the Prophet (peace be upon him) in one of his traditions that: "I have been sent with the Religion that is benevolent, upright and fully evident".[106] By 'benevolent' he meant a religion wherein obedience does not involve any hardship such as those heretically invented by hermits. Rather, for every genuine problem of hardship, there is in this Religion a provision for concession. Thus, its injunctions are practicable for the strong and the weak alike, and for every slave as well as a free man at the same time. By 'upright' he meant that this was the Religion of Ibrāhīm (peace be upon him) wherein lies the establishment of the symbols of God's obedience, a subdual of the symbols of polytheism and the abolition of all perversions, corrupt customs and practices. By 'evident' he meant that the facts, rational considerations, and the objectives on which its injunctions were founded are so manifest and self-evident that anyone who contemplates over them with a sound mind and humility will not fail to appreciate them.

And God is the best knowing.

Sections on Politics

207. It should be noted that it is necessary for every society of Muslims to have a *khalīfah* [ruler]. This is because there are certain vital interests that cannot be attained without one. These interests are quite numerous. They fall in either of the following two categories:

First, that which pertains to politics. This involves: (a) repulsion of armies that might attack them [i.e. the populace] and try to overpower them; (b) emancipation of the oppressed from the oppressors; and (c) adjudication of disputes and other related issues. We have already explained these issues.

Second, that which pertains to the True Religion. For the supremacy of Islam over all other religions cannot be contemplated without a *khalīfah*, who can check and deal strongly with those who might rebel against the True Religion, and commit something expressly prohibited, or discard anything explicitly enjoined. Moreover, it is he (i.e. the *khalīfah*) who can overpower the followers of other religions and impose *jizyah* on them, with willing submission on their part while they are subdued. Since without this arrangement, both Muslims and non-Muslims shall be equated in status, and no preference in favour of one group over the other shall be manifest. Besides, there would remain no restraint over them to check their transgression.

208. The Prophet (peace be upon him) classified all these issues under five categories namely:

(a) *maẓālim* i.e. administrative injustices, and the ways and means of dealing with them;

(b) *ḥudūd*, i.e. specified punishments laid down in the Qur'ān or the *Sunnah* for crimes that belong to the category of acts which are related to the rights of God in contrast to the rights of human beings;

(c) judiciary; and

(d) *jihād*.

209. There arose then the need to provide basic rules to govern different acts falling in the purview of each category. As to details and subsidiary matters, they were left to the opinions of the *imāms*.[107] However, a general advice was tendered to them: to be fair and good to the community. This was done due to a number of reasons, namely:

(i) Those holding the office of *khalīfah* often tend to be cruel and oppressive, following their whims and vagaries. They may abuse their authority and corrupt the populace by an unbridled exercise of power in disregard of the latter's rights. In such circumstances, the disadvantages of the office of *khalīfah* might exceed its anticipated advantages. In pursuing this policy, they often fall back on false claims of following the right course and of giving consideration to some supposed public policy. It was, therefore, necessary that certain basic rules were laid down whose violation would be condemned and the rulers could be subjected to impeachment on account of their violation. Thus all argument against rulers could be based on these basic rules.

(ii) The *khalīfah* should be there to demonstrate before the general public the injustices of the unjust, and that the punishment awarded is not in excess to the requirement. Also, it should be brought home to them that in the adjudication of the disputes he (i.e the *khalīfah*) has pronounced the right judgement, otherwise people would be divided amongst themselves and might as well turn against him. Those who have been aggrieved by his decisions and their kith and kin might entertain feelings of ill will against him. Besides, there remains the likelihood of their resorting to treason. They might secretly hate him, feeling that their rights could only be protected by themselves and not by the *khalīfah*. This will surely be a condition of great difficulty for the *khalīfah*.

(iii) There are a lot of people who do not know what is the best course for the public policy of the state. They follow their independent reasoning and erroneously slant themselves toward right or left. There are some people who are so rigid and radical that even extreme measures of deterrent action appear insufficient for them. At the same time, there are other people who are too lenient and soft, and even a little penal action is too much in their eyes. Another category consists

of individuals who are so credulous as to believe all contentions of plaintiffs. There is yet another type of individuals who are so impervious and cynical that they think of people only negatively. Since it is not possible to accommodate all divergent trends and attitudes—for to do so would amount to demanding the impossible—it was necessary that certain definite principles be laid down that could subsume all the conditions. While disagreement among people in particular cases is of little consequence, their disagreement in regard to the basic postulates is not so.

(iv) If the laws stem from the *sharī'ah*, they are no less sacred than prayers and fasting, in so far as they bring Divine proximity and are instrumental in reminding people of God. It was, therefore, necessary that matters are not left to individuals who are carried away by lustful whims or beastly desires. Moreover, it is not possible to ensure infallibility and immunity from oppressive tendencies in the rulers. Also, the beneficial considerations which we pointed out in our discussions on "the prescription of injunctions and factors responsible for it" and on "the wisdom underlying the quantification of various acts of worship", are all applicable in the present context as well.

And God knows the best.

Khilāfah

210. It should be known that there are certain conditions that have been laid down for a person to be a *khalīfah*. He should be sane, adult, male, brave, sage, able to listen, observe and articulate. He should also be among those whose honour and the honour of his kinsfolk are generally recognized by the people. Also, he should be such that people should have no aversion to follow him. Besides, he should be reputed for his pursuit of the right course in public policies. All these things have been established by reason.

211. Furthermore, all communities among the progeny of Adam, despite their difference in religion and distance in dwellings, have been in agreement on the above conditions because they have appreciated the fact that the purposes for installing a *khalīfah* cannot be realized without these conditions. And whenever any course, contrary to these conditions, was followed, people witnessed the impropriety of this course which they disliked in their hearts but kept quiet in disgust.

212. The compulsive nature of these conditions is partly explained by the following statement of the Prophet: "A people who delegated their affairs to a woman shall never attain felicity".[108]

213. Besides, the Religion of Muṣtafā (peace be upon him) in respect of the vicegerency of the Prophetic mission has taken a few other things into consideration. These include: belief in Islam, knowledge, and just and upright conduct because certain vital interests of the religious community cannot be safeguarded without them, according to the consensus of the Muslims. A cardinal principle in this respect has been provided in the following verse of the Qur'ān: "God has promised to those of you who believe and do good deeds that He will surely make them rulers in the earth as He made those before them rulers, and that He will surely establish for them their Religion

which He has chosen for them, and that He will surely give them security in exchange after their fear. They will serve Me, not associating aught with Me. And whoever is ungrateful after this, they are the transgressors".[109]

214. One of these conditions is that he [i.e. the *khalīfah*] should be a Qurashī. The Prophet has said: "The leaders are from amongst the Quraysh".[110] The reason warranting this qualification is that the Truth which God has manifested through the Prophet (peace be upon him) was revealed in the language of the Quraysh, and in keeping with their customs and conventions. Most of the quantifications of *'ibādāt* and specified punishments were those that were already in vogue among them. Also, many of the injunctions were laid down against the background provided by their society. That was why they were able to adopt and uphold them more than any other people among mankind.

215. Additionally, the Quraysh were the Prophet's own people and group. They had nothing to take pride except in the exaltation of the Religion of Muḥammad (pace be upon him). Religious zeal was thus combined for them with a passion for race. Therefore, they provided the most suitable milieu for the establishment of, and adherence to, the revealed code of law.

216. Moreover, the *khalīfah* should be an individual from whose obedience people do not desist in consideration of his noble birth and high morals. For often those without noble birth are regarded as worthless and contemptible by the commonalty. Also he [i.e. the *khalīfah*] should be from amongst those who are known for enjoying prestigious and leading positions in the society, and whose group has a practical experience of marshalling people and conducting war and whose people are strong and prepared to protect and support him and dedicate their lives for his sake. All these qualities were not combined except in Quraysh, particularly after the investiture of the Prophet (peace be upon him) by God to carry out His mission and the rise of the Quraysh to a position of honour as a result thereof.

217. It was to this fact that Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq (may God be pleased with him) was referring when he said: "This mission shall not rise to prominence except through Quraysh who dwell in the middle of Arabia ..."[111]

218. It is significant that no further condition was laid down that he (i.e. *khalīfah*) should be a Hāshimī. This was due to two reasons:

First, that people may not harbour any feelings of suspicion, and think that he [i.e. the Prophet] intended to establish his own dynastic rule like the rest of the kings. Such a suspicion would have been conducive to apostasy. It was also for this reason that the Prophet (peace be upon him) did not hand over the keys [of Ka'bah] to 'Abbās ibn 'Abd al-Muṭṭalib.[112]

Second, it is important that people should accept the *khalīfah* as such, and are unanimous in this acceptance, and extol him. Similarly, it is necessary that he establishes *ḥudūd*, strives for the defence of the religious community, and enforces the injunctions. The presence of all these qualities together is often difficult [even] in more than one individual at one time. If there were any condition that he should belong to a particular tribe, there would have been hardships and difficulties because that particular tribe may not have in its ranks a man possessing these qualities while another tribe might produce such an individual. For this reason, the jurists tend to prohibit that any condition be laid down for accepting someone as *khalīfah* such as the condition that he should belong to a small town. Rather they regard it permissible that he might belong to a big town.

219. It is possible to instal the khalīfah through any one of the following procedures:

(a) By a mandate from those who are entitled to untie and bind *(ahl al-ḥall wa al-'aqd)* from amongst the *'ulamā'*, chiefs, commanders of armies, who are men of understanding and are sincere to the Muslim community. This mode of the installation of the *khalīfah* was adopted in the case of Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq (may Allāh be pleased with him);

(b) By a testament from the preceding *khalīfah* to the people in favour of some individual, as was the case in the establishment of the caliphate *(khilāfah)* of 'Umar (may Allāh be pleased with him);

(c) By way of consultation, as was the case in the *khilāfah* of 'Uthmān ibn 'Affān (may Allāh be pleased with him);

(d) By the dominance of a person over the people who fulfils the qualifications and establishes his authority over them like all the *khulafā'* who succeeded the *khilāfat al-nubuwwah* (vicegerency of the prophethood).[113]

220. If someone who does not fulfil the necessary conditions becomes dominant, it is not appropriate to immediately resort to disputation, because his deposition is often not possible without going through violence and strifes which would involve more harm than the benefits expected [by the installation of a duly qualified person as *khalīfah*]. When asked about such rulers: "Should we not oppose them by force? the Prophet (peace be upon him), replied:"No, as long as they establish Prayers among you".[114] He further said: "Except when you find evident infidelity about which you possess a conclusive evidence sanctioned by God".[115]

221. In short, if the *khalīfah* turns infidel by neglecting anything which constitutes one of the essentials of Religion, opposing him by force is not only permissible, but becomes obligatory. Otherwise, it is neither permissible, nor obligatory, because in such a circumstance, the benefit of installing a *khalīfah* in office is nullified, and there is apprehension of great harm that would be caused to people by his mischief. Therefore, in such an event fighting against him shall be an act of *jihād* in the way of God.

222. The Prophet (peace be upon him) has said: "Hearing and obeying is an obligation of every Muslim, whether he likes the command or dislikes it, as long as he is not commanded to commit a sin. If he is commanded to commit sin, then he is absolved of the obligation to hear and obey".[116]

    (I say): Since an *imām* is installed for two kinds of public weal, by which religious and political affairs are regulated, and since the Prophet (peace be upon him) was sent for their sake, and the *imām* is the Prophet's deputy and an executor of his mission, therefore, obedience to the *imām* is indeed obedience to the Prophet. And disobedience to him would be tantamount to disobedience of the Prophet except when he commands to commit a sin. For then it would be evident that obedience to him is no longer an obedience to God, and in that event, he would cease to be a deputy of God's Prophet. This is why the Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "Whoever follows an *amīr*,[117] he indeed follows me, and whoever disobeys an *amīr*, he indeed disobeys me".[118]

223. Further, the Prophet (peace be upon him) has said: "Verily the *imām* is a shield behind which his people fight their enemies, and through which they seek their own protection. If he commands piety and

guides them toward it, he shall be entitled to a reward for it. But if he pursues any other path, then he shall have his portion of the evil consequences".[119]

(I say): The Prophet (peace be upon him) regarded the *imām* as a shield because he is an instrument of inner cohesion among Muslims and a source of defence for them. The Prophet (peace be upon him) has also said: "Whoever finds something in his *amīr* which he detests, he should tolerate it, because whoever separates himself a single span of hand from the community and dies in that position, his death indeed shall be in the state of *Jāhiliyyah*".[120]

(I say): This is because Islam is distinguished from *Jāhiliyyah* by addressing these two categories of public weal. And it is the *khalīfah* who deputises the Prophet in carrying out the purposes of this public weal. Therefore, when someone separates himself from the executor of this public weal, he falls in the category of those who are living in the *Jāhilī* era.[121]

224. The Prophet (peace be upon him) also said: "Any servant of God to whose care God gave a people, but he did not lend his fullest sincerity to their cause, he shall not [even] smell the fragrance of paradise".[122]

(I say): Since the installation of *khalīfah* takes place for the realisation of certain vital interests, it is necessary that the *khalīfah* is directed to fulfil these objectives. At the same time, the people should also be urged to follow him so that these stipulated interests are achieved from both sides.

225. Moreover, since the *imām* cannot by himself perform the duties of collecting *ṣadaqāt*, and receiving *'ushr*[123] and adjudicating the disputes in all corners of his realm, it was necessary to depute governors and judges. Further, since all these functionaries are occupied in a vocation relating to the public policy, they should be entitled to their livelihood from the exchequer. It was to this fact that Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq referred when he said on his appointment to the office of *khalīfah*: "My people knew that my trade was not insufficient for the maintenance of my family. Now that I have been occupied in the work of Muslims, therefore, the family of Abū Bakr will be fed from the exchequer while he shall be devoted to work for the Muslims".[124]

226. Likewise, it is necessary that all functionaries of the government are required to adopt a course of convenience in carrying out their duties. At the same time they should be forbidden from exploitation and bribery. On the other hand, the people should also be required to cooperate with them so that the necessary objectives are achieved. There are several statements of the Prophet (peace be upon him) to guide us in this behalf such as the following: "There are some individuals who misappropriate the wealth of God [i.e. public exchequer] without any right. Such individuals shall have nothing but hell fire on the Day of Judgement".[125] He also said: "Whoever is appointed by us to perform a duty and we provide him with sustenance on that account, and yet he acquires something in excess to what has been given to him, it is indeed an act of embezzlement".[126] In another tradition, the Prophet (peace be upon him) cursed the giver as well as the receiver of bribe.[127]

227. The idea in these directives is that all such practices jeopardise the envisaged public weal, and open avenues for corruption. Moreover, the Prophet (peace be upon him) has said: "We do not appoint to any office those who demand that office for themselves".[128]

(I say): This is because a demand for wordly authority is seldom free from selfish motives. We also have the following saying of the Prophet (peace be upon him): "When a governmental functionary comes to serve you, let him leave while he is pleased with you".[129]

Further, it is necessary that the amount to be provided to the functionaries of the state, in consideration of their work should be specified, so that the *imām* does not violate it by making any increase or decrease in it. Those appointed to various offices may also observe these limits. This is further elucidated by the following tradition of the Prophet (peace be upon him): "Whoever is a functionary on our behalf, he should get a wife; if he does not have a servant, he may have one; if he is without a house, he may acquire one".[130]

228. Therefore, when the *imām* deputes a functionary in connection with the collection of *ṣadaqāt* he should fix such portion for him in the proceeds of *ṣadaqāt* as would be sufficient for his living. Additionally, some increment should also be provided to him, whereby he can satisfy the above needs. This is because excess has no limit, and also a mere subsistence allowance without any increment is something for which a functionary is not likely to exhaust himself, nor is he expected to take interest in his work.

SECTION XXII

Judiciary

229. It should be noted that disputation between people is something of the most common occurrence which gives rise to serious strife among them. This generates animosity, hatred, and severement of bonds among human beings. Selfish niggardliness tends to disrespect every right in defiance of all reason. Therefore, it was necessary to depute in every quarter someone who could settle disputes among people with justice and equity, and could also compel them to act accordingly, whether they liked the judgement or not. That was why the Prophet (peace be upon him) paid his utmost attention to deputing judges. Ever since then, Muslims have been consistently upholding the practice of the Prophet (peace be upon him) in this behalf.

230. Since adjudication among people brings in its wake possibilities of corruption and injustice, it was again pertinent to warn the people concerned against unfair judgement and to prescribe certain basic principles in order to regulate the conduct of the judiciary.

231. The Prophet (peace be upon him) has said: "Whoever gets appointed as judge over people, he is indeed slaughtered without a knife".[131]

(I say): This is to emphasize the fact that judicial office is an extremely heavy burden. Acceptance of this position involves risks of perdition except when God wills otherwise. Similar is the tradition of the Prophet (peace be upon him) which says: "Whoever seeks a judicial office, and demands it for himself, he is left to himself [i.e. he is left without any support from God]. But he who is compelled to perform this duty, God sends down an angel to help him discharge it".[132]

232. The significance, as I can see, of this injunction lies in the fact that a candidate for judicial office is not often without a selfish motive to seek wealth, prestige, or position, in order to retaliate from some

enemy of his, etc. Therefore, the sincerity of purpose which brings Divine blessings is not actualized in such a situation.

233. The Prophet (peace be upon him) also said: "Judges are of three kinds: two of them are doomed to be cast in hell, while one of them shall be in Paradise. The one who will go to Paradise is the judge who knows the truth and decides accordingly. The other is he who knows the truth, yet he decides unjustly. He will surely be in hell. There is the third kind of judge who adjudicates among people ignorantly. He shall also go to hell".[133] (I say): The purport of this saying of the Prophet (peace be upon him) is that only those who are just, free from oppressiveness and partiality, and who are known for these virtues, are qualified to hold judicial office. Further, these persons should be learned enough to understand what is right, particularly in respect of judicial matters. The reason for this emphasis is quite evident, since the purpose of the required public weal cannot be realized without it.

234. The Prophet (peace be upon him) has further said: "An arbitrator should never decide anything between two parties, while he is overcome with fury".[134] (I say): The reason for the above command is that someone whose mind is overtaken by fury is not able to seriously consider the relevant arguments and the circumstances of the case, and is thus hindered from understanding the truth of the matter.

235. The Prophet (peace be upon him), also said: "When a ruler [i.e. a man in authority, whether administrative or judicial] exercises his *ijtihād* in deciding a matter, and makes a right decision, he is entitled to a double reward; but if he commits a mistake, then he shall be entitled to a single reward".[135] The word *ijtahada* occurring in the above tradition means: exhausting one's intellectual potential in establishing an argument. For human responsibility has been prescribed according to ability. While it is within the ability of a person to strive in the exercise of *ijtihād*, he cannot guarantee the attainment of truth.

236. The Prophet (peace be upon him) said to 'Alī: "When two parties submit any matter before you for judgement, you should not decide in favour of either of them unless you hear the contention of the other. In this manner, it is more probable that you will reach the right decision".[136] (I say): This is because by considering the arguments of both sides, the preferable course becomes clear.

237. It should be noted that in the judicial process there are two stages: first, to know the facts of the case concerning which dispute has arisen between two parties; second, the right and fair judgement warranted by those facts.

238. The judge may be in need of both or either of them. For example, if each of the two parties claims that an animal was owned by him, and had been born in his possession, or that a stone had been found by him in a mountain, the problem can be solved by knowing the facts of the case. For instance, in the dispute over bringing up (*ḥaḍānah)* the daughter of Ḥamzah, which took place between 'Ali, Zayd and Ja'far, facts of the case were already known, and what was needed was only the judgement.[137]

239. Similarly, if a person sues someone for illegal seizure and the nature of the disputed object is such that its quality changes, and the defendant denies the charge, the need shall arise to know first the facts of the case as to whether there has actually been any illegal seizure. Subsequently, a judgement would be required, whether the seized object itself should be returned, or a value thereof.

240. The Prophet (peace be upon him) has laid down the mode of dealing with both the above stages of judicial process by providing general principles. For the first stage [i.e. determining the question of fact], nothing can be more appropriate than evidence and oath. This is so because the circumstances of a case can be found out by the information of those who witnessed them, or by the statement of the aggrieved party supported by the evidence that should make it probable that his statement is not false. The Prophet (peace be upon him) says: "If people were to be given things merely on their claims, some people would have claimed lives and properties of other people. But conclusive evidence (*al-bayyinah*) is the responsibility of the plaintiff, while the onus of oath is on the defendant".[138]

241. A plaintiff is the one who makes a claim contrary to the existing situation and establishes a wrong.The defendant is the one who claims continuity of a past situation and relies on the *status quo*. Nothing is nearer to justice than considering the evidence which is brought forth by the plaintiff, and then considering the oath of the defendant who relies on the existing situation and defends himself, if the claim of the other party (i.e. the plaintiff) is not proved.

242. The Prophet (peace be upon him) has pointed out the reason for prescribing this principle in his above statement, viz. "If people were to be given...' What the Prophet meant to say was that if the claims of people were admitted without any scrutiny, this would have led to many injustices and wrongs. Hence the emphasis on *ḥujjah*, that is, conclusive evidence.

243. Further, it is necessary that the witnesses who give evidence are among the approved ones, according to the commandment of God in the Qur'ān: "... from amongst those you approve ..."[139] This approval is to be accorded, after ascertaining sanity, majority, understanding, articulateness, faith in Islam, integrity, good nature and absolution from any past allegation.

244. The Prophet (peace be upon him) also said: "The evidence of a corrupt man, or a corrupt woman, or an adulterer or an adulteress or of a malicious person against his brother is not admissible. Similarly, the evidence of somebody in the service of, or in a state of subservience to, a family shall be liable to rejection".[140]

With regard to those convicted of *qadhf* (false accusation of unchastity), the command of God has been expressed in the following verse of the Qur'ān: "... and never accept their evidence. They are the transgressors, except those who afterwards repent ..."[141]

In disqualifying witnesses, all other major sins have the same effect as *qadhf* and *zinā*.

245. This is because every information is capable of being right or wrong. It is through circumstantial indications that one of the possibilities is established. These circumstantial indications may appear in the informer, or in the matter about which information is given, or in any other thing. Nothing can more suitably serve as a guiding principle in this behalf than laying down qualifications for the informer (witness). It is around this principle that the injunctions of the *sharī'ah* revolve, in addition to the existing condition, and the original state, mentioned in the foregoing.

246. The above requirement has been met by prescribing conclusive evidence for the plaintiff and oaths for the defendant. Further, the nature of the various kinds of rights infringed upon determines the number of witnesses required. For instance, commission of *zinā* (adultery or fornication) cannot be established without four witnesses. This is

based on the Qur'ānic verse: "And those who accuse free women, and bring not four witnesses ..."[142]

247. In the foregoing we have discussed the rationale of prescribing four witnesses for adultery. Similarly, in cases of *ḥudūd* and *qiṣāṣ*, the evidence of no less than two male witnesses has been prescribed. Moreover, there has been the consistent practice that the evidence of women is not admitted in *ḥudūd*.[143] So far as financial rights are concerned, the evidence of one male and two females is provided. This is based on the Qur'ānic verse: "... but if there are not two men, then one man and two women ..."[144] And God has, at the same time, mentioned the reason for prescribing multiple number in respect of female witnesses, and said: "... so that, if one of the two errs, one of them may remind the other ..."[145] This means that they are deficient in [financial] intelligence, hence compensation of this deficiency by increasing the number of witnesses.

248. The Prophet (peace be upon him) has also decided some cases on the basis of one witness plus oath.[146] For, if an honest witness is supplemented by oath, the case is further strengthened. The question of evidence is such that it should be dealt with by a degree of flexibility. Further, the consistent practice under the *sharī'ah* has been that if there is doubt, the two witnesses should be scrutinised. This is necessary because the evidence of two individuals is considered on the basis of their qualities, which might support preference of their truthfulness over their untruthfulness. It was, therefore, necessary to ascertain these qualities first. Another consistent practice under the *sharī'ah* has been that if there is doubt in proving a case, then the oaths should be accentuated so as to increase their sanctity by prescribing a definite time, venue and text for them.[147] Because an oath becomes the true proof of the veracity of a statement when there are external circumstances showing that the maker of that statement cannot tell a lie in the presence of those circumstances. Therefore, the more there is suspicion the higher shall be the need for the strength of circumstances. By the text of the oath we mean further qualifying the essence and attributes of God. This provision is in accord with a tradition of the Prophet (peace be upon him), wherein he laid down the following mode: "I swear by God beside Whom there is no God, and Who is the Knower of all the unseen as well as the visible things ..." and such other modes of expression.[148] Similarly, the time prescribed [for such an extraordinary oath] is after *'aṣr*, because God

Almighty says in this regard: "... you should detain them after the Prayers ..."[149]

249. As to the venue prescribed for such an oath, the witness should be made to stand between *rukn* [one of the four corners of the *Ka'bah*] and *maqām*,[150] if he happens to be in Makkah, or near the pulpit of the Prophet (peace be upon him) [in his mosque in Madīnah], if he is at Madīnah or near the pulpit of a mosque at any other place.[151] This is because these places are regarded as sacred and their sanctity would accentuate the untruth of a statement, should a witness think of resorting to it.

250. There is also the need to warn people in the most serious manner about the evil consequences of committing anything contrary to what God has ordained for them with regard to the settlement of disputes, and finding out the truth of the matter in those disputes. The *sharī'ah* has given this warning in three ways:

First, that wilful commission of an act, which has been most emphatically prohibited by God, is tantamount to lack of piety, and is an act of insolence toward Him. Thus, while this attitude on the part of a witness was considered insolence toward God, its necessary consequences werealso indicated, such as inescapable entry into the fire of the hell and disqualification for the Paradise, etc.

Second, that this attitude of non-observance of the prescribed norms of administering true and honest evidence, with full moral consciousness, amounts to striving for injustice. It becomes identical with theft and robbery or like conducting a thief to some wealth so as to enable him to steal it, or like abetting a highwayman. Thus the curse which descends from God, His Angels, and the people on those who strive to spread corruption, also automatically extends to him (i.e. the false witness), and he becomes liable to enter the hell.

Third, that it constitutes a defiance of what God has prescribed for His servants and an effort to prevent its function, according to the will of God as embodied in His *sharā'i'* (codes of law). Since oath has been prescribed to unfold the truth, and evidence has been laid down to reveal the circumstances of a case, practice of false evidence and oath closes the door of the public weal, which is the chief concern of the *sharī'ah*.

251. Among the things that close this door are:

(i) Concealment of evidence, as the Qur'ān says: "... and whoever conceals it, his heart is surely sinful".[152]

(ii) False evidence, which the Prophet (peace be upon him) has regarded as a major sin.

(iii) False oath about which the Prophet (peace be upon him) has said: "Whoever takes oath on a matter to which he is called to witness, and he makes a false statement in order to deprive a person of his legitimate right, he shall meet the wrath of God on the Day of Judgement".[153]

(iv) False litigation, as the Prophet (peace be upon him) has said: "Whoever claims something which does not belong to him, he is not one of us, and he should be ready to occupy his place in hell".[154]

(v) Acquiring something on the basis of a judicial decree when one is not actually entitled to it. In this connection we have the following statement of the Prophet (peace be upon him) to guide us: "Indeed I am a human being like you. You bring your disputes to me for judgement. At times, some of you is more eloquent in his argument than the other, and I may decide in his favour on the basis of what I hear from him. Therefore, if I decide to give somebody anything from the right of his brother, he should not take it from him, because he is in fact being given a portion of the hell-fire".[155]

(vi) Among the things that close the door of public weal is habitual disputation and litigation for this attitude is not devoid of the possibility of creating discord among people. The Prophet (peace be upon him), says: "The most abominable of all people to God is a habitual disputant".[156]

252. Moreover, the Prophet (peace be upon him) commended the attitude of avoiding disputations, whether they are for right or for wrong because abandoning them is in fact giving way to the temptation for generosity. This is also because often the right does not actually belong to its claimant, while he thinks that it does. Therefore, he can only be absolved of accountability with surety, by resolving to eschew disputation in both right and wrong. A case has been reported in the Prophetic tradition wherein two persons claimed title to the same animal. Each of them established, with full evidence, that it belonged to him and was born under his care. The Prophet (peace

be upon him) then decreed in favour of the actual possessor of the animal.[157]

(I say): The principle underlying the verdict of the Prophet (peace be upon him) is that when two arguments are in conflict with each other, they are both nullified, and the disputed property remains with the actual possessor due to the absence of any valid cause warranting its removal from his possession. Or we can say that it is because one of the contentions is supported by the evident circumstance of possession.

253. For the second stage of judicial process the Prophet (peace be upon him) has laid down certain principles to which recourse should be made. The cardinal principle is that if the facts of the case are known, then the dispute shall arise from a demand by both the parties for something which is originally permissible. The rule which invariably governs such cases is to give preference in view of an additional characteristic wherein there is some benefit for Muslims, or for the disputed thing itself, or in view of the fact that one of the parties had acquired that thing before the other, or by casting lots.[158]

254. An example of the application of this rule is to be found in the dispute which took place between Zayd, 'Alī and Ja'far over the question of bringing up the daughter of Ḥamzah. The Prophet (peace be upon him) decided in favour of Ja'far, and remarked: "An aunt [mother's sister] is like mother".[159]

255. Another example is the saying of the Prophet (peace be upon him) concerning *adhān* (call to Prayers): The text of the *ḥadīth* is: "... if people had known the great value of calling to the Prayers (*adhān*), and that of standing in the first row in congregational Prayers and then they had found no other means to attain it except by casting lots, they would have done that".[160]

256. Also, whenever the Prophet (peace be upon him) intended to go on a journey, he used to cast lots between his wives.[161]

257. A dispute may arise in connection with any prior contract, or a forcible seizure, and each of the parties claims that it is more entitled to something than the other, and each of them has an equal benefit of doubt, then the verdict of the *sharī'ah* is to follow the *'urf* (usage) common among the majority of the people. Also the texts of various contracts and confessions should be interpreted according

to their connotations that are generally accepted among the common people. In the same way, damages should be determined according to usage.[162]

258. An example for the application of this rule is found in the case of Barā' ibn 'Āzib whose camel traversed a wall and damaged it. Each of the parties to the dispute put forward a contention. The Prophet (peace be upon him) decided the case according to the known convention of Arabia, namely: "That the owners of boundaries should guard their properties during the day while the owners of livestock should guard them during the night".[163]

259. One of the principles on which many injunctions of the *sharī'ah* are based is: "Every privilege entails a liability". The source of this principle is the following verdict of the Prophet (peace be upon him): "Entitlement to *kharāj* is contingent upon liability"[164] because it is difficult to regulate all benefits in detail. Among these principles there is also the principle that whatever properties had been distributed and whatever bloodshed had taken place and the modes that had been adopted to dispose of these cases in the *jāhilī* era shall not be re-opened. The *sharī'ah* was to proceed on the assumption that all actions shall be treated as originating after the *jāhilī* era. These principles also include that possession of something shall be valid unless proof to the contrary is established. This is the idea which underlies the principle known as *istiṣḥāb* (i.e. a contention relying on the continuity of a past state).

260. These principles also include that if there is no avenue open for investigation, the case should be decided according to the contention of the owner of the property in question, or both parties should cancel the agreement. This principle has been deduced from the following statement of the Prophet (peace be upon him): "If there is a dispute between a vendor and the vendee while the commodity of sale exists, and there is no conclusive proof with either of them, then the contention of the vendor shall prevail, or both of them shall have to rescind withdraw their contract of sale".[165]

261. The cardinal principle governing all contracts is that everyone should fully receive his due, and each party should be bound to fulfil the terms to which he has committed himself, through the contract, unless, of course, there is any stipulation involving a violation of the *sharī'ah*. This principle is based on the following statement of the

Prophet (peace be upon him): "Muslims shall observe their stipulations, except where any stipulation permits a prohibition or prohibits a permission".[166]

262. Thus far, we have presented a portion of what the Prophet (peace be upon him), has prescribed for the second stage of judicial proceeding [i.e. the question of appropriate law applicable in a case after ascertaining the relevant circumstances].

263. Among the cases decided by the Prophet (peace be upon him) is the case of the upbringing the daughter of Ḥamzah. In this case, one of the disputing parties, 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, contended: "She is my cousin and I have already taken her under my care". The other party, Ja'far ibn Abī Ṭālib, pleaded: "She is my cousin and her maternal aunt is married to me", while the third claimant, Zayd, submitted: "She is my brother's daughter". After hearing all the contending parties, the Prophet (peace be upon him), decided in favour of Ja'far ibn 'Abī Ṭālib and observed: "A maternal aunt is like the mother".[167]

264. In a dispute over the lineage of a son born to a slave girl belonging to Zam'ah, Sa'd contented: "My brother had taken a pledge from me in this behalf". While the other party 'Abd ibn Zam'ah pleaded: "He is the son of the slave girl of my father, born in his bed". After hearing both the parties, the Prophet (peace be upon him), pronounced his judgement as follows: "He belongs to you, O 'Abd ibn Zam'ah, for a child essentially belongs to the mother. As to the adulterer, he should only get stones".[168]

265. In the dispute between Zubayr and a man from amongst the Anṣār over the water passage from mountain to plain, the Prophet (peace be upon him) first advised something to accommodate the claims of both the parties and said: "Irrigate, O Zubayr, and then let the water flow to your neighbour!". But the man from the Anṣār got angry. Thereupon the Prophet (peace be upon him) granted full rights to Zubayr, and said: "Hold the water till it touches the walls".[169]

266. In the dispute over the she-camel of Barā' ibn 'Āzib, which trespassed the boundary wall of a man from amongst the Anṣār and damaged it, the Prophet (peace be upon him) decreed as follows: "The owners of properties are bound to guard their properties in the day, while at night it is the duty of the owners of the cattle to guard their animals".[170]

267. The Prophet (peace be upon him) also granted the right of pre-emption in respect of the properties that are not yet distributed. But after their demarcation takes place and roads are opened, then there is no room for pre-emption.[171]

268. In the foregoing we have discussed the main principles on which these judgements of the Prophet (peace be upon him), are based.

269. The Prophet (peace be upon him), also said: "If you have a dispute over the road, then let it be seven arms wide".[172] I think, this is because when people established their settlements in open land free for all, and narrowed the space, there were disputes among them over the road. Some people wanted to narrow the road by building on the land. Others objected to it, and pleaded that leaving wider road was necessary. It was in this context that the Prophet (peace be upon him) decided that the standard width of the road shall be seven arms. This was because it was necessary that two lines of camels should be able to pass simultaneously on each side so that if one camel, laden with goods, comes from one side, and another from the opposite side, the road should be wide enough for their simultaneous passage otherwise there would be difficulties. Thus the width of the road was determined by the Prophet (peace be upon him) to be seven arms.

270. The Prophet (peace be upon him) has also said: "Whoever cultivates a land without the permission of its owners, he is entitled to nothing of its produce. He shall, however, be paid the cost of cultivation".[173] In my view, he (i.e. the unauthorised cultivator) has been treated as a workman who is employed to perform a profitable work.

God indeed knows best.

SECTION XXIII

Jihād

271. It should be borne in mind that the most complete of all prescribed codes of law and the most perfect of all revealed religions is the one wherein *jihād* is enjoined.[174] For, prescription by God of various obligations of commission and omission for His servants may be illustrated by the example of a person whose slaves fall sick, whereupon he commands some of his close aides to administer a medicine to them. If he compels them to take the medicine and forces it down their throats, he will be justified to do so. But clemency requires that he explains to them the benefits of that medicine so that they may take the medicine with a desire for it. Further, clemency also demands that he should mix the medicine with honey so that the rational desire is reinforced by an instinctive longing.

272. Moreover, there are a lot of people who are dominated by lowly passions, beastly habits, and luciferian temptations in their craving for ascendancy and power. Their thought and imagination are inseparably attached to the customs of their ancestors, and they pay no heed to their benefits. They are neither prone to submit to the directions of the Prophet nor do they ponder over the benefits of these directions. Therefore, it is no mercy to them to stop at intellectually establishing the truth of Religion to them. Rather, true mercy towards them is to compel them so that Faith finds way to their minds despite themselves. It is like a bitter medicine administered to a sick man. Moreover, there can be no compulsion without eliminating those who are a source of great harm or aggression, or liquidating their force, and capturing their riches, so as to render them incapable of posing any challenge to Religion. Thus their followers and progeny are able to enter the fold of faith with free and conscious submission. That was why the Prophet (peace be upon him) wrote to the Caesar: "Verily you shall be accountable for the sins of your farmers".[175] It was to this fact that the Prophet (peace be upon him) alluded, when

he said: "What a marvel of God's will it is that there are people who enter the paradise in chains".[176]

273. Besides, perfect mercy toward mankind requires that God guide them to virtuous conduct, deter the oppressors among them from their oppressive acts, and reform their modes of *irtifāqāt*, manners of house-keeping and norms of statecraft. This is because corrupt socio-political systems dominated by powerful predatory elements are like a growing cancer in human body. And without cutting off the sick part from the body, no human being can attain health. Anyone who is concerned with improving the state of a man, and restoring his ailing condition to normalcy, has no option but to cut off the sick part. For, if little amount of strong action necessarily leads to greater good, it ought to be taken inevitably.

274. In the history of Quraysh and their prominent men you can find an example of this. They were farthest among God's creatures from the virtuous ways of conduct, and were the worst of all oppressors against the weak. There used to be internecine fights among them in which they would try to capture each other. Most of these people never pondered over the conclusive proof of the Religion furnished by the Prophet (peace be upon him) nor did they ever think of any reason to justify their stand *vis-à-vis* the Prophet. Therefore, the Prophet (peace be upon him) fought against them, killing those of them whose grip was strongest over the people and whose egos were hardest until God's command ultimately prevailed and they surrendered to it. Thus these people became included among virtuous men and the affairs of their life were properly organised. Had there been no scope for *jihād* against such people in the *sharī'ah*, Divine grace could not have materialized in their favour.

275. Also because of God was displeased with the Arabs and the Persians, He decreed the fall of their empire and an end to their rule. It was against this background that the heart of the Prophet (peace be upon him) and through him the hearts of his Companions were inspired by God to take arms in the way of God so that the required objectives could be achieved. The Prophet (peace be upon him) and his Companions through the accomplishment of this mission became like angels who also strive for the execution of the Divine scheme. The difference between angelic and human undertakings is that the former struggle without being guided by any universal principle, while

human beings submit to the will of God, fight for the sake of a definite universal objective given by God Almighty.

276. Thus the performance of *jihād* becomes the greatest of all deeds on their part. That is why the act of killing is not attributed to its human agents. It is attributed to the Divine Being who issued the command to kill. This is like attributing the act of killing of a traitor to the ruler rather than the executioner, as the Qur'ān says: "...so you slew them not, but God slew them".[177] And it was to this fact that the Prophet (peace be upon him) alluded when he said: "...Verily God was displeased with the Arabs and the Persians except the remnants of the people of the Book..."[178] The Prophet (peace be upon him) also said: "... There shall be no Khosraus, nor any Caesars ..."[179] meaning thereby that the era of those who follow the religions of *jāhiliyyah* has come to an end.

277. The rewarding virtues of *jihād* rest on a number of basic considerations. Among these considerations is that the performance of *jihād* amounts to establishing a conformity to the Divine scheme and inspiration. Therefore, by striving for the realization of the Divine scheme, one is overwhelmed by Divine mercy. Similarly, any effort to undo this scheme entails dissemination of curse. Moreover, negligence of the obligations of *jihād* during such times as the present era would deprive us of tremendous good.

278. Among these considerations is that since *jihād* is a hard work demanding strenuous struggle which involves sacrifice of life and property, leaving one's home, and abandoning other vital needs of life, those who accept its challenges are the ones whose loyalty to the Religion is purest and who prefer the life of the Hereafter to this temporal world and totally rely on God.

279. Among these considerations is also that one's heart can only be inspired to *jihād* if one is able to develop an attitude identical with that of the angels. The one most worthy of this perfection among all humans are those who are farthest from the evils of animality and in whose minds and hearts Religion is deeply seated. Such an attitude is truly indicative of one's purity of heart.

280. The above qualities are integral to *jihād* only when all its precedent conditions are fulfilled. The following tradition of the Prophet (peace be upon him) sheds ample light on this: "The Prophet (peace

be upon him) was asked: "Man sometimes fights to display bravery, sometimes he does so out of sheer fury. Which of these kinds of fight is to be reckoned in the way of God"? The Prophet (peace be upon him) replied: "The one who fights so that the word of God is exalted, that is reckoned in the way of God".[180]

281. These considerations also include the fact that the reward in the Hereafter shall be realized in the form of the deed performed in this world. This is the purport of the following tradition of the Prophet (peace be upon him): "There is none who is injured in the way of God — and God knows best, who is injured in His way — but he shall appear on the Day of Judgement while his wound is still overflowing with blood and smelling of musk".[181]

282. Among these considerations is that since *jihād* is a deed approved by God and it is not normally performed without some expense, provision of horses tied at the frontier, and preparation of archery etc. It follows from this as a corollary that Divine approval should extend to these instruments and appurtenances as well because these are means to a sacred end.

283. Among these considerations also is that it is through *jihād* that the Religion is brought into full prominence, and pursuing its path is made like an inevitable course for humanity.

284. If you are able to comprehend these considerations, then you can easily appreciate the significance of the traditions pertaining to the rewarding value of *jihād*. The Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "In the Paradise, there are one hundred grades reserved for the *mujāhids*...."[182] I think the purport of the above tradition is that the elevation of status in the world of recompense is a symbolic representation for the elevation of position in the sight of God. Since the human soul attains its bliss through utmost concentration on the proximity of God, and since *jihād* is a means to the paramountcy of the symbolic commands of God and His Religion and for the popularization of all those virtues that please God, therefore, all such actions that occasion the realization of these two objectives are rewarded with high stations in the Paradise. It has been said in a tradition concerning the one who recites the Qur'ān that it will be said to him in the Hereafter: "Recite and ascend further, and recite slowly, as you were wont to do in your worldly home".[183] Similarly, it has been said concerning *jihād* that it is conducive to the elevation of

stations, because the struggle of a *mujāhid* is fruitful in that it brings about the elevation of Religion. Therefore, he shall be entitled to a reward similar to what his actions consisted of.

285. Moreover, elevation of station is achieved by a variety of factors. Each factor is represented by a station in Paradise. Each station is as wide as the space between the heavens and the earth, because this represents the uppermost limit in the perceptive vistas of human mind. That is why it will be reflected in the world of recompense according to the capacity of human cognition.

286. The Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "A *mujāhid* in the cause of God is like the one who fasts with utmost devotion".[184] The meaning of this tradition, in my view, is that a person who fasts with dedication is preferred to others because he performs a strenuous act exclusively for the sake of God's pleasure and becomes like angels by seeking an aspect of similitude with them. Indeed, if the struggle of a *mujāhid* is strictly in accordance with the ordinances of the *sharī'ah*, he really becomes like those who fast with extreme devotion in every respect. Since striving for the obedience of God is something the virtues of which are recognised by the people generally, and this act (i.e. *jihād*) is comprehended only by a few, he (i.e. *mujāhid*) was likened to a fasting man so that the real significance of this act becomes widely known.

287. Further, there was need to provide incentives for those acts that are preliminary to *jihād* without which *jihād* does not normally materialize like steeds of war and pasture, etc. This is because when God Almighty commands something and is pleased with it, knowing that it cannot materialize without certain preludes, then He prescribes and is pleased with those preludes as well. For example, concerning steeds of war it has been said in a tradition that: "They are better than this world and all that it contains",[185] and that: "It is better than fasting and praying a whole month, and that: "When he [i.e. the one who performs this deed] dies, his virtuous acts continue earning their rewards, he is continuously provided with his sustenance and becomes immune from the trials of the grave".[186]

288. I think the meaning of "being better than this world and all that it contains" is that *jihād* is capable of yielding lasting fruits in the Hereafter, while every comfort of this world is perishable. Similarly, the significance of calling it better than fasting and praying a whole

month is that since it is a task that is cumbersome for our animal nature, and yet it is performed for the sake of God and in His way, it has been likened to pious acts like fasting and praying. Similarly, the significance of recurring reward is that *jihād* is an exercise of which every part depends on the other. It is like a structure in which the walls rest on the foundation and the roof rests over the walls.

289. *Jihād* made it possible for the early followers of Islam from the *Muhājirūn* and the *Anṣār* to be instrumental in the entry of the Quraysh and the people around them into the fold of Islam. Subsequently, God destined that Mesopotamia and Syria be conquered at their hands. Later on it was through the Muslims of these areas that God made the empires of the Persians and Romans subdued. And again, it was through the Muslims of these newly conquered realms that God actualized the conquests of India, Turkey and Sudan. In this way the benefits of *jihād* multiply incessantly, and it becomes, in that respect, similar to creating an endowment, building of inns, and other kinds of recurring charities.[187]

290. As to the "immunity from the trials of the grave" [mentioned in the tradition cited above], it signifies the fact that the danger from *munkar* and *nakīr*[188] is incurred only by those whose minds and souls are not in accord with the Religion of Muḥammad (peace be upon him), and who do not come forward in response to his call to support his religious mission. But those who are vigilantly dedicated to *jihād*, consolidate their thoughts and sentiments to testify to his message and whose initiative had been aroused to march on with the light of God's message shall naturally be immunised from this danger.

291. The Prophet (peace be upon him), said: "Whosoever equips a fighter in the way of God, it is as though he also fought; and whoever looks after a fighter's family, he is also treated as though he fought".[189] The Prophet (peace be upon him) also said: "The best of charity is to provide the shade of a tent in the cause of God".[190] There are similar other traditions to this effect. The purport, as I think, of such traditions is that *jihād* is an exercise replete with tremendous benefits for the Muslim community, and it is the instrument of *jihād* alone which can bring about their victory. This is precisely the sense present in the words *'ghazw'* and *'sadaqah'* used in the above traditions. The Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "There is none who is injured in the way of God—and God knows best who is injured in His way —

but he shall appear on the Day of Judgement while his injury is still flowing with blood and smelling of musk".[191]

In my opinion an act remains attached to the human soul with its form and substance, and is conducive to multiplicity in its own fruits. And the Divine recompense is realised through the reflection of bounty and bliss in a form nearest to what is in store in the heavens. When a martyr will appear on the Day of Judgement, his act shall be manifest on him, and he shall be granted bounties in some form similar to his act.

While explaining the Qur'ānic verse: "And think not of those who are killed in God's way as dead. Nay, they are alive being provided sustenance from their Lord".[192] The Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "Their spirits reside inside the bodies of green birds. There are candles hung on the Divine Throne for them. They wander about the Paradise as they wish, and then return to those candles".[193]

292. In my opinion, among those martyred in the cause of God, two qualities are manifest. One is that their souls are fully gratified and filled with spirituality. Their consciousness of the objectives to which they dedicate themselves during their worldly existence never fades away. They are like the people who, while engaged in their normal pursuits of life, go to sleep. They are unlike those dead people who suffer severe diseases that change their temperaments and make them forget a great deal of what had been occupying them during their worldly lives.

293. The second quality of martyrs is that they are overwhelmed by the Divine mercy which encompasses the entirety of the cosmic system, including the *holy enclosure* and the angels present in the Divine proximity. When the spirit of a martyr leaves his body while it is filled with striving for the establishment of God's Religion, there opens between him and the *holy enclosure* a wide space from which love, bounty, and happiness are constantly showered upon him. This spirit is reflected in the *holy enclosure* in the form of a symbolic soul. Then his reward is reflected, according to what his soul contains. Thus, with the combination of these two qualities wonderful things emerge. Among these things is that the martyr's soul is reflected as attached to the Throne (*'arsh*) in some way. This is because this soul is included among the bearers of the Throne, and his concentration becomes focused on what is there.

294. Among these wonderful things also is that the martyr's soul is symbolised in the body of a green bird. He is given the form of a bird because he stands *vis-à-vis* angels in the same relationship as animals of earth, *vis-à-vis* birds. Thus the qualities of the common genus appear briefly in him, as the qualities of animals appear briefly in birds. He is assigned green colour for its beautiful spectacle. Among these wonderful things also is that the martyr's bounties and comforts are reflected in the sustenance provided during his worldly existence in the form of fruits and roasted meat.

295. Moreover, there was a need to distinguish the things that help refine the soul from those that do not lend such help. Because the *sharī'ah* has been instituted for two main objectives, namely, to organise the affairs of the people at the level of locality, state, and the universal community and to perfect the souls spiritually.

The Prophet (peace be upon him) was asked: "There is a man who fights for booties and there is yet another one who fights for fame. Who of them is truly fighting in the way of God"? The Prophet (peace be upon him), replied: "It is the one who fights so that the word of God is exalted, he indeed is reckoned as fighting in the way of God".[194]

In my opinion, as stated before, this is because deeds are bodies and intentions are their spirits; and indeed the value of all deeds lies in the intentions that motivate them. A body without spirit is worthless. Nay, sometimes mere intentions may bear the fruits of actions even without being supplemented by the actions in case the latter is missed for any impediment caused by nature or necessity, without any omission on the part of the subject. This is precisely the purport of the Prophet's saying: "Indeed there are people in Madīnah who were by your side in every march you made forward, and in every valley that you traversed, but they were detained behind by a valid excuse".[195] But if anyone stays behind from *jihād*, out of his own omission, then he shall not be entitled to any reward, because no intention existed on his part to join it. The Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "Blessings are in the foreheads of horses".[196] He also said: "Good benefits are tied to the foreheads of horses till the Day of Judgement in the form of reward and booty".[197]

296. It should also be noted that the Prophet (peace be upon him) has been sent with the universal vicegerency. The supremacy of his Religion over all other religions cannot be realized without *jihād* and

the necessary preparation for it including the procurement of its instruments. Therefore, if the Prophet's followers abandon *jihād* and pursue the tails of cows they will soon be overcome by disgrace, and the people of other religions will overpower them.

297. The Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "Whosoever keeps a mare in the way of God, motivated by faith in Him, and believing in His promise of reward, then the act of feeding it, quenching its thirst, and all its dropping and urine, shall weigh in the balance of his deeds on the Day of Judgement".[198] I think that since he labours in providing fodder and water to it, and in managing its dropping and urine, this act on his part is visualised in the form of that labour. Therefore, it shall appear in the same manner on the Day of Judgement.

298. The Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "God shall indeed admit three persons to Paradise simultaneously on account of one arrow: (i) the one who makes it in the hope of reward; (ii) the archer who shoots it; and (iii) the helper who hands it over to the archer".[199] The Prophet (peace be upon him) also said: "Whosoever shoots an arrow in the way of God it will be sufficient to free him from hell"[200] In my view, since God knows that subduing infidels is not accomplished without these instruments, the pleasure of God, linked with the elimination of infidelity and oppression, is extended, *ipso facto*, to these instruments as well.

299. God says: "There is no blame on the blind, nor is there blame on the lame, nor is there blame on the sick ..."[201] God also says: "No blame lies on the weak, nor on the sick, nor on those who can find nothing to spend".[202] The Prophet (peace be upon him) said to someone: "Do you have parents?" He said: "Yes!" Thereupon the Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "Then accomplish your *jihād* in their service".[203] I think that since the entire community's simultaneous pursuit of *jihād* would disturb their *irtifāqāt* [viz. their civic life], it was considered necessary that only a group from amongst them should devote themselves to it. Thus some people are exempted from this obligation on account of a valid cause. These causes have been designated expressly as such, since these are cases of hardship. Besides, in their joining the operations of *jihād*, there is no worthwhile help for the forces of Islam. On the contrary, harm is more apprehended from their participation.

300. God says: "Now God has lightened your burden, and He knows that there is weakness in you".[204] In my opinion, exalting the word of God cannot be realized by any people without committing themselves to an attitude of steadfastness, mutual aid, and perseverance in the hardships of war. But if people become accustomed to escaping from hardships, this goal cannot be achieved. Nay, such an attitude might lead to utter disgrace. Also, running away is cowardice and a weakness of character. In fact, it is the lowest level of morality.

301. Moreover, it is necessary to determine some limit by which the difference between the obligatory and the non-obligatory could be distinguished. Also mutual help and favour cannot be demonstrated except when the factors of defeat outnumber the factors of victory. So this was first measured by ten times, because disbelief at that stage was rampant, and Muslims were quite small in number. If Muslims of those days were given a concession to flee, there would not have taken place any *jihād* at all. Later on, this measure of bravery was reduced to double, because mutual help and perseverance cannot be displayed in less than that measure.

302. Further, since *jihād* was prescribed for establishing the supremacy of the word of God, the necessary means of establishing this supremacy were also made obligatory. That is why it has been an obligation and a consistent practice on the part of the *imām* to organize defence of the frontiers of *Dār al-Islām*, to marshal fighting force, and to post commanders in all corners and frontiers. The Prophet (peace be upon him) and his successors have established practical precedents in this behalf.

303. Whenever the Prophet (peace be upon him) appointed anyone as commander of an army, or despatched a military detachment, he counselled him to fear God in his personal conduct, and to be kind toward the group of Muslims under his command. Thereafter, the Prophet (peace be upon him) used to say: "Fight in the name of God and in His cause; fight those who disbelieve in God, and do not be perfidious..."[205]

304. The Prophet (peace be upon him) forbade from perfidy, as this would dishearten Muslims and might give rise to discord among them. As a consequence of this, they might tend to prefer spoils to war. This attitude often leads to defeat. He forbade deception so that the protection of their pledges and guarantees is not nullified. Further, he

prohibited mutilation because it is a distortion of God's creation. He also forbade Muslims from killing infants because this would diminish the strength of Muslims, and would cause harm to them. If these infants remain alive, they would become their slaves, and the captives might enter the fold of Islam. Moreover, they (viz. infants) can neither inflict any injury upon an enemy, nor can they help any party.[206]

305. As to the invitation to choose either of the three options, they are in the following order:

(i) That they embrace Islam along with its necessary implications of performing *hijrah* and *jihād*. In the event of their choosing this option, they shall be entitled to the same rights of booty and spoils of war as other Muslim fighters.

(ii) That they embrace Islam without performing *hijrah* and *jihād* except when there is levy *en masse*. In this case, there will be no share for them in spoils or booties because booties are granted to those who are highest in the degree of importance, and then to those next to them in importance. Besides, the convention has it that the exchequer need not be burdened with an expenditure for those who are peacefully settled in their lands and are not participating in *jihād* in any manner. Therefore, there is no contradiction between this injunction, and the following statement of 'Umar: "If I lived more, there shall surely reach every shepherd, his portion of the booty, even if he is dwelling on an isolated pass of Ḥimyar and his forehead will not have even sweated in *jihād*" .[207] What 'Umar (may God be pleased with him) meant was that when the treasures of monarchs are acquired and large sums of *kharāj* (land tax) are brought, then after covering the portions of the fighters, there would still remain much.

(iii) That they accept the position of the 'people of pledge' (*Ahl al-Dhimmah*) and pay the poll-tax (*jizyah*).[208]

306. From the first of these options, the following benefits are obtained: establishment of order in the world, elimination of mutual oppression among people, and refinement of their souls. These benefits lead to their salvation from hell-fire and to their striving in the advancement of the Divine mission on earth. The second option achieves their salvation from hell, but they are unable to attain the status of *mujāhid*s. The third option brings about the fall of the infidel forces

and the glory of Muslims. It was for the achievement of such objectives, *inter alia*, that the Prophet (peace be upon him), was sent.

307. It is incumbent upon the *imām* to contemplate ways and means of enhancing the glory of Muslims and eliminating the possibilities of any aggression against them by the infidel forces. To that end, he should exercise *ijtihād* and exert his mental energies. He should act as his *ijtihād* guides him in the light of his own understanding, and in accordance with the precedents set by the Prophet (peace be upon him) and the exemplary pattern of his successors, (may God be pleased with them). This is because the *imām* is installed for certain specific objectives. These objectives cannot be achieved without pursuing the policy that we have spelled out above. The basic guidance in this behalf is to be discerned from the conduct of the Prophet (peace be upon him) in times of war and peace.

308. To sum up the traditions of the Prophet (peace be upon him) in this regard, we have to say that it is necessary that the frontiers of the Islamic realms are guarded by the armies to deter all those who might be arrayed nearby. Also, there should be appointed over such armies an individual who is brave, wise and sincere to Muslims. If the *imām* deems it necessary, he should dig trenches or construct fortresses as was done by the Prophet (peace be upon him). Also, when he (that is, the *imām*) sends a detachment, he should appoint over it a commander who is best of them or most useful for the interest of Muslims. Further, he should counsel his commanders pious behaviour in their private and public conduct as was done by the Prophet (peace be upon him).

309. When a commander sets out to the operation of war, he ought to assess the strength of his army and deploy his cavalry and fighting men. He should not accept anyone in his ranks under fifteen years of age as did the Prophet (peace be upon him).[209]

310. Also, he should not accept anybody who prompts people to desert, nor anyone who spreads rumours and through gossiping about enemy's power, demoralizes the Muslims. This injunction is based on the following verse of the Qur'ān: "... God did not like their going forth. So He withheld them and it was said: hold back with those who hold back. Had they gone forth with you, they would have added to you naught but trouble".[210]

311. Further, he should not accept in his ranks any polytheist because the Prophet (peace be upon him) has said: "We do not take help from any polytheist, save in extreme necessity, and only when we can trust him".[211]

312. Nor should he accept young women whose presence might involve danger to their safety. However, he may allow elderly women to join. It is for this reason that the Prophet (peace be upon him) used to go to battle along with Umm Salīm and other senior ladies of the *Anṣār* who would bring water to the soldiers and served in the treatment of the injured.[212]

313. Moreover, he should moblize the army on the right and left flanks. He should designate a standard for each unit, appoint a commander for every battalion, and deploy a reconnaissance force, as was done by the Prophet (peace be upon him) on the day of the conquest of Makkah. These measures are extremely useful for frightening the enemy and for a better organisation of the battle. Further, he should also adopt certain passwords to be used by Muslim soldiers during night raids so that they do not kill each other by mistake. This has also been a practice of the Prophet (peace be upon him) in his battles. He should preferably go out to fight on Thursdays or on Mondays because during these two days human deeds are submitted before God.[213]

314. Further, the commander should direct his soldiers to make so much advance as the weak among them can also endure except in cases of emergency. He should select best spots for their camping where water is most abundant, and should deploy guards, and *avant-guarde* if he apprehends the enemy's attack.

315. Moreover, he should keep all matters secret, as far as possible, and should keep even his thoughts concealed, except from the wise and the sincere.

316. The Prophet (peace be upon him) has said: "There shall be no cutting of hands during battles".[214] The reason behind this command of the Prophet (peace be upon him) has been explained by 'Umar (may God be pleased with him). He says that this is because a person whose hand is chopped off (for theft) may be carried away by a diabolical rage to join the enemy forces. Besides, this might open the door for discord among people, which would jeopardise their vital interests.

317. He should fight the People of the Book and the Magians until they embrace Islam or accept to pay *jizyah* out of acknowledgement of superiority, while they are in a state of subjugation.[215]

318. He should not kill infants and women. Nor any elderly person should be killed by him, except in extreme emergency like a night raid.[216] He should not cut down trees nor should he set anything on fire.[217] Also, he should not injure animals, except when there is a definite and necessary purpose to justify it, as was in the case of Buwayrah, a village inhabited by Banū Naḍīr.[218]

319. He should not break any pledge. He should not arrest carriers of mail, because this would cut off communication between them. He may resort to misleading the enemy because "war is trickery".[219] He should strike the enemy unawares and should attack with artillery while encircling the enemy forces. He should also try to straiten the enemy. All these measures that we have enumerated above have been adopted by the Prophet (peace be upon him) according to the established tradition and they are an obvious necessity for every successful battle. Resort may also be made to hand to hand combat with the permission of the *imām* by those who are self-reliant, as was done by 'Alī and Ḥamzah (may God be pleased with them).[220]

320. The Muslims engaged in battle are permitted to appropriate whatever food or fodder is available to them without formal distribution into five portions, because there will be great hardship for them if concession is not allowed in this regard.

321. When Muslims take prisoners, the *imām* may exercise either of the four options: (i) to kill them; (ii) to take ransom [and set them free]; (iii) to set them free gratuitously; and (iv) to enslave them. He may choose the most expedient of these options.[221] He is also authorized to grant them protection individually or collectively.[222] The basis of this injunction is the verse of the Qur'ān: "...and if anyone of the idolaters seeks your protection, then protect him ..."[223]

This is so because the entry of these prisoners in the fold of Islam cannot be achieved without their mixing with Muslims and finding an opportunity to appreciate their reason and conduct. Besides, often need arises for a free passage of traders and the like [which prompts a lenient policy toward them]. Further, the *imām* may make peace with them in exchange for some monetary benefit, or even without any benefit. Also, because Muslims may become weak at times, and

stand in need of peace, or they might require money to strengthen themselves, such a policy might be warranted. At other times leniency is to be adopted because the Muslims might have to protect themselves from the animosity of a people in order to fight some other people, and so on.

322. The Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "Do not let me encounter any of you, coming on the Day of Judgement, with a braying camel placed round his neck, entreating: 'O Prophet of God, help me, And I would then have to say: I possess nothing for you, for I have already conveyed the message to you".[224]

In a similar version of the tradition, we find the following words: "...with a mare hanging to his neck neighing, and a sheep bleating, while his breath is felling and garments fluttering ..."[225]

In my view, the basic idea conveyed in such traditions is that a sin assumes the form in which it is committed. The notion of carrying these animals represents their onus and the consequential torture. As to the sound to be produced by these animals, it represents the punishment inflicted upon the sinner by exposing his sin in this manner.

323. The Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "When you find somebody committing a breach of trust, burn all his belongings and beat him".[226] This was the policy adopted by Abū Bakr and 'Umar also. In my opinion, the purpose of this injunction is to reprimand the culprit and to deter other people from committing a similar sin.

324. It may be borne in mind that the wealth acquired from the infidels is of two kinds:

(i) That which is acquired by pressing forward with horses and riding camels and bearing the hardships of war. This is called *ghanīmah* (viz. spoils);[227] and

(ii) that which is acquired without any fighting like *jizyah, kharāj* and 10% revenue recovered from their [i.e. enemy's] traders, or what is paid by the enemy, as part of any peace agreement, or whatever is left behind by the enemy fleeing in distress.[228]

325. *Ghanīmah* is liable to extraction of one fifth, and this one fifth is expended for the purposes specified by God in the Qur'ān: "And know that whatever you acquire of spoils in war, one fifth of it is for

God, and for the Messenger, and for the near of kin, and the orphans and the needy and the wayfarer ..."[229]

The portion of the Prophet (peace be upon him) is dedicated, after his demise, to the common weal of the Muslim community, according to its priorities. The portion of the near of kin is given to the progeny of Hāshim and al-Muṭṭalib, the rich and the poor, male and female alike.[230]

326. In my view, the *imām* is authorised to determine the amounts to be spent in various areas specified above. 'Umar, for instance, increased the share of the Prophet's family from the exchequer of Muslims. He also provided aid from the exchequer to those in debt, or those who needed help for marriage, or who were otherwise needy.[231]

327. The portion of orphans is to be paid to the young orphans. As to the portions of the poor and the needy, they should go to these categories. The *imām* is authorized to perform his function in respect of distribution according to his *ijtihād* whereby he should determine the order of precedence and priority in this behalf and act accordingly.

328. As to the remaining four fifths, the *imām* should distribute it among those who actually acquire this wealth. In this connection, he should consider the conditions of his army. He may grant booty to those for whom such a grant would prove most beneficial in the general interest of Muslims. This grant can be given in either of the following three ways:

(i) If the *imām,* while advancing in the enemy territory (*Dār al-ḥarb*) sends forward a battalion to attack a village: to men of such battalion he may grant one fourth, or one third, after taking out one fifth as mentioned before. So whatever has been acquired by this advance battalion, one fifth of it is to be extracted first. Then out of what remains, the *imām* may allocate one fourth, or one third for the warriors of this battalion, and the remainder may be included in the spoils of war to be distributed according to the relevant provisions of the law.

(ii) The *imām* may also allocate an amount, out of the spoils, for those who accomplish a useful task for the Muslims.[232] For example, he may announce that those who will conquer a certain fortress will be entitled to this much or those who will capture a prisoner will get this thing or those who would kill an enemy, will be given his spoils.[233]

If the *imām* promises them a reward from the exchequer of Muslims, he may do so. If he promises them anything from the spoils, then he may grant them from the four fifths, after setting aside one fifth according to the Qur'ānic injunctions.

(iii) The *imām* may also designate some particular warriors, for paying special grants to them from the spoils for their meritorious achievements and bravery, as the Prophet (peace be upon him) granted to Salmah ibn al-Akwa', in the battle of Dhū Qarad, the portion of cavalry as well as infantry. This was because Salmah had achieved great success of tremendous benefit for the Muslims in this battle.[234]

329. In my view, the right position is that the spoils of an individual (enemy) warrior, who is killed, can be granted to the killer when the *imām* has already declared this reward for him, or when he decides to grant the spoils to him afterwards.

330. Further, the *imām* should extract from the spoils an amount to be given as a small gift, but it should be less than a full-fledged share. This amount should be granted to those women who treat the sick, cook the food, and look after the fighters, and to the slaves and children, and the guaranteed citizens (*Ahl al-Dhimmah*) of *Dār al-Islām*.[235] if they have been allowed to join the Muslim army by the *imām* for some purpose to be served by their presence.

331. If it is found that a part of the spoils was in fact a property of some Muslim which had been captured by the enemy earlier, this part shall be returned to its Muslim owner, without any price or consideration.[236] The remaining parts will then be liable to distribution. The riders shall be entitled to three times the portion of the pedestrians.[237]

332. In my opinion, if the *imām* considers it expedient to grant to the camel riders, or marksmen something in excess, or to grant some amount less than a full-fledged share to the riders of Arabian horses in preference to those of ordinary horses, he may do so after consulting men of wisdom and knowledge, and reaching a consensus in that behalf. By the same process of mutual consultation, he should reconcile any variations that may be found in the reported conduct of the Prophet (peace be upon him) and his Companions, concerning similar situations.

333. All those individuals who are deputed by the commander, on various missions on behalf of the army, like carrying messages, guarding the army, and spying, may also receive grants from the spoils, even if these individuals might not have been physically present in the battle, as was in the case of 'Uthmān, who was deputed at Madīnah in the battle of Badr.[238]

334. As to the wealth acquired from the infidels without fighting (i.e. *fay'*), it is to be distributed in accordance with the Divine command contained in the following verses:

> Whatever God restored to His Messenger from the people of the towns, it is for God, and for the Messenger, and for the near of kin, and the orphans and the needy, and the wayfarer, so that it be not taken by turns, by the rich among you; and whatever the Messenger gives you accept it, and whatever he forbids you, abstain therefrom; and keep your duty to God. Surely God is severe in retribution. It is for the poor who fled, who were driven from their homes and their possessions, seeking grace of God, and His pleasure and helping God and His Messenger. These it is, that are the truthful. And those who set themselves up in the city and in the faith before them, love those who have fled to them, and find in their hearts no need of what they are given, and prefer them before themselves, though poverty may afflict them. And whoever is saved from niggardliness of his soul, these it is, that are the successful. And those who come after them say: our Lord, forgive us and our brethren, who had precedence of us in faith, and leave no spite in our hearts towards those who believe. Our Lord, surely Thou art kind, Merciful.[239]

When 'Umar read these verses, he observed: "These verses include all Muslims". Therefore, he gave the ruling that the proceeds of *fay'* be expended according to the degrees of priority, keeping in view the overall interest of the community rather than any particular interest.[240]

335. Traditions have differed in respect of the method of distributing the proceeds of *fay'*. Whenever the Prophet (peace be upon him) received *fay'*, he distributed it on the same day. Out of these, he granted to the married couples double the portion given to single

individuals.[241] The first *khalīfah* Abū Bakr used to grant to the free and the slave alike, taking their needs into full consideration. The second *khalīfah* 'Umar established a bureau in which he maintained complete record of the needs and the entitlements of people. Every individual with his seniority in Islam, his trials, his dependents and his needs, all this information was preserved in this bureau.[242]

336. The basic point underlying the nature of these differences is that each of them, viz. the Prophet (peace be upon him) and his Successors, formulated a policy on the basis of his individual *ijtihād* and took into consideration the expediency of his own time.

337. The lands that come under the suzerainty of the Muslims are appropriated in either of the three manners with the discretion of the *imām*:

(i) He may distribute them among those entitled to the spoils of war; or

(ii) he may designate them as a trust for the warriors as was done by the Prophet (peace be upon him) in Khaybar when he distributed half of the land and declared the other half a trust.[243] While 'Umar made the entire lands of the rural areas of Iraq (*Sawād*) a trust;[244] or

(iii) he may also settle non-Muslims in these lands as guaranteed citizens. In respect of these citizens, we find that the Prophet (peace be upon him) instructed Mu'ādh ibn Jabal to charge (as tax) one *dīnār* or Yamanite garment or its equivalent value from every major while 'Umar, levied forty eight dirhams on the affluent, twenty four *dirhams* on those who had only normal means of livelihood and twelve *dirhams* on those who were poor but among the earning people.[245]

338. This shows that the determination of the amounts of these taxes is left to the discretion of the *imām* who is authorised to act according to the public weal. This is why the precedents in this regard appear to be at variance. The same, in my opinion, is the rule governing the leviable rate of *kharāj*, and all such matters in which precedents from the Prophet (peace be upon him) and his successors differ.

339. The acquisition of spoils and booty has been made permissible for us by God for reasons explained by the Prophet (peace be upon him) in the following tradition: "Spoils of war were not made permissible

for anyone before us. It was when God considered our weakness and disability that He made it permissible for us".[246]

The Prophet (peace be upon him) also said: "Verily God has favoured my community over others, for He made spoils of war permissible for us".[247]

340. Since we have already explained this in the foregoing part of our discussion, we shall not repeat it here. The cardinal principle in determining the items of expenditure is that there are certain foremost objectives that are to be pursued. They are as follows:

(i) to maintain those human beings who are unable to do any work due to some chronic illness or who are in dire need of financial help for being remote from the sources of maintenance;

(ii) to protect the state from the treacheries of the infidel forces by defending its frontiers, expending on war, armament and cavalry;

(iii) to organize and regulate the affairs of the state, by maintaining security forces and judicial institutions, enforcing the penal code and establishing the system of *ḥisbah*;[248]

(iv) to preserve the *millah*, the universal Muslim community by employing *khaṭīb*s (orators), *imām*s, preachers, and teachers; and

(v) to look after such collective interests as digging canals and building bridges, etc.

341. It should be borne in mind that the territories we are dealing with are of two kinds: first is the territory which belongs exclusively to the followers of Islam, or wherein Muslims are dominant, like Ḥijāz. The second is the territory where the majority of inhabitants are infidels and it comes under the control of Muslims by force or through a peace agreement.

342. The second type of territory shall always need large forces of men, equipment of war, appointment of judges, and posting of guards and government officials while the former type of territory may not require such arrangement in a full-fledged form and in abundance. It is the intent of the *sharī'ah* to distribute the consolidated sources of the exchequer among all territories in the most equitable manner. For instance, the *sharī'ah* has laid down the items of expenditure for

the proceeds of *zakāt* and *'ushr* in a manner that the purpose of providing adequate self-sufficiency to the needy is realized more than anything else. Similarly, the expenditure from the proceeds of spoils and booty has been channelized toward the purposes of preparing for war, protecting the Muslim community and organizing the affairs of the state, more than any other purpose. That is why the share of the orphans, the poor and the destitute in the booties and spoils of war, is less than their share in *ṣadaqāt*. And for the same reason the share of warriors in them is greater than it is in *ṣadaqāt*.

343. Moreover, since spoils are acquired by enduring hardships and pressing forward horses and camels, the warriors cannot be contended in their hearts without taking a share in them. And also, it is necessary that all such basic rules that have a universal application should take into account the conditions of the common people, rather than the particular few. It is also necessary to reinforce their rational conviction with a natural enthusiasm. This enthusiasm cannot be inculcated in them without giving them a portion of what they achieve in war. This is why four fifths of it were given to the warriors who accomplish victory. As to the booty (*fay'*), it is acquired merely by intimidation without any actual operation of war; therefore, it need not necessarily be confined to any particular category of people. Rather, this ought to be appropriated according to the level of priority in the society.

344. The origin of *khums* [one fifth taken from the spoils of war], is traceable to the one fourth portion which the leader of the community and his kin claimed as their right in the *jāhilī* era. This practice was ingrained in their consciousness, and they found no straitness about it in their minds. A poet of those times mentioned this practice in his verse: "To us indeed belongs one fourth of the spoils of every attack, whether it be at Najd or in the lands of Tahā'im". Therefore, God prescribed one fifth for the needs of the government and the people on a pattern similar to the existing convention of Arabia. A parallel to this is to be found in the Divine practice of granting miraculous signs to the Prophets in a form similar to the images common among various communities. One fourth was given to the leader of the community and his kin in order to extol their position, and also because they were supposed to be engaged in managing the collective affairs on behalf of the general populace.[249]

345. Therefore, God appointed the portion of one fifth for His Prophet because he (peace be upon him) was occupied in looking after the community's affairs and could not devote himself to earn for his own family. It was, therefore, considered necessary that his expenses be borne by the exchequer of Muslims. Another consideration in prescribing *khums* was that victory was achieved, thanks to the call made by the Prophet (peace be upon him) and the overpowering prestige which God had conferred upon him. Thus he was like someone who directly participated in the battle.

346. *Khums* was also meant, *inter alia*, for the near of kin because their zeal for Islam was greater than other people. In those people religious zeal converged with ethnic enthusiasm, for their pride lay in the supremacy of the Religion of Muḥammad (peace be upon him). It also implied elevation of the position of the Prophet's family. Thus, this was a benefit which ultimately accrued to the community as a whole. As honouring the *'ulamā'* and *qurrā'* is conducive to enhancing the prestige of the True Religion, so also honouring the near of kin has the same significance.

347. One fifth was also prescribed, *inter alia,* for the needy who were referred to [in the Qur'ān] as the destitute, the poor and the orphans. Besides, it is also established in the tradition that the Prophet (peace be upon him) conferred grants from the proceeds of *khums* upon those whose hearts were inclined to the Truth; therefore, express mention of the five categories enumerated above was to stress their importance. Further, this express mention was made in the Qur'ānic text to underline the fundamental requirement of Islam that the wealth coming from the sources of *fay'* and *khums* is not taken in turns by the rich among the community, in disregard of the needy. Another wisdom underlying these injunctions is to close the door of evil thoughts about the Prophet (peace be upon him), and his relatives.

348. The various portions and shares less than the full-fledged portions have been prescribed because man does not often plunge himself in any fatal exercise, without some benefit, in which he is interested. This is an ingredient of the natural disposition and character of human beings, which ought to be taken into consideration. The allocation of three fourths of the shares in spoils for horsemen and one fourth of it for foot-soldiers is prescribed because the dependence of Muslims on the former, as well as their needs, are greater than the

latter. If you reflect over the conditions of armies, you will not doubt the fact that horsemen can neither be satisfied in their hearts, nor can their needs be fulfilled, unless they are given a reward three times the portion of the the foot-soldiers. This is a universal practice common among all communities of Arabs and non-Arabs despite their varying conditions and customs.

349. The Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "If I lived long enough by the will of God, I shall surely extern all Jews and Christians from the Arabian peninsula". Further, the Prophet (peace be upon him) made a will to turn the polytheists out of the peninsula.

I think the Prophet (peace be upon him) knew that history is nothing but alternate turns of rise and fall. At any time, the forces of Islam might become weak and disunited. In such a circumstance, if the enemy was entrenched in the heartland of Islam, this will lead to the violation of the sanctity of the Rites of God.

350. He further directed their expulsion from around the seat of knowldge (i.e. Madīnah) and the area where the House of God is located. Moreover, association with the infidels results in the distortion of the faith of people and deviation of their minds. Since there was no possibility to avoid this association, he directed the Muslims to purify the two sanctuaries (*ḥarams*) of Makkah and Madīnah from these elements, Besides, what was destined to happen in the future had become evident to the Prophet (peace be upon him). That was why he had said: "Surely Religion shall eventually turn to Madīnah for refuge..."[251] Naturally, it could not be expected to serve as a citadel of Islam unless it was made free from the presence of the followers of all other religions.

Notes and References

PART ONE

1. The present study is not interested *per se* in the biographical details of Shāh Walī Allāh, of which only those aspects will be taken notice of in the following pages, which have a direct bearing on our subject, and our references to them will be quite brief. Recourse may be had to the following well-known sources for further biographical information about Shāh Walī Allāh: Raḥīm Bakhsh, *Ḥayāt-i Walī* (Lahore, 1955); Fazle Mahmood, *A Study of the Life and Works on Shāh Walī Allāh* (Lahore: 1972); G.N. Jalbani, *Life of Shāh Walī Allāh* (Delhi: 1981); Allāh Ditta Muztar, *Shāh Walī Allāh: A Saint Scholar of Muslim India* (Islamabad: 1979).

2. This tumultuous period was full of recurrent crises and untold miseries for the Muslim community in India and has been a subject of keen interest of historians. See, for example, Mahmud Husain, ed., *A History of the Freedom Movement*, Karachi: 1957, vol. 1, pp. 108-109, and 195; Abdur Rashid, *A Short History of Pakistan*, ed., I. H. Qureshi (Karachi: 1967), vol. 3, p. 131; W. Irvine, *Later Mughals* (Calcutta: 1921-22), vol .1, p. 21; vol. 2, pp. 370-71; Jadunath Sarkar, *The Fall of the Mughal Empire* (Calcutta: 1925-30), vol. 2, p. 37; I. H. Qureshi, *Ulema in Politics* (Karachi: 1974), pp. 99-106; Shāh 'Abd al-'Azīz, *Mulfūẓāt* (Urdu translation) (Karachi: 1960).

3. See Mahmud Husain, *A History of the Freedom Movement*, vol. 1, pp. 91-92; W. Irvine, *Later Mughals*, vol. 1, pp. 277-78; Jadunath Sarkar, *The Fall of the Mughal Empire*, vol. 1, pp. 86-88; Tara Chand, *History of Freedom Movement in India* (Calcutta: 1961), vol. 1, pp. 101-02.

4. For an appreciation of the revivalist aspect of Shāh Walī Allāh's contribution, see the celebrated work by one of the most outstanding scholars of Pakistan in recent times, Sayyid Abu'l A'lā Mawdūdī,(d. 1979) *A Short History of the Revivalist Movements in Islam* (Lahore: 1963). The above work is an English version of the author's celebrated book in Urdu titled: *Tajdīd va Iḥyā'-i Dīn* (Lahore: 1952). In this work, the author has highlighted the revivalist role of Shāh Walī Allāh and the significance of reformation as a principle of socio-political movement in Islam.

5. See Mahmood Ahmad Ghazi, *Islamic Renaissance in South Asia: The Role of Shāh Walī Allāh*, under publication by the Islamic Research Institute, Islamabad.

6. Sayyid Abū al-Alā Mawdūdī, "Manṣabi-i Tajdīd kī Ḥaqīqat aur Tārīkh-i Tajdīd mēṇ Ḥazrat Shāh Walī Allāh kā Maqām", in *al-Furqān* (Special issue on Shāh Walī Allāh, ed., Muḥammad Manẓur Nu'mānī), (Bareily: 1941), pp. 105-107 (hereinafter referred to as Mawdudi, *Furqān* (Special Number)). For a detailed study of the impact of this movement on Muslim life in India see Muin ul-Haq, *The Great Revolution of 1857* (Lahore: 1979), pp. 13-37.

7. See Muhammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, ed., M. Saeed Sheikh (Lahore: 1986).

8. Abdul Hamid Siddiqi, "Renaissance in Indo-Pakistan: Shāh Walī Allāh Dihlawī", in M.M. Sharif, ed., *A History of Muslim Philosophy* (Karachi: 1983), vol. 2, p. 1577 (hereinafter referred to as Siddiqi "Renaissance").

9. See Qureshi, *Ulema in Politics*, pp. 111-126; see also Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent* (The Hague: 1962), p. 162.

10. See 'Ubayd Allah Sindhī, *Shāh Walī Allāh aur Unkā Falsafah* (Lahore: 1964), pp. 45-47 (hereinafter referred to as *Falsafah* (Urdu)).

11. See, e.g., some of his juridical discussions representing this trend in his *Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah* (Lahore: n.d.), pp. 124-27 (hereinafter referred to as *Ḥujjah*); see also Sindhī, *Falsafah*, pp. 185-206.

12. See Qureshi, *Ulema in Politics*, pp. 121-22; Sindhī, *Falsafah*, pp. 28-30. For further study of Shāh Walī Allāh's approach to the problem of existence and his reconciliatory view of the two major doctrines of the Muslim mystical philosophy, see chapter two, below. See also Shāh Walī Allāh, *Maktūb-i Madanī*, Urdu tr., Muḥammad Ḥanīf Nadvī (Urdu) (Lahore: 1965), pp. 6, 23-36; Siddiqi, "Renaissance", pp. 1569-72.

13. Sindhī, *Falsafah*, pp. 28-30, 209-224.

14. See Mawdudi, *Furqān* (Special Number), pp. 62-67.

15. For a better understanding of this aspect of Shāh Walī Allāh's philosophy see his discussion on the essence, nature and scope of bliss (*sa'ādah*) and the means for its attainment, etc. in *Ḥujjah*, pp. 50-56.

16. Sindhī, *Falsafah*, pp. 31-37, 45-47.

17. See Shāh Walī Allāh, *al-Fawz al-Kabīr fī Uṣūl al-Tafsīr*, Arabic tr. Muḥammad Munīr al-Dimashqī (Karachi: 1960), pp. 1-14; Sindhī, *Falsafah*, pp. 49-51 (hereinafter referred to as *al-Fawz*).

18. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Fatḥ al-Raḥmān fī Tarjamat al-Qur'ān* (Karachi: Tāj Kampanī, n.d.). It is a simple and lucid rendering of the Qur'ān into Persian, with brief explanatory notes here and there. The latest edition of this translation was printed in 1993 at the Da'wah Academy, International Islamic University, Islamabad.

19. See Abū Ḥāmid Muḥmmad al-Ghazāli, *al-Mustaṣfā min 'Ilm al-Uṣūl*, vol. 2 (Qum: 1364 Hijrī Solar Calendar), p. 350.

20. Sindhī, *Falsafah*, pp. 49-51.

21. Shāh Walī Allāh, *al-Fawz*, pp. 1-14; Sindhī, *Falsafah*, pp. 51-53.

22. The term *mutashābih*, derived from the Qur'ān (3:7), has been used in the literature on Qur'ānic exegesis to denote the verses whose meaning is liable to several interpretations. Some of these interpretations pose the problem of an apparently anthropomorphic connotation.

23. See Sindhī, *Falsafah* p. 69. With regard to the possibility of arriving at a definite meaning of the verses categorized as *mutashābih*, Shāh Walī Allāh's opinion is based on the interpretation of the verse (3:7) of the Qur'ān in the explanation of which exegetes had been holding variant views. See, for example, Muḥammad 'Abduh al-Falāḥ, *Ashraf al-Ḥawāshī* (Lahore: n.d.), p. 61. This commentary on the Qur'ān, though concise, is strictly within the framework of authentic traditions. For further insight, see an earlier and in-depth study, regarded as one of the basic works on the principles of exegesis, Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, *al-Itqān fī 'Ulūm al-Qur'ān*, (Lahore: 1980) vol. 2, pp. 2-13.

24. Sindhī, *Falsafah*, p. 108.

25. Shāh Walī Allāh's approach to *Sunnah* as essentially a commentary on the Qur'ān appears to be an influence of Imam al-Shafi'ī whose jurisprudence is considered to be premised on this principle. This approach of Shāh Walī Allāh is most conspicuously reflected in the treatment of juridical issues in the *Ḥujjah*. See *Ḥujjah*, pp. 128-29, 136-38; Sindhī, *Falsafah*, p. 109.

26. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Ḥujjah*, pp. 129-31.

27. Ibid., pp. 147-52.

28. Ibid., pp. 105-8.

29. *Ijmā'* has been regarded as an independent source of law by a large number of jurists. Ibn al-Humām defines it as follows: "It is the consensus of the *mujtahid*s of a particular age in the religious community of the Prophet Muḥammad". See Kamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn al-Humām, *al-Taḥrīr fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh* (Cairo: 1351 A.H.), p. 399.

30. Sindhī, "Imām Walī Allāh kī Ḥikmat kā Ijmālī Ta'āruf" in *al-Furqān* (Special Number), pp. 277-78.

31. Shāh Walī Allāh discusses at length the issue of the authority of *ijmā'*. The authoritative *ijmā'*, according to him, consists of the consensus of the Prophet's immediate successors, and that alone is a binding source of law. See Shāh Walī Allāh, *Qurrat al-'Aynayn fī Tafḍīl al-Shaykhayn* (Lahore: 1976), pp. 26-27, 50-60; *Izālat al-Khafā' 'an Khilāfat al-Khulafā'* (Karachi: 1976), vol. 1, pp. 60-62, 212-15, 430-41 (hereinafter referred to

as *Izālah*). For a more comprehensive view of Shāh Walī Allāh's stand on various juridical issues see Maẓhar Baqā', *Uṣūl al-Fiqh aur Shāh Walī Allāh* (Karachi: 1986), pp. 380-393 (hereinafter referred to as *Uṣūl al-Fiqh*).

32. *Qiyās*, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, is the extension of the verdict of a principal injunction on the basis of a common factor of causality. See *Ḥujjah*, pp. 129-31. For further details see Maẓhar Baqā', *Uṣūl al-Fiqh*, pp. 425-55.

33. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Maktūb-i Madanī*, p. 2. See also Sindhī, *al-Furqān* (Special Number), pp. 320-21; and *Falsafah*, pp. 194-99.

34. See n. 12 above; see also Shāh Walī Allāh, *Maktūb-i-Madanī*, p. 2.

35. According to Shiblī Nu'mānī, the intellectual degeneration which had set in the Muslim scholarship since the time of Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Rushd was arrested by Shāh Walī Allāh "whose subtle arguments eclipsed the academic accomplishments of al-Ghazālī". Shiblī Nu'mānī, *'Ilm al-Kalām* (Aligarh: 1906), p. 109. For an account of the historical development of *Kalām*, see ibid., pp. 30-35, 56-84.

36. For a contemporary Western scholar's view of the development of *Kalām* as a distinct discipline, see W. Montgomery Watt, *The Formative Period of Islamic Thought* (Edinburgh: 1973), pp. 180-204 and 303-16.

37. For an appraisal of Imām Rāzī's contribution to *Kalām*, see Shiblī Nu'māni, *'Ilm al-Kalām*, pp. 68-86.

38. Ibid., pp. 153-76.

39. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Ḥujjah*, p. 3.

40. Shāh Walī Allāh himself spells out the major features of the science of *asrār al-dīn* in his introduction to the *Ḥujjah*. See Shāh Walī Allāh, *Ḥujjah*, pp. 4-11.

41. Ibid., pp. 19-28.

42. Sindhī, *Falsafah*, pp. 209-24.

43. Nu'mānī, *'Ilm al-Kalām*, pp. 56-66.

44. See ibid., pp. 109-119 for a brief, but comprehensive account of Shāh Walī Allāh's original contribution to *Kalām*.

45. Sindhī, *Falsafah*, pp. 210-15.

46. Sindhī, *Falsafah*, pp. 28-31. See also Shāh Walī Allāh, *al-Khayr al-Kathīr* (Akora Khatak: 1959), pp. 4-16.

47. Shah Walī Allāh, *Ḥujjah*, pp. 11-13; Shāh Ismā'īl Shahīd *'Abaqāt*, tr. Manāẓir Aḥsan Gīlanī (Hyderabad: India, n.d.), pp. 99-104. Another important source of the ontological doctrines of Shāh Walī Allāh is his own brief but comprehensive work titled *Saṭa'āt*, tr. Muḥammad Matīn Hāshimī (Lahore: 1990), pp. 57-107.

48. Shāh Walī Allāh, *al-Tafhīmāt al-Ilāhiyyah* (Bijnaur: 1936), vol. 1, pp. 117-120, 165-167; Muḥammad Sarvar, *Armaghān-i Shāh Walī Allāh* (Lahore: 1988), pp. 244-256.

49. *Waḥdat al-shuhūd* is not exactly a full-fledged doctrine of the same consequence and significance as *waḥdat al-wujūd*. Rather, the former only signifies the contention of its votaries, represented by Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindī and his disciples, that the state experienced at a certain stage of the spiritual journey, which seems to be that of a unity of existence, is merely a perception and not a reality. See Burhan Ahmad Faruqi, *The Mujaddid's Conception of Tauhid* (Lahore: 1974), p.119. See also his scholarly and critical exposition of Shāh Walī Allāh's metaphysical doctrines in ibid., chapter II.

50. See n. 12 above.

51. Shāh Walī Allāh, *al-Tafhīmat al-Ilāhiyyah*, pp. 186-88.

52. Shahīd, *'Abaqāt*, pp. 65-92.

53. Ibid., pp. 88-93; see also Sindhī, *Falsafah*, pp. 78-80. Among the earlier thinkers who defended Ibn 'Arabī, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzi and 'Abd al-Wahhāb al-Sha'rānī (d. 973/1565) are especially worth mentioning. The latter has domonstrated in his seminal work: *Al-Yawāqīt wa al-Jawāhir Fī Bayāni 'Aqā'id al-Akābir* (Beirut: 1997) that the views of leading sufis specially those of Ibn 'Arabī are fully in accord with the theological postulates of the orthodoxy. After Shāh Walī Allāh also there emerged many supporters of Ibn 'Arabī. All these advocates of the doctrine of *waḥdat al-wujūd*, however, endeavoured to put forward such explanations of this doctrine as could be consistent with the theological position of the mainstream Muslim scholars on the subject through the ages. These advocates of post-Walī Allāh era included such celebrated luminaries as Maulana Ashraf 'Alī Thanvī (d. 1943) who produced a full-fledged work titled *Tanbīh al-Ṭarabī fī Tanzīh Ibn al-'Arabī* (lit. "Awakening the Ecstatic Concerning the Vindication of Ibn 'Arabī"), in his defence. See Muhammad Ismā'īl, "Shaykh-i Akbar Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn al-'Arabi", in *al-Raḥīm*, Hyderabad: vol.2, no. 3, August 1964, pp. 25-27. For a Western view of Ibn 'Arabī's philosophy of existence and the related aspects of Divine creative process, see Henry Corbin, *Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn 'Arabi*, tr. from the French by Ralph Manheim (Princeton: 1969), pp. 179-207. See also the seminal work by a contemporary Islamic scholar, William C. Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Knowledge* (Albany, NY: 1989).

54. Shahīd, *'Abaqāt*, 65–92; Sindhī, *Falsafah*, pp.80-81; Shāh Walī Allāh, *Maktūb-i Madanī*, pp. 30-36.

55. Sindhī, *Falsafah*, pp. 81-82.

56. Shāh Walī Allāh, *al-Tafhīmāt al-Ilāhiyyah*, vol. 1, pp. 106-109 and 246-256.

57. Sindhī, *Sharḥ Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah* (Lahore: 1950), pp. 75-78 (hereinafter referred to as *Sharḥ*).

58. Ibid., p. 74.

59. Such attempts at explaining the concept of God exclusively within a rationalist framework have lent themselves to strong criticism by other philosophers of both the past and the present. See, for instance, the critical discussion by a leading scholar of our time, Syed Zafarul Hasan, *Philosophy: A Critique* (Lahore: 1988), especially the chapter on "Philosophical Theism", pp. 137-153.

60. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Ḥujjah*, pp. 19-24.

61. Shāh Walī Allāh, *al-Budūr al-Bāzighah*, tr. J.M.S. Baljon (Lahore: 1980), p. 10 (hereinafter referred to as *Budūr* (English).

62. Shahīd, *'Abaqāt*, p. 410.

63. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Ḥujjah*, pp. 13-14.

64. See Malik Ghulām Murtażā, *Shāh Walī Allāh kā Falsafah* (Lahore: n.d.), pp. 37-38.

65. Shahīd, *'Abaqāt*, p. 425.

66. Although Shāh Walī Allāh derives his concept of *'ālam al-mithāl*, like other mystic philosophers before him, by interpreting a number of Prophetic traditions, yet early traces of a similar concept are found in the "world of forms" of Plato (d. 347 B.C.) According to this theory:

> ...a general idea or concept is immutable, timeless, one over many, intellectually apprehensible, and capable of precise definition, at the end of a piece of pure ratiocination, because it is an independently existing real thing or entity. As our world contains people, trees, stones, planets, storms and harvests, so a second and superior or transcendental world contains concept objects. As Socrates and Peloponnesus name perceptible objects here, so justice, equity, unity, and similarity, name intellectually apprehensible objects there.
>
> ... Furthermore, as the human mind or soul gets into contact—though only perfunctory and imperfect contact—with ordinary things and happenings in this world by sight, hearing, touch and so on, so the human mind or soul gets into nonsensible contact with the ideal and eternal objects of the transcendental world. (Gilbert Ryle, art. "Plato" in *The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, New York: 1967, vol. 6, p. 314).

It would make an interesting study if the two doctrines are examined in comparison with each other. An in-depth comparison might bring out further similarities between the ideas of a fourth century B.C. Greek philosopher, and an eighteenth century Muslim thinker of India. The possibility

of a revelational source of knowledge, being available to Plato—which source had never been wholly extinct in any era or area—might, to some extent, explain this similarity. For details see W. D. Ross, *Plato's Theory of Ideas* (Oxford: 1953) and Friedreich Solmsen, *Plato's Theology* (New York: 1942).

67. In the chapter on *'ālam al-mithāl* in *Ḥujjah*, Shāh Walī Allāh gives many illustrative examples of this idea. For instance, this material world is reflected in it in the form of an old woman, with mixed black and white hair, blue teeth and a wide mouth. Death is represented by a male sheep which, according to a tradition, will be slaughtered on the Day of Judgement, whereby this phenomenon will come to an end. These abstract forms include many acts of virtue and vice, that are not objects of our physical cognition in this temporal world.

68. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Ḥujjah*, p. 14; Sindhī, *Sharḥ*, pp. 103-104.

69. Sindhī, *Sharḥ* pp. 112-113; Shahīd, *'Abaqāt*, pp. 205-210.

70. Shahīd, *'Abaqāt*, pp. 205-210; Sindhī, *Sharḥ*, pp. 113-114. Shāh Walī Allāh, *al-Budūr al-Bāzighah*, ed., M.S.H, Masumi (Hyderabad: 1970), pp. 28–30. (Hereinafter referred to as *Budūr*). In the ancient Greek thought also, there are some elements of a similar idea. According to this idea:

> [T]he world was conceived as a whole, while some part of it, usually man, was seen as a model or epitome of it. According to one version of this ancient analogy, man and the Universe are constructed according to the same harmonious proportions, each sympathetically attuned to the other, each a cosmos ordered according to reason. By an imaginative leap, the universe itself was thought to be like man, living and conscious, a divine creature whose nature is reflected in human existence.
>
> Animism and panpsychism also regard the world as alive throughout, but the microcosm idea is distinct in emphasizing the unity or kinship of all life and thought in the world. If man is the microcosm of the universe, then not only is every thing animated by some soul or other, but there is one world soul by which everything is animated. See Donald Levy, "Macrocosm and Microcosm" in *The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, vol. 6, pp. 121-122;

See also R.A. Nicholson, *Studies in Islamic Mysticism* (Cambridge: 1980), pp. 121-125; For further Islamic background and exposition of this sufi doctrine in the writings of other scholars before and after Shāh Walī Allāh see: Shafqat Allāh, "al-'Allamah 'Abd al-'Azīz al-Farhārwī wa Risālatuhū 'an 'Ālam al-Mithāl" in *al-Dirāsāt al-Islāmiyyah*(Oct-Dec. 2000).

71. Sindhī, *Sharḥ*, pp. 114-27. Latin equivalents of the Arabic terms *unviersum permagnum* and *repercussus permagnum* have been borrowed from the above source.

72. Shāh Walī Allāh, *al-Tafhīmat al-Ilāhiyyah*, pp. 19-21; *Budūr*, pp. 127-34.

73. See the English translation of *Ḥujjah* (hereinafter referred to as "translation"), Section I, Paras 4-5. In all subsequent references to the "translation" we shall refer to the numbers of paragraphs rather than pages. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr* (English), pp. 32-33; *Cf.* Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, *Maqāsid al-Falāsifah* (Cairo: 1331 A.H.), pp. 276-84.

74. Translation, Section I, Paras 4-5; Shāh Walī Allāh,*Budūr* (English), pp. 33-38.

75. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Ḥujjah*, pp. 26-27.

76. Qur'ān 57:25.

77. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Ḥujjah*, pp. 53-55. See also the discussion of a contemporary scholar on the ethical philosophy of Shah Walī Allah: A.J. Halepota, *The Philosophy of Shāh Walī Allāh* (Lahore: n.d.), pp. 54-60. See also Sindhī, *Shāh Walī Allāh aur Unkī Siyāsī Taḥrīk* (Lahore: 1965), pp. 203-205.

78. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Ḥujjah*, pp. 20-24.

79. Sindhī, *Falsafah*, pp. 218-21.

80. Ibid.

81. Translation, Section XII, Paras 80-84.

82. Translation, Section XIII, Paras 86-87.

83. Shāh Walī Allāh, *al-Khayr al-Kathīr*, pp. 98-103.

84. Ibid.

85. Translation, Section XV, Paras 121-128.

86. Ibid., Section XIII, Paras 90-91.

87. See, for detail, the chapter on the philosophy of *taklīf* in Shāh Walī Allāh, *Ḥujjah*, pp. 20-24.

88. In the Qur'ānic verse 30:30 the word *fiṭrah* refers to this balanced state, according to Shāh Walī Allāh. See Muḥammad Sarvar, *Armaghān-i Shāh Walī Allāh*, p. 294; see also Shāh Walī Allāh, *Ḥujjah*, pp. 50-51.

89. According to Shāh Walī Allāh, the *sharī'ah* is a completion of *taqdīr*. He defines *taqdīr* as a measured course eternally calculated for every species by God. *Taklīf* completes the formation of human species through the gratification of its urges. For each species has a given form and a definite nature. There are certain acts and morals which are appropriate for man's peculiar formation. By virtue of this formation, man instinctively receives certain intuitions from nature according to its recurrent needs. See Sarvar, *Armaghan-i Shāh Walī Allāh*, pp. 293-94.

90. Ibid.
91. Translation, Section XIV, Para 107.
92. Ibid., Paras 103-05.
93. Ibid., Section XV, Paras 117-20.
94. See Shāh Walī Allāh, *al-Juz' al-Laṭīf fī Tarjamat al-'Abd al-Ḍa'īf; Anfās al-'Ārifīn* and *al-Qawl al-Jamīl*, as quoted in Maẓhar Baqā', *Uṣūl al-Fiqh*, p. 130.
95. Sindhī, *Falsafah*, pp. 28-29.
96. Ibid., p. 29.
97. Ibid., pp. 28-32.
98. Ibid., pp. 31-37.
99. Abridged by Muḥammad Manẓūr Nu'mānī in *al-Furqān* (Special Number), p. 404.
100. For further information on the early education of Shāh Walī Allāh, see Maẓhar Baqā', *Uṣūl al-Fiqh*, pp. 126-34.
101. Nu'māni, *'Ilm al-Kalām*, pp. 102-04.
102. Sindhī, *Falsafah*, pp. 39-42; Maẓhar Baqā', *Uṣūl al-Fiqh*, pp. 91-94.
103. Ibid., pp. 97-98.
104. Sindhī, *Falsafah*, 42-44. See also: Shāh Walī Allāh, *Fiqh-i 'Umar*, ed. and tr. into Urdu by Abū Yaḥyā Imām Khān (Lahore: 1987).
105. Sindhī, *Falsafah*, pp. 138-48.
106. Muḥammad Uways Nadvī, "Shāh Walī Allāh kā Ēk 'Ilmī Ma'khadh" in *al-Furqān* (Special Number), pp. 370-73; J.M.S. Baljon, *Religion and Thought of Shāh Walī Allāh Dihlawī* (Leiden: 1986), pp. 200-201. According to Maẓhar Baqā', Shāh Walī Allāh's admiration for Ibn Taymiyyah is indicated by the fact that he wrote a full-fledged treatise on Ibn Taymiyyah, highlighting his great genius and valuable contribution to Islamic scholarship. See Maẓhar Baqā', *Uṣūl al-Fiqh*, p. 93.
107. See, e.g., Shāh Walī Allāh's discussion of the universal paradigm of society. Translation, Section X, Paras 68-71.
108. Sindhī, *Falsafah*, pp. 45-47.
109. Baljon, *Religion and Thought of Shāh Walī Allāh Dihlawī*, p. 192. According to Professor Baljon, the principle of mutual aid as a central element in a social order is not an original idea of Shāh Walī Allāh, since it has also been underlined as an essential component of cooperation for the maintenance of human society by Ibn Sinā. See his *Kitāb al-Najāt* (Cairo: 1913),

p. 498 and Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddimah* (Paris: 1958), p. 368. It is, however, submitted that any social or political doctrine of Shāh Walī Allāh should be viewed with reference to, and as an integral part of, his overall philosophy of life and in the framework of his socio-political thought. For, if we were to compare between fragments of his ideas and the writings of other earlier socio-political thinkers in and outside the Muslim tradition, there will surely be found many more areas of similarity. But the worth of Shāh Walī Allāh's socio-political ideas, as an original contribution to Islamic thought, lies in that he has developed a pervasive view of life in the context of which he theorized the phenomena of human social organization. It is Shāh Walī Allāh's characteristic pervasiveness of approach to the complex and multi-faceted enterprise of life, explaining in relation to it, the individual, familial, social, economic, political, international and even religious and spiritual undertakings of man and society, that makes his contribution original and unparallelled. In all fairness, therefore, Shāh Walī Allāh, should be duly credited for it.

110. Sindhī, *Falsafah*, pp. 163-70.

111. Siddiqi, "Renaissance", p. 1559.

112. Translation, Section XII, Paras 78-80.

113. Siddiqi, "Renaissance", p. 1560.

114. Translation, Section XVIII, Paras 161-162; Sindhī, *Shāh Walī Allāh Aur Unkī Siyāsī Taḥrīk*, p. 41.

115. Translation, Section XII, Paras 80-82.

116. Maris Biesanz and John Hiltunin, *Introduction to Sociology* (New Jersey: 1978), p. 7. See also Howard Baecker and Harry Barnes, *Social Thought from Lore to Science* (Washington D.C.:1952), pp. 564-94.

117. Ilyas Ba-Yunus, "Contemporary Sociology: An Islamic Critique" in *Islam: Source and Purpose of Knowledge*, Islamization of Knowledge Series no. 5 (Herndon, VA: 1988), p. 275.

118. Biesanz and Hiltunin, *Introduction to Sociology*, pp. 16-17; see also Alvin W. Gouldner, *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* (New York: 1970), pp. 20-24.

119. Max Weber, *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, tr. Talcott Parsons (New York: 1945), *passim.*

120. See David Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character* (New York: 1965), *passim.*

121. See Robin Williams, *American Society: A Sociological Interpretation* (New York: 1970), *passim.*

122. Biesanz and Hiltunin. *Introduction to Sociology*, p. 16.

123. Ibid., p. 7.

124. The multi-dimensional approach referred to here is very conspicuous in his major works: *Ḥujjah*, *Budūr*, *Izālah* and *Tafhīmāt*. For a fuller discussion on some of these works see chapters 2-5 of part two of the present work.

125. How keenly Shāh Walī Allāh observed the events taking place around him, is reflected in the letters he wrote to some of his contemporary kings and nobles. See for example, letters nos. 1 and 2 in Khalīq Aḥmad Niẓamī, ed., *Shāh Walī Allāh kē Siyāsī Maktūbāt* (Delhi: 1969), pp. 3-17.

126. Ibid.

127. Translation, Section XVIII, Paras 152-164.

128. See pp. 33-34 above.

129. *Sharī'ah* and *ṭarīqah* represent the two main aspects of the Divine guidance whose mutual relationship and total compatibility have also been expatiated upon by Sirhindī before this was done by Shāh Walī Allāh. For Sirhindī's views on this relationship see Malik Ḥasan 'Alī, *Ta'līmāt-i Mujaddidiyah: Maktubāt kī Roshnī mēn* (Sheikhupura: 1965), pp. 95-109.

130. See Shāh Walī Allāh, *Ḥujjah*, vol. 1, p.6. For details about Fārābī's ideas see M.S.H. Masumi, "al-Fārābī" in M.M. Sharif, ed., *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, vol. 1, pp. 713-717. For Ghazālī see M.A. Abdul Khaliq, "Ethics" in ibid., vol. 1, pp. 624-37. For points of similarity between Shāh Walī Allāh and Māwardī, see Muhammad Qamaruddin Khan, "al-Māwardī" in ibid., pp. 719-31. See also Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Ya'qūb al-Māwardī, *al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah wa al-Wilāyāt al-Dīniyyah* (Cairo: 1966), pp. 5-21.

131. Ibrahim Madkour, "al-Fārābi" in M.M. Sharif, *A Hisotory of Muslim Philosophy*, vol. 1, p. 450.

132. 'Abd al-Salam Nadvī, *Ḥukamā'-i Islām* (Azamgarh: 1953), vol. 1, pp. 125, 311-12.

133. It is difficult to ascertain as to who was the first to grant him the title of *al-Mu'allim al-Thānī*, the second teacher, but generally the writers on Muslim Philosophy and logic have been using this epithet for him since the earliest times subsequent to Fārābī. See Ibrahim Madkour, "al-Fārābi" in M.M. Sharif, *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, vol. 1, p. 455.

134. Translation, Section XI, Paras 72-77 and Section XIII, Paras 85-101.

135. Ibrahim Madkour, "al-Fārābi" in M.M. Sharif, *A Hisotory of Muslim Philosophy*, vol. 1, p. 453.

136. Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī, *Iḥṣā' al-'Ulūm* (Cairo: 1949).

137. Muhammad Iqbal, *Reconstruction*, pp. 23-49.

138. Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī, *Ārā' Ahl al-Madīnah al-Fāḍilah* (Beirut: 1959), p. 85.

139. See Shāh Walī Allāh, *Ḥujjah*, vol. 1, pp. 50-58.

140. Ibid.

141. Qur'ān 2: 164. There are numerous other verses that convey the same sense.

142. Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī, *al-Siyāsah al-Madaniyyah* (Hyderabad (India): 1346 A.H.), pp. 4-5.

143. Fārābī, *Ārā'*, p. 77, as quoted in H.K. Sherwani, *Studies in Muslim Political Thought and Administration* (Lahore: 1970), p. 69.

144. Māwardī, *al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah*, pp. 5-21.

145. For a fuller discussion on Ibn Taymiyyah's impact on Shāh Walī Allāh, see Muḥammad Uvays Nadvī in *al-Furqān* (Special Number), pp. 369-373.

146. See Badawī Ṭabānah's "Introduction" to *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn* (Cairo: 1957), pp. 3-38. For a more in-depth study of Ghazālī's concept of social virtues see M. Umaruddin, *Ethical Philosophy of al-Ghazālī* (Lahore: 1988), pp. 191-216. The discussion of Ghazali's concept of vice significantly determines the philosophical parameters for the doctrine of virtue expounded by him. For a comparison with Shāh Walī Allāh's ideas on this subject see *ibid.*, pp. 159-190 and Shāh Walī Allāh, *Ḥujjah*, pp. 58-82.

147. Translation, Section I, Paras 1-13.

148. It is significant that in the context of the biological laws too, Shāh Walī Allāh uses the term *sharī'ah*. Thus, it seems, that he conceives the function of the Divine law in two spheres namely, biological and social. As we would probe further in our study of the social ideas of Shāh Walī Allāh, we will be able to show that he develops his thesis further along the same line, that is, identifying a necessary congruence between the social laws of the *sharī'ah* and the biological laws of *fiṭrah*(nature). To him, each of these spheres fully complements the other.

149. Translation, Section I, Paras 1-6. See also Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr* (English), pp. 31-32.

150. Translation, Section I, Paras 3-6. See also Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr* (English), p. 32.

151. Translation, Section 1, Paras 3-6.

152. See ibid., p. 31.

153. Muhsin Mahdi, *Ibn Khaldun's Philosophy of History* (Chicago: 1964), p. 173.

154. See Charles Darwin, *The Origin of Species* (London: 1859).

155. Translation, Section I, Paras 4-5.

156. Ibid., Paras 6-7.

157. Ibid.

158. Ibid., Paras 8-9.

159. See pp. 45-47 above.

160. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr* (English), p. 32.

161. However, one peculiarity which makes the animal instinct different from the human disposition is that in the former there is a dominant physio-biological factor or *nafs* or *ṭabī'ah* to which its intelligence (*'aql*) and volitional faculty (*qalb*) are in absolute subservience. (Shāh Walī Allāh, *Hujjah*, p. 33; Shahīd, *'Abaqāt*, p.114). In human dispositions, on the other hand, the influence of intelligence or intellect is the predominant factor. See Halepota, *Philosophy of Shāh Walī Allāh*, p. 26.

162. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr* (English), p. 33. For further details of the ideas of Shāh Walī Allāh on this subject see Halepota, *Philosophy of Shāh Walī Allāh*, pp. 31-33. For the psychological dimension of human personality in the philosophy of Shāh Walī Allāh, see ibid., pp. 33-34.

163. Translation, Section I, Paras 10-11.

164. Ibid.

165. Ibid. See also Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr* (English), p. 64. In the context of the cultural evolution in society and its various stages, Shāh Walī Allāh employs a number of key terms representing his own original concepts. But the terms "virtuous practices" (*sunan ṣāliḥah*), "virtuous realms" (*al-aqālīm al-ṣāliḥah*), and "temperate realms" (*al-aqālīm al-mu'tadilah*) seem to have their roots in the classical Muslim social thought. Unlike other social terms coined by Shāh Walī Allāh, which he explains in some detail in *Ḥujjah* and *Budūr*, he uses these terms apparently taking for granted the familiarity of his readers with these terms since he does not explain them. We are inclined to assume, therefore, that such terms as "virtuous realms" (*al-aqālīm al-ṣāliḥah*) and "temperate realms" (*al-aqālīm al-mu'tadilah*) represent the typical ecological approach, as it were, to the classification of societies in the early social thought of Islam. See. e.g., 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddimah* (Beirut: n.d.), pp. 82-91; see also 'Abd al-Wāḥid Siddiqi, "Shāh Walī Allāh kī ba'ż 'Umrānī Iṣṭilāḥāt" in *al-Raḥīm*, (June: 1964), pp. 74-76.

166. Translation, Section I, Para 12.

167. Ibid., Para 13.

168. Ibid.

169. Translation, Section VI, Para 37. There are some indications of similarity between different socio-political thinkers, representing various epochs and traditions, with regard to their explanation of the growth of cities, evolution of social culture, and the development of political organization. See, for

instance, Plato's *Compendium Legum Platonis* (preserved for posterity by Fārābī in his *Talkhīṣ Nawāmīs Aflāṭūn),* (London: 1952), vl. 3, pp. 16-18.

170. Halepota, *Philosophy of Shāh Walī Allāh*, pp. 107-08.

171. Translation, Section II, Para 14.

172. See George Gaylord Simpson, "The Biological Nature of Man" in S.L. Washburn and C. Jay Phyllis, eds., *Perspectives on Human Evolution* (New York: 1968).

173. See John Limber, "Language in Child and Chimp" in *American Psychologist,* vol. 32, pp. 280-95.

174. Translation, Section II, Para 15.

175. Ibid., Para 16.

176. Ibid.

177. Ibid., Section I, Para 6.

178. Ibid., Section II, Para 16.

179. Biesanz, *Introduction to Sociology*, p. 46.

180. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr* (English), pp. 63-82.

181. Translation, Section III, Para 17.

182. Halepota, *Philosophy of Shāh Walī Allāh*, p. 55.

183. Translation, Section III, Para 18.

184. Ibid., Paras 19-21.

185. Ibid., Para 19.

186. Ibid., Paras 19-20.

187. Ibid., Para 21.

188. Ibid.

189. Ibid., Section IV, Para 22.

190. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr* (English), p. 69.

191. Translation, Section IV, Para 22; Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr* (English), pp. 69-70.

192. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr* (English), pp. 70-71. Translation, ibid., Para 23.

193. Translation, Section IV, Para 24.

194. David A. Schultz, *The Changing Family: Its Function and Future* (New Jersey: 1976), p. 64; Gerald R. Leslie, *The Family in Social Context* (New York: 1967), p. 27.

195. In the terminology of contemporary sociology, such a minimum size of family is referred to as nuclear family. See Richard Adams "An Enquiry Into The Nature of the Family", in Gertrude R. Dole and Robert L. Gruneiro, eds. *Essays in the Science of Culture* (New York: 1960), pp. 35-49.

196. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr* (English), p. 72.

197. Translation, Section IV, Para 31.

198. Translation, Section IV, Para 22; Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr* (English), p. 72.

199. Translation, Section IV, Para 22.

200. Ibid.

201. Translation, Section IV, Para 27.

202. Ibid., p. 344; Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr* (English), p. 72.

203. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Ḥujjah*, vol. 2, p. 135.

204. Translation, Section V, Para 36.

205. This principle is a legal maxim derived from the Prophet's tradition to this effect. It is included also in the legal maxims of *Majallah*, the Ottommon Civil Code. See *Majallat al-Aḥkām al-'Adliyyah*, art. 87.

206. Translation, Section IV, Para 30.

207. Ibid., Para 31.

208. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr* (English), pp. 77-82; Translation Section V, Para 33.

209. Translation, Section V, Para 33.

210. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr* (English), p. 77.

211. Ibid., p. 78; Translation, Section V, Paras 33-34.

212. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr* (English), p. 78-79. There are some interesting similarities between Shāh Walī Allāh and Ibn Khaldūn in the identification of essential crafts and vocations. Each of them, however, seems to have mainly derived his ideas from an empirical observation of society in his own time. See Ibn Khaldūn, *Muqaddimah*, pp. 405-14.

213. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr* (English), pp. 78-79.

214. Translation, Section V, Para 35.

215. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr* (English), p. 80.

216. Translation, Section V, Para 36.

217. Ibid.

218. Ibid.

219. Translation, Section V, Para 36. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr* (English), p. 80-82.

220. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr* (English), pp. 80-82.

221. See Translation, Section VI, Para 37.

222. Ibid.

223. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr* (English), p. 83.

224. Mahmood Ahmad Ghazi, "State and Politics in the Philosophy of Shāh Walī Allāh", in Klaus Ferdinand and Mehdi Mozaffari, eds., *Islam, State and Society* (London: 1988), p. 92.

225. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr* (English), pp. 82-83.

226. Ibid., p. 83.

227. Ghazi, "State and Politics", p. 92; see also Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr*, pp. 91-92. It is interesting to note that Ibn Khaldūn is inclined toward making a distinction between religious, socio-political, and intellectual organizations functioning independently of each other. In the case of Shāh Walī Allāh, however, it is *siyāsat al-madīnah* (although the terms used by both are almost identical), which is pervasive and which integrates diverse pursuits of collective life that a society requires for its mundane as well as spiritual well-being. See Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddimah*, pp. 302-11.

228. Translation, Section VI, Paras 38-39.

229. Ibid., pp. 356-59; Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr* (English), pp. 83-85.

230. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr*, pp. 95-96; see also the editor's note on these pages.

231. Translation, Section VIII, Paras 55 and 61.

232. *Khilāfah* is the classical term used to this day to denote collective vicegerency of the Muslim community represented by the Islamic political order established on the pattern of the early model of state which emerged in Madīnah immediately after the Prophet's demise in 11 A.H. See also Translation, Section XXI, Paras 210-228. It should be noted that we have used the term "state" for *khilāfah* merely for want of a better equivalent in English.

233. Ibid.

234. Translation, Section VII, Para 48; Shāh Walī Allāh *Budūr* (English), pp. 86-88.

235. Translation, Section VII, Paras 48-49.

236. Ibid. For further elaboration of the qualifications of rulers, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, see Mahmood Ahmad Ghazi, "State and Politics", p. 94.

237. Translation, Section VIII, Para 55.

238. Ibid., Para 57.

239. Ibid., Para 61.

240. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr*, p. 112.

241. Ibid., pp. 89-90. Translation, Section VIII, Para 61.

242. Translation, Section VIII, Para 61. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr* (English), pp. 93-94.

243. The term *naqīb* has been used in the Qur'ān (5:12) with reference to the twelve chiefs who were appointed by God among the Children of Isrā'īl. The same term was also used, in the context of the oath of allegiance (*bay'ah*), made by the inhabitants of Madīnah (*Anṣār*), to the Prophet (peace be upon him), prior to *hijrah*. See, for detail, the commentary on the above verse in Muḥammad 'Alī Kāndhlawī, *Ma'ālim al-Qur'ān* (Sialkot: 1978), vol. 6, pp. 371-73.

244. Translation, Section VIII, Para 61.

245. Ibid. and Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr* (Arabic), p. 111.

246. Translation, Section VIII, Para 61. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr* (Arabic), p. 112.

247. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr* (Arabic), p. 101.

248. Ibid., p. 102.

249. Ibid., pp. 102-103. According to Ibn Khaldūn, the sources of strength for a political organization are glory and solidarity that are sustainable by maintaining formidable armed forces. Notwithstanding some minor points of similarity between him and Shāh Walī Allāh, the former seems to lay greater emphasis on the material strength of a state than on its moral and spiritual strength. See, Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddimah*, pp. 294-297. Hence the main causes of decay in a state, in Ibn Khaldūn's opinion, consist in weakness in the military capability of the state, which is chiefly contingent—according to him—upon abundance of wealth and material resources. See also ibid., pp. 359-64.

250. Translation, Section IX, Paras 62-67.

251. Translation, Section vi, Paras 37-45.

252. Mahmood Ahmad Ghazi, "State and Politics", p. 94.

253. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr*, pp. 109-10.

254. See Translation, Section I, Para 13.

255. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr* , pp. 106-09.

256. Translation, Section IX, Para 62.

257. Ibid., Paras 63-64; Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr*, pp. 113-14.

258. See for an explanation of the two typical terms employed by Shāh Walī Allāh in discussing the distinctive characteristics of humans and beasts, namely: *al-ra'y al-kullī*, and *al-ray al-juz'ī*. Translation, Section I, Paras 1-6. For a more detailed discussion see Halepota, *Philosophy of Shāh Walī Allāh*, p. 54-69.

259. Translation, Section IX, Paras 64-66.

260. For biographical enquiries see Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-A'yān* (Cairo: 1858), vol. 2, pp. 112-14; see also Ibrahim Madkour, *La place d' Al-Farabi dans l'ecole philosophique Musulman* (Paris: 1934).

261. Ann K.S. Lambton, *State and Government in Medieval Islam* (New York: 1985), p. 73. See also Māwardī, *al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah*, pp. 5-6.

262. Translation, Section IX, Paras 66-67.

263. Ibid.

264. Ibid.

265. Ibid. These and some other privileges of rulers have also been taken note of by Ibn Khaldūn. See Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddimah*, pp. 257-70.

266. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr*, pp. 106-09, 112.

267. The ultimate fountainhead for moral guidance, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, is the teaching of Prophets. See Translation, Section XII, Paras 78-80.

268. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr*, pp. 113-14.

269. Translation, Section IX, Para 64.

270. Ibid.

271. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr*, p. 65. For further elaboration of this point see 'Ubayd Allāh Sindhī, *Shāh Walī Allāh aur Unkī Siyāsī Taḥrīk*, pp. 500-53.

272. Mahmood Ahmad Ghazi, "State and Politics", pp. 95-96.

273. Translation, Section X, Paras 68-71.

274. Ibid.

275. Ibid. For the roots of human moral traits in the psychic disposition of man as explained in the ethical philosophy of Shāh Walī Allāh. See Halepota, *Philosophy of Shāh Walī Allāh*, pp. 31-47.

276. Translation, Section X, Paras 68-71. This chapter discusses empirical bases for the universal application of the principles of *irtifāqāt* propounded by Shāh Walī Allāh.

277. Aḥmad Amīn, ed., *Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān li Ibn Sinā wa Ibn Ṭufayl wa al-Suhrawardī* (Baghdad: 1958), pp. 9-14, 57-131. For biographical details about Ibn Ṭufayl and his contribution to Muslim philosophical thought and an English summary of *Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān,* see Bakhtiar Husain Siddiqi, "Ibn Ṭufayl" in M.M. Sharif, ed., *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, vol. 1, pp. 526-539.

278. See Translation, Section X, Para 71.

279. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr*, p. 125.

280. See the discussion under the sub-heading: "Man and his *raison detre*", in chap. 2, pp. 20-22 above.

281. Translation, Section I, Para 4.

282. *Iqtirāb* is the singular of *iqtirābāt,* lit. seeking proximity. The root of this infinitive is "q-r-b" which carries the sense of nearness.

283. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr*, pp. 119-20, 126-34.

284. Ibid., pp. 90-96.

285. See Bashīr Aḥmad Ludhiyānvī, *Irtifāqāt-i Ma'āshiyyah* (Lahore: 1969), p. 146.

286. For an explanation of the title *khalīfah* and other related terms see Aḥmad ibn 'Abd Allāh al-Qalqashandī, *Ma'āthir al-Ināfah fī Ma'ālim al-Khilāfah*, ed., 'Abd al-Sattār Faraj (Beirut: n.d.), pp. 8-16.

287. W.M. Watt, "God's Caliph: Qur'ānic Interpretation and the Ummayyad Caliphs", in C.E. Bosworth, ed., *Iran and Islam* (Edinburgh: 1971), p. 568.

288. Lambton, *State and Government in Medieval Islam*, p. 15.

289. See the relevant tradition concerning the designation of Abū Bakr by the Prophet (peace be upon him), as *imām* in Abū Yūsuf, Ya'qūb ibn Ibrāhim *Kitāb al-Āthār* (Beirut: 1355 A.H), p. 57.

290. See some of these traditions and their political significance in Mahmood Ahmad Ghazi, "State and Politics", pp. 97-102. See also another contemporary discussion of the various titles used for *khalīfah* and other Muslim rulers in Muḥammad Farūq al-Nabhān, *Niẓām al-Ḥukm fī al-Islām* (Beirut: 1988), pp. 400-405.

291. Muṣṭafā Ḥilmī, *Niẓām al-Khilāfah fī al-Fikr al-Islāmī* (Alexandria: 1977), pp. 395-401; Māwardī, *al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah*, p.5; Lambton, *State and Government in Medieval Islam*, pp. 37-42.

292. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Izālah*, vol. 1, pp. 15-17.

293. Ibid., p. 17.

294. The term *jāhiliyyah* had been used since the time of the Prophet as an antithesis to Islam. It denotes a condition of faith and practice which is devoid of the guidance of Islam, particularly on the pattern that existed prior to the Prophetic era. The tradition cited by Shāh Walī Allāh has been, reported, *inter alia*, by Muslim, in *al-Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 3 (Cairo: 1955), p. 1478.

295. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Izālah*, pp. 14-15.

296. Shāh Walī Allāh, *al-Tafhīmāt al-Ilāhiyyah*, vol. 1, p. 13.

297. Muḥammad Sarvar, *Armaghān-i Shāh Walī Allāh*, p. 276.

298. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Izālah*, vol. 1, p. 13.

299. See Translation, Section VII, Paras 48-50 and Section XXI, Paras 210-13.

300. Translation, Section XII, Paras 210-218.

301. The term *kabā'ir* (major sins) used by Shāh Walī Allāh denotes the acts expressly prohibited by the injunctions of the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*.

302. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Izālah*, vol. 1, p. 20.

303. Ibid., pp. 20-21. The condition of possessing thorough religious knowledge, juridical understanding and other qualifications of *khalīfah* discussed by Shāh Walī Allāh have been more or less similarly mentioned in the works of most of the classical Muslim political thinkers like Juwaynī, Ghazālī, Ibn Khaldūn, Abū Ya'lā and Māwārdī. See a comparative discussion of the opinions of these thinkers in Muḥammad Farūq al-Nabhān, *Niẓām al-Ḥukm fī al-Islām*, pp. 412-27.

304. Translation, Section XXI, Paras 214-215. See the source of this tradition in Part Three (note 110). For the opinions of earlier authorities on the question of paternal ancestry of *khalīfah* see al-Nabhān, *Niẓām al-Ḥukm fī al-Islām*, pp. 24-27.

305. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Izālah*, vol. 1, pp. 18-21.

306. For the significance of this institution in the Islamic political and constitutional theory, see Muṣṭafā Ḥilmī, *Niẓām al-Khilāfah fī al-Fikr al-Islāmī*, pp. 416-423; Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī, *al-Tamhīd fī al-Radd 'alā al-Mulḥidah wa al-Mu'aṭṭilah* (Cairo: 1947), p.178; Māwardī, *al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah*, pp. 6-10; al-Nabhān, *Niẓām al-Ḥukm fī al-Islām*, pp. 430-32.

307. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Izālah*, vol. 1, p. 23.

308. Ibid., p. 24; Translation, Section XXI, Para 219.

309. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Izālah*, vol. 1, p. 23.

310. On the constitutional position of jurists with regard to *de facto* political authority see Māwardī, *al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah*, pp. 33-34; on the modes of establishment of *khilāfah* see al-Qalqashandī, *Ma'āthir al-Inafāh fī Ma'ālim al-Khilāfah*, pp. 39-59.

311. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Izālah*, vol. 1, pp. 23-24; Translation, Section XXI, Para 220. See also an analysis of the views of the early political philosophers on the constitutional aspects of deposing unqualified rulers in Muṣṭafā Ḥilmī op. cit., pp. 440-46; on the question of conditional cooperation with rulers within the limits prescribed by the *sharī'ah* see Mawdūdī, *Islāmī Riyāsat* (Lahore: 1988), pp. 407-18.

312. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Izālah*, vol. 1, p. 26.

313. Translation, Section XXI, Para 219.

314. The term *ṣadaqāt* (pl. of *ṣadaqah*, which may be approximately translated as "charity"), stands for an elaborate system of compulsory religious tax to be levied by the Islamic state on the excess wealth or savings of those affluent Muslim citizens who reach a specified ceiling. The proceeds are to be expended on the eight items specified in the Qur'ān (9: 60). See also the elaborate exposition of Ibn Taymiyyah on the question of valid means of expenditure from the exchequer recognized in the *sharī'ah* in his *al-Siyāsah al-Shar'iyyah fī Iṣlāḥ al-Rā'ī wa al-Ra'iyyah* (Beirut: n.d.), pp. 55-67.

315. *Amīr al-Ḥajj* was the title given to the dignitary appointed by the *khalīfah* to lead the pilgrimage and supervise the affairs related to this important pillar of Islam on that occasion.

316. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Izālah*, vol. 1, pp. 28-30. See also al-Māwardī, *al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah*, pp. 15-16. He identifies ten responsibilities of the *khalīfah* which are more or less similar to the ones recognized by Shāh Walī Allāh. See also al-Qalqashandī, *Ma'āthir al-Inafah fī Ma'ālim al-Khilāfah*, pp. 59-62 and al-Nabhān, *Nizām al-Ḥukm fī al-Islām*, pp. 465-74.

317. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Izālah*, vol. 1, p. 26.

318. Qur'ān 2:55.

319. According to Shāh Walī Allāh, the word *minkum* ("from amongst you"), occurring in the verse quoted above, is noteworthy in that it confines the signification of this verse to the early adherents of Islam, who actually attended the occasion of the revelation of this particular verse. The second important aspect of his argument is that since the Divine promise contained in this verse was contingent upon the acceptance of Faith by the first addressees of the Qur'ān, and that this promise was made in the most emphatic and categorical terms, therefore, there is no reason why this promise should not have materialized in respect of those who responded to the Prophet's call. Hence the application of this verse to the early Caliphs, particularly the first two of them, is beyond all doubt.

320. See Shāh Walī Allāh, *Izālah*, vol. 1, pp. 43-73.

321. *Muhājirūn* are those Muslims who migrated from Makkah to Madīnah along with the Prophet (peace be upon him). According to Shāh Walī Allāh,

verses 22:39-41 clearly imply Divine promise of establishing their rule in the land. See Shāh Walī Allāh, *Izālah*, vol. 1, pp. 43-45.

322. These high ranks of the faithful have been mentioned in the Qur'ān. See 4:69-70 in Sūrah 4; see also the commentary on the above verses in Muḥammad 'Alī Kandhlawī, *Ma'ālim al-Qur'ān*, vol. 6, pp. 367-70.

323. Shāh Walī Allāh explains in detail each component of these qualifications for *khilāfah khāṣṣah* and substantiates, with evidence from early history, his contention that the four immediate successors of the Prophet (peace be upon him), particularly the first two of them, were tacitly designated, not only by the Prophet which is also recognized by some scholars (see, for instance, Ḥāmid al-Anṣārī Ghazī, *Islām kā Niẓām-i Ḥukūmat*,, 3rd ed. Lahore: n.d., pp. 100-120)—but also by the implicit suggestions made in a number of Qur'ānic verses. See Shāh Walī Allāh, *Izālah*, vol. 1, pp. 43-73.

324. Ibid., pp. 27-28.

325. Ibid., p. 42.

326. Ibid., p. 39.

327. Ibid., p. 31. For a background to the discussions of the classical jurists and political thinkers of Islam concerning the nature of relations between the state and its citizens, see Lambton, *State and Government in Medieval Islam*, pp. 307-15.

328. Translation, Section XXI, Paras 220-222; see also the factors warranting the removal of the *khalīfah* in al-Qalqashandī, *Ma'āthir al-Ināfah fī Ma'ālim al-Khilāfah*, pp. 64-74.

329. Ibid., Para 220.

330. Ibid.

331. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Izālah*, vol. 1, p. 32.

332. Ibid., pp. 31-33.

333. Translation, from the Sections on politics, Para 209.

334. For a contemporary discussion of the ideas of al-Bāqillānī and Māwardī see Lambton, *State and Government in Medieval Islam*, pp. 69-82 and 83-102.

335. See chapter 4 above, on the theory of *irtifāqāt*. See also Translation, Sections I-IX, Paras 1-67.

336. The term *jizyah* denotes the poll-tax levied on non-Muslims living under the protection of the Islamic state. See Abū Yūsuf, *Kitāb al-Kharāj*, pp. 120-49. The author, a well-known disciple of Imām Abū Ḥanīfah and one of the early founders of his school, held the office of the Chief Justice under the Abbasid Caliph, Hārūn al-Rashīd, and wrote the above treatise at the latter's request.

337. Translation, from the Section on politics, Para 207.

338. Ibid.

339. Ibid., Para 208.

340. Ibid., Para 209.

341. Qur'ān 5:32.

342. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Ḥujjah*, vol. 2, p. 151.

343. Ibid., pp. 151-56.

344. Ibid.

345. Ibid., pp. 153-68. For an earlier juridical discussion on these crimes see 'Abd al-Wahhāb al-Sha'rānī, *al-Mizān al-Kubrā* (Cairo: 1279 A.H.), vol. 2, pp. 171-94.

346. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Ḥujjah*, vol. 2, p.151; see also 'Alā' al-Dīn ibn Mas'ūd al-Kāsāni, *Badā'i 'al-Ṣanā'i'* (Karachi: 1400 A.H), vol. 2, pp. 33-40.

347. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Ḥujjah*, p. 166.

348. Ibid., p. 167. For the detailed rules of the *sharī'ah* with regard to judicature see Abū Bakr Aḥmad ibn 'Umar al-Khaṣṣāf, *Sharḥ Adab al-Qāḍī*, tr. Saeed Ahmad (Islamabad: 1987), vol. 1, pp. 67-109.

349. Translation, Section XXII, Paras 237-70.

350. Ibid., Section XXIII, Para 271.

351. Ibid., Para 272.

352. Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad* (Cairo: 1313 A.H.), vol. 2, p. 306.

353. Translation, Section XXIII, Paras 272-273.

354. Qur'ān 8:17.

355. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Ḥujjah*, vol. 2, pp. 170-174. For an early discussion based on the Prophetic traditions about *jihād* see 'Abd Allāh ibn al-Mubārak *Kitāb al-Jihād*, ed., Nazīh Ḥammād (Beirut: 1971), *passim.*

356. Translation, Section XXIII, Paras 271-75.

357. Translation, Section XXIII, Paras 278-79.

358. Ibid., Paras 280-81.

359. Ibid., Para 282.

360. Ibid., Paras 283-84.

361. Ibid.

362. Ibid., Para 289. For a detailed and authentic account of the early battles of Islam see Muḥammad ibn 'Umar al-Wāqidī, ed., M. Jones, *al-Maghāzī* (Cairo: 1966), *passim*.

363. Translation, Section XXIII, Para 296.

364. Ibid., Paras 299-302.

365. Ibid., Para 302.

366. Ibid., Paras 303-04. For details of the Prophet's conduct in war, see an early source *Akhbār al-Nabī* in Muḥammad ibn Ibn Sa'ad *Ṭabaqāt*, (Karachi: 1983), vol. 1, pp. 302-75. For the principles of Islamic international law (both public and private), see the relevant provisions of Islamic legal injunctions regulating the mandatory conduct of state in war: Muhammad Ḥamidullah, *The Muslim Conduct of State* (Lahore: 1973), pp. 179-284.

367. For the full text of the relevant tradition see Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 4, p. 240. For the Prophet's precedents in war, see the work of a contemporary scholar, Muḥammad Sa'īd Ramaḍān al-Būṭī, *Fiqh al-Sīrah* (Damascus: 1980), pp. 211-311.

368. See Shāh Walī Allāh, *Ḥujjah*, vol. 2, p. 175.

369. The term *hijrah* denotes migration in the way of God for the protection of Faith and the furtherance of its cause. See, for the significance of *hijrah* in early Islam, Mahmood Ahmad Ghazi, *The Hijrah: Its Philosophy and Message for Modern Man* (Lahore: 1980), *passim*.

370. Translation, Section XXIII, Paras 305-06.

371. Ibid., Para 321.

372. In this context, the term *imām* seems to stand for whoever acts as the leader in-charge of the Muslims concerned with the issue in question. The standard definition of the title has been offered, among others, by 'Alī ibn Muḥammad al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d. 816 A.H.) as follows: "*imām* is the one who exercises general authority in religious as well as worldly matters". See al-Jurjānī, *Kitāb al-Ta'rifāt* (Beirut: 1969), p. 37.

373. Translation, Section XXIII, Paras 324-47. See also a legal commentary on the relevant verses of *Sūrat al-Anfāl (Sūrah* 8) in Shaykh Aḥmad (alias Mullā Jīwan Jaunpūri), *al-Tafsīrat al-Aḥmadiyyah fī Bayān al-Āyāt al-Shar'iyyah* (Bombay: 1327 A.H.), pp. 428-48.

374. Translation, Section XXIII, Paras 308-12.

375. Ibid., Para 307.

PART TWO

376. For an appreciation of Shāh Walī Allāh as an author see Abū al-Ḥasan 'Alī Nadvī, "Ḥażrat Shāh Walī Allāh ba Ḥaythiyat-i Muṣannif" in *al-Furqān* (Special Number), pp. 359-368. See also the volume on Shāh Walī Allāh in his series entitled: *Tarīkh-i Da'wat va 'Azīmat* (Lucknow: 1984), *passim*. Syed Abū al-Naẓar Amrōhvi Riżvī, "Shāh Walī Allāh aur Unkī ba'ż 'Ilmī Khuṣūṣiyyāt" in *al-Furqān*, (Special Number), pp. 376-426. See also Muḥammad Manzūr Nu'mānī, ibid., General Introduction to the Life and Works of Shāh Walī Allāh, pp. 401-26. It may be mentioned here that the last article also contains a summary of the short autobiographical account of Shāh Walī Allāh.

377. For the details of the historical authenticity of various works attributed to Shāh Walī Allāh see Muḥammad Ayyūb Qādirī, "Shāh Walī Allāh sē Mansūb Taṣānīf" in *al-Raḥīm*, vol. 2, no. 1 (June, 1964), pp. 14-26; Bashīr Aḥmad Ludhiyānvī, *Irtifāqāt-i Ma'āshiyyah*, pp. 17-32; Ghulām Muṣṭafā Qāsimī, "Shāh Walī Allāh kī Tālifāt par Ēk Naẓar" in *al-Raḥīm*, vol. 4, no. 1 (June 1966), pp. 31-36.

378. According to M.S.H. Masumi, the learned editor of *al-Budūr al-Bāzighah*, however, *Budūr* was written after the *Ḥujjah*. See *Budūr*, p. 111. But looking at the development and further elaboration of the very ideas in the *Ḥujjah*, found concisely but succinctly in the *Budūr*, the present writer is tentatively inclined to the opposite view, pending the availability of any authentic historical record which might furnish some definite evidence to the contrary on this point, in future.

379. Halepota, *Philosophy of Shāh Walī Allāh*, pp. 53-69.

380. This seems to be an inference from the verse 20:5 of the Qur'ān; see also Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr*, pp. 2-9.

381. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Badūr*, p. 2.

382. Ibid., p. 31.

383. Ibid., pp. 32-42.

384. Ibid., pp. 61-4.

385. Halepota, *Philosophy of Shāh Walī Allāh*, pp. 54-55.

386. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Ḥujjah*, vol. 1, pp. 26-29.

387. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr*, pp. 47-60. For a detailed discussion of the psychological aspects of human behaviour in the philosophy of Shāh Walī Allāh see Halepota, *Philosophy of Shāh Walī Allāh*, pp. 54-66.

388. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Budūr*, pp. 61-113.

389. *Iqtirābāt*, plural of *iqtirāb* is Shāh Walī Allāh's special term for human endeavours toward attaining Divine proximity conducive to salvation in the Hereafter. See ibid., pp. 115-116.

390. Ibid., pp. 125-27.

391. Ibid., p. 127.

392. Ibid., pp. 127-34.

393. Ibid., pp. 135-239.

394. Ibid., p. 240.

395. Ibid., pp. 241-54.

396. Ibid., p. 256.

397. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Izālah*, p. 8.

398. See the translator's note, ibid., p. 5.

399. Ibid., pp. 8-9.

400. Ibid., p. 12.

401. Ibid., pp. 13-35.

402. All this discussion is spread throughout *Izālah* and is replete with original insights on this subject. See Ibid., pp. 75-610.

403. See the elaborate discussion of the extraordinary attributes and achievements of the early caliphs in Shāh Walī Allāh, *Izālah*, vol. 2, *passim*.

404. Mahmood Ahmad Ghazi, "Political Letters of Shāh Walī Allāh" in *Journal of Pakistan Historical Society*, vol. 30 (April, 1982), pt. 2, pp. 87-88.

405. See Khalīq Aḥmad Niẓāmī, *Shāh Walī Allāh kē Siyāsī Maktūbāt* (Delhi: 1969).

406. Ibid., pp. 42-46.

407. Ibid., letter no. 2, pp. 6-17.

408. Mahmood Ahmad Ghazi, "Political Letters", p. 90.

409. Niẓāmī, *Shāh Walī Allāh kē Siyāsī Maktūbāt*, p. 232.

410. Ibid., letter no. 6, p. 21.

411. See also ibid., letter no. 8, p. 24.

412. Ibid., p. 25.

413. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Ḥujjah*, p. 3.

414. Ibid.

415. See Shāh Walī Allāh, *Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bāliġhah*, Urdu trans. 'Abd al-Raḥīm (Lahore: 1983), vol. 2, p. 102.

416. Ibid.

417. Muḥammad Manẓūr Nu'māni, in *al-Furqān* (Special Number), p. 407.

418. Abū al-Ḥasan 'Alī Nadvī, "Ḥażrat Shāh Walī Allāh ba Ḥaythiyat Muṣannif" in *al-Furqān* (Special Number), p. 363.

419. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Ḥujjah*, p. 3.

420. Ibid., p. 4.

421. Ibid., p. 11.

422. Ibid.

423. Ibid. pp. 11-31.

424. Ibid., pp. 31-32.

425. Ibid., pp. 38-49.

426. Ibid., pp. 50-51.

427. Ibid., p. 50.

428. Ibid., pp. 56-58.

429. Ibid., pp. 58-59.

430. Ibid., pp. 60-61.

431. Ibid., pp. 82-128.

432. Ibid., pp. 128-162.

433. *Taqlīd* denotes a strict adherence to the opinions of one jurist or his school without scrutanizing the evidence supporting these opinions. See ibid., pp. 126-128.

434. *Sunan* is a term used in the *Ḥadīth* literature for the collections of *aḥādīth* according to subjects such as *īmān*, *ṭahārah*, *ṣalāh*, *ṣawm*, *zakāh*, *ḥajj* and *jihād* (e.g., *Sunan Abī Dāwūd*).

435. *Jāmi'* signifies a *ḥadīth* compilation covering all the typical eight subjects included in such early works as *al-Jāmi'* by al-Tirmidhī. These eight subjects are; *īmān, aḥkām, akhlāq, fitan, qaṣaṣ, tafsīr, adab,* and *riqāq*.

436. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Ḥujjah*, p. 162.

PART THREE

1. Qur'ān 2:246.
2. Qur'ān 17:40.
3. Qur'ān 2:193.
4. Qur'ān 13:8.
5. *Karāmāt*, plural of *karāmah*, i.e. the semi-miraculous signs seen in persons below the rank of a Prophet. But unlike the miracles of the Prophets, *karāmāt* are strictly personal experiences devoid of any normative value. See Muḥammad Ajmal, "'Ilm aur Madhabī Wāridāt" in *Maqālāt-i Ajmal*, ed. Shīmā Majīd (Lahore: 1987), pp. 87-101.
6. Qur'ān 62:2.
7. Qur'ān 3:109.
8. Abū Dawūd Sulaymān ibn al-Ash'ath al-Sajistānī, *Sunan* (Kanpur: 1346 A.H.), vol. 1, p. 54.
9. For the philosophical aspect of the institution of Prophethood in Islam, see the scholarly exposition of Khalifa Abdul Hakim, *The Prophet and His Message* (Lahore: 1987), pp. 1-26, 238-58.
10. Qur'ān 37:171-73.
11. Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, *Jam' al-Jawāmi'* (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyyah, 1288 A.H.), vol. 1, pp. 477-478. See also Ismā'īl ibn Muḥammad al-'Ajlūni, *Kashf al-Khafā' wa Muzīl al-Albās 'ammā Ishtahara min al-Aḥādith 'alā Alsinat al-Nās* (Cairo: 1351 A.H.), vol. 1, p. 311.
12. Qur'ān 53:42.
13. See Ábū Muḥammad Ḥusayn ibn Mas'ūd al-Baghawī (d. 516 A.H.), *Ma'āalim al-Tanzīl*, (Beirut: 1986), vol. 4, p. 255. The editors of this early work on *tafsīr* say that they were unable to trace this tradition in any early sources of *Ḥadīth*.
14. For the doctrinal bases of these juridical schools in the early Islamic period see Abū Zahrah, *Ta'rīkh al-Madhāhib al-Fiqhiyyah* (Cairo: n.d.), pp. 31-41 and 175-181. See also an early source of the Ḥanafī school: Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī, *Kitāb al-Ḥujjah 'alā Ahl al-Madīnah*, 4 vols. (Lahore: 1981).
15. Qur'ān 2 : 189. This verse alludes to Mu'ādh ibn Jabal and another Companion from the *Anṣār*. The two of them are reported to have put this question to the Prophet (peace be upon him) concerning the lunar phenomenon. See al-Baghawī, *Ma'ālim al-Tanzīl*, commentary on verse 2:189.

16. Qur'ān 42:13.
17. Mujāhid ibn Jabr al-Makkī, *Tafsīr Mujāhid*, ed., 'Abd al-Raḥmān Sūrtī (Dawḥah, Qatar: 1976), p. 574.
18. Qur'ān 23:52-3.
19. Qur'ān 5:48.
20. Muḥammad ibn Ismā'īl al-Bukhāri, *al-Jāmi' al-Ṣaḥīḥ* (Damascus: 1987), vol. 1, p. 11.
21. Qur'ān 22:67.
22. Qur'ān 2:275.
23. For details concerning *kharāj* and *'ushr* see Yaḥyā ibn Ādam al-Qurashī (d. 203 A.H.), *Kitāb al-Kharāj*, ed., Aḥmad Muḥammad Shākir (Cairo: 1384 A.H.); also see *infra* n. 208.
24. Qur'ān 2:93. See, for the background to the revelation of this verse, al-Qurṭubī, *al-Jāmi' li Aḥkām al-Qur'ān* (Cairo: 1936), vol. 4, pp. 134-136. For the prohibition of camel's meat and milk among the Israelites see the tradition cited by Abū 'Īsa al-Tirmidhī, *al-Jāmi'* (Karachi: 1984), vol. 2, p. 144.
25. Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, vol. 1, p. 204.
26. Abū Ḥusayn Muslim ibn al-Ḥajjāj, *Ṣaḥīḥ* (Beirut: 1954), vol. 4, p. 1831.
27. Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 2, p. 49.
28. Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Yazīd ibn Mājah, *Sunan* (Cairo: 1952), vol. 2, p. 963.
29. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 547.
30. The doctrine of abrogation, a subject of lengthy discussions among the classical Qur'ānic exegetes and jurists, is mainly based on the verse 2:106 of the Qur'ān.
31. Qur'ān 23:53.
32. Qur'ān 13:11.
33. Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 1, p. 116.
34. The Old Testament has listed the kins with whom marriage is unlawful, but it does not mention the sister's daughter as one of them. However, a more extensive search might reveal the Jewish source of this injunction in that religion as contented by Shāh Walī Allāh. See *Holy Bible*, King James Version (New York: 1967), Lev. 18 : 2-30, pp. 150-51.
35. Qur'ān 22:78.
36. Qur'ān, 37:83.

37. Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 1, pp. 184-86.

38. The term *ifk*, derived from the Qur'ānic verses 24:11-17, alludes to the false accusation levelled against Sayyidah 'Ā'ishah, the Mother of the Faithful (may God be pleased with her). The above verses were revealed to furnish Divine vindication of her character. Bukhārī has recorded the incident in a detailed report narrated by him in his *Ṣaḥīḥ*. See Bukhāri, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 4, pp. 1774-78.

39. Qur'ān 58:1-4.

40. Qur'ān 5:101.

41. Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 2, p. 975.

42. See n. 26 above.

43. Abū Jā'far Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, *Jāmi' al-Bayān fī Tafsīr al-Qur'ān*, ed. Maḥmūd Muḥammad Shākir (Cairo: 1374), vol. 2, pp. 204-06.

44. Mālik ibn Anas, *al-Muwaṭṭa'* (Beirut: 1951), vol. 2, p. 885.

45. Qur'ān 5:38.

46. Qur'ān 24:2.

47. Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 3, p. 476.

48. Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, vol. 2, p. 1189.

49. Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 5, p. 257.

50. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 381.

51. Ibid., vol. 5, p. 266.

52. For further information on the pre-Islamic Arab culture, see 'Umar Farrūkh, *Ta'rīkh al-Jāhiliyyah* (Beirut: 1964), pp. 149-168.

53. See Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, vol. 2, pp. 268-69; see also Aḥmad ibn 'Alī al-Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rīkh al-Ya'qūbī* (Najaf: 1358 A.H.), vol. 1, pp. 213-14.

54. *Qasāmah* is the principle of collective liability in *diyah* if the actual murderer is not traceable. See Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, vol. 2, pp. 265-66 and Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 5, p. 432.

55. Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, vol. 2, pp. 257 and 378-379.

56. For the bases of these injunctions in the *Sunnah*, see Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, vol. 1, p. 586. For other details concerning the provisions of land revenue in Islam see a historical-cum-juridical work, Muftī Muḥammad Shafī', *Islām kā Niẓāmi-i Arāḍī* (Karachi: 1383 A.H.), pp. 14-48.

57. *Holy Bible*, Lev. 20 : 10, p. 153; Ex. 22 : 2, p. 98; Gen. 9 : 6, p. 14.

58. Features of pre-Islamic religious culture have been an important subject of study from the earliest times. It was against this background that many Muslim scholars attempted to explain a number of social, psychological and anthropological dimensions of the injunctions of Islam. Shāh Walī Allāh is no exception to this. For further information on the religious life of the Arabs before the advent of Islam, see Muḥammad 'Izzah Darwazah, *Ta'rīkh al-Jins al-'Arabī* (Beirut: 1961), vol. 5, pp. 269-306.

59. Ibn Ḥanbal, *Sunan*, vol. 2, pp. 233 and 240 and vol. 5, pp. 92 and 99.

60. Ibid., vol. 5, p. 72.

61. Qur'ān 2:279. See also Abū al-Fidā' Ismā'īl ibn 'Umar ibn Kathīr, *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-'Aẓīm* (Cairo: 1956), commentary on the above verses of the Qur'ān.

62. See 'Abd Allāh ibn al-Muqaffa', *Kalīlah wa Dimnah* (Cairo: 1936), p. 77.

63. See n.58 above. See also Maḥmūd Shukrī al-Ālūsī, *Bulūgh al-Arab fī Ma'rifat Aḥwāl al-'Arab* (Cairo: 1924), vol. 2, pp. 194-244.

64. Qur'ān 3:109.

65. See Abū al-Fidā' Ismā'īl ibn 'Umar ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāyah wa al-Nihāyah*, (Cairo: 1932), vol. 7, pp. 18-113.

66. See 'Alī ibn Ḥusayn al-Mas'ūdī, *Murūj al-Dhahab* (Cairo: 1948), vol. 2, p. 331. See also ibid., pp. 87-88.

67. Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, vol. 2, p. 236.

68. See n. 59 above.

69. Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 3, pp. 129 and 183.

70. ibid., vol. 2, p. 151.

71. This requirement of paying tribute, which represents a symbolic acknowledgement of Islam's ascendancy, is based on the verse 9:29 of the Qur'ān.

72. Qur'ān 22:78.

73. For details see Jawwād 'Alī, *Ta'rīkh al-'Arab Qabl al-Islām* (Beirut: 1980), vol. 4, pp. 14-15, 438; vol. 6, pp. 34,69,76-81. For further information on pagan and polytheistic practices in the pre-Islamic Arabian society, see al-Ālūsi, *Bulūgh al-Arab fī Ma'rifat Aḥwāl al-'Arab*, vol. 2, pp. 286-300.

74. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 36.

75. Al-Ālūsi gives an elaborate and comprehensive survey of the religious concepts and rites prevalent among the Arabs which were nullified by Islam. See ibid., vol. 2, pp. 301-366.

76. For a discussion of *irtifāqāt*, see *supra*, Sections I to VIII.

77. Qur'ān 32:3.

78. Qur'ān 31:25.

79. Qur'ān 6:41.

80. Qur'ān 17:67.

81. Analogy for the unseen (*ghayb*) drawn from the seen (*shahādah*) means the speculation that the authority of certain presumably holy persons in the Divine scheme was similar to that of smaller kings within a vast worldly empire ruled by a mighty emperor.

82. Qur'ān 66:6.

83. Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 1, p. 256, vol. 4, p. 438. For further biographical and literary information on Umayyah ibn Abī al-Ṣalt (d. 624 C.E.), see Jurjī Zaydān, *Ta'rīkh Ādāb al-Lughah al-'Arabiyyah* (Beirut: 1983), vol. 1, pp. 132-33.

84. Among important sources for the study of pre-Islamic religious concepts is the available material of poetry attributed to that age. See Nūrī Ḥammūdī al-Qaysī, *Dirāsāt fī al-Shi'r al-Jāhilī* (Baghdad: 1972), pp. 30-43.

85. Qur'ān 6:91.

86. Qur'ān 25:7.

87. Qur'ān 46:9.

88. Quss ibn Sā'idah al-Ayādī (d. circa 600 C.E.) was a Christian hermit renowned for his oratory, wisdom and monotheistic ideas in pre-Islamic Arabia. For details see Aḥmad Ḥasan al-Zayyāt, *Ta'rīkh al-Adab al-'Arabī*, 23rd ed. (Cairo: n.d.), pp. 20-22. See also Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāyah wa al-Nihāyah*, vol. 2, pp. 230-37; Jurjī Zaydān, *Tārīkh Ādāb al-Lughah 'al-Arabiyyah*, p. 135; al-Ālūsi, *Bulūgh al-Arab fī Ma'rifat Aḥwāl al-'Arab*, vol. 1, pp. 172-78, 267, 309.

89. Zayd ibn 'Amr ibn Nafīl (d. *circa* 620 C.E) was a poet from the Quraysh known for his abandonment of paganism and idolatry in the *jāhilī* era. He was a cousin of the Caliph 'Umar and belonged to the famous 'Adī tribe. See Abū al-Faraj al-Iṣbahāni, *Kitāb al-Aghānī* (Cairo: 1223 A.H), vol. 2, pp. 15-19. For further biographical information see Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāyah wa al-Nihāyah*, pp. 237-43; and al-Ālūsī, *Bulūgh al-Arab fī Ma'rifat Aḥwāl al-'Arab*, vol. 2, pp. 244-58.

90. For further details about 'Amr ibn Luḥayy and his role in the propagation of idolatry in pre-Islamic Arabia. See al-Mas'ūdī, *Murūj al-Dhahab*, vol. 2, pp. 56-57; Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāyah wa al-Nihāyah*, pp. 187-90.

91. Al-Iṣbaḥānī, *Kitāb al-Aghānī*, vol. 2, pp. 15-19; see also n. 89 above.

92. Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 4, p. 388.

93. Al-Ālūsī, *Bulūgh al-'Arab fī Ma'rifat Aḥwāl al-'Arab*, vol. 2, pp. 194-244.

94. See The Old Testament, in *The New Scofield Reference Bible* (Great Britain, 1967), Gen. 17 : 9-14; see also *Holy Bible*, Rom. 4 : 1-12, pp. 1215-16.

95. Al-Ālūsī, *Bulūgh al-Arab fī Ma'rifat Aḥwāl al-'Arab*, vol. 2, pp. 194-244.

96. Farrūkh, *Ta'rīkh al-Jāhiliyyah*, pp. 149-68.

97. Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 1, pp. 4-5.

98. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 903-05.

99. Ibid., vol. 4, p.1637; see also al-Ālūsī, *Bulūgh al-Arab fī Ma'rifat Aḥwāl al-'Arab*, vol. 2, p. 288.

100. Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 2, p. 718.

101. 'Āṣ ibn Wā'il (d. *circa* 620 C.E.) was one of the chiefs of Quraysh in pre-Islamic Arabia. He was the father of the prominent Companion of the Prophet, 'Amr ibn al-'Āṣ, the conqueror of Egypt. See Khayr al-Dīn al-Ziriklī, *al-A'lām* (Beirut: 1980) vol.3, p. 247; see also Abū Ja'far, Muḥammad ibn Ḥabīb al-Baghdādī (d. 245 A.H.), *Kitāb al-Muḥabbar* (Lahore: n.d.), pp. 133, 158, 161, 170 and 176.

102. Al-Ālūsī, *Bulūgh al-Arab fī Ma'rifat Aḥwāl al-'Arab*, vol. 3, p. 66; Jurjī Zaydān, *Ta'rīkh Ādāb al-Lughah al-'Arabiyyah*, vol. 1, pp. 178-84.

103. Al-Ālūsi, *Bulūgh al-Arab fī Ma'rifat Aḥwāl al-'Arab*, vol. 3, p.66; Jurjī, Zaydān, *Ta'rīkh Ādāb al-Lughah al-'Arabiyyah*, pp. 178-84.

104. Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 2, pp. 580-81.

105. See *supra*, nn. 73 and 90. For the role of 'Amr ibn Luḥayy in the popularization of idolatry in pre-Islamic Arabia see al-Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rīkh al-Ya'qūbī*, vol. 1, pp. 211-14 and 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Khaldūn, *Ta'rīkh* (Cairo: 1936), vol. 2, pp. 156-158.

106. Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 6, pp. 116 and 232.

107. The term *imām* denotes intellectual and religious leader of the community of the faithful who possesses knowledge, piety and wisdom. In other contexts, however, the same term stands for a ruler who fulfills the requisite qualifications laid down in Islam, as we shall see later.

108. Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 4, p. 1610.

109. Qur'ān 24:55.

110. Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 3, p. 129, 183 and vol. 4, p. 421.

111. For this and other statements of political significance of the early successors, see Shāh Walī Allāh, *Izālah*, vol. 1, pp. 2-18.

112. On the occasion of the conquest of Makkah, instead of handing over the keys of the House of God to his uncle, 'Abbās ibn 'Abd al-Muṭṭalib, the Prophet (peace be upon him) retained the privilege of having them with their erstwhile keepers. This gesture, according to Shāh Walī Allāh, was meant to emphasize the egalitarian message of Islam which recognized no exclusive privilege of any family. See, for the details of this event, Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 2, p. 103.

113. On the installation of the early caliphs, their legitimacy, and the mode of their election see Shāh Walī Allāh, *Izālah*, vol. 1, pp. 2-18. See also Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, vol. 2, p. 52 and Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 2, pp. 185-188.

114. Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 3, p. 1481.

115. Ibid., vol. 3, p. 1470.

116. Ibid., vol. 3, p. 1569.

117. *Amīr*, in this context, is a general term, which stands for any authority validly established within the religio-political order of Islam.

118. Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 3, p. 1466.

119. Ibid., vol. 3, p. 1471.

120. Ibid., vol. 3, p. 1477.

121. The term *jāhiliyyah* has been inaccurately translated by some contemporary writers as ignorance. It has, in fact, been used in the classical literature as the way of life that is an anti-thesis to Islam. The root J-H-L, apart from ignorance, also carries a sense of violence. If the root of Islam is S–L– M (i.e. peace), its anti-thesis should naturally be peacelessness or violence. *Jāhiliyyah* is thus, an ethos devoid of the compassion and clemency that is characteristic of Islam. For a further exploration of the signification of this term see Farrūkh, *Ta'rīkh al-Jāhiliyyah, passim.*

122. Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 6, p. 2614.

123. *'Ushr* (lit. one tenth part of something) is the 10% compulsory religious tax deducted from the agricultural produce, subject to certain conditions. See n. 23 above.

124. Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 2, p. 729.

125. Ibid., vol. 3, p. 1135.

126. Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, vol. 2, p. 52.

127. Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, vol. 2, p. 775.

128. Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 2, p. 789; see also another tradition pertaining to self candidature in Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, vol. 2, p. 50 and Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 6, p. 2613.

129. Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 4, p. 360. The text of this tradition, as we have been able to locate, contains the word *muṣaddiq*, collector, rather than *'āmil* (governor), which occurs in the version cited by Shāh Walī Allāh. However, this variation in text does not significantly affect the implication in the context of the present discussion.

130. Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, vol. 2, pp. 52-53.

131. Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, vol. 2, p. 774. For a detailed juridical discussion of the relevant provisions of Islamic law of judicature, see Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfi'ī, *Kitāb al-Umm* (Cairo: 1324 A.H.), vol. 6, pp. 201-79, vol. 7, pp. 2-87 and Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī, *al-Jāmi' al-Ṣaghīr* (Karachi: n.d.), pp. 313-31.

132. Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, vol. 2, p. 774.

133. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 776.

134. Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 6, p. 2616.

135. Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, vol. 2, p. 776.

136. Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 1, pp. 143 and 150.

137. Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 2, p. 960.

138. Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, vol. 2, p. 778.

139. Qur'ān 2:282.

140. Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, vol. 2, p. 792.

141. Qur'ān 24:4-5.

142. Qur'ān 24:4-5.

143. Abū Bakr 'Abd Allāh ibn Muḥammad ibn Abī Shaybah, *al-Muṣannaf*, (Karachi: 1986), vol. 10, p. 58; 'Abd al-Razzāq Abū Bakr ibn Humām al-Ṣan'ānī, *al-Muṣannaf* (Beirut: 1972), vol. 8, pp. 329-32.

144. Qur'ān 2:282.

145. Qur'ān 2:282.

146. Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, vol. 2, p. 793.

147. Tirmidhī, *al-Jāmi'*, vol. 2, pp. 106-10.

148. Abū Bakr al-Jaṣṣāṣ, a leading authority on the legal study of the Qur'ān, while commenting on the verse 2: 282, has discussed at length the provisions of the laws of evidence in the Qur'ān. See Abū Bakr Aḥmad ibn 'Alī al-Jaṣṣāṣ, *Aḥkām al-Qur'ān* (Lahore: 1980), vol. 1, pp. 494-522; see also Tirmidhī, *al-Jāmi'*, vol. 2, p. 110.

149. Qur'ān 7:106.

150. *Maqām* (lit. standing place) is the spot in al-Masjid al-Ḥarām at Makkah where Prophet Ibrāhīm stood while building the Ka'bah. The sanctity of this spot has been underlined in the Qur'ān. See Qur'ān 2:125.

151. Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, vol. 2, p. 779.

152. Qur'ān 2:283.

153. Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, vol. 2, p. 777.

154. Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 1, pp. 79-80.

155. Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, vol. 2, p. 777.

156. Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 2, p. 767.

157. 'Alī ibn 'Umar ibn Mahdī al-Dārquṭnī, *Sunan*, vol. 2 (Delhi: 1310 A.H.), p. 513.

158. For the Prophet's precedent of deciding a dispute by casting of lots, see Ibn Abī Shaybah, *al-Muṣannaf*, vol. 6, p. 318.

159. See *supra*, n. 137. The Prophet preferred Ja'far in his judgement, because the latter's wife happened to be the maternal aunt of the girl whose care was solicited by the three disputing Companions of the Prophet (peace be upon him).

160. The text of the tradition is: "If people had known the tremendous religious value of calling to prayers and that of the standing in the first row in congregational prayers, and then they had found no means to attain it other than casting lots, they surely would have done so". See Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 2, pp. 303, 533.

161. Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, vol. 2, p. 786.

162. For the significance of *'urf* (usage) and *'ādah* (custom) as evidence in Islamic law, see al-Fatḥī al-Duraynī, *al-Manāhij al-Uṣūliyyah fī al-Ijtihād bi al-Ra'y*, vol. 1 (Damascus: 1976), pp. 579-634.

163. Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, vol. 2, p. 781.

164. Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 6, p. 237.

165. Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 3, p. 1163.

166. Tirmidhī, *al-Jāmi'*, vol. 1, p. 251.

167. See *supra*, nn. 137 and 159.

168. Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 2, pp. 239, 280, 386, 400, 406, 475 and 492 and Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 2, p. 852.

169. Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 1, p. 166 and vol. 6, p. 5.

170. Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, vol. 2, p. 781.

171. Ibn Abī Shaybah, *al-Muṣannaf*, vol. 7, pp. 171-73.

172. Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, vol. 2, p. 784.

173. Tirmidhī, *al-Jāmi'*, vol. 1, p. 253.

174. It should be noted that Ibn Khaldūn classifies the phenomenon of war—which, according to him, is intrinsic to human nature—into moral and immoral categories, reckoning *jihād* in the former category. He clarifies the concept of *jihād* in contradistinction to oppressive, aggressive and expansionist wars, illustrating his views with reference to historical events. See Ibn Khaldūn, *Muqaddimah*, pp. 270-79.

175. Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 4, pp. 162 and 266.

176. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 306.

177. Qur'ān 8:17.

178. Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 1, p. 2197; Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 2, p. 306 and vol. 4, p. 162.

179. See n. 59 above.

180. Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 4, pp. 392, 397, 402, 405 and 417.

181. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 242, 400 and 531; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 3, p. 1496.

182. Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 3, p. 1028 and Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 2, pp. 325 and 355.

183. Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 2, p. 192.

184. Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 2, p. 1498.

185. Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 2, p. 1059.

186. Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 2, p. 1520; Ibn Hanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 1, pp. 62, 65, 66 and 75.

187. For an historical account of these conquests, see Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāyah wa al-Nihāyah*, vols. 7-10.

188. *Munkar* and *nakīr* are the names of the two Angels who are commissioned to pose questions to the dead concerning their faith. For further elaboration see Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, *Iḥyā' 'Ūlūm al-Dīn*, (Cairo: 1957), vol. 4, pp. 483-488.

189. Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 3, p. 1045-46 and Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 1, p.20 and 53, vol. 4, pp. 115-17.

190. This report could not be traced in any of the available well-known sources of the traditions. However, the sense of this tradition is implied in the significations of several other statements of the Prophet (peace be upon him), some of which have been cited earlier.

191. See *supra*, n. 181.

192. Qur'ān 3:169.

193. Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 3, pp. 1502-03; Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 1, p. 266, vol. 4, p. 386.

194. Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 2, p. 923 and Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 3, pp. 103, 160, 182, 214, 300 and 341.

195. Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, vol. 2, p. 923; Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 3, pp. 103, 160, 182, 214, 300 and 341.

196. Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 3, p. 1494 and Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 3, pp. 114, 127 and 171.

197. Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 3, p. 1493; Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 3, p. 39, vol. 5, p. 181.

198. Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 3, p. 1048; Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 2, p. 374.

199. Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, vol. 2, p. 940; Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 4, pp. 144, 146, 148 and 154.

200. Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 4, pp. 113 and 384.

201. Qur'ān 48:17.

202. Qur'ān 9:91.

203. Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 2, pp. 14 and 197.

204. Qur'ān 8:66.

205. Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, vol. 2, pp. 953-54; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, vol. 1, pp. 351-52. The rest of this tradition, as reported in the above sources, reads as follows: "...do not deceive, do not mutilate, do not kill an infant, when you encounter your enemy from amongst the polytheists, invite them to three options. Accept from them whatever of these options is chosen by them, and then refrain from fighting".

206. For prohibition of mutilation, breach of faith, killing of women and children and other instructions of the Prophet (peace be upon him) and about proper conduct in war see Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 3, p. 1098; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 3, pp. 1357-58; Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 4, pp. 246, 307, 428-29; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, vol. 1, pp. 335-56 and vol. 2, pp. 2-29.

207. Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 1, p. 42.

208. *Jizyah* is a tax levied on such non-Muslim citizens of the Islamic state as, pursuant to an agreement, accept to live under the supremacy of the *sharī'ah*. Their religious observances, lives, and properties are guaranteed by the Islamic state and they pay this tax in consideration of that guarantee and as an acknowledgement of the suzerainty of the Islamic State. Further, they are exempted from fighting along with the Muslims. These citizens of the Islamic state are called *Ahl al-Dhimmah*. Their sole obligation consists

in living peacefully and remaining neutral in any conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims. For further details see Abū Yūsuf, *Kitāb al-Kharāj*, pp. 120-49; see also *supra*, n. 23.

209. Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, vol. 2, p. 54; Tirmidhī, *al-Jāmi'*, vol. 1, p. 300.

210. Qur'ān 9:46-7.

211. Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, vol. 2, p. 945; Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 6, pp. 68, 149.

212. Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 3, p. 1443.

213. Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 2, pp. 268, 329, 484, vol. 5, p. 209.

214. Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, vol. 2, p. 249.

215. *Supra*, n. 208.

216. Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 3, pp. 1364-65.

217. Ibid., pp. 1365-66.

218. Banū Naḍīr were one of the two main Jewish tribes in Madīnah. Ibid.

219. Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 2, p. 1102; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 3, p. 1361.

220. Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, vol. 2, p. 5.

221. The provision of these options is based on verse 47: 4 of the Qur'ān.

222. Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, vol. 2, pp. 10-11.

223. Qur'ān 9:6.

224. Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 2, p. 246.

225. Ibid., vol. 4, p. 189, vol. 5, pp. 40, 99.

226. Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, vol. 2, p. 15; Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 1, p. 22.

227. Disposal of wealth acquired from the spoils of war is regulated by the *Sharī'ah* in accordance with well-defined rules. For further details, see early juridical discussion of the subject in Abū Yūsuf, *Kitāb al-Kharāj*, pp. 18-23.

228. Wealth obtained from non-Muslim sources without war is designated as *fay'* and is dealt with, under a separate heading in Islamic legal literature. See ibid., pp. 23-27; see also al-Khaṭīb Muḥammad al-Sharbīnī, *Mughnī al-Muḥtāj* (Beirut: n.d.), vol. 2, p. 92.

229. Qur'ān 8:41.

230. Al-Sharbīnī, *Mughnī al-Muḥtāj*, p. 94.

231. *Supra*, n. 227.

232. Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, vol. 1, p. 342.

233. Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 3, pp. 1370-71.

234. Ibid., pp. 1433-1441; Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 4, p. 53.

235. Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, vol. 2, p. 181.

236. Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 2, pp. 2, 80.

237. Ibid.

238. See *supra*, n. 235.

239. Qur'ān 59:7-10.

240. Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, vol. 2, p. 57.

241. Ibid., p. 54; Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 6, pp. 25, 29.

242. Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, vol. 2, pp. 53-54.

243. Ibid., p. 69.

244. See Abū Yūsuf, *Kitāb al-Kharāj*, pp. 28-41, 57-67.

245. Ibid., pp. 71-75, 120-149.

246. Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 3, pp. 1366-67.

247. Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 5, pp. 248 and 256.

248. *Hisbah* has been a well-established institution in Islam which functioned under the *khalīfah* to check and maintain public morality. Its functionaries were permitted to resort to penal action where the circumstances of the case involving any serious contravention of the norms of public morality so warranted. The institution was separate and distinct from the executive and independent of the judiciary, and dealt with such matters as were normally outside the jurisdiction of governments as well as courts. See Māwardī, *al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah*, pp. 240-259. For a contemporary discussion on the significance and role of this institution in the classical era of the Islamic state, with particular reference to relevant historical precedents of early Islam: Mahmood Ahmad Ghazi, *Adab al-Qāḍī* (Islamabad: 1983), pp. 751-778.

249. Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 4, pp. 257, 378 and 379.

250. Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 3, p. 1388.

251. Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 1, p.184; vol. 2, p. 286 and 422.

Bibliography

Abdul Khaliq, M.A. Art. "Ethics: al-Ghazālī". Ed. M.M. Sharif. *Hisotry of Muslim Philosophy*. Karachi: 1983.

'Abd al-'Azīz, Shāh. *Malfūẓāt*. (Urdu translation). Karachi: 1960.

'Abd al-Ḥakīm, Jalāl al-Dīn. *Jām' al-Jawāmi'*, ms. no. 95. Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyyah, 1288 A.H.

Abdur Rashid. *Short Hisotry of Pakistan*. Ed. I. H. Qureshi. Karachi: 1967.

Abū Dāwūd, Sulaymān ibn al-Ash'ath al-Sajistānī. *Sunan*. Kānpūr: 1346 A.H.

Abū Yūsuf, Ya'qūb ibn Ibrāhīm. *Kitāb al-Āthār*. Beirut: 1355 A.H.

————————. *Kitāb al-Kharāj*. Cairo: 1382 A.H.

Abū Zahrah, Muḥammad. *Ta'rīkh al-Madhāhib al-Fiqhiyyah*. Cairo: n.d.

Adams, Richard. "An Enquiry into the Nature of the Family" in Gertrude R. Dole and Robert L. Gurneiro. Eds. *Essays in the Science of Culture*. New York: 1960.

Al-'Ajlūnī, Ismā'īl ibn Muḥammad. *Kashf al-Khafā' wa Muzīl al-Albās 'am mā Ishtahara min al-Aḥādith 'alā Alsinat al-Nās*. Cairo: 1351 A.H.

Al-Ālūsī, Maḥmūd Shukrī. *Bulūgh al-Arab fī Ma'rifat Aḥwāl al-'Arab*. Cairo: 1924.

Amīn, Aḥmad. Ed. *Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān li Ibn Sīnā wa Ibn Ṭufayl wa al- Suhrawardī*. Baghdad: 1958.

Baecker, Howard and Harry Barnes. *Social Thought from Lore to Science*. Washington, D.C.:1952.

Al-Baghawī, Abū Muḥammad Ḥusayn ibn Mas'ūd. *Ma'ā'lim al-Tanzīl*. Beirut: 1986.

Baljon, J.M.S. *Religion and Thought of Shāh Walī Allāh Dihlawī*. Leiden: 1986.

Baqā', Maẓhar. *Uṣūl al-Fiqh aur Shāh Walī Allāh*. Karachi: 1986.

Al-Bāqillānī, Abū Bakr. *Al-Tamhīd fī al-Radd 'alā al-Mulḥidah wa al-Mu'aṭṭilah*. Cairo: 1947.

Biesanz, Maris and John Hiltunin. *Introduction to Sociology*. New Jersey: 1978.

Bukhārī, Muhammad ibn Ismā'īl. *Al-Jami' al-Ṣaḥīḥ*. Damascus: 1987.

Al-Būṭī, Muḥammad Sa'īd Ramaḍān. *Fiqh al-Sīrah*. Damascus: 1980.

Chand, Tara. *History of Freedom Movement in India*. Calcutta: 1961.

Chittick, William C. *The Sufi Path of Knowledge*. Albany, N.Y: 1989.

Corbin, Henry. *Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn Arabī*. Tr. from French by Ralph Manheim. Princeton: 1969.

Darwazah, Muḥammad 'Izzat. *Ta'rīkh al-Jins al-'Arabī*. Beirut: 1961.

Darwin, Charles. *The Origin of Species*. London: 1859.

Al-Dārquṭnī, 'Ali ibn 'Umar ibn Mahdī. *Sunan*. Delhi: 1310 A.H.

Al-Duraynī, Fatḥī. *Al-Manāhij al-Uṣūliyyah fī al-Ijtihād bi al-Ra'y*. Damascus: 1976.

Al-Falāḥ, Muḥammad 'Abduh. *Ashraf al-Ḥawāshī*. Lahore: n.d.

Al-Fārābī, Abū Naṣr. *Arā' Ahl al-Madīnah al-Fāḍilah*. Beirut: 1959.

————. *Iḥṣā' al-'Ulūm*. Cairo: 1949.

————. *Al-Siyāsah al-Madaniyyah*. Hyderabad (India): 1346 A.H.

Farrūkh, 'Umar. *Ta'rīkh al-Jāhiliyyah*. Beirut: 1964.

Faruqi, Burhan Ahmad. *Mujaddid's Concept of Tauhid*. Lahore: 1974.

Al-Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad. *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn*. Cairo: 1957.

Ghāzī, Ḥāmid al-Anṣarī. *Islām kā Nizam-i Ḥukūmat*. 3rd edn. Lahore: n.d.

Ghazi, Mahmood Ahmad. *Adab al-Qāżī*. Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 1983.

————. *Islamic Renaissance in South Asia: The Role of Shāh Walī Allāh*. Currently under print at the Islamic Research Institute, Islamabad.

————. "State and Politics in the Philosophy of Shāh Walī Allāh" in Ferdinand Klaus and Mehdi Mozaffari. Eds. *Islam: State and Society*. London: 1988.

————. *The Hijrah: Its Philosophy and Message for the Modern Man*. Lahore: 1980.

Gouldner, Alvin W. *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology*. New York: 1970.

————. *Maqāṣid al-Falāsifah*. Cairo: 1331 A.H.

————. *Al-Mustaṣfā min 'Ilm al-Uṣūl*. Qum: 1364 A.H.

Mahmood, Fazle. *Study of the Life and Works on Shāh Walī Allāh*. Lahore: 1972.

Halepota, A.J. *The Philosophy of Shāh Walī Allāh*. Lahore: n.d.

Hamidullah, Muhammad. *The Muslim Conduct of State*. Lahore: 1973.

Hasan, Syed Zafarul. *Phisolophy: A Critique*. Lahrore: 1988.

Ḥilmī, Muṣṭafā. *Nizām al-Khilāfah fī al-Fikr al-Islāmī*. Alexandria: 1977.

The Holy Bible. (King James' Version). New York: 1967.

Husain, Mahmud. Ed. *History of the Freedom Movement*. Karachi: 1957.

Al-Ḥuwaysh, Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm. *Al-'Uqūbāt al-Shar'iyyah*. Riyadh: 1979.

Ibn Abī Shaybah, Abū Bakr 'Abd Allāh ibn Muḥammad. *Al-Muṣnnaf*, Karachi: 1986.

Ibn Ḥabīb, Abū Jā'far Muḥammad (al-Baghdādī). *Kitāb al-Muḥabbar*. Lahore: n.d.

Ibn Ḥanbal, Aḥmad. *Musnad*. Cairo: 1313 A.H.

Ibn al-Humām, Kamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad. *Al-Taḥrīr fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh*. Cairo: 1351 A.H.

Ibn Kathīr, Abū al-Fidā' Ismā'īl ibn 'Umar. *Al-Bidāyah wa al-Nihāyah*. Cairo: 1932.

———. *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-'Aẓīm*. Cairo: 1956.

Ibn Khaldūn, 'Abd al-Raḥmān. *Al-Muqaddimah*. Paris: 1958.

———. *Ta'rīkh*. Cairo: 1936.

Ibn Khallikān. *Wafayāt al-A'yān*. Cairo: 1858.

Ibn Mājah, Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Yazīd. *Sunan*. Cairo: 1952.

Ibn al-Mubārak, 'Abd Allāh. *Kitāb al-Jihād*. Ed. Nazīh Ḥammād. Beirut: 1987.

Ibn al-Muqaffā', 'Abd Allāh. *Kalīlah wa Dimnah*. Cairo: 1936.

Ibn Sa'd, Muḥammad. *Al-Ṭabaqāt*. Karachi: 1983.

Ibn Sīna. *Kitāb al-Najāt*. Cairo: 1913.

Ibn Taymiyyah, Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad. *Al-Siyāsah al-Shar'iyyah fī Iṣlāḥ al-Rā'ī wa al-Ra'iyyah*. Beirut: n.d.

Ba-Yunus, Ilyas. "Contemporary Sociology: An Islamic Critique" in *Islam: Sources and Purpose of Knowledge*. Islamization of Knowledge Series no. 5. Herndon: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1988.

Iqbal, Muhammad. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*. Ed. M. Saeed Sheikh. Lahore: 1986.

Irvine, W. *Later Mughals*. Calcutta: 1921-1922.

Al-Iṣbahānī, Abū al-Faraj. *Kitāb al-Aghāni*. Cairo: 1223 A.H.

Ismā'īl, Muḥammad. "Shaykh-i Akbar Muḥīy al-Dīn Ibn-i 'Arabī". *Al-Raḥīm*. Hyderabad: (Paksitan), vol. II, no. 3, August 1964.

Jalbani, G.N. *Life of Shāh Walī Allāh*. Delhi: 1981.

Al-Jaṣṣās, Abū Bakr Aḥmad ibn 'Alī. *Aḥkām al-Qur'ān*. Lahore: 1980.

Al-Jurjānī, 'Ali ibn Muḥammad al-Sharīf. *Kitāb al-Ta'rīfāt*. Beirut: 1969.

Kāndhlavī, Muḥammad 'Alī. *Ma'ālim al-Qur'ān*. Sialkot: 1978.

Al-Kāsānī, 'Alā' al-Dīn ibn Mas'ūd. *Badā'i' al-Ṣanā'i'*. Karachi: 1400 A.H.

Khan, Muhammad Qamaruddin. Art. "Al-Māwardī". Ed. M.M. Sharif. *History of Muslim Philosophy*. Karachi: 1983.

Al-Khaṣṣāf, Abū Bakr Aḥmad ibn 'Umar. *Sharḥ Adab al-Qāḍī*. Tr. Sa'īd Aḥmad. Islamabad: 1987.

Lambton, Ann K.S. *The State and Government in Medieval Islam*. New York: 1985.

Leslie, Gerald R. *The Family in the Social Context*. New York: 1967.

Levy, Donald. "Macrocosm and Microcosm". *The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*. New York: 1967.

Ludhiyānvī, Bashīr Aḥmad. *Irtifāqāt-i Ma'āshiyyah*. Lahore: 1969.

Madkour, Ibrahim. Art. "Al-Fārābī". Ed., M.M. Sharif, *History of Muslim Philosophy*. Karachi: 1983.

————. *La Place d'al-Fārābī dans l'ecole Philosophique Musulman*. Paris: 1934.

Mahdi, Muhsin. *Ibn Khaldūn's Philosophy of History*. Chicago: 1964.

Malik, Ḥasan 'Alī. *Ta'līmāt-i Mujaddidiyyah: Maktūbāt kī Roshnī mēṇ*. Sheikhupura: 1965.

Mālik ibn Anas. *Al-Muwaṭṭa'*. Beirut: 1951.

Al-Mas'ūdī, 'Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn. *Murūj al-Dhahab*. Cairo: 1948.

Masumi, M.S.H. Art. "Al-Fārābī". Ed. M.M. Sharif. *History of Muslim Philosophy*. Karachi: 1983.

Al-Māwardī, Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Yā'qūb. *Al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah wa al-Wilāyāt al-Dīniyyah*. Cairo: 1966.

Mawdudi, Sayyid Abul Ala. *Short History of the Revivalist Movements in Islam*. Lahore: 1963.

————. *Islāmī Riyāsat*. Lahore: 1988.

————. *Tajdīd va Iḥyā-'i Dīn*. Lahore: 1952.

————. "Manṣabi-i Tajdīd kī Ḥaqīqat aur Tārīkh-i Tajdīd mēṇ Ḥażrat Shāh Walī Allāh kā Maqām" in *al-Furqān* (Special Number on Shāh Walī Allāh). Ed. Muḥammad Manẓūr Nu'mānī. Bareily: 1941.

Muin ul-Haq. *The Great Revolution of 1857*. Lahore: 1979.

Mujāhid ibn Jabr. *Tafsīr Mujāhid*. Ed. 'Abd al-Raḥmān Sūrtī. Dawḥah, Qatar: 1976.

Muslim, Abū al-Ḥusayn ibn al-Ḥajjāj al-Qushayrī. *Ṣaḥīḥ*. Beirut: 1954.

Muztar, Allah Ditta. *Shāh Walī Allāh: Saint Scholar of Muslim India*. Islamabad: 1979.

Al-Nabhān, Muḥammad Fārūq. *Niẓām al-Ḥukm fī al-Islām*. Beirut: 1988.

Nadawī, Sayyid Abū al-Ḥasan. "Ḥaẓrat Shāh Walī Allāh ba Ḥaythiyat Muṣannif". *Al-Furqān*, (Special Number). Ed. Muḥammad Manẓūr Nu'mānī. Bareily: 1941.

————. *Tārīkh-i Da'wat va 'Azīmat*. Lucknow: 1984.

Nadvī, 'Abd al-Salām. *Ḥukamā'-i Islām*. Azamgarh: 1953.

Nadvī, Muḥammad Uvays. "Shāh Walī Allāh kā Ēk 'Ilmī Ma'khadh." *Al-Furqān*. (Special Number). Ed. Muḥammad Manẓūr Nu'mānī. Bareily: 1941.

The New Scofield Reference Bible. London: 1967.

Nicholson, R.A. *Studies in Islamic Mysticism*. Cambridge: 1980.

Niẓāmī, Khalīq Aḥmad. *Shāh Walī Allāh kē Siyāsī Maktūbāt*. Delhi: 1969.

Nu'mānī, Shiblī. *'Ilm al-Kalām*. Aligarh: 1906.

Pfeiffer, John E. *The Emergence of Man*. New York: n.d.

Plato's *Compendium Legum Platonis*. Ed. Franciscus Gabrieli. London: 1952.

Qādirī, Muḥammad Ayyūb. "Shāh Walī Allāh sē Mansūb Taṣānīf". *Al-Raḥīm*. Vol. 2, no. 1 June 1964 pp. 14-26.

Al-Qalqashandī, Aḥmad ibn 'Abd Allāh. *Ma'āthir al-Ināfah fī Ma'ālim al-Khilāfah*. Ed. 'Abd al-Sattār Faraj. Beirut: n.d.

Qāsimī, Ghulām Muṣṭafā. "Shāh Walī Allāh kī Ta'līfāt par Ēk Naẓar". *Al-Raḥīm*. Vol. IV, no. 1, June 1966.

Al-Qaysī, Nūrī Ḥamūdī. *Dirāsāt fī al-Shi'r al-Jāhilī*. Baghdad: 1972.

Al-Qurashī, Yaḥya Ibn Ādam. *Kitāb al-Kharāj*. Ed. Aḥmad Muhamamd Shākir. Cairo: 1384 A.H.

Al-Qurṭubī. *Al-Jāmi' li Aḥkām al-Qur'ān*. Cairo: 1936.

Qureshi, I.H. *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent*. The Hague: 1962.

————. *Ulema in Politics*. Karachi: 1974.

Raḥīm Bukhsh. *Ḥayāt-i Walī*. Lahore: 1955.

Riżvī, Sayyid Abū al-Naẓar Amrōhvī. "Shāh Walī Allāh aur Unkī ba'ż 'Ilmī Iṣṭilāḥāt". *Al-Furqān*.

Ross, W.D. *Plato's Theory of Ideas*. Oxford: 1953.

Ryle, Gilbert. Art. "Plato". *The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*. New York: 1967.

Al-Ṣan'ānī. 'Abd al-Razzāq Abū Bakr ibn Humām. *Al-Muṣannaf*. Beirut: 1972.

Sarkar, Jadunath. *The Fall of the Mughal Empire*. Calcutta: 1925-1930.

Sarvar, Muḥammad. *Armaghān-i Shāh Walī Allāh*. Lahore: 1988.

Schultz, David A. *The Changing Family: Its Function and Future*. New Jersey: 1976.

Shafī', Muftī Muḥammad. *Islām kā Niẓāmi-i Arāżī*. Karachi: 1383 A.H.

Al-Shāfi'ī, Muḥammad ibn Idrīs. *Kitāb al-Umm*. Cairo: 1324 A.H.

Shafqatullah. "Al-'Allamah 'Abd al-'Azīz al-Farhārwī wa Risālatuh 'an 'Ālam al-Mithāl" in: *Al-Dirasat al-Islamiyyah*, quarterly journal of the Islamic Research Institute, Islamabad. Oct-Dec, 2000.

Al-Sharbīnī, Muḥamamd al-Khaṭīb. *Mughnī al-Muḥtāj*. Beirut: n.d.

Al-Shaybānī, Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan. *Kitāb al-Ḥujjah 'alā Ahl al-Madīnah*. Lahore: 1981.

————. *Al-Jāmi' al-Ṣaghīr*. Karachi: n.d.

Al-Sha'rānī, 'Abd al-Wahhāb. *Al-Mizān al-Kubrā*. Cairo: 1279 A.H.

————. *Al-Yawāqīt wa al-Jawāhar fī Bayān 'Aqā'id al-Akābir*. Beirut: 1997.

Shāh Walī Allāh. *Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah*. Tr. into Urdu by 'Abd al-Raḥīm. Lahore: 1983.

————. *Al-Budūr al-Bāzighah*. Ed. M.S.H. Masumi. Hyderabad: 1970.

————. *Fatḥ al-Raḥmān fī Tarjamat al-Qur'ān*. Karachi: n.d.

————. *Al-Fawz al-Kabīr fī Uṣūl al-Tafsīr*. Arabic tr., Muḥammad Munīr al-Dimashqī. Karachi: 1960.

————. *Izālat al-Khafā' 'an Khilāfat al-Khulafā'*. Karachi: 1976.

———————. *Al-Khayr al-Kathīr*. Akora Khatak: 1959.

———————. *Maktūb-i Madanī*. Urdu translation by Muḥammad Ḥanīf Nadavī. Lahore: 1965.

———————. *Qurrat al-'Aynayn fī Tafḍīl al-Shaykhayn*. Lahore: 1976.

———————. *Sata'āt*. Tr. Muhamamd Matīn Hashimī. Lahore: 1990.

———————. *Al-Tafhīmāt al-Ilāhiyyah*. Bijnaur. U.P. (India): 1936.

Shahīd, Shāh Ismā'īl. *Al-'Abaqāt*. Tr. Manāẓir Aḥsan Gīlānī. Hyderabad, India: n.d.

Shaykh Aḥmad alias Mullā Jīwan al-Jaunpurī. *Al-Tafsīrāt al-Aḥmadiyyah fī Bayān al-Āyāt al-Shar'īyyah*. Bombay.

Sherwani, H.K. *Studies in Muslim Political Thought and Administration*. Lahore: 1970.

Ṣiddīqī, 'Abd al-Waḥīd. "Shāh Walī Allāh kī ba'ż 'Umrānī Iṣṭilāḥāt". *Al-Raḥīm*. June 1964.

Siddiqi, Bakhtyar Husain. Art. "Ibn Tufail". M.M. Sharif. Ed. *History of Muslim Philosophy*. Karachi: 1983.

Siddiqi, Abdul Hamid. Art. "Renaissance in Indo-Pakistan: Shāh Walī Allāh Dihlawī". Ed. M.M. Sharif. *Hisotry of Muslim Philosophy*. Karachi: 1983.

Simpson, George Gaylord. "The Biological Nature of Man". Ed. S.L. Washburn and Phyllis C. Jay. *Perspectives on Human Evolution*. New York: 1968.

Sindhī, 'Ubayd Allāh. *Shāh Walī Allāh aur Unkā Falsafah*. Lahore: 1964.

———————. *Sharḥ-i Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah*. Lahore: 1950.

———————. *Shāh Walī Allāh aur Unkī Siyāsi Taḥrīk*. Lahore: 1965.

Solmsen, Friedrich. *Plato's Theology*. New York: 1942.

Al-Suyūṭī, Jalāl al-Dīn. *Al-Itqān Fī 'Ulūm al-Qur'ān*. Lahore: 1980.

Al-Ṭabarī, Abū Ja'far Muḥammad ibn Jarīr. *Jāmi' al-Bayān 'an Ta'wīl Āy al-Qur'ān*. Ed. Maḥmūd Muḥammad Shākir. Cairo: 1374.

Al-Tirmidhī, Muḥammad Ibn 'Īsā. *Al-Jāmi'*. Karachi: 1984.

Umaruddin, M. *Ethical Philosophy of al-Ghazali*. Lahore: 1988.

Al-Wāqidī, Muḥammad ibn 'Umar. *Al-Maghāzī*. Cairo: 1966.

Watt, W.M. Art. "God's Caliph: Qur'ānic Interpretation and the Umayyad Claims". In. C.E. Bosworth. Ed. *Iran and Islam*. Edinburgh: 1971.

———————. *The Formative Period of Islamic Thought*. Edinburgh: 1973.

Weber, Max. *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Tr. from German, Talcott Parsons. New York: 1948.

Williams, Robin. *American Society: A Sociological Interpretation*. New York: 1970.

Al-Ya'qūbī, Aḥmad ibn 'Alī. *Ta'rīkh al-Ya'qūbī*. Najaf: 1358 A.H.

Zaydān, Jurjī. *Ta'rīkh Ādāb al-Lughah al-'Arabiyyah*. Beirut: 1983.

Al-Zayyāt, Aḥmad Ḥasan. *Ta'rīkh al-Adab al-'Arabī*. 23rd ed. Cairo: n.d.

Al-Zirikilī, Khayr al-Dīn. *Al-A'lām*. Beirut: 1980.

Index

'Abbās ibn 'Abd al-Muṭṭalib, 245, 316
'Abd al-'Azīz, Shāh, 283
Abdālī, Aḥmad Shāh, 128, 129
'Abd al-Jabbār, Qāḍī, 84
'Abd al-Raḥīm, Shāh, 5, 28
'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn 'Awf, 90
Abraham, 8
Abū Riḍā, Shaykh, 28
Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq, 84, 244, 247, 301
    appointment of, 95
Abū Bakr al-Aṣamm, 84
Abū Dāwūd, 310, 311, 313, 321
Abū Ḥanīfah, 304
Abū Yūsuf, 301, 304, 321
Abū Zahrah, 310
'adālah, 34
adhān, 256
adultery, 100
aesthetic urge, 45
aides
    number of, 170
    qualifications of, 168
'Ālam al-Arwāḥ, 18
'Ālam al-Mithāl, 18, 19
'Alī ibn Abī Ṭalib, 258
Aligarh, 4
Al-Ālūsī, Maḥmūd Shukrī, 313
Amīr al-Ghuzāt, 70
'Amr ibn al-'Āṣ, 315
'Amr ibn Luḥayy, 315
angelic disposition, 21, 24, 26, 209
animalistic disposition, 26, 45
Arabic, 4, 202
archetypal
    man, 44, 119, 120, 132
    model of society, 28
Aristotle, 20
'Arsh, 19
'Āshiq, Shāh Muḥammad, 127, 132
Al-'Āṣ ibn Wā'il, 315
atheists, 7, 232

Ba-Yunus, Ilyas, 292
Baecker, Howard, 292
Al-Baghawī, Muḥammad Ḥusayn ibn Mas'ūd, 310
Al-Baghdādī, Abū Ja'far, Muḥammad ibn Ḥabīb, 315
bahīmiyyah, 21, 26
Baljon, J.M.S., 113, 288, 291
Al-Bāqillānī, Abū Bakr, 84, 302
Barā' ibn 'Āzib, 258
Al-Bukhārī, Muḥammad ibn Ismā'īl, 112, 311
Buwayrah, 273

Caliphate, 124, 245
Children, 58, 60, 150, 154, 157, 173, 176, 197
city-states, 163, 182
    rulers of, 74, 77
civic
    policies, 169
    system, 146, 163, 175
civilised
    cities, 47
    conventions, 172
    human societies, 156
collective social behaviour, 48
commander of the soldiers, 170
common folk, 182
common good, 46, 47
ommunity, 4, 23, 24, 53, 60, 74, 79, 84, 150, 153, 157, 175, 179, 181–184, 187–189, 191, 193, 201, 204, 207, 208, 219, 222, 223, 226, 267
Comte, Auguste, 35, 36
conduct of rulers, 165
confederacy, 75
    raison d'etre of, 76

units of, 73
consensus of the Muslims, 243
contracts, 257
conventions, 52, 160, 162, 170, 178–180, 204, 217, 219, 244
cooperative
activities, 160
relationship, 157
Corbin, Henry, 287
corruption, 71, 162, 168, 173, 178, 204, 232, 248, 254
cosmic
man, 19
phenomena, 15
scheme, x
system, 266
cosmological framework, ix
cultural
development, 135, 136
progress, 41
culture
evolution of, 82
universal human, 55
customs, 55, 140, 179, 200, 204, 217, 219, 222, 232

Dār al-Islām, 269
Al-Dārquṭnī, 'Alī ibn 'Umar ibn Mahdī, 318
Darwin, Charles, 294
Dawwānī, Jalāl al-Dīn, 29, 30, 37
Day of Judgement, 175
Deoband, 4
development, socio-cultural, 74, 119, 227
distribution of heritage, 157
disunity, malady of, 5
Divine
commands, 23
cosmic phenomena, 135
dispensations, 178
injunctions, 139, 140
inspiration, 185
intervention, 27
law, 101
legislation, 196
proximity, 184, 188, 209, 266
recompense, 135, 136, 210
retribution, 178
scheme, 32, 33, 187, 206, 261
vicegerent, 20
wisdom, 187
divorce
procedure of, 157
doctrine of
irtifāqāt, vi
waḥdat al-wujūd, 14
doctrines, socio-political, 28

earning
chief means of, 159
sources of, 159
election
modes of, 89
equity, 249
Ethical framework, x
ethics
rules of, 64
ethos, vi
evidence, 251, 252, 255
evlution of social life, 43
evolution of society, 49
Existential phenomena, x

family, 162, 176, 196, 247, 252, 265, 275, 281
institution of, 56, 60, 61
Al-Fārābī, v, 36, 37
and Muslim thinkers, 38
his concept of prophethood, 40
Farangī Maḥal, 4
Faruqi, Burhan Ahmad, 287
Al-Fawz al-Kabīr, 6, 112
fiṭrah, 26

Ghanīmah, 274
Al-Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid, 7, 11, 285, 319
Ghazi, Mahmood Ahmad, 66, 283, 298–301, 308
Gīlanī, Manāẓir Aḥsan, 286
good ruler
characteristics of, 165
Gouldner, Alvin W., 292
governance, 97, 233
government, 163, 222, 248, 279
raison d'etre of, 48
agency of, 67
functionaries of, 248
institution of, 66
system of, 168
unitary systems of, 73

universal paradigm of, 67
Greek tradition, 17

ḥaḍānah, 251
hādī, 40
Ḥadīth
compendia of, 138
early compilers of, 139
Ḥadīth Sciences, 112, 138
ḥakīm, 24
Halepota, A.W.J., v, 290
Hamidullah, Muhammad, 306
Ḥanafī school, 31
ḥarām (prohibited), 27
Hārūn al-Rashīd, 304
Hāshimī, 245
Ḥaẓīrat al-Quds, 19, 188, 208
hellenized rationalism, 38
Hermansen, Marcia, 113
higher assembly, 186, 188, 205, 208, 209
ḥikmah or rational policy, 39
ḥikmat-i 'amalī, 29
history, 115
household
management of, 154, 157, 186
human
bliss, 137
nature, 162, 167, 176
personality, 119
social organisation, 33, 48
society, 77, 81, 82, 132, 138, 147
soul, 120
Husain, Mahmud, 283
hypocrites, 7

Ibn 'Arabī, Muḥyī al-Dīn, 5, 13, 31, 287
Ibn Khaldūn, 'Abd al-Raḥmān, 33, 44, 297–299, 302, 315, 319
Ibn Mājah, 316
Ibn Miskwayh, 37
Ibn Rushd, 286
Ibn Taymiyyah, v, 42, 286, 294, 303
Ibn Abī Shaybah, Abū Bakr 'Abd Allāh ibn Muḥammad, 317, 318
Ibn al-Muqaffa', 'Abd Allāh, 313
Ibn Ḥanbal, Aḥmad, 306, 313–315
Ibn al-Humām, Kamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad, 285
Ibn Kathīr, 313, 314
Ibn Sa'd, Muḥammad, 306
Ibn Sīnā, 33, 37, 40
Ibn Ṭufayl, 81, 301
iḥsān
principles of, 56
Ikhbāt, 21
illegal seizure, 251
'Ilm al-Kalām
evolution of, 9
'Ilm asrār al-dīn, 134
imām, 24, 40, 83
India, 3
inductive reason, 6
Al-insān al-akbar, 19
interpretation, vii, 9
intuitions, instinctive, 27
Iqbal, Muhammad, 4, 39, 284, 293
Iqtirābāt, 81, 120
Irtifāq, 150, 177, 179, 217, 238
basic principles of, 80
first stage of, 51, 147, 149, 150, 163
fourth stage of, 75
primary level of, 46, 176
second level of, 56, 154
second stage of, 53, 61, 147, 148, 151, 158
theory of, 51
third, 65
irtifāqāt, 178, 195, 217
principles of, 175, 176
theory of, 136
al-Iṣbahānī, Abū al-Faraj, 314
Islamic
ethic, 41
state, 77, 83, 97–99, 101, 102
weltanschauung, 39
Islamic state
functions of, 98
Ismā'īl ibn 'Abd Allāh Rūmī, 113
Ismā'īl, Shāh (Shahīd), 4, 286

Ja'far ibn Abī Ṭālib, 258
Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Abū Bakr Aḥmad ibn 'Alī, 317
jihād, 102, 104, 105, 241, 246, 260, 263, 265, 267, 269
conduct of war in, 106
institution of, 103
juridical aspect of, 105
rewarding value of, 263

theory of, 102
Jinnah, Muhammad Ali, 127
jizyah, 240, 274
judges, 247, 279
functions of, 92
judicature, 101, 219
judicial, 258
proceeding, 258
process, 251, 256
judiciary, 240
conduct of, 249
Jurisprudence
principles of , 111
Al-Jurjānī, 'Alī ibn Muḥammad al-Sharīf, 306
justice, 22, 249
dispensation of, 102
economic, 34
Al-Juwaynī, Imām al-Ḥaramayn, 84, 302

Al-Kāsānī, 'Alā' al-Dīn ibn Mas'ūd, 305
Khalīfah, 24, 40, 49, 73, 76, 77, 88, 91, 96, 99, 172, 174, 245, 246
appointment of, 91
duties of, 92
election of, 89
office of, 90, 91
qualifications of, 87
responsibilities of, 92
kharāj (land tax), 270
khilāfah, xi, 28, 42, 83, 84, 87, 129, 243, 245
'āmmah, 93
khāṣṣah, 93
agency of, 93
definition of, 49, 86
early model of, 86, 123
institution of, 85, 124
legal and constitutional framework of, 125
normative model of, 123
al-khilāfah al-'uẓmā, 73
khilāfat al-nubuwwah, 245
Khosraus, 262
kings, 48
knowledge
categories of, 138
knowledge, unity of, 38
Al-Kurdī, Shaykh Ibrāhim, 30
Kurdī, Shaykh Abū Ṭāhir, 30

labour
division of, 61
language, 51
essence of, 149
phenomenon of , 52
primary form of, 52
significance of, 52
law and jurisprudence, 9, 113
law of causality, 28
Levy, Donald, 289
Lieutenants of rulers, 68
literalist legalism, vi

Macro-sociological theory, vi
malaise
disunity, 5
lack of faith, 5
moral degeneration, 5
malakiyyah, 21, 26
Mālik ibn Anas, 31, 112
man
raison d'etre of, 20
basic morals of, 21
position of, 33
marriage, 59, 219
abandonment of, 157
institution of, 72, 155
termination of, 155
Marx, Karl, 36
Al-Mas'ūdī, 'Alī ibn Ḥusayn, 313
matrimonial
cooperation, 155
duties, 157
obligations, 60
Al-Māwardī, v, 37, 41, 42
Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abu'l A'lā, 283
maẓālim, 240
Metaphysics, 22
al-millah al-ḥanīfiyyah, 121
moral
being, 20
consciousness, 34
ideal, 20
Mu'ādh ibn Jabal, 310
al-Mu'allim al-Thānī, 38
mu'āyyad bi rūḥ al-quds, 24
mufham, 24
muḥaddithūn, 18
Mujāhid ibn Jabr al-Makkī , 311
mujtahid, 31

mundhir, 40
Muslim community, 85, 105
Muslim society, 141
    rise and fall of, 125
Muslim, Abū Ḥusayn ibn al-Ḥajjāj, 311
mustaḥabb (recommended), 27
Mutakallimūn, 11, 29
mutashābih, 7
Mu'tazilah, 84
mutual cooperation, 154, 158, 160
mutual inheritance, 157

Nadvī, 'Abd al-Salām, 293
Nadvī, Muḥammad Uways, 291
Nadvī, Abū al-Ḥasan 'Alī, 133, 307, 309
Nadwat al-'Ulamā', 4
Najīb al-Dawlah, 129
nationalism
    cult of, 75
    political philosophy, 75
natural law, 43
natural order, 33
Nicholson, R.A., 289
Nizami, Khaliq Ahmad, 127, 128, 293
Nu'mānī, Shiblī, 286
Nu'mānī, Muḥammad Manẓūr, 133, 284, 307, 309

ontology, 13
Origin of Species, 45
Orthopraxic tradition, vii
Ottoman, 3

paradise, 94, 180, 194, 247, 250, 261, 263
parents
    kindness to, 60
penal injunctions, 98, 99
People of the Book, 7, 273
philosophy, 38
    and metphysics, 117
    and scholastics, 113
    dialectics of, 134
    of existence, 14
    principles of, 191
    speculative, 132
Phulatī, Shaykh Muḥammad, 115
Plato, 288
political
    letters, 36
    order, 66
    organization, 67
    organization of the society, 28
politically organized society
    universal paradigm of, 137
politics, 111
polytheists, 7
post-Awrangzeb period, 128
principles of spiritual excellence, 152
profit and loss sharing, 160
Prophet
    biography of, 115
    infallibility of, 190
    investiture of, 187
    precedents set by, 271
prophethood
    concept of, 22
    institution of, 187
Prophetic dispensation, 27
Prophets
    distinctive features of, 190
public
    policy, 185, 241, 247
    weal, 247, 255
    welfare, 166
public policies, 68, 165, 243
punishments, specified, 100
Purposes, individual, 21

qadhf, 252
Qādirī, Muḥammad Ayyūb, 115
Qur'ān
    studies on, 112
Qur'ānic exegesis, 112
Quraysh, 261, 265
Quss ibn Sā'idah al-Ayādī, 314

al-ra'y al-juz'ī, 44
al-ra'y al-kullī, 43, 45
Al-Rāzī, Fakhr al-Dīn, v, 10, 11, 36, 286, 287
real existence, 15
reform, 25
reformation, 28
Religion, 10, 20, 28, 33, 35, 69, 87, 188, 193, 196, 198, 200, 201, 203, 208, 210, 214, 218, 221, 225–227
    cardinal principles of, 123
    essence of, 194

religious community, 186
religious philosophy, 132
repercussus permagnum, 16
Revealed Law, 34
Revealed religions, 260
revelation, 6, 7
  first addressees of , 93
Riesman, David, 36, 292
rulers, 48
  oppressive, 173
  qualities of, 67

sa'ādah, 40
ṣadaqāt
  collection of, 248
ṣaḥīḥ al-manqūl, 39
Sā'is al-Madīnah, 70
samāḥah, 22
al-Ṣan'ānī,'Abd al-Razzāq Abū Bakr ibn Humām, 317
sarīḥ al-ma'qūl, 39
Sarvar, Muḥammad, 290
Sayyid Aḥmad (Shahīd), 4
science, 151, 158, 172, 196, 230
sciences
  five basic, 63
Second Teacher, 38
secretary*(Wakīl)*, 71
sense perception, 146, 183
al-Shāfi'ī, Muḥammad ibn Idrīs, 317
al-shakhṣ al-akbar, 16, 18, 19
Al-Sha'rānī, 'Abd al-Wahhāb, 305
Sharif, M. M., 293
Al-Shaybānī, Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan, 310, 317
Siddiqi, Abdul Hamid, 284
Siddiqi, Bakhtiar Husain, 301
Sindhī, Maulānā 'Ubayd Allāh, 8, 32, 284
Sirhindī, Shaykh Aḥmad, v, 5, 14, 114, 127, 287
social
  animal, 20
  customs, 48
  environment, 48
  evolution, 51, 79
  group, 55
  life, 132, 133
  organization, 25, 33, 34
  phenomena, 33
  philosophers, 36
  philosophy, 41
  practices, 48
  progress, 53
social development, 33, 146, 147, 149
  beneficial stages of, 45
  first level of, 147
  first stage , 53
  fourth stage, 72
  highest stage, 72
  methods of, 53
  second stage, 47, 54, 56, 61–63, 148
  stages of, 43, 48, 51
  stages of , 52
  third stage, 49, 67, 148
society, 100, 161, 162, 165, 169
  categories of, 41
  disorder in, 162
  evolution of, 69
  Islamic character of, 78
  kinds of, 53
  solidarity of, 159
  strata of, 64
  welfare of, 68, 159
socio-political organization, 22
  Islamic paradigm of, 79
  universal model of, 80
  universal stage of, 136
socio-political thought, ix, 36
sociology
  and religion, 35
  modern science of, 52
Spencer, Herbert, 35
spiritual ideal, 20
spiritual sciences, 114
spoils of war, 269, 270
state, 84, 207, 213, 221, 230, 233
  raison d'etre, 84
  functionaries of, 248
  functions of, 97, 100
  Islamic version of, 80
  universal model of, 84
  universal paradigm of, 98, 119
  welfare of, 196
Supreme Divine Law, 34
supreme spirit *(al-rūḥ al-a'ẓam)*, 19
Al-Suyūṭī, Jalāl al-Dīn, 19, 285, 310

ṭahārah, 21

al-tajallī al-aʿẓam, 16, 19
taklīf, 22, 26
taqdīrāt, 26
tawḥīd, 39
tax-collection
  system of , 164
tax-collector *('amil)*, 70
taxes
  collection of, 166, 172
teachers, 92
terminology, 117
Thānwī, Maulānā Ashraf 'Alī, 127
theocentric view, 34
traditions, 93
transcendental moral law, 34

ultimate being, 17
ultimate reality, 11, 13
'Umar, 90
  nomination of , 95
'Umar's school of *fiqh*, 31
Umm Salīm, 272
unity of knowledge, 39
universal good, 45
universal norms of civics and statecraft, 186
universal purposes, 75, 179, 180, 185
universal religion, 121
universal soul, 14–16, 19
universal vicegerency, 267
universal weal, 180
universality of purpose, 20, 43, 54, 81, 145, 147, 151
universal *sharīʿah*, 27
universum permagnum, 16, 18
'Uthmān, 90

verdict of the Prophet, 256, 257
virtuous
  communities, 148
  practices, 48
  realms, 47
vocational skills, 182

waḥdat al-shuhūd, 9
waḥdat al-wujūd, 9
wājib(obligatory), 27
Walī Allāh, Shāh
  academic traditions, 37
  and early thinkers, 36
  macro-sociology, 36
Al-Wāqidī, Muḥammad ibn 'Umar, 306
Watt, W.M., 83
Weber, Max, 35, 292
weltanschauung of Islam, 75
witnesses, 252, 253
world-view, 28

zarāfah, 45
Zayd ibn 'Amr ibn Nafīl, 314
Zaydān, Jurjī, 314
Al-Zayyāt, Aḥmad Ḥasan, 314
Al-Ziriklī, Khayr al-Dīn, 315